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Of Clear and Obfcure, Diftinct and Confused Ideas.
$2, page 383, line 11. OUR fimple ideas are clear.
He means that then they are clear, when they are fuch that nature defigned we fhould have.
Ibid. line 23. And the number and order.-For if there are complex ideas, which are continually varying as to their number, and order of their ingredients, they can never be clear in the fenfe above-mentioned.
§ 4, page 384, line 1. As a clear idea is that.-The perception the mind hath of clear ideas is all it can, or is to have, and is a vigorous, lively perception.
$ 5, page 384, line 9. No idea therefore.-Every idea confidered in itself as in the mind is diftinguishable from all others (different perceptions making it fo) and is only a confufed idea of the things the names it is expreffed by ftand for. Thus the idea of a fpotted beast confidered in itself is distinct from that of a beast without fpots, and from all other ideas in the mind, and is only a confufed idea of those beafts expreffed by the names leopard, lynx, panther.
§8, page 386, line 12. This draught.-Thefe furprizing pieces of art are faid to have been invented, or much improved by one Mr. Matthews, Fellow of Sid ney College, Cambridge.
Of Real and Fantaftical Ideas.
$4, page 395. Bhave no notions of any moral virBUT
moft men think could
tues or vices without deriving them from real actions either in their own minds, or from the fenfible actions of others; and as every man's notions agree, more or lefs, with that which is founded in nature, fo they are more or lefs perfect, but not more or less real. And no ideas feem to be archetypes or originals: they are all, when in the mind, types or copies derived from real actions in nature; elle virtue and vice would be arbitrary notions, made according to every man's pleasure and fancy.
Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.
§ 2, page 397, line 1. SIMPLE, ideas are inadequate as well as complex: 1. Becaufe there is no natural connexion between thofe qualities, when confidered in the object, and the effect of them, when confidered as in the mind; the effect is widely different and incommenfurate by the caufe. 2. Because we have more knowledge of all the forts of fingle qualities or modes of particular fubftances, than we could derive from the things confidered in themselves: fo vaftly do the effects exceed their original fimple caufes.
$6, page 400. The word effence is generally used for that only by which a thing is diftinguished from every thing else, and in this fenfe we may have as adequate idea of any fubftance as of any quality in it.
* Lee, p. 136.
+Ibid. p. 138.
Ibid. line 3. Now thofe ideas. In order to underftand the author's fenfe of this matter we must recollect from what has gone before, what ideas we have of fubftances, and how far they anfwer their archetypes.
1. Therefore to begin with the general divifion of fubftance, of matter and fpirit, which are all the forts of it we know of. The idea we have in general of matter is an idea of folidity, extenfion, figure, &c. with an unknown fubftratum, fupport, or caule of union of these qualities. The idea we have of fpirit in general is an idea of confcioufnefs or thinking in general with an unknown fubftratum or fupport alfo. This fubftratum or caufe of union is the fame thing which the men he here hath to do with, call real effence, specific effence, or internal conftitution, &c. from which all the qualities flow, upon which they depend, and with which they have a neceffary connexion.
2. The idea we have of particular material fubftances, fc. inanimate, vegetable, animal bodies, confifts, ift, Of all that was in the former idea, because they are fo many parcels of matter. 2dly, Of the fuppofition of a divifion into minute parts, and of a particular bulk, figure, and motion of thofe parts, which are called the primary qualities of bodies; which, though they must needs be fuppofed, or elfe all parcels of matter would be alike, are as unknown to us as the fubftratum above. 3dly, Of active and paffive powers discoverable by our fenfes, which are called fecondary qualities, because they refult from the primary ones, and are indeed all that we think, have ideas of, or conceive in them. So likewife our idea of particular immaterial substances, fc. God, angels, human fouls, confists of the idea abovementioned, and the fuppofition of any particular modes of thinking unknown to us, and the active and paffive powers we know in them.
Of any of thefe particular material fubftances (for of thefe alone the author treats) fc. gold, it may be faid, that its primary qualities (fc. the particular bulk, figure, VOL. I.
Ibid. line 4. 1. Sometimes they are. Sometimes when men think of fubftances they endeavour to think of nothing but a fuppofed real effence in them.
Ibid. Sometimes they are.- 8, page 403, Those who endeavour to copy fubftances. Sometimes fome men, when they think of fubftances, think of nothing but that collection of that active and paffive powers they obferve in them, and this is all the idea we have of them.
Ibid. line 12. It is ufual. He fuppofes that men generally give names to things only upon account of their specific effence; that their names folely refpect them; so that they would not, for inftance, call a parcel of matter, gold, did they not think it had a certain real effence, which runs through all the parcels of that fort; for its having fuch an effence is what they mean when they give it that name.
Ibid. line 24. And thus they. Thus they give the
Ibid. line 41. For then the properties.-He fup-
Ibid. line 59. That men should.—That they should afcribe the diftribution of things into forts to the specific effences (one of which is fuppofed to run through every fort and diftinguish it from all others) as the only caule of fuch a diftribution.
$9, page 404, line 2. Could not rationally-For the real effence being but one, a fixed and certain thing: VOL. I.