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10. In matters, where reafon
can afford certain knowledge, that is to be hearkened to.
11. If the boundaries be not fet between faith and reafon, no enthusiasm, or extravagancy in religion, can be contradicted.
CHA P. XIX. Of enthusiasm.
1. Love of truth neceffary.
3. Force of enthusiasm.
8, 9. Enthufiafm mistaken for
10. Enthusiasm, how to be dif-
11. Enthusiasm fails of evi-
13. Light in the mind, what.
15, 16. Belief, no proof of revelation.
CHA P. XX,
Of wrong affent, or errour. SECT.
1. Caufes of errour
6. Thirdly, want of will to use them.
7. Fourthly, wrong measures of probability; whereof, 8-10. First, doubtful propofitions, taken for principles. 11. Secondly, received hypothefes.
12. Thirdly, predominant paffions.
13. The means of evading probabilities, ift, fuppofed fallacy.
14. 2dly, fuppofed arguments for the contrary.
15. What probabilities deter-
16. Where it is in our power
of ideas in the mind, there are
parts, or whole fen
a great many others that are made ufe of, to fignify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas, or propofitions, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thought to others, does not only need figns of the ideas it has then before it, but others alfo, to fhow or intimate fome particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those ideas. This it does feveral ways; as is, and is not, are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. But befides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falfhood, the mind does, in declaring its fentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propofitions, but whole fentences one to another, with their feveral relations and dependencies, to make a coherent difcourfe.
In them confifts the art of well-speaking.
§. 2. The words, whereby it fignifies what connexion it gives to the feveral affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reafoning or narration, are generally called particles; and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly confifts the clearnefs and beauty of a good style. To think well, it is not enough that a VOL. II. B
man has ideas clear and diftinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement or difagreement of fome of them; but he must think in train, and obferve the dependence of his thoughts and reafonings upon one another. And to express well fuch methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to fhow what connexion, restriction, diftinction, oppofition, emphasis, &c. he gives to each refpective part of his difcourfe. To mistake in any of thefe, is to puzzle, inftead of informing his hearer; and therefore it is that thofe words which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas, are of such conftant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to men's well expreffing themselves.
They show what relation
the mind gives to its
§. 3. This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as fome others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of cafes and genders, moods and tenfes, gerunds and fupines in thefe, and the like, there has been great diligence ufed; and particles themselves, in fome languages, have been, with great show of exactnefs, ranked into their several orders. But though prepofitions and conjunctions, &c. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their diftinct fubdivifions; yet he who would show the right ufe of particles, and what fignificancy and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and obferve nicely the several postures of his mind in difcourfing.
S. 4. Neither is it enough, for the explaining of thefe words, to render them, as is ufual in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which come nearest to their fignification for what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another language. They are all marks of fome action, or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the feveral views, poftures, ftands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and feveral other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be ftudied. Of these there is a great va
riety, much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to exprefs them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers, and fometimes almoft oppofite fignifications. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle confifting of but one fingle letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty feveral fignifications.
§. 5. But is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that fays it is a difcretive conjunction, and that it anfwers fed in Latin, or mais in French, thinks he has fufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate feveral relations the mind gives to the feveral propofitions or parts of them, which it joins by this monofyllable.
First, "but to fay no more:" here it intimates a ftop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it,
Secondly, "I faw but two plants:" here it shows, that the mind limits the sense to what is expreffed, with a negation of all other.
Thirdly, you pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion,"
Fourthly, "but that he would confirm you in your own. The first of these Buts intimates a fuppofition in the mind of fomething otherwife than it should be; the latter shows, that the mind makes a direct oppofition between that, and what goes before it.
Fifthly, "all animals have fenfe; but a dog is an animal:" here it fignifies little more, but that the latter propofition is joined to the former, as the minor of a fyllogifm.
but lightly touched here.
§. 6. To thefe, I doubt not, might be added a great many other fignifications of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and confider it in all the places it is to be found: which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those manners it is made ufe of, it would deferve the title of difcretive, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full B 2 expli
explication of this fort of figns. The inftances I have given in this one, may give occafion to reflect on their ufe and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of feveral actions of our minds in difcourfing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles; fome whereof conftantly, and others in certain conftructions, have the fenfe of a whole fentence contained in them.
predicable one of another, and why.
Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.
HE ordinary words of language,
would have given us light into the nature of our ideas, if they had been but confidered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abftract its ideas, and fo they become effences, general effences, whereby the forts of things are diftinguifhed. Now each abftract idea being diftinct, fo that of any two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propofitions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another. This we fee in the common ufe of language, which permits not any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one of another. For how near of kin foever they may feem to be, and how certain foever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at firft hearing perceives the falfhood of thefe propofitions; humanity is animality, or rationality, or whitenefs: and this is as evident, as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract idea to be another, but one abftract idea to be joined to another; which abftract ideas, in fubftances, may be of any fort; in all the reft, are little elfe but of relations;