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fafe for her to go abroad thin clad, in fuch a day, after a fever: the clearly fees the probable connexion of all thefe, viz. fouth-weft wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of feveral fyllogifms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them; and the probability which she eafily perceives in things thus in their native state would be quite loft, if this argument were managed learnedly, and proposed in mode and figure. For it very often confounds the connexion: and, I think, every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes fhorteft and cleareft without fyllogifms.

Inference is looked on as the great act of the rational faculty, and fo it is when it is rightly made; but the mind, either very defirous to enlarge its knowledge, or very apt to favour the fentiments it has once imbibed, is very forward to make inferences, and therefore often makes too much hafte, before it perceives the connexion of the ideas that must hold the extremes together.

To infer is nothing but, by virtue of one propofition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, i. e. to fee or fuppofe fuch a connexion of the two ideas of the inferred propofition, v. g. Let this be the propofition laid down, men shall be punished in another world," and from thence be inferred this other, "then men can determine themselves.". The question now is to know whether the mind has made this inference right or no; if it has made it by finding out the intermediate ideas, and taking a view of the connexion of them, placed in a due order, it has proceeded rationally, and made a right inference. If it has done it without such a view, it has not fo much made an inference that will hold, or an inference of right reafon, as fhown a willingness to have it be, or be taken for fuch. But in neither cafe is it fyllogifm that discovered thofe ideas, or fhowed the connexion of them, for they must be both found out, and the connexion every where perceived, before they can rationally be made use of in fyllogifm: unless it can be

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faid, that any idea, without confidering what connexion it hath with the two other, whofe agreement fhould be fhown by it, will do well enough in a fyllogifm, and may be taken at a venture for the medius terminus, to prove any conclufion. But this nobody will fay, because it is by virtue of the perceived agreement of the intermediate idea with the extremes, that the extremes are concluded to agree; and therefore cach intermediate idea must be fuch as in the whole chain hath a visible connexion with thofe two it has been placed between, or else thereby the conclufion cannot be inferred or drawn in for wherever any link of the chain is loose, and without connexion, there the whole ftrength of it is loft, and it hath no force to infer or draw in any thing. In the inftance above-mentioned, what is it fhows the force of the inference, and confequently the reasonablenefs of it, but a view of the connexion of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the conclufion, or propofition inferred? v. g. men shall be punishedGod the punisher- -juft punishmentnifhed guilty


-the pu

-could have done otherwife-felf-determination: by which chain of ideas thus visibly linked together in train, i. e. each intermediate idea agreeing on each fide with those two it is immediately placed between, the ideas of men and felf-determination appear to be connected, i. e. this propofition, men can determine themfelves, is drawn in, or inferred from this, that they fhall be punished in the other world. For here the mind feeing the connexion there is between the idea of men's punishment in the other world and the idea of God punishing; between God punishing and the juftice of the punishment; between juftice of the punishment and guilt; between guilt and a power to do otherwife; between a power to do otherwife and freedom; and between freedom and felfdetermination; fees the connexion between men and felf-determination.

Now I afk whether the connexion of the extremes be not more clearly seen in this fimple and natural difpofition, than in the perplexed repetitions, and jumble of five or fix fyllogifms. I must beg pardon for calling it



jumble, till fomebody fhall put thefe ideas into fo many fyllogifms, and then fay, that they are lefs jumbled, and their connexion more visible, when they are tranfpofed and repeated, and spun out to a greater length in artificial forms, than in that short and natural plain order they are laid down in here, wherein every one may fee it; and wherein they must be feen before they can be put into a train of fyllogifms. For the natural order of the connecting ideas, must direct the order of the fyllogisms, and a man must see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those that it connects, before he can with reafon make use of it in a fyllogifm. And when all those fyllogifms are made, neither thofe that are, nor thofe that are not logicians will fee the force of the argumentation, i. e. the connexion of the extremes, one jot the better. [For thofe that are not men of art, not knowing the true forms of fyllogifm, nor the reasons of them, cannot know whether they are made in right and conclufive modes and figures or no, and fo are not at all helped by the forms they are put into; though by them the natural order, wherein the mind could judge of their respective connexion, being difturbed, renders the illation much more uncertain than without them.] And as for the logicians themselves, they fee the connexion of each intermediate idea with those it ftands between (on which the force of the inference depends) as well before as after the fyllogifm is made, or else they do not fee it at all. For a fyllogifm neither fhows nor ftrengthens the connexion of any two ideas immediately put together, but only by the connexion feen in them fhows what connexion the extremes have one with another. But what connexion the intermediate has with either of the extremes in that fyllogifm, that no fyllogifm does or can fhow. That the mind only doth or can perceive as they ftand there in that juxta-pofition only by its own view, to which the fyllogiftical form it happens to be in gives no help or light at all; it only fhows that if the intermediate idea agrees with those it is on both fides immediately applied to; then those two remote ones, or as they are called, extremes, do certainly agree, and. therefore the immediate connexion of each idea to that

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which it is applied to on each fide, on which the force of the reafoning depends, is as well feen before as after the fyllogifm is made, or else he that makes the fyllogifm could never fee it at all. This, as has been already obferved, is feen only by the eye, or the perceptive faculty of the mind, taking a view of them laid together, in a juxta-pofition; which view of any two it has equally, whenever they are laid together in any propofition, whether that propofition be placed as a major, or a minor, in a fyllogifm or no.

Of what ufe then are fyllogifms? I anfwer, their chief and main ufe is in the fchools, where men are allowed without flame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifeftly agree; or out of the fchocis, to those who from thence have learned without fhame to deny the connexion of ideas, which even to themfelves is vifible. But to an ingenuous fearcher after truth, who has no other aim but to find it, there is no need of any fuch form to force the allowing of the inference: the truth and reafonablenefs of it is better feen in ranging of the ideas in a fimple and plain order: and hence it is, that men, in their own inquiries after truth, never use fyllogifms to convince themfelves, [or in teaching others to inftruct willing learners.] Because, before they can put them into a fyllogifm, they muft fee the connexion that is between the intermediate idea and the two other ideas it is fet between and applied to, to fhow their agreement; and when they fee that, they fee whether the inference be good or no, and fo fyllogifm comes too late to fettle it. For to make ufe again of the former instance; I afk whether the mind, confidering the idea of juftice, placed as an intermediate idea between the punishment of men and the guilt of the punished, (and, till it does fo confider it, the mind cannot make use of it as a medius terminus) does not as plainly fee the force and ftrength of the inference, as when it is formed into a fyllogifm. To show it in a very plain and eafy example; let animal be the intermediate idea or medius terminus that the mind makes use of to fhow the connexion of homo and vivens: I afk, whether the mind does not more readily and plainly fee that connexion in the fimple


and proper pofition of the connecting idea in the middle; thus,



Than in this perplexed one,



Which is the pofition these ideas have in a fyllogifm, to fhow the connexion between homo and vivens by the intervention of animal.

Indeed fyllogifm is thought to be of neceffary use, even to the lovers of truth, to fhow them the fallacies that are often concealed in florid, witty, or involved difcourses. But that this is a mistake will appear, if we confider, that the reason why sometimes men, who fincerely aim at truth, are impofed upon by fuch loose, and as they are called rhetorical difcourfes, is, that their fancies being ftruck with fome lively metaphorical reprefentations, they neglect to obferve, or do not easily perceive what are the true ideas, upon which the inference depends. Now to fhow fuch men the weakness of fuch an argumentation, there needs no more but to strip it of the fuperfluous ideas, which, blended and confounded with those on which the inference depends, feem to show a connexion where there is none; or at least do hinder the discovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked ideas, on which the force of the argumentation depends, in their due order, in which pofition the mind, taking a view of them, fees what connexion they have, and fo is able to judge of the inference without any need of a fyllogifm at all.

I grant that mode and figure is commonly made use of in such cases, as if the detection of the incoherence of fuch loofe difcourfes were wholly owing to the fyllogiftical form; and fo I myself formerly thought, till upon a ftricter examination I now find, that laying the intermediate ideas naked in their due order, fhows the incoherence of the argumentation better than fyllogifm; not only as fubjecting each link of the chain to the immediate view of the mind in its proper place, whereby its connexion is best observed; but also because fyllo

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