the figns of fuch ideas: and things agree or difagree, as really they are; but we obferve it only by our ideas. §. 19. Before we quit this fubject, it may Four forts of be worth our while à little to reflect on four arguments. forts of arguments, that men, in their reafonings with others, do ordinarily make ufe of, to prevail on their affent; or at leaft fo to awe them, as to filence their oppofition.

cundiam.

First, the firft is to allege the opinions 1. Ad vere- of men, whofe parts, learning, eminency, power, or fome other caufe has gained a name, and fettled their reputation in the common esteem with fome kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and queftion the authority of men, who are in poffeffion of it. This is apt to be cenfured, as carrying with it too much of pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with refpect and fubmiffion by others and it is looked upon as infolence for a man to fet up, and adhere to his own opinion, against the current ftream of antiquity; or to put it in the balance against that of fome learned doctor, or otherwife approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with fuch authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to ftyle it impudence in any one who fhall ftand out against them. This, I think, may be called argumentum ad verecundiam.

rantiam.

§. 20. Secondly, another way that men 2. Ad igno- ordinarily ufe to drive others, and force them to fubmit their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to affign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ignorantiam.

3. Ad homi

nem.

§. 21. Thirdly, a third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles, or conceffions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem. $. 22. Fourthly, the fourth is the ufing 4. Ad judiBium. of proofs drawn from any of the foundations

of

of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum ad judicium. This alone, of all the four, brings true inftruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, because I out of refpect, or any other confideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the fame with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeft, and therefore not oppose another man's perfuafion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an errour, and another may fhow me that I am fo. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arifing from the nature of things themselves, and not from my fhame-facedness, ignorance, or errour.

Above, contrary, and according to.

reafon.

§. 23. By what has been before faid of reason, we may be able to make fome guess at the diftinction of things, into thofe that are according to, above, and contrary to reafon. 1. According to reafon are fuch propofitions, whose truth we can difcover by examining and tracing thofe ideas we have from fenfation and reflection; and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reason are fuch propofitions, whofe truth or probability we cannot by reafon derive from thofe principles. 3. Contrary to reafon are fuch propofitions, as are inconfiftent with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and diftinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God is according to reafon; the existence of more than one God, contrary to reafon; the refurrection of the dead, above reafon. Farther, as above reason may be taken in a double sense, viz. either as fignifying above probability, or above certainty; fo in that large fenfe also, contrary to reason, is, I fuppofe, fometimes taken. §. 24. There is another ufe of the word reason, wherein it is oppofed to faith; which though it be in itself a very improper $ 3

Reafon and faith not op

pofite.

way

way of fpeaking, yet common ufe has fo authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppofe or hope to remedy it: only I think it may not be amifs to take notice, that however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm affent of the mind: which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason; and fo cannot be oppofite to it. He that believes, without having any reafon for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither feeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him ufe thofe difcerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and errour. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he fometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckinefs of the accident will excufe the irregularity of his proceeding. This at leaft is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes ufe of the light and faculties God has given him, and feeks fincerely to discover truth by thofe helps and abilities he has, may have this fatisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should mifs truth, he will not mifs the reward of it. For he governs his affent right, and places it as he should, who, in any cafe or matter whatfoever, believes or disbelieves, according as reafon directs him. He that doth otherwife tranfgreffes against his own light, and mifufes thofe faculties which were given him to no other end, but to fearch and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability. But, fince reafon and faith are by fome men oppofed, we will fo confider them in the following chapter.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their diftin&t Provinces.

Neceffary to
know their
boundaries,

$. I.

T has been above fhown, 1. That

IT has been abolity ignorant, and

want knowledge of all forts, where we want

ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined fpecific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our affent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor teftimony of other men, to bottom our reafon upon.

From these things thus premifed, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reafon; the want whereof may poffibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great difputes, and perhaps miftakes in the world. For till it be refolved, how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain difpute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion. §. 2. I find every fect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, it is matter of faith, and above reafon. And I do not see how they can argue, with any one, or ever convince a gainfayer who makes ufe of the fame plea, without fetting down ftrict boundaries between faith and reafon; which ought to be the first point established in all queftions, where faith, has any thing to do.

Faith and reafon what,

as contradiftinguished.

Reason therefore here, as contradiftinguished to faith, I take to be the difcovery of the certainty or probability of fuch propofitions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from fuch ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties ; viz. by fenfation or reflection.

Faith, on the other fide, is the affent to any propofition, not thus made out by the deductions of reafon; but upon the credit of the propofer, as coming from God, in fome extraordinary way of communication. This way of difcovering truths to men we call revelation.

S. 3. First then I fay, that no man infpired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new fimple ideas, which they had not before from fenfation or reflection. For whatsoever impreffiohs he

S 4

No new fim ple idea can by traditibe conveyed onal revelation.

himself

himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new fimple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words, or any other figns. Because words, by their immediate operation on us, caufe no other ideas, but of their natural founds: and it is by the cuftom of using them for figns, that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only. fuch ideas as were there before. For words feen or heard, recal to our thoughts thofe ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown fim→ ple ideas. The fame holds in all other figns, which cannot fignify to us things, of which we have before never had any idea at all.

Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the defcription he can make to others of that place, is only this, that there are fuch things, " as eye hath not feen, nor ear "heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to "conceive." And fuppofing God fhould difcover to any one, fupernaturally, a fpecies of creatures inhabit, ing, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is poffible there may be fuch, nobody can deny) which had fix. fenfes; and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that fixth fenfe; he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men thofe ideas, imprinted by that fixth fenfe, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour by the founds of words into a man, who, having the other four fenfes perfect, had always, totally wanted the fifth of feeing. For our fimple ideas then, which are the foundation and fole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we muft depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I fay, traditional revelation, in diftinction. to original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impreffion, which is made immediately by God, on the mind of any man, to which we cannot fet any bounds; and by the other, thofe impreffions delivered over to 6 others