which others exprefs by that name, when it is not so, but is that which they exprefs by the name green.

§ 12, page 411, line 14. In reference.—In reference to the ideas of other men, expreffed by the fame names, and looked upon as a standard.

§ 14, page 412, line 10. And thus anfwering. This is coincident with adequate ideas, c. 30, § 2, page 394, and fo each fenfation answering the power; and with real ideas, c. 31, § 2, page 397, and thus our fimple ideas are all real and true, because they answer, &c.

Ibid. line 13. If the mind. So judges of them, it makes a falfe judgement, which is all the falfenefs there can be in ideas. Though indeed this false notion of them ferves the ufes of life as well as the true one.

$15, page 413, line 6. If the idea of a violet.-The fuppofition is that the idea, produced by a Violet in the mind of A, is the fame that a Marigold produces in the mind of B, and confequently different from that which a Violet produces in the mind of B, and fo in like manner, the idea produced by a Marigold in the mind of A, is the fame that a Violet produces in the mind of B, and confequently different from that which a Marigold produces in the mind of B. Now though this wou'd breed no confufion or inconvenience as to the uses of life, provided A called that idea which a Violet produced in him blue, as well as B, though it were different from B's idea; and that idea which the Marigold produced in him, yellore, as well as B, though different from B's idea. Yet, notwithstanding, if A fhould think his idea of blue and yellow were the fame with B's ideas of those colours; this would be a falfe judgement of his ideas, which is all the falfenefs that can be in them.

§ 18, page 414, line 12. When they put together. This and the following inftance of falle ideas are coincident with the fantaftical ones, c. 30, 2, page 397. VOL. I. BOOK

BOOK, III.

Of Words, or Language in General.

§ 5, page 428, line 12. ARE all words taken, &c.—

This inference feems to be

too general; for every man, whether there were any words or articulate founds ufed or not, would understand his own thoughts; the ufing fuch words, therefore, to exprefs infenfible things, argues only the defect in language, but not our want of knowledge of fuch things, unless we could fuppofe fuch as are deaf and dumb have no thoughts or confcioufnefs of the actions of their own minds; or that there is a natural connexion between the founds and the thoughts themselves, both which are demonftrably falfe.*

Ibid. line 13. Spirit in its primary.-Thefe words indeed feem to prove that fenfible ideas were the firft in the mind; for men would not have taken from them words to express their ideas of immaterial fubftances, had they not been known and familiar to the mind before fuch ideas of immaterial fubftances. But as for the metaphorical words he mentions, adhere, conceive, inftill, they feem not to have been made by the first beginners of languages, but to have been brought in afterwards by poets, orators, rhetoricians, to pleafe and gratify the fancies of men, and adorn and embellifh difcourfe,

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

82, page 431, line 13.. NOR can any one apply.—

13.

He may pronounce the word like a parrot without knowing what idea it ftands

* Ch. 2, § 1.

for: but if he do apply it to any idea at all, it must be to one of his own ideas.

Ibid. line 15. For this would be to make. This would be to be capable of doing a thing which would wholly deftroy the use of language, and confequently be a reflection on the Author of nature for contriving it in fuch

a manner.

CHA P. III.

Of General Terms.

§ 9, page 439. A the reprefentation or refemblance

N abftract idea is nothing else but

in the mind of a fingle or particular visible object, when the object itself is not prefent does not actually affect the eye.

There can be no general or abftract ideas in the author's sense, because no men can think of more than one thing at one inftant, and therefore cannot form a general or abstract idea.*

§ 12, page 442, line 15. Whereby it is evident.The feries and force of this reafoning is this: to be of any fpecies is the fame as to have a right to the name of that fpecies. To have right to the name of a fpecies is to have a conformity to the abftract idea of that fpecies; to have a conformity to the abftract idea of that fpecies is to take all in that the abftract idea contains; ergo, to have the effence of a fpecies is the fame as to have all that the abftract idea of that fpecies contains and no more; fo that the effence of a fpecies, and the abftract idea of it, are the fame.

19%

§ 12, page 444, line 4. For the having the effence. -Having the effence of a fpecies-being of that fpecies

VOL. II.

* Lee, p. 204.
M

having