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VOLUMES AND CASES TO BE INCLUDED.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS.

Black, 2; Cranch, 9; Dallas, 3; Howard, 24; Otto, 16; Peters, 16; Wallace, 23;
Wheaton, 12,

CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT REPORTS.

Abbott's Admiralty, 1; Abbott's U. S., 2; Baldwin, 1; Bee, 1; Benedict, 10; Bissell, 9; Blatchford, 19; Blatchford's Prize Cases, 1; Blatchford & Howland, 1; Bond, 2; Brown, 1; Chase, 1; Clifford, 4; Crabbe, 1; Cranch, C. C., 5; Curtis, 2; Daveis, 1; Deady, 1; Dillon, 5; Flippin, 2; Fisher's Prize Cases, 1; Gallison, 2; Gilpin, 1; Hempstead, 1; Hoffman, 1; Holmes, 1; Hughes, 4; Lowell, 2; McAllister, 1; McCahon, 1; McCrary, 3; McLean, 6; Marshall, 2; Mason, 5; Newberry, 1; Olcott, 1; Paine, 2; Peters' C. C., 1; Peters' Admiralty, 2; Sawyer, 7. Sprague, 2; Story, 3; Sumner, 3; Taney, 1; Wallace, C. C., 1; Wallace, Jr. 3; Ware, 2; Washington, 4; Woods, 3; Woodbury & Minot, 3; Woolworth, 1; Van Ness, 1, OPINIONS OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL AND COURT OF CLAIMS,

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PARTIAL LIST OF FEDERAL CASES TAKEN FROM OTHER SOURCES.

Smith (N. H.); 3 and 4 Day (Conn.); 16, 32 and 34 Conn. ; 2 Brown (Pa.); 6 Call (Va.); 2 Martin (N. C.); 25 Tex. Sup. ; Cooke (Tenn.); Overton (Tenn.); Vt. Reps., 20-25, and 29; 35 Georgia; American Law Register, 30 Vols.; Brewster (Pa.), 3 and 4; Legal Gazette Reports (Pa.), 1; 2 Haywood (N. C.); Pittsburgh Reports, the Pittsburgh Legal Journal, 3 Vols. ; The Philadelphia Reports, 12 Vols.— a reprint of the Legal Intelligencer,

THE WHOLE, IN ORIGINAL VOLUMES, MAKE A TOTAL OF

Vols.

105

142

33 12

20

312

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FEDERAL DECISIONS.

CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

[Evidence in Criminal Cases, see EVIDENCE. Limitation Laws, see LIMITATIONS. As to Powers of Congress over Elections, see CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, II, 2; ELECTIONS. Constitutionality of Removal Laws, see CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, VI; VII; XI, 3. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder, see CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IV. Powers of the Federal Government, see CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, II, 6. As to Appeal, see APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR, IV, 5; XXVIII Offenses under the Bankrupt Laws, see DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. Contempt, see COURTS.]

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V. UNDER ELECTION LAWS, §§ 327-372. VI. OFFENSES ON THE HIGH SEAS, SS 373-591.

1. In General, §§ 373–510.

2. Piracy, §§ 511-591.

VII. HOMICIDE, §§ 592–715.

VIII. VIOLATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS, SS 716-790.

IX. LARCENY, §§ 791-830.

X. OFFENSES BY OFFICERS, §§ 831-850. XI. POLYGAMY, SS 851-870.

XII. THE POSTOFFICE, SS 871-1021.

1. In General, $$ 871-955.

2. Non-mailable Matter, §§ 9561021.

XIII. UNDER PENSION LAWS, SS 1022

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XXIII. TWICE IN JEOPARDY, §§ 1759-1809.
XXIV. GRAND JURY, SS 1810-1911.
XXV. JURY, §§ 1912-2044.
XXVI. INDICTMENT, SS 2015-2667.

1. In General, §§ 2045-2209.
2. Joinder, §§ 2210-2252.
3. Conspiracy, §§ 2253-2313.
4. Counterfeiting and Forgery,
S$ 2314-2372.

5. Violation of Internal Revenue
Laws, § 2373-2436.

6. Violation of the Postoffice Laws, SS 2437-2506.

7. Perjury, §§ 2507-2532.

8. Miscellaneous Offenses, § 25332667.

XXVII. MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS OF PRACTICE, SS 2668-2941.

XXVIII. NEW TRIAL AND ARREST OF JudgMENT, SS 2942-2992.

XXIX. FELONIES AND INFAMOUS CRIMES, S$ 2993-3027.

XXX. PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY, $$ 30283055.

XXXI. PUNISHMENT, §§ 3056-3102. XXXII. INSANITY, §§ 3103-3167.

XVI. RESISTING AN OFFICER, SS 1118-1168. XXXIII. REMOVAL OF CAUSES, §§ 3168-3230.

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SUMMARY — Criminal intent, § 1.— Act not an offense at the time it is committed, § 2.— Offenses against the United States, § 3.- Marital coercion, §§ 4, 5.- Married woman indicted as a single woman; plea in abatement, § 5.

§1. The criminal intent necessary to the commission of a public offense must exist when the act complained of is done; it cannot be imputed to a party by a subsequent independent transaction. United States v. Fox, §§ 6-8.

VOL. XII-2

See § 67.
17

§ 2. So, though a person obtains goods under false pretenses within a certain time before bankruptcy, he cannot be punished therefor as for an act in fraud of the bankrupt law. Ibid. §3. An act committed within a state, whether for a good or a bad purpose, or whether with an honest or a criminal intent, cannot be made an offense against the United States, unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act not having any such relation is one in respect to which states alone can legislate. So, though a person obtains goods under false pretenses within a certain time before bankruptcy, he cannot be punished therefor as for an act in fraud of the bankrupt law. Ibid.

§ 4. It is doubted by the court whether the defense of marital coercion as a protection to women engaged in the commission of crime has any place in the criminal jurisprudence of the United States. United States v. De Quilfeldt, §§ 9-13.

§ 5. Although it may be proper that a woman indicted as a single woman should, if she relies on her coverture, plead in abatement the wrong addition, the failure to so plead it does not preclude her from taking advantage of the defense under the general issue, and she may therefore give evidence, under the general issue, of the fact of marriage, and the other facts necessary to make out marital coercion. Ibid.

[NOTES.-See §§ 14-151.]

UNITED STATES v. FOX.

(5 Otto, 670–673. 1877.)

CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION from U. S. Circuit Court, Southern District of New

York.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.- Fox was indicted for obtaining goods upon false pretenses within three months before he filed a petition in bankruptcy. He was convicted in the district court, but in the circuit court, upon a motion in arrest of judgment, the judges were divided in opinion as to whether, if a person does a thing which at the time is no offense against the laws of the United States, he is liable to punishment for it by reason of subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy.

§ 6. What is necessary to constitute an offense against the law. Opinion by MR. JUSTICE FIELD.

The question presented by the certificate of division does not appear to us difficult of solution. Upon principle, an act which is not an offense at the time it is committed cannot become such by any subsequent independent act of the party with which it has no connection. By the clause in question, the obtaining of goods on credit upon false pretenses is made an offense against the United States, upon the happening of a subsequent event not perhaps in the contemplation of the party, and which may be brought about against his will by the agency of another. The criminal intent essential to the commission of a public offense must exist when the act complained of is done; it cannot be imputed to a party from a subsequent independent transaction. There are cases, it is true, where a series of acts are necessary to constitute an offense, one act being auxiliary to another in carrying out the criminal design. But the present is not a case of that kind. Here an act which may have no relation to proceedings in bankruptcy becomes criminal, according as such proceedings may or may not be subsequently taken, either by the party or by another.

87. The power of congress to enforce by suitable penalties any of its legislation. There is no doubt of the competency of congress to provide, by suitable penalties, for the enforcement of all legislation necessary or proper to the execution of powers with which it is intrusted. And as it is authorized "to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States," it may embrace within its legislation whatever may be deemed important to a

complete and effective bankrupt system. The object of such a system is to secure a ratable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among his creditors, when he is unable to discharge his obligations in full, and at the same time to relieve the honest debtor from legal proceedings for his debts upon a surrender of his property. The distribution of the property is the principal object to be attained. The discharge of the debtor is merely incidental, and is granted only where his conduct has been free from fraud in the creation of his indebtedness or the disposition of his property. To legislate for the prevention of frauds in either of these particulars, when committed in contemplation of bankruptcy, would seem to be within the competency of congress. Any act committed with a view of evading the legislation of congress, passed in the execution of any of its powers, or of fraudulently securing the benefit of such legislation, may properly be made an offense against the United States. But an act committed within a state, whether for a good or a bad purpose, or whether with an honest or a criminal intent, cannot be made an offense against the United States unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of congress or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act not having any such relation is one in respect to which the state can alone legislate.

§ 8. Congress has no power to punish an act which, though an offense against the laws of the state, does not appear by the act to be an offense against the laws of the United States.

The act described in the ninth subdivision of section 5132 of the Revised Statutes is one which concerns only the state in which it is committed; it does not concern the United States. It is quite possible that the framers of the statute intended it to apply only to acts committed in contemplation of bankruptcy; but it does not say so, and we cannot supply qualifications which the legislature has failed to express.

Our answer to the questions certified must be in the negative, and it will be so returned to the circuit court.

UNITED STATES v. DE QUILFELDT.

(Circuit Court for Tennessee: 5 Federal Reporter, 276-286. 1881.)

Opinion by HAMMOND, D. J.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.— The defendant, being arraigned upon an information charging her with counterfeiting coins, pleaded not guilty, and was put upon her trial. She is described in the information simply as "Annie De Quilfeldt, otherwise known as Annie Egbert;" all addition, such as "wife of A. B.," "widow," or "spinster," being omitted. On the trial, a witness, the detective who arrested her, was asked whether she was not living with Charles G. De Quilfeldt, who had just been convicted of counterfeiting, as his wife; whether they, at the time of arrest, called and recognized each other as such, and whether they were not reported to be man and wife among their neighbors. This testimony was, on objection of the district attorney, excluded. There was proof tending to show that, when the defendant was caught in the act of moulding the coins, this man, De Quilfeldt, was either present, or so nearly connected with the act as to shield her under the doctrine of marital coercion, if she be in fact his wife: He was proved to have been engaged in counterfeiting at his house, where this defendant lived with him. The testimony was excluded, as will appear hereafter, on the ground that by pleading over the defendant had waived the defense of coverture. But the court sought to pro

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