yet, by virtue of the constitutional provision that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." the pardoning power cannot operate to refund any fine or forfeiture which has actually passed into the treasury, by a covering warrant or otherwise. Where the forfeiture is consummated so far as the guilty party is concerned, and its money value has passed into the hands of an officer of the government, it may be refunded by an executive warrant in execution of a pardon, provided it is a forfeiture accruing to the United States, and the payment was not in such form as to constitute a complete severance from intermediate official custody, and an absolute entry into the treasury of the United States. Effect of Pardous,* 8 Op. Att'y Gen'l, 281.

$3324. Bar to a civil suit.- An unconditional pardon for an offense against the revenue laws is a bar to a civil suit by the government to recover, as a penalty, twice the amount of the tax out of which the government was defrauded by the criminal act. United States v. McKee, 4 Dill., 130.

§ 8325. Where a person is convicted of knowingly purchasing smuggled goods, and is pardoned by the president, such pardon is a bar to an action of debt brought to recover twice the value of the property smuggled. United States v. Tilton,* 7 Ben., 306.

§3326. Where the defendant has been pardoned after indictment, trial and sentence, for an offense under section 3169, Revised Statutes, the offense is fully purged and he stands as if it had not been committed, and consequently is not liable to an action on his official bond for the offense pardoned. United States v. Cullerton, 8 Biss., 170.

§ 3327. A full pardon, or a conditional one, after the performance of the condition, releases its recipient from all the penalties, whether civil or criminal, attached to the offense. He is purged of the offense and stands as if it had never been committed. Ibid.

§ 3328. Restoration of civil rights. It is competent for the president to restore civil rights by a pardon issued after the expiration of the term of sentence. Stetler's Case,* 1 Phil., 302.

§ 3329. A person convicted of an offense against the laws of the United States, which disfranchises him as a citizen, can be restored to all the rights which he had before conviction, by a free and full pardon from the president of the United States. Such a pardon may be given after he has suffered the other penalties incident to his conviction, as well as before. Effect of Pardon,* 9 Op. Att'y Gen'l, 478.

§ 3330. A pardon restores to his competency as a witness one who has been convicted of an infamous crime. United States v. Rutherford, 2 Cr. C. C., 528.

§ 3331. Where the pardon speaks of a conviction, at the "June term," of the offense of "counterfeiting the silver coin," and a sentence thereon of "imprisonment; " and the record shows a conviction at the "May sessions," of two felonies, one "forging and counterfeiting ten pieces" of coin, the other "uttering and passing them," on which there is a sentence of "fine," as well as imprisonment, the pardon will not restore the competency of the convict as a witness. Stetler's Case,* 1 Phil., 302.

§ 3332. Where a state statute provides that no person "convicted of an infamous crime" shall vote at any election "unless he shall have been pardoned and restored to all the rights of a citizen," if the pardon by the president of one convicted in such state of an infamous crime under an act of congress does not restore the offender to his political rights in such state, it is not within the power of the president to remove such disability. Pardons,* 7 Op. Att'y Gen'l, 760.

§ 3333. Vested rights to fines.- Where one was convicted and fined for having in his possession merchandise subject to duty for the purpose of selling the same with the design of avoiding the payment of the duties imposed thereon, and one-half of the fine was adjudged to be for the use of the informer and the other half to the United States, it was held that a pardon and a remission of the fine by the president was inoperative to divest the share vested in the informer by the judgment. United States v. Harris, 1 Abb., 110.

§ 3334. It seems that the pardoning power of the president has never been construed to extend to the taking away of the right of an informer, asserted by him in his own name alone, to recover a penalty imposed for a violation of the laws of the United States, where the penalty belongs wholly to the informer, and the United States has no interest therein. The Laura, 19 Blatch., 570.

§ 3335. It seems that the right of a private person to a share of a penalty by reason of his being an informer, or having instituted a prosecution under a penal law, is released by a pardon unless actually vested by a judgment. United States v. Cullerton, 8 Biss, 172.

§ 3336. In an action of debt by the United States to recover a penalty incurred under the internal revenue law of June 30, 1864. judgment was reudered against the defendants, and onehalf of the penalty was adjudged to the use of the first informer in accordance with the above A subsequent pardon of the offense and remission of the penalties by the president was

act.

held to remit the moiety adjudged to the informer, as well as the moiety belonging to the United States. United States v. Thomasson, 4 Biss., 336.

§ 3337. The pardoning power of the president does not extend to the remission or release of a private right or interest in a fine, penalty or forfeiture, accrued under the laws of the United States, and consummated by judgment or condemnation. And hence, in case of a judgment in the District of Columbia, in the name of the United States, against an offender against the laws of Maryland (adopted and continued by act of congress as the law of that part of the District of Columbia), prohibiting the unlawful transportation of slaves, where by the law constituting and defining the offense, and by the judgment of the court, one-half of the fin› belongs to the respective owners of the slaves unlawfully transported; and by law the other half of the fine belongs to the board of commissioners of the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia, for the use of the county, the president has no power to remit the fine, or the imprisonment of the offender, committed to compel payment of the fine. Pardoning Power,* 5 Op. Att'y Gen'l, 532. The same incumbent a short time afterwards gave it as his opinion that the president could remit both the fine and the imprisonment. Pardoning Power,* 5 Op. Att'y Gen'l, 579.

$3338. Where a vessel had been seized for a violation of the embargo laws, and restored at its appraised value upon bond given with condition to respond for said value in the event of condemnation, it was held that a pardon of the president, issued after the condemnation, remitting all the interest of the United States in the penalty or forfeiture of such bond, and requiring all further proceedings in the case on behalf of the United States to be discontinued, did not affect the moiety of the penalty claimed by the officers of the customs. United States v. Lancaster, 4 Wash., 64.

§3339. Participation in rebellion.- Under the act of congress of August 6, 1861, which enacted that property used in aid of the rebellion with the consent of the owner should be the lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found, and made it the duty of the president to cause it to be seized, confiscated and condemned, the forfeiture arose not from the mode in which the property was used independent of the act of the owner, but from the consent of the owner to the employment of his property in aid of the rebellion, as an offense. And hence a full pardon and amnesty for all offenses, committed by the owner, arising from participation, direct or indirect, in the rebellion, will release the owner from the forfeiture of his property. (MILLER, J., dissents.) Armstrong's Foundry, 6 Wall., 766. See § 3239.

§ 3340. A full pardon and amnesty granted by the president to one formerly in rebellion, and accepted before the institution of any proceedings to condemn property confiscated by act of congress, is a bar to a judgment of condemnation. United States v. Athens Armory, 2 Abb., 147.

§ 3341. A petitioner for the recovery of the proceeds of his property under the abandoned or captured property act, who frames his petition without alleging and swearing that he has not in any way aided, abetted or given encouragement to the rebellion, cannot maintain his action, although he has received pardon and amnesty from the president by virtue of the thirteenth section of the act of July 17, 1862, and under his proclamation of amnesty of May 29, 1865. (CASEY, C. J., dissents.) Pargoud v. United States,* 4 Ct. Cl., 337.

§ 3342. The form of pardon granted by the executive to persons engaged in the late rebellion does not restore them, by its own operation, to any property, or proceeds of any property, sold under a judgment of confiscation. President's Pardon,* 12 Op. Att'y

Gen'l, 81.

§3343. A pardon which recites that "by taking part in the late rebellion" he "has made himself liable to heavy pains and penalties" is of no force as an admission of crime, as it is vague, uncertain, and dependent upon abstruse legal conclusions. Scott v. United States,* 8 Ct. Cl., 457.

§ 3344. Where the name, place of residence and occupation of the claimant of rights, se cured by an amnesty, are all identical with the name, place of residence and business of the person mentioned and described in the oath of amnesty, he will be held to be the person who took the oath, and entitled to all the benefits conferred by it. Backer v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 551.

§ 3345. Validity of act of July 12, 1870.- The proviso in the act of July 12, 1870, which declares in substance that the acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer, shall be conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but shall be null and void as evidence of the rights conferred by it, is void, as an invasion of the powers of the judicial and executive departments. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128. Said article is unconstitutional, because it denies to pardons granted by the president the effect which the supreme court has adjudged them to have. Backer v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 551; Witkowski v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 393.

§ 3346. Proclamation of 1863.—The amnesty proclamation of December 8. 1833, was abrogated by that of May 29, 1865. Scott v. United States.* 8 Ct. Cl., 457.

§3347. The proclamation of the president, of the 8th of December, 1863. offering a full pardon, with restoration of all rights of property except as to slaves, to all who, having engaged in the rebellion as actual participants, or as aiders or abettors, would take and keep inviolate a prescribed oath, entitled persons who accepted this condition to the proceeds in the treasury of their property, abandoned to the agent of the treasury department. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128.

§ 3348. A citizen of a loyal state charged with treason against the United States, by giving aid and comfort to the rebellion, is included within the amnesty proclamation of December 8. 1863. United States v. Hughes,* 1 Bond, 574.

§ 3349. Where a citizen, by complying with the terms of mercy proposed in the proclamation of amnesty of December 8, 1863, has entitled himself to its benefits, no subsequent act of the president, or of any other department of the government, can deprive him of the rights so acquired. The amended or explanatory proclamation of March 26, 1864, could not therefore exclude a citizen from right already acquired by compliance with the former proclamation. Ibid.

§ 3350. Amnesty of 1864.- All citizens and residents of the rebel states, not excepted from the amnesty of March 26, 1864, who did, after the issuing of the proclamation, or after notice thereof, or within a reasonable time, within which it must be supposed that they had notice, refrain from further hostilities and take the oath of amnesty voluntarily, with the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority -- being at the time free from arrest, confinement or duress, and not under bonds,- were entitled to all the benefits and rights granted. Where the oath was taken without the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority, though taken promptly, the amnesty and pardon did not attach. Pardoning Power,* 11 Op. Att'y Gen'l, 227.

§ 3351. Amnesty of 1865.- The proclamation of May 29, 1865, requires persons seeking to avail themselves of the amnesty offered by it, to take an oath to "support, protect and defend the constitution," and to "abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the late rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves." It is held that an oath which substitutes the word "existing" for "late," and omits the word "protect," is sufficient. Hamilton v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 444.

§ 3352. Proclamation of 1867.-The president's proclamation of September 7, 1867, did not work a dismissal of proceedings against the property of persons implicated in the rebellion. Semmes v. United States, 1 Otto, 25.

§ 3353. Amnesty of 1868.- The proclamation of general amnesty by the president of the United States, made on December 25, 1868, granting, unconditionally and without reservation, to all who had participated in the rebellion, full pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States, put an end to the prosecution of Jefferson Davis for treason, then pending in the supreme court on a certificate of division of opinion. United States v. Davis, 1 Chase's Dec., 1.

§ 3354. It relieved claimants of the proceeds of property under the abandoned or captured property act from the consequences of their participation in the rebellion, and from the necessity of establishing their loyalty to the Union. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall., 147.

§ 3355. It relieves claimants of abandoned and captured property from proof of adhesion to the United States during the late civil war. Pargoud v. United States, 13 Wall., 156; Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall., 154.

§ 3356. It will not have the effect to restore to a person who did not participate in the rebellion property belonging to him which was forfeited to the government under the laws forbidding the transportation of goods into the rebel lines. Gay's Gold, 13 Wall., 358.

§ 3357. It does not entitle a person included within its terms to the proceeds of his property previously condemned and sold under the confiscation act of 1862, after such proceeds have been paid into the treasury. Knote v. United States, 5 Otto, 152.

§ 3358. It relieves a citizen coming within its terms from making proof of loyalty in order to recover his property under the abandoned or captured property act. Witkowski v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 393.

§ 3359. It restored all persons who had participated in the rebellion to their rights of property, and enabled them to sue in the court of claims under the abandoned or captured property act. Waring v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 501.

§ 3360. It applies to persons, and not to the general obliteration of treasonable offenses. It does not extend to one who died previously. Scott v. United States,* 8 Ct. Cl., 457. It included aliens resident within the United States who had participated with the Confederates in their treasonable purposes. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall., 147.

§ 3361. The abandoned or captured property act, having required the claimant to prove

that he had never given any aid or comfort to the rebellion, the administratrix of a disloyal owner of captured property who died before the proclamation of December 25, 1868, without taking the oath of amnesty or accepting the special pardon offered him by the president, cannot avail herself of that act. Meldrim v. United States,* 7 Ct. Cl., 595.

3362. The proclamation of amnesty and pardon issued by the president on July 4, 1868, did not restore to the owner property which was condemned, and the title divested out of the owner and vested in the United States, by a decree of court, before the date of the proclamation. The proclamation expressly excepts from its effects "any property of which any person may have been legally divested under the laws of the United States." Bragg v. Lorio, 1 Woods, 203.

§ 3363. Cherokee Indian — Treaty of 1846.— The second article of the treaty of Washington of August 6, 1846, declares that "all offenses and crimes committed by a citizen or citizens of the Cherokee nation against the nation, or against an individual or individuals, are hereby pardoned." It is held under this treaty that a Cherokee Indian is pardoned of the offense of killing a white man, who incorporated himself with that tribe as one of them, married one of their women, and was treated and recognized by the authorities of the tribe as one of their number, and entitled to all the rights and privileges of a Cherokee Indian. United States v. Ragsdale, Hemp., 497.

XXXV. EXTRADITION.
1. Foreign.

SUMMARY — Right depends upon treaty stipulations, § 3364; courts have no power to hold in custody, § 3365.- Power of a commissioner in absence of a mandate, § 3366.- Treaty with Switzerland; crimes subject to infamous punishment, § 3367.- Warrant of arrest; may be served in any state, § 3358.— Complaint need not allege issue of mandate, § 3369.- Description of offense in complaint, $$ 3370, 3371, 3373.- Variance between complaint and mandate, § 3372.— By whom complaint to be made, § 3373.— The complaint should charge the substance of the offense, 3374.— Complaint setting forth several offenses, § 3375.— Offense of forgery not sufficiently described, § 3376.— Requisites of warrant of arrest, § 3377.-Issue of warrant abroad not a necessary preliminary step, § 3378.- Showing of warrant as to appointment of commissioner, § 3379; must show authority of commissioner, § 3380.- Description of offense in the mandate, § 3381.— Judiciary cannot act without a previous requisition, § 3382.— Judge not to inquire as to authority from foreign government, 3383.- Arrest not authorized until demand made, § 3384.- Evidence in a case of forgery, 3395.- What papers admissible in evidence under act of 1860, § 3386.- Authentication of papers, §§ 3387, 3393, 3394. — Several documents may be certified as one paper, 3388.-Procedure, by what law governed; right of prisoner to testify, § 3389.-Sufficiency of evidence, §§ 3390, 3391.— Right of fugitive to be confronted by witnesses; admissibility of depositions, § 3392.— Documents offered in evidence must be such as would be received in the fugitive's own country, § 3395. — Copies of original information and warrant in eridence, § 3396.— Depositions may be authenticated by parol, § 3397.— Depositions; act not repealed, § 3398.— Certificate as to admissibility of depositions, § 3399. — Adjournments, § 3400, 3401.- Review of proceedings before commissioner, §§ 3402-3406.- Power of the executive department, §§ 3407–3409.- - Right of accused to examine foreign consul, § 3410.Prosecution for other offenses, SS 3111-3413.-— British extradition act of 1870, no force in this country, § 3414.

-

§ 3364. A nation, whose citizen or subject commits a crime within its own jurisdiction, and is afterwards found within that of another, has no right, by the law of nations, upon its demand, to have him delivered up by that of the other, for the purpose of being tried where the crime was committed. The United States are, therefore, under no obligation to deliver up a fugitive criminal, in the absence of treaty stipulation. Case of Jose Ferreira dos Santos, SS 3115-16.

$3365. If the United States were bound to deliver up a fugitive criminal at the demand of a foreign government, by the law of nations and in the absence of treaty stipulations, the courts of the United States would have no authority to detain him in custody until the government from which he fled should make a demand on the government of the United States for his surrender.

Ibid.

§ 3366. Whether a commissioner has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the apprehension of an alleged fugitive, under our treaty stipulations with Great Britain on that subject, until authority for that purpose has been granted by the executive department of the United States, quære. In re Macdonnell, §§ 3417–24.

§ 3367. The convention for extradition between the United States and Switzerland says that persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the convention, who shall be charged with the crimes therein specified, "when these crimes are subject to infamous punishment." It is held that this provision requires only that the crime shall be subject to infamous punishment in the country where it was committed, and not that it should be subject to infamous punishment in the country from which extradition is sought. In re Farez, $$ 3425-37.

§ 3368. The implied restrictions of the twenty-seventh section of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, relative to the service of process by marshals, without their own districts, has no application to warrants for the arrest of fugitives from foreign countries. Nor has the thirty-third section of the same act, authorizing and regulating the removal of persous arrested in one district, to be held for trial in another, any application to proceedings in international extradition. A warrant issued by a judge of the circuit court in the southern district of New York, addressed to the marshals of the United States for any district respectively, and to their deputies, or the deputies of any of them, or to any of the said deputies, for the arrest of an alleged fugitive from the justice of a foreign country, and to bring him before the said judge or before a commissioner, authorizes the arrest of the fugitive in Wisconsin, by a special deputy of the marshal of the southern district of New York. In re Hen. rich, SS 3447-53.

§ 3369. The complaint upon which the warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive is issued by the commissioner need not state that a mandate has been issued to the commissioner by the executive department, in pursuance of a requisition from the foreign government. In re Macdonnell, § 3417-24.

§ 3370. The complaint upon which the warrant of arrest is issued in a proceeding for extradition need not, in order to confer jurisdiction to proceed thereon, describe the offense with the technical precision required in an indictment for the offense. It is sufficient for the jurisdiction of the commissioner that the complaint makes a prima facie case. Ibid.

§ 3371. It is no ground of objection that the complaint in a proceeding for extradition is more specific than the mandate in describing the offense. Ibid.

8372. It is no material variance between the mandate, in a proceeding for the extradition of a fugitive, and the complaint and the warrant, that, in the former, the alleged offender is called George Macdonell," and in the latter, "George Macdonell, otherwise Macdonnell," where the warrant recites the requisition and mandate and shows that the warrant is issued in pursuance thereof and directs the arrest of the offender named therein. Ibid.

3373. In carrying out the provisions of extradition treaties, the complaint must, in many cases, be made by the representative of the foreign government; and all that can be required is that it shall be sufficiently specific, clear and distinct in its averments, to enable the party accused to understand precisely what it is he is charged with. In re Farez, §§ 3425–37.

§ 3374. It is not sufficient, in a complaint for a warrant of arrest for an alleged fugitive from justice, to charge the crime named in the convention generally. It should set forth clearly and briefly the substance of the offense charged. In re Farez, S$ 3138-42.

§ 3375. It is no objection to the proceedings for the extradition of a fugitive that the complaint upon which the warrant of arrest is issued contains charges of a large number of offenses, the offenses being distinctly alleged in the complaint, and being set forth with all the particularity necessary in such proceedings. In re Henrich, $ 3447-53.

3376. In proceedings for the extradition of an alleged fugitive from justice, the complaint, in order to justify an arrest, must charge the offense in such a way that the warrant might properly issue had the crime been committed here. So a complaint charging that in Belgium the accused" wilfully and knowingly and maliciously uttered and put in circulation forged papers, or counterfeit papers, or counterfeit obligations, or other titles or instruments of credits," without specifying the kind, character or nature thereof, was held insufficient, for the reason that it did not inform the accused of the nature of the crime so as to enable him to meet and prepare for the investigation. Ex parte Van Hoven, §§ 3154-56.

3377. A warrant for the arrest of an alleged fugitive from justice, which shows on its face that the jurisdiction has been regularly and formally invoked, for the arrest of the alleged fugitive; and declares in terms the special authority on which the proceeding is based, to wit, the treaty with Great Britain, the act of congress, and the appointment of the officer to execute the law; and declares the demand of the foreign government, the mandate of our own, and describes the offense in the language of the treaty, is sufficient. It is not necessary that the particulars required to be proved, in order to establish the offense mentioned in the treaty, should be specified in the warrant; nor is it the province of the warrant to disclose the details, to notify the prisoner of those details. In re Macdonnell, § 3117-24.

§ 3378. It is not a necessary preliminary step to an investigation, under an extradition treaty, that a warrant shall have been issued abroad. Therefore where the complaint recites