lay great stress upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the reprefentations of fomething that really exifts. The Platonifts have their foul of the world, and the Epicureans their endeavour towards motion in their atoms, when at reft. There is fcarce any fect in philofophy has not a diftinct fet of terms, that others understand not; but yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, ferves fo well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar ufe amongst those of the fame tribe, to feem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the moft fignificant. And should aerial and ætherial vehicles come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt those terms would make impreffions on men's minds, fo as to establish them in the perfuafion of the reality of fuch things, as much as Peripatetic forms and intentional fpecies have heretofore done. Inftance, in matter. §. 15. How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philofophical writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in words little fufpected of any fuch mifufe. I fhall inftance in one only, and that a very familiar one: how many intricate difputes have there been about matter, as if there were fome fuch thing really in nature, diftinct from body; as it is evident the word matter ftands for an idea diftinct from the idea of body? For if the ideas these two terms ftood for were precifely the fame, they might indifferently, in all places, be put for one another. But we fee, that though it be proper to fay, there is one matter of all bodies, one cannot fay there is one body of all matters: we familiarly fay, one body is bigger than another; but it founds harth (and I think is never ufed) to fay, one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? viz. from hence, that though matter and body be not really diftinct, but wherever there is the one there is the other; yet matter and body ftand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For body ftands ftands for a folid extended figured fubftance, whereof matter is but a partial and more confufed conception, it feeming to me to be used for the fubftance and folidity of body, without taking in its extenfion and figure: and therefore it is that fpeaking of matter, we fpeak of it always as one, becaufe in truth it exprefsly contains nothing but the idea of a solid fubftance, which is every where the fame, every where uniform. This being our idea of matter, we no more conceive or fpeak of different matters in the world, than we do of different folidities; though we both conceive and speak of different bodies, because extenfion and figure are capable of variation. But fince folidity cannot exift without extenfion and figure, the taking matter to be the name of fomething really exifting under that precifion, has no doubt produced thofe obfcure and unintelligible difcourfes and difputes, which have filled the heads and books of philofophers concerning materia prima; which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms, I leave to be confidered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer difputes in the world, if words. were taken for what they are, the figns of our ideas only, and not for things themselves. For when we argue about matter, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we exprefs by that found, whether that precife idea agree to any thing really exifting in nature or no. And if men would tell what ideas they make their words ftand for, there could not be half that obfcurity or wrangling, in the fearch or fupport of truth, that there is. This makes errors lafting. S. 16. But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am fure, that by conftant and familiar use they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to perfuade any one, that the words which his father or schoolmafter, the parfon of the parish, or fuch a reverend doctor used, fignified nothing that really exifted in nature; which, perhaps, is none of the leaft caufes, that men are fo hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely purely philofophical, and where they have no other intereft but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed. 5. Setting them for what they cannot fignify. §. 17. Fifthly, another abufe of words, is the setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means fignify. We may observe, that in the general names of fubftances, whereof the nominal effences are only known to us, when we put them into propofitions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should ftand for the real effence of a certain fort of fubftances. For when a man fays gold is malleable, he means and would infinuate fomething more than this, that what I call gold is malleable, (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, viz. that gold, i. e. what has the real effence of gold, is malleable; which amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is infeparable from the real effence of gold. But a man, not knowing wherein that real effence confifts, the connection in his mind of malleableness, is not truly with an effence he knows not, but only with the found gold he puts for it. Thus when we fay, that "animal rationale" is, and "animal implume bipes latis unguibus" is not a good definition of a man; it is plain, we fuppofe the name man in this cafe to ftand for the real effence of a fpecies, and would fignify, that a rational animal better described that real effence than a two-legged animal with broad nails, and without feathers. For elfe, why might not Plato as properly 'make the word gwmos, or man, ftand for his complex idea, made up of the idea of a body, diftinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as Ariftotle make the complex idea, to which he gave the name gros, or man, of body and the faculty of reafoning joined together; unless the name ewros, or man, were fuppofed to ftand for fomething elfe than what it fignifies; and to be put in the place of fome other thing than the idea a man profeffes he would exprefs by it? §. 18. v. g. Putting them for the real effences of fubftances. §. 18. It is true, the names of fubftances would be much more ufeful, and propofitions made in them much more certain, were the real effences of fubftances the ideas in our minds which thofe words fignified. And it is for want of thofe real effences that our words convey fo little knowledge or certainty in our difcourfes about them: and therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret suppofition, to ftand for a thing, having that real effence, as if thereby it made fome nearer approaches to it. For though the word man or gold fignify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties united together in one fort of fubftances: yet there is fcarce any body in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real effence, on which these properties depend. Which is fo far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it when we would make them ftand for fomething, which not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the fign of. Hence we think every change of our idea in fubstances not to change the fpecies. §. 19. This fhows us the reafon why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the compofition of the complex one, being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, i. e. to be of another fpecies, it is plain in chance-medley, man-flaughter, murder, parricide, &c. The reason whereof is, because the complex idea fignified by that name is the real as well as nominal effence; and there is no fecret reference of that name to any other effence but that. But in fubftances it is not fo. For though in that called gold one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice verfa; yet men do not ufually think that therefore the fpecies is changed: because they fecretly in their minds refer that name, and fuppofe it annexed to a real immutable effence of a thing exifting, on which those properties depend. He that adds to his complex idea of gold that of fixednefs and folubility in aq. regia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the fpecies; but only to have a more perfect VOL. II. D idea, idea, by adding another fimple idea, which is always in fact joined with thofe other, of which his former complex idea confifted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we had not the idea, is fo far from helping at all, that it only ferves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real effence of that fpecies of bodies, the word gold (which by standing for a more or lefs perfect collection of fimple ideas, ferves to defign that fort of body well enough in civil difcourfe) comes to have no fignification at all, being put for somewhat, whereof we have no idea at all, and fo can fignify nothing at all, when the body itself is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well confidered, it will be found a quite different thing to argue about gold in name, and about a parcel in the body itself, v. g. a piece of leaf-gold laid before us; though in difcourfe we are fain to fubftitute the name for the thing. The caufe of of nature's S. 20. That which I think very much difpofes men to fubftitute their names for the real effences of fpecies, is the supposition before-mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and fets the boundaries to cach of those species, by giving exactly the fame real internal conftitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who obferves their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the fame name, are, in their internal conftitution, as different one from another as feveral of those which are ranked under different fpecifick names. This fuppofition, however, that the fame precife and internal conftitution goes always with the fame fpecifick name, makes men forward to take thofe names for the reprefentatives of thofe real effences, though indeed they fignify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may fo fay, fignifying one thing, and being fuppofed for, or put in the place of another, they cannot but, in fuch a kind of ufe, caufe a great deal of uncertainty in men's difcourfes; efpecially in those who have tho roughly |