of influence in Macedonia. But the revolt of Eastern Roumelia, followed by the Servo-Bulgarian war and the chastisement of Greece by the Powers, provoked so much bitterness of feeling among the rival races that for many years nothing more was heard of a Balkan Confederation. The idea has lately been revived under different auspices and with somewhat different aims. During the past six years the Triple Alliance, with England, has, despite the indifference of Prince Bismarck, protected the Balkan States in general, and Bulgaria in particular from the armed intervention of Russia. It has also acted the part of policeman in preserving the peace throughout the Peninsula, and in deterring the young nations from any dangerous indulgence in their angry passions. The most remarkable feature in the history of this period has been the extraordinary progress made by Bulgaria. Since the revolt of Eastern Roumelia, Bulgaria has been treated by Dame Europa as a naughty child. But the Bulgarians have been shrewd enough to see that the Central Powers and England have an interest in their national independence and consolidation; they have recognised the truth that fortune favours those who help themselves, and they have boldly taken their own course, while carefully avoiding any breach of the proprieties such as might again bring them under the censure of the European Areopagus. They ventured, indeed, to elect a Prince of their own choosing without the sanction of that august conclave; the wiseacres shook their heads, and prophesied that Prince Ferdinand's days in Bulgaria might, perhaps, be as many as Prince Alexander's years. Yet Prince Ferdinand remains on the throne, and is now engaged in celebrating the fourth anniversary of his accession; the internal development of the country proceeds apace, and the progress of the Bulgarian sentiment outside the country-in other words, the Macedonian propaganda-is not a whit behind. The Bulgarians have made their greatest strides in Macedonia since the fall of Prince Bismarck, who was always ready to humour Russia at the expense of Bulgaria. What happened after the great war of 1878? A portion of the Bulgarian race was given a nominal freedom which was never expected to be a reality; Russia pounced on Bessarabia, England on Cyprus, Austria on Bosnia and Herzegovina. France got something elsewhere, but that is another matter. The Bulgarians have never forgiven Lord Beaconsfield for the division of their race, and I have seen some bitter poems upon the great Israelite in the Bulgarian tongue which many Englishmen would not care to hear translated. The Greeks have hated us since our occupation of Cyprus, and firmly believe that we mean to take Crete as well. The Servians have not forgotten how Russia, after instigating them to two disastrous wars, dealt with their claims at San Stefano; they cannot forgive Austria for her occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and every Servian peasant, as he pays his heavy taxes, or reluctantly gives a big price for some worthless imported article, feels the galling yoke of her fiscal and commercial tyranny. Need it be said how outraged Bulgaria scowls at Russia, or how Roumania, who won Plevna for her heartless ally, weeps for her Bessarabian children, and will not be comforted? It is evident that the Balkan peoples have no reason to expect much benefit from the next great war, from the European Conference which will follow it, or from the sympathy of the Christian Powers. What, then, do the authors of the proposed Confederation suggest as its ultimate aim and object? The Balkan States are to act independently of the foreign Powers, and in concert

BALKAN STATES, 1899-1901

with one another. The Sick Man's [Turkey's] inheritance lies before them, and they are to take it when an opportunity presents itself. They must not wait for the great Armageddon, for then all may be lost. If the Central Powers come victorious out of the conflict, Austria, it is believed, will go to Salonika; if Russia conquers, she will plant her standard at Stamboul, and practically annex the Peninsula. In either case the hopes of the young nations will be destroyed forever. It is. therefore, sought to extricate a portion at least of the Eastern Question from the tangled web of European politics, to isolate it, to deal with it as a matter which solely concerns the Sick Man and his immediate successors. It is hoped that the Sick Man may be induced by the determined attitude of his expectant heirs to make over to them their several portions in his lifetime; should he refuse, they must act in concert, and provide euthanasia for the moribund owner of Macedonia, Crete, and Thrace. In other words, it is believed that the Balkan States, if once they could come to an understanding as regards their claims to what is left of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, might conjointly, and without the aid of any foreign Power, bring such pressure to bear upon Turkey as to induce her to surrender peaceably her European possessions, and to content herself henceforth with the position of an Asiatic Power." -J. D. Bourchier, A Balkan Confederation (Fortnightly Review, Sept., 1891).-See also BULGARIA: 1885-1886.

1885. In September Eastern Rumelia rose in revolt. Here the Sultan was anxious to intervene, but owing mainly to British diplomatic support of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, Turkish action was stayed. Serbia declared war on Bulgaria in November, and by the Peace of Bucharest the real independence of the two Bulgarias was confirmed. See SERBIA: 1875-1878.

1899-1901.-Condition of Balkan States."The States of the Balkan Peninsula, ever since the practical disruption of European Turkey after the war of 1877-78, have been in a condition of chronic restlessness. Those who desire the repose of Europe have hoped against hope that the new communities which were founded or extended on the ruins of the Ottoman dominion in Europe would be able and willing to keep the peace among themselves and to combine in resisting the intrusion of foreign influences. These expectations have been too frequently disappointed. The lawlessness of Bulgaria and the unsettled state of Servia, more especially, continue to constitute a periodical cause of anxiety to the diplomacy of Europe. The recent murder at Bukharest of Professor Mihaileano, a Macedonian by birth and a Rumanian by extraction, appears to be a shocking example of the teaching of a school of political conspirators who have their centre of operations at Sofia. These persons had already combined to blackmail and terrorise the leading Rumanian residents in the capital of Bulgaria, where the most abominable outrages are stated to have been committed with impunity. Apparently, they have now carried the war, with surprising audacity, into the Rumanian capital itself. Two persons marked out for vengeance by the terrorists of Sofia had previously been murdered in Bukharest, according to our Vienna Correspondent, but these were Bulgarians by birth. It is a further step in this mtschievous propaganda that a Rumanian subject, the occupant of an official position at the seat of the Rumanian government, should be done to death by emissaries from the secret society at Sofia. His crime was that, born of Rumanian parents in Macedonia, he had the boldness to controvert in

the Press the claims of the Bulgarians to obtain the upper hand in a Turkish province, where Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Serbs are inextricably mixed up. Professor Mihaileano had probably very good reasons for coming to the conclusion that, whatever may be the evils of Ottoman rule, they are less than those which would follow a free fight in the Balkans, ending, it may be, in the ascendency of Bulgarian ruffianism.

"It is for this offence that M. Mihaileano suffered the penalty of death by the decree of a secret tribunal, and at the hands of assassins sent out to do their deadly work by political intriguers who sit in safety at Sofia. The most serious aspect of the matter, however, is the careless and almost contemptuous attitude of the Bulgarian Government. The reign of terror at Sofia and the too successful attempts to extend it to Rumania have provoked remonstrances not only from the government at Bukharest, but from some of the Great Powers, including Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy. . . . There is only too much reason to fear, even now, that both the Bulgarian Government and the ruler of the Principality are afraid to break with the terrorists of Sofia. Political assassination is unfortunately among the traditions of the Bulgarian State, but it has never been practised with such frequency and impunity as under the rule of Prince Ferdinand. . . . His own conduct as a ruler, coupled with the lamentable decline of the spirit of Bulgarian independence, which seemed to be vigorous and unflinching before the kidnapping of Prince Alexander, has steadily lowered his position. The Bulgarian agitation to a large extent a sham one-for the 'redemption,' as it is called, of Macedonia is a safety-valve that relieves Prince Ferdinand and those who surround him from much unpleasant criticism.

1912.-Balkan League. The idea of a Balkan confederation aimed at Turkish rule in the peninsula, dates back to the later 'seventies of last century. Mutual distrust and jealousies had prevented the fruition of the idea, and it fell through from the sheer impossibility of securing the essential harmony among the Balkan peoples themselves. Turkish rule was safe so long as the discord of centuries continued. How those differences were temporarily overcome and the league finally came into being; how it speedily and almost completely achieved its object only to fall apart again, forms one of the political romances of modern times. The prominent part played by James David Bourchier (died January, 1921), for many years Balkan correspondent of the London Times, is thus told by Colonel Rankin of the British army: "Bourchier, with a knowledge of the conditions prevailing in Turkey and in the Balkans, on the one hand, and at the councils of the Great Powers on the other, superior to that of any other man living, saw that things must go from bad to worse. The end would be the extinction of the subject nationalities. All hope of the intervention of the Powers had gone shipwreck. Bourchier realised that the only remedy was a combination of the free nations, kinsmen of the oppressed peoples, either to bring such pressure, to bear on the Young Turks as to induce them to mitigate their rule, or, if they resisted, to put them out by force. He came to this conclusion at the end, I believe, of 1910. He did not want an immediate war; the first thing to be done was to apply presBut there was little probability that this would succeed. The Young Turks were elated by success and by the praise which their admirers in Western Europe had lavished on them. They had spent all the money which they could obtain from their financial friends or by taxation in creating a powerful army, and could snap their fingers at the little States; so the programme of pacific remonstrance seemed to end in a cul-de-sac. So Bourchier turned his attention to the other possible solution of the problem. What forces could the four States of the Balkans-Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro-command for the purposes of bringing pressure, of one kind or another, to bear upon the oppressors of their coreligionists and kinsmen? The Bulgars were ready; their army was excellent, reorganised by Savoff, who had seen the evil effects on other armies of politics in cafés, and had inspired in his junior officers an enthusiasm for hard work which has borne its due fruit. The Bulgars could put 250,000 men in the field on the day of mobilisation. The

"The situation in the Balkans is in many respects disquieting. The Bulgarian agitation for the absorption of Macedonia is not discouraged in high quarters. The hostility of the Sofia conspirators to the Koutzo-Wallachs, the Rumanians of Macedonia, is due to the fact that the latter, being a small minority of the population, are ready to take their chance of equal treatment under Turkish rule, subject to the supervision of Europe, rather than to be swallowed up in an enlarged Bulgaria, dominated by the passions that now prevail in the Principality and that have been cultivated for obvious reasons. Russia, it is believed, has no wish to see Bulgarian aspirations realized, and would much rather keep the Principality in a state of expectant dependence. Servia and Greece would be as much embarrassed as Rumania by the success of the Bulgarian propaganda, and Austria-Hungary would regard it as a grave menace. Of course the Turkish government could not be expected to acquiesce in what would, in fact, be its knell of doom. . . . In Greece, the insubordination in certain sections of the army is a symptom not very alarming in itself, but unpleasantly significant of latent discontent. In Turkey, of course, the recrudescence of the fanaticism which periodically breaks out in the massacres of the Armenians cannot be overlooked. A more unfortunate time could not be chosen for endeavouring to reopen the Eastern question by pressing forward the Bulgarian claim to Macedonia. Nor could a more unfortunate method be adopted of presenting that claim than that of the terrorists who appear to be sheltered or screened at Sofia."-J. D. Bourchier (London Times, August BC, 1900).-See also BULGARIA: 18751878 to 1895-1896; MONTENEGRO: 1389-1868 to 1898; RUMANIA: 1856-1875; 1866-1914.

sure.

BALKAN STATES, 1912

Servian army had improved since the Bulgars hammered it; it could provide at least another 150,000. The Greek army had had latterly the advantage of the instruction of French officers. English officers had been reorganising the fleet, and their Averof was a bigger and better man-ofwar than any the Turks possessed. Little Montenegro could certainly put up a gallant fight.

Here was the germ of the Balkan Leaguethe first cause of the war which drove the Turks out of Europe after nearly five hundred years of misrule-a calculation simmering in the brain of an unofficial Irishman who, for love of them, had given half his life to the service of the Balkan peoples. So it came about that during the winter of 1910-11 Bourchier had long talks with M. Venezelos, the Greek Prime Minister [who was the moving spirit of the plan], and the two men discussed the scheme of a defensive and eventually offensive alliance between the Balkan States against the Turk. . . . At last, one day in May, 1911, the decisive step was taken. . . . Venezelos told Bourchier that he had finally approved the draft treaty of an alliance with Bulgaria against Turkey. . . . As before narrated, the Greek proposals were sent to Bulgaria in May, 1911. Some months later, Bourchier went to Sofia and put his arguments in favour of the alliance before King Ferdinand and M. Gueshoff. Just so, nearly a year before, he had persuaded Venezelos and King George [of Greece] to take the first step towards the formation of the Balkan League, so again in Sofia he persuaded the Bulgarian Government to fall into line with Greece. In February, 1912, he himself brought back to Athens from Sofia a reply favourable to Venezelos' proposal of a defensive alliance. Up to that moment only five people had an inkling of what was going on, namely, King George of Greece and M. Venezelos, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and M. Gueshoff, and Bourchier. After Bourchier's return to Athens negotations were put on a diplomatic basis, and the Greek Minister at Sofia was informed of the alliance and instructed to conduct the negotiations at the Bulgarian capital. That made six people in the plot. February and March passed; the negotiations went on in absolute secrecy; in April a definitive treaty was signed between Greece and Bulgaria. Bourchier had not left Servia out of the hunt. At the end of December, 1911, he went to Belgrade, and broached his plan to M. Milovanovitch, the Foreign Minister. He urged on him the idea of a combination between the Balkan States-a defensive combination to protect and maintain the rights of the Christian nationalities in Turkey. Milovanovitch was favourable in principle, but he pointed out the great risks that Servia would run-in the first place from Austria, if that Power got wind of the project, and in the second from Turkey herself, who could kill Servian commerce by closing the Salonika route. But M. Milovanovitch, who had already had a secret interview with M. Gueshoff, was sound on the question, and Bourchier left him, not doubting the ultimate issue, and went back to Bulgaria to inform his friends there how matters stood in Belgrade. In due course the Serbo-Bulgar Treaty was signed a week or two before the Bulgar-Greek Treaty. Montenegro had no treaty with either Bulgaria or Greece, but there was a definitive treaty between her and Servia. Bourchier went back to England in July, 1912, and at that time the Balkan League was practically formed, although further details and military conventions were agreed on a little later. . . . In the early autumn things got rapidly worse between the Turks and Bulgarians on the one hand, and

BALKAN STATES, 1912

the Turks and the Servians and Montenegrins on the other. There was a frontier dispute, followed by a series of massacres which did nothing to alleviate the situation. But matters did not come to a head till September, when the assembling of a large Turkish force at Adrianople caused the fear of invasion to spread throughout Bulgaria. At last, on September 30, the four States mobilised."-R. Rankin, Inner history of the Balkan war, pp. 11-15.-See also EASTERN QUESTION.— "What is known as the 'Berchtold Proposition' was an ambiguous appeal made to Europe in August 1912 (by the Power [Austria] that in 1908 took from Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina) to assist the Ottoman Government in applying a policy of progressive decentralization in favour of the Macedonian nationalities, and to urge upon the Balkan States a peace-policy. This proposal, made while the French Prime Minister, M. Poincare, was in Russia conferring with the Tsar's Government, aroused suspicion in Europe. It was generally regarded as an attempt to steal a march on Russia and to checkmate the policy of the Triple Entente. Yet the good faith of the Austro-Hungarian Government would seem to have been demonstrated by the subsequent course of events. Count Berchtold's initiative was perhaps one of the efficient causes, it was not necessarily the final cause, of the Balkan Crusade. The Balkan States. crushed between the Young Turks and AustriaHungary, fearing both the growth of Ottoman imperialism and the descent of Austria to Salonica, had by 1911-achieved their miraculous union under the hegemony of the Bulgarian tsar. Meanwhile the prolongation of the Turco-Italian war aroused their dormant ambition. . . . Count Berchtold formulated his famous proposal calculated to forestall and avert just such irreparable action on the part of the Balkan League as took place in October 1912, when the four Balkan States declared war."-W. M. Fullerton, Problems of power, p. 327.-See also BULGARIA: 1912: SERBOBULGARIAN PACT; CONCERT OF EUROPE: History and meaning of term; ITALY: 1912-1914.

1912.-German interest in Balkans.-Opposition of Balkan States to war. See GERMANY: 1912: Balkan and Asia Minor interests; and INTERNATIONAL: 1912; WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 71 (iv).

1912.-First Balkan war.-Bulgaria alded with Serbia, Greece and Montenegro declared war on Turkey.-"What was the occasion of the war between Turkey and the Balkan states in 1912? The most general answer that can be given to that question is contained in the one word Macedonia. Geographically Macedonia lies between Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria. Ethnographically it is an extension of their races. And if, as Matthew Arnold declared, the primary impulse both of individuals and of nations is the tendency to expansion, Macedonia both in virtue of its location and its population was fore-ordained to be a magnet to the emancipated Christian nations of the Balkans. Of course the expansion of Greeks and Slavs meant the expulsion of Turks. Hence the Macedonian question was the quintessence of the Near Eastern Question. But apart altogether from the expansionist ambitions and the racial sympathies of their kindred in Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece, the population of Macedonia had the same right to emancipation from Turkish domination and oppression as their brethren in these neighboring states. The Moslems had forfeited their sovereign rights in Europe by their unutterable incapacity to govern their Christian subjects. Had the Treaty of Berlin sanctioned, instead of undoing the Treaty of San Stefano,

the whole of Macedonia would have come under Bulgarian sovereignty; and although Servia and especially Greece would have protested against the Bulgarian absorption of their Macedonian brethren (whom they had always hoped to bring under their own jurisdiction when the Turk was expelled), the result would certainly have been better for all the Christian inhabitants of Macedonia as well as for the Mohammedans (who number 800,000 persons or nearly one third of the entire population of Macedonia). As it was these people were all doomed to a continuation of Turkish misgovernment, oppression, and slaughter. The Treaty of Berlin indeed provided for reforms, but the Porte through diplomacy and delay frustrated all the efforts of Europe to have them put into effect. For fifteen years the people waited for the fulfillment of the European promise of an amelioration of their condition, enduring meanwhile the scandalous misgovernment of Abdul Hamid II. But after 1893 revolutionary societies became active. The Internal Organization was a local body whose programme was 'Macedonia for the Macedonians.' But both in Bulgaria and Greece there were organized societies which sent insurgent bands into Macedonia to maintain and assert their respective national interests. This was one of the causes of the war between Turkey and Greece in 1897, and the reverses of the Greeks in that war inured to the advantage of the Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia. Servian bands soon after began to appear on the scene. These hostile activities in Macedonia naturally produced reprisals at the hands of the Turkish authorities. In one district alone 100 villages were burned, over 8,000 houses destroyed, and 60,000 peasants left without homes at the beginning of winter. Meanwhile the Austrian and Russian governments intervened and drew up elaborate schemes of reform, but their plans could not be adequately enforced and the result was failure. The AustroRussian entente came to an end in 1908, and in the same year England joined Russia in a project aiming at a better administration of justice and involving more effective European supervision. Scarcely had this programme been announced when the revolution under the Young Turk party broke out which promised to the world a regeneration of the Ottoman Empire. [See TURKEY: 1903-1907.] Hopeful of these constitutional reformers of Turkey, Europe withdrew from Macedonia and entrusted its destinies to its new master. Never was there a more bitter disappointment. If autocratic Sultans had punished the poor Macedonians with whips, the Young Turks flayed them with scorpions. Sympathy, indignation, and horror conspired with nationalistic aspirations and territorial interests to arouse the kindred populations of the surrounding states. And in October, 1912, war was declared against Turkey by Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece."-J. G. Schurman, Balkan wars (19121913), PP. 30-32.-See also TURKEY: 1912-1913. 1912.-War opened by Montenegro.-The smallest member of the Balkan League started the conflict on its own account, before the others were ready. "On Wednesday, October 9, the astounding news of Montenegro's declaration of war took every one aback, especially as the earlier press telegrams had announced Turkey's decision to introduce into Macedonia the reforms sanctioned by the law of 1880, which would at least afford a convenient basis for negotiation. The diplomatic corps was furious and did not hesitate to term it an insult to the Great Powers. Relatively, however, it created little excitement in the capital [Belgrade], although a few unscrupulous news

papers did a thriving business by selling extra editions which did not contain any additional news.... On the next day it became more and more apparent that the Montenegrin coup de force had created a serious flutter in diplomatic dovecots, and no secret was made of the fact that every one suspected Russia of having egged on King Nicholas. The chief argument given as proof of Russian support was that Nicholas declared war with such indecent haste in order to prevent the Russian and Austrian ministers presenting the pacific advice of their governments in Cettigne, as they did on the same day in Sofia, Belgrade and Athens. . . . From October 11 events moved apace, and it became more and more apparent, even to the dullest, that any intervention of the Powers would now come too late. . . . The next step was the presentation to the Turkish Ministers in the four capitals of the allied States of a Note dictating the reforms which must be applied by the Sublime Porte to improve the conditions of the Christian population in the vilayets of Macedonia and Adrianople."-Special correspondent, Balkan war drama, London, 1913, pp. 66-68."Nor was it, perhaps, unfitting that the Balkan country, over whose rude crags the Crescent had never flown, should be the champion to throw down the glove of defiance in that death-struggle which was to free the Balkans from the Turk. Pretexts for war were not wanting, for the normal state of life upon the frontier between Montenegro and Albania is one of disguised warfare. A Montenegrin post had been besieged by the Turks, and the apologies of the Turkish Minister at Cettigne were not accepted. Nothing further was needed to set alight the conflagration. War against Turkey was declared, and at once every Montenegrin sprang to arms."-R. Rankin, Inner history of the Balkan war, p. 160.-See also MON

TENEGRO: 1912-1913.

1912-1913.-Entrance of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece. "Turkey was attacked on four sides at the same time, as the movements of the Allies were well coördinated. The Montenegrins invaded Albania; the Serbians, Northern Macedonia; the Bulgarians, Thrace; and the Greeks, Southern Macedonia. General Savoff, with an army of three hundred thousand Bulgarians, captured Kirk-Kilisseh. He then engaged the enemy at the great Battle of Lule Burgas (October 27 to November 2), where a Turkish army of one hundred and fifty thousand was completely routed by the Bulgarians, who displayed great skill and courage. The Turks were driven to seek refuge behind the fortress of Tchatalja, which barred the way to Constantinople. [Behind the Tchatalja lines the Turks were strongly intrenched and in uninterrupted communication with Constantinople.] The Serbians, too, won notable successes in the western field. They occupied Prishtina, Novi Bazaar, and Monastir; and on November 28 they captured the important seaport of Durazzo. The Greeks invaded Macedonia from the south; and, after a series of victories, they laid siege to Saloniki, which surrendered on November 8. The Greek navy did notable service by blockading Turkish ports and by capturing many islands in the Ægean." On November 14, 1912, simultaneous proposals with a view to mediation were made to the Balkan States by representatives of the Great Powers. At Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens the governments agreed to take the matter into consideration. At Cettigne the King's representative declared that Montenegro could not now consent to an armistice except subject to the unconditional surrender of Skutari. "At the instance of Sir Edward Grey, the English Foreign Minister, an

mistice preliminary to peace was signed in London on December 3, 1912. The armistice, 'however, accomplished nothing, for Turkey refused to surrender Adrianople to Bulgaria and the Egean Islands to Greece. Hostilities were resumed early in February of the following year. The Greeks captured Janina, and a combined army of Serbs and Bulgarians forced their way into Adrianople. Scutari, an important town in Albania, was invested by an army of Montenegrins, who continued to besiege it even after a second armistice was made to negotiate a peace. It fell on April 23, 1913. Representatives of the belligerent nations met in London, where, on May 30, 1913. they concluded peace. Turkey was practically ousted from Europe, as she was compelled to cede to the Allies all her European territory except Constantinople and the adjacent region, which lay between the Sea of Marmora and the line connecting Midia on the Black Sea with Enos on the Ægean. Crete was given to Greece. The status of the islands in the Egean and that of Albania were left for a later decision."-J. S. Schapiro, Modern and contemporary European history, pp. 646-647. -"Kirk-Kilissé marks the end of an epoch, the Bismarckian, and the beginning of a new era, not merely of European, but of world history. Thirtynine years before the discovery of America the Turks took Constantinople. Four hundred and fifty-nine years later Turkey virtually ceased to be a European power. Although, in consequence of Bulgarian treason to the cause of Balkan Unity, Turkey ultimately recovered Adrianople from which she had been driven, she has, in reality, been thrust back into Asia by a military coalition of the small Slav States This is the first result of the Balkan War of 1912. The War has put an end to the dream of Catherine II: the road to Byzantium is closed to Russia. At the same time the enforced concentration of the Turks in Asia will oblige Russia to exercise special vigilance in the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian, and particularly in her sphere of influence in Armenia. But while Russia has been arrested in her overland march to the Middle Sea, Austria has been arrested as well, and Germany also: a new Slav empire, a potential United States of Balkany, is taking the place left vacant by the Ottomans, closing the road to Salonica, and the Pan-German hopes of eventually making Trieste an integral part of the national patrimony of Greater Germany have thus been dissipated."W. M. Fullerton, Problems of power, pp. 333-334 (London, 1914). See also BULGARIA: 1912: First Balkan War; GREECE: 1912; SERBIA: 1909-1913; WORLD WAR: Causes: Indirect: d, 3.

shared with Montenegro; whilst those in Kossovo and in old Servia neither gave her a direct access to the seaboard of the Egean nor provided her with any compensation for the blood and treasure which she had expended for Bulgaria in Thrace.

In short, by the Treaty of London the sole Power which had gained far more than could have been anticipated even by the wildest dreamers at the outbreak of the war, was Bulgaria, and those gains she had to a great extent made with the help of her Allies. Yet, of all the Allied Powers, Bulgaria was the only one which showed herself unreasonable. The Bulgarians ignored the sacrifices of their Allies, and held only to their ethnographical claims, real or pretended. . . . But Servia held, and probably rightly, that as she had been cut off from the Adriatic, and as the war had been prolonged for four months so as to enable Bulgaria to acquire Adrianople at the cost of Servian blood, she was entitled to a revision of these arrangements [as made in the Treaty of March 13, 1912], especially as much of the disputed territory, for instance, Prilip and Monastir, was already held by Servian troops. This revision Bulgaria refused to grant mainly upon the grounds that Servia had not been called upon to give her the military support in Western Thrace which had been provided for by the military convention. . . . In both Servia and in Bulgaria the war fever was rising.... Greece, Montenegro, and Servia accepted, moreover, without reserve, the invitation to the Conference of Prime Ministers at St. Petersburg [Petrograd]; Bulgaria alone held back on the pretext that she wished to submit the questions at issue to the arbitration of the six Great Powers, and not to that of those of the Triple Entente alone. . . . Servia, on June 22, rejected the Bulgarian proposals, and suggested that the original Treaty should be torn up and a newer and wider basis created for Russian arbitration. . . . In vain the Great Powers made representations both at Belgrade and Sofia to induce the disputants to submit to arbitration: the military element was too strong to be disregarded."-R. Rankin, Inner history of the Balkan war, pp. 524-526, 529. -"A second Balkan war broke out in July, 1913. this time between Bulgaria and her erstwhile allies. Hostile armies began to converge on Bulgaria from three directions, Serbians and Montenegrins from the west [see MONTENEGRO: 1912-1913], Greeks from the south [see GREECE: 1913: Second Balkan War], and Rumanians from the south. Several battes were fought in which the Bulgarians were defeated. Frightful atrocities were committed on both sides, who now hated each other more than they hated the Turks The latter, taking advantage of the dissensions among their foes,' reopened hostilities and recaptured Adrianople from the Bulgarians. At the instance of Austria the Second Balkan War was brought to a close by the Treaty of Bucharest, which was concluded on August 10, 1913. Bulgaria was shorn of nearly all her conquests . . . By the Treaty of Constantinople (Sept. 29, 1013) between Turkey and Bulgaria, the former doubled the European territory left to her by the Treaty of London, as Adrianople and Eastern Thrace were given back to the Sultan."-J. S Schapiro, Modern and contemporary European history, p. 648 Rumania had remained neutral during the first Balkan war. When the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute became acute, a significant communication from Bucharest appeared in a Vienna journal stating that Rumania would not remain neutral in the event of another war: "Any government which should remain inactive during a new Balkan war would be swept away by the force of public opin

1912-1913.-Effect of wars on England, Germany and Austria.-London conference. See WORLD WAR: Diplomatic background: 71 (viii); and (ix.)

1913. Second Balkan war.--Serbo-Bulgarian quarrel.-Break-up of League.-Bulgarian defeat and losses.-"By the Treaty of London, Bulgaria had gained not only the much-coveted territories in Macedonia, but nearly the whole of Thrace, and it was to be left to the Powers to lay down the frontier between the extreme points of Enos and of Midia, which was to determine how near she was to be brought to Gallipoli, to the Sea of Marmora, and to Constantinople Servia, on the other hand, had profited but little by the war. The jealousy of Austria and of Italy had excluded her from the Adriatic, which she could only reach under conditions which made her in fact if not in name the humble servant of Montenegro and of Albania; her gains in the Sanjak with its bleak pasture lands would have to be