tion of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had fo near a connexion with words, that, unless their force and manner of fignification were first well obferved, there could be very little faid clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge; which being converfant about truth, had constantly to do with propofitions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce feparable from our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves fo much between our understandings and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the medium through which vifible objects pafs, their obfcurity and diforder do not feldom caft a mift before our eyes, and impofe upon our understandings. If we confider, in the fallacies men put upon themselves as well as others, and the mistakes in men's difputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or mistaken fignifications, we shall have reason to think this no small obftacle in the way to knowledge; which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warned of, because it has been fo far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have been made the business of men's ftudy; and obtained the reputation of learning and fubtilty, as we fhall fee in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of language, as the inftrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controverfies that make fuch a noife in the world, would of themfelves ceafe; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

This fhould teach us moderation, in impofing our own sense of old authors.

§. 22. Sure I am, that the fignification of words in all languages depending very much on the thoughts, notions, and ideas of him that uses them, muft unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the same language and country. This is fo evident in the Greek authors, that he that fhall peruse their writings will find in almoft every one of them a diftinct language, though the fame words. But when to this natural dif

ficulty

ficulty in every country there fhall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, ornaments and figures of fpeech, &c. every one of which influenced the fignification of their words then, though to us now they are loft and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstanding of those antient writings: which though of great concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the names of fimple ideas, and fome very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms, of conveying the fenfe and intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the hearer. And in difcourfes of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.

§. 23. The volumes of interpreters and commentators on the old and new Teftament are but too manifeft proofs of this. Though every thing faid in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay cannot choose but be very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of God, when cloathed in words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that fort of conveyance; when even his Son, whilft cloathed in flesh, was subject to all the frailties and inconveniencies of human nature, fin excepted. And we ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all the world fuch legible characters of his works and providence, and given all mankind fo fufficient a light of reafon, that they to whom this written word never came, could not (whenever they fet themselves to fearch) either doubt of the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him. Since then the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and feldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obfcurities and difficulties incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful

C 3

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careful and diligent in obferving the former, and lefs magifterial, pofitive, and imperious, in impofing our own fenfe and interpretations of the latter.

Abuse of words.

CHA P. X.

Of the Abufe of Words.

§. I.

B

ESIDES the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obfcurity and confufion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are feveral wilful faults and neglects which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render thefe figns lefs clear and diftinct in their fignification, than naturally they need to be.

First, Words without any, or without clear ideas.

§. 2. First, in this kind, the first and most palpable abufe is, the ufing of words without clear and diftinct ideas; or, which

is worse, figns without any thing fignified. Of thefe there are two forts:

I. One may obferve, in all languages, certain words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their first original and their appropriated ufe, not to ftand for any clear and diftinct ideas. Thefe, for the most part, the feveral fects of philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors, or promoters, either affecting fomething fingular and out of the way of common apprehenfions, or to fupport fome ftrange opinions, or cover fome weakness of their hypothefis, feldom fail to coin new words, and fuch as, when they come to be examined, may juftly be called infignificant terms. For having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them, when they were firft invented; or at least such as, if well examined, will be found inconfiftent; it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar ufe of the fame party, they remain empty founds, with little or no fignification, amongft those who think it enough to have

them

them often in their mouths, as the diftinguishing characters of their church, or school, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I fhall not need here to heap up instances; every man's reading and converfation will fufficiently furnish him: or if he wants to be better stored, the great mint-mafters of this kind of terms, I mean the school-men and metaphyficians (under which, I think, the difputing natural and moral philofophers of thefe latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§. 3. II. Others there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who take fo little care to lay by words, which in their primary notation have fcarce any clear and diftinct ideas which they are annexed to, that by an unpardonable negligence they familiarly ufe words, which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas, without any diftinct meaning at all. Wisdom, glory, grace, &c. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them, fhould be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: a plain proof, that though they have learned those founds, and have them ready at their tongues end, yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expreffed to others by them.

Occafioned by learning

names before

the ideas they belong to.

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§. 4. Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words, which are easily got and retained, before they knew, or had framed the complex ideas, to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for; they usually continue to do fo all their lives; and without taking the pains neceffary to fettle in their minds determined ideas, they use their words for fuch unsteady and confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the fame words other people use: as if their very found neceffarily carried with it conftantly the fame meaning. This, though men make a fhift with, in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it neceffary to be understood, and therefore they make figns till they are

fo; yet this infignificancy in their words, when they come to reafon concerning either their tenets or intereft, manifeftly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words for the most part ftanding for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their bare founds are often only thought on, or at least very obfcure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours; and that they may not feem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning: whereby, befides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, that as in such difcourfes they feldom are in the right, fo they are as feldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as to difpoffess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no fettled abode. This I guess to be fo; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no.

2. Unfteady application of them.

§. 5. Secondly, another great abuse of words is inconftancy in the use of them. It is hard to find a difcourfe written of any fubject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the fame words (and those commonly the most material in the difcourfe, and upon which the argument turns) used fometimes for one collection of fimple ideas, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for figns of my ideas, to make them known to others, not by any natural fignification, but by a voluntary impofition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and fometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater difhonesty. And a man, in his accompts with another, may, with as much fairnefs, make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another collection of units (v. g. this character 3 ftand fometimes for three, fometimes for four, and fometimes for