"[For the love of God, and for the sake as well of our peoples as of ourselves, I promise that from this day forth, as God shall grant me wisdom and strength, I will treat this my brother as one's brother ought to be treated, provided that he shall do the same by me. And with Lothair I will not willingly enter into any dealings which may injure this my brother."-E. Emerton, Mediæval Europe, p. 27.]

"The actual division between Louis and Charles of Lothaire's 'Middle Kingdom' did not take place until many years after the Treaty of Verdun. It was not until about 870 that Louis the German entered into the possession of his share, which included Alsace as well as other of the Lotharingian parcels. Then the Vosges Mountains, instead of the Rhine River, became the boundary between the Germanic and Frankish kingdoms. ... Germany counted her own birthday as the day when the Treaty of Verdun was signed. A thousand years of existence was celebrated in 1843. Into that thousand-year nationality, Alsace did not enter either at the beginning or the end. On both days her fate was linked to another sovereignty...

[See also

"Had the realm covered by the titular authority of Charles the Great remained intact, the Alsatian tract might have had a different history, for the great Carolingian made Colmar and Schlestadt his residence from time to time, and a mid-European capital might have grown into importance,― a capital looking east and west over a wide imperial domain. But after 870 A. D. the lot of Alsace as a border land on Germanized territory was practically decided, although confusing changes continued to make her ultimate political affiliations look very uncertain from time to time. LORRAINE: 911-980.] The trail of hazardous fortune cannot be followed in detail. In the twelfth century her fealty was due to the great German King and Roman Emperor (1152), Frederick Barbarossa, while her immediate control was in the hands of various lesser authorities. A new power was springing into being at that period, destined to affect European life more than was possible for the sovereign, seldom seen by the people at large. That was the free city, waxing into prowess by means of valuable privileges bought from emperors who wished to obtain money for schemes of conquest or personal ambition, or bestowed by them voluntarily for the purpose of erecting burgher bulwarks against over-powerful nobles. In course of time, ten of these communes came into being in Alsace, while Strasburg besides being a city state continued to exert influence as a dominant episcopal see. Long before the two Pragmatic Sanctions of Frederick II (1220 and 1232) endowed bishops and nobles with supremacy in their own towns,-except when the Emperor was present in person,-this Alsatian bishopric had acquired territorial independence and a high degree of temporal power. Once, indeed, when the city attempted to use influence in an imperial election, it suffered seriously at the hands of the successful candidate whom it had opposed to no purpose, but as a rule it managed to hold its own against any interference from without. By the third quarter of the fifteenth century, the state of Alsatian administration was as follows: First, it must be noted that after the episode of Duke Ettich-Eticho, Attich-the dukedom does not seem to have been revived as such. Without examining too curiously how it all happened, we find in existence two landgraviates, dividing Alsace into two gauen, the Sundgau and the Nordgau, the latter, Lower Alsace, dependent on the see of

Strasburg, the former, Upper Alsace, in the hands of the cadet branch of the House of Habsburg. . . . Financial embarrassments led to a curious commercial transaction in regard to the lands to which the Habsburgs had title. Sigismund of Austria mortgaged his rights to Charles of Burgundy and the report made to the latter by Jean Poinsot and Jean Pellot, June 13, 1471, gives a detailed account of the condition of Alsace. Here is the story of what happened and what led to such happening.

"The Habsburgs took the title by which they have so long been known from a castle built in the eleventh century by one bishop of Strasburg and his brother Radbod upon the Aar, in Swiss territory, not far from the border of Upper Alsace. Tradition has it that Radbod followed his hawkHabicht-into an unknown region and was SO much charmed with the beauty of the spot that he decided to build a castle there and, later, named the house Habichtsburg from the guide who had led him thither. The longer term contracted, naturally, by easy transition into Habsburg and has held its own to this day. Little by little, the family grew to be one of the foremost in the Empire, and in 1273 its reputation was enhanced by the elevation of Rudolph, Count of Habsburg, to the imperial dignity, the first of many sons of the race to hold that office, although it did not become the assured perquisite of the Habsburgs until later. [See also AUSTRIA: 12461282.] It may be added that Radbod and his brother the bishop, Werner, who collaborated in the castle building on the heights of the Wulpelsberg, are alleged to be descendants of Duke Ettich of Alsace. Possibly the tradition originated to account for the partition of the two gauen or districts of Alsace between the see of Strasburg and the count of Habsburg. After three centuries of fortunes, more or less fair, we find Frederick III. Emperor, and his cousin the Archduke Sigismund, of the cadet branch, in possession of the Habsburg lands in Tyrol in various other places, besides being Landgrave of the Sundgau and holding other estates in Alsace. Sigismund did not have a compact principality to administer from his capital, Innspruck, and perhaps that was the reason why he fell into serious difficulties in every direction.... There was a group of princes in Europe at this epoch (1460), Louis XI. of France, Charles of Burgundy, Frederick III. and his son Maximilian, who spent their lives in trying to overreach each other. Frederick could not help his cousin, so Sigismund applied to Louis XI. for assistance, but fear of the Swiss made the King refuse. Then the Archduke went down to the Netherlands with his petition and found Charles more amenable. The reason was plain. Charles was most desirous of uniting his Netherland group of duchies, countships, and seigniories with his two Burgundies, and the territories offered to him by Sigismund lay so as to fill in part of the gap between. The Burgundian's hope of erecting a new edition of a 'Middle Kingdom' affected his policy in many respects and never more markedly than in this transaction with Sigismund. The bargain was made. Perhaps the fact that the applicant was pretty close to the Emperor, who alone could turn a duke into a real king, made Charles especially willing to oblige his needy visitor. At St. Omer on May 9th another of the long row of treaties was signed which, without the slightest concern for the will of the inhabitants, disposed of the political control of Alsatian soil. Charles agreed to pay Sigismund ten thousand florins immediately and forty thousand before Septem1

24th in return for the cession of all Sigismund's seigniorial rights in the landgraviate of Alsace, the county of Ferrette, and in certain Rhine towns. If he found himself in possession of means to buy back his landgraviate, Sigismund was to be permitted so to do, provided that he could produce at Besançon the whole sum at once, that augmented by all the outlays made by the Burgundian upon the property. . . . No real gain came to Charles from the Treaty of St. Omer. The Austrian dukes had not been popular in Alsace, but their poverty had prevented them from being hard masters even where they retained the right to exert any local authority at all. . . . Before the death of Charles at Nancy in 1477, Sigismund had drawn back the Alsace estates to the Habsburgs. His friends rallied around him when they saw what Charles was about. Money was found for the Archduke, who was enabled to offer his creditor full redemption, with the required payment in one sum. Charles had refused to accept this and, as far as appears clearly, no money ever did return to the Burgundian treasury."-R. Putnam, Alsace and Lorraine, pp. 22-37.

843-870.-Included in the kingdom of Lorraine. See LORRAINE: 843-870.

10th century.-Joined to the Holy Roman empire. See LORRAINE: 911-980.

13th century.-Origin of the house of Hapsburg. See AUSTRIA: 1246-1282.

1525.-Revolt of the peasants. See GERMANY:

1524-1525.

1552-1774.-Medieval period.-Thirty Years' War. Under Louis XIV, acquired by Louis XV. "In the later Middle Ages Lorraine formed a duchy, within which lay a number of small and in some cases independent feudal states and the city of Metz, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire whose people spoke French. In 1552, on the petition of certain German Protestant princes, Metz was placed under the protection of the king of France, who took possession of the city and the surrounding territory subject to it. In 1613 the bishopric of Metz and its lands were taken over by the French king, the whole being combined with Toul and Verdun into the three provinces of the Three Bishoprics (Trois Evêchés), and the cession was confirmed by the Emperor in the treaty of Westphalia of 1648. [See also GERMANY. 1648.1 Further acquisitions made in the seventeenth century, notably Sierck and Saarlouis, gave France a strategic line of communication through Lorraine to Alsace. The duchy of Lorraine, which had likewise been dependent on the Holy Roman Empire, was declared free by Emperor Charles V and was gradually drawn into the French sphere of influence. Relinquished by its Hapsburg duke in 1736, in 1738 by the treaty of Vienna it was handed over to a Polish duke, Stanislas Lesreynski, on condition that at his death it should pass to his son-in-law, Louis XV of France, by whom it was accordingly acquired in

1700

Certain small enclaves within Lorraine did not pass to France until the Revolution. Alsace, except the city of Mulhouse, was annexed to France in the course of the reign of Louis XIV. The Middle Ages had broken the country up into a great variety of feudal states and free cities; the Reformation divided it still further by reHelous dissensions In the Thirty Years' War France Intervened on the side of the Protestant princes of Germany, at its close France received condiderable possessions in Alsace, in much the same way that Brandenburg (the future Prussia) then secured valuable additions in the north. The treaty of Westphadex (1848) assured to France

certain lands and certain governmental rights possessed by the Emperor in his imperial capacity and as head of the house of Hapsburg, but the provisions were, possibly with intention, left vague at certain points and became the occasion of protracted legal and historical disputes. By a combination of undoubted grants, more or less justified legal interpretations, and the direct seizure of the city of Strasburg, Louis XIV rounded out his possession of the whole of Alsace. [See also FRANCE: 1679-1681.] The sole exception, Mülhouse, allied with the Swiss Confederation, voluntarily offered itself to France in 1798."-C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, Some problems of the Peace Conference, pp. 77-79.

1621-1622.-Invasions by Mansfeld and his predatory army. See GERMANY: 1621-1623.

1636-1639.-Invasion and conquest by Duke Bernhard of Weimar.-Secured for France by Richelieu. See GERMANY: 1634-1639.

1659.-Renunciation of the claims of the king of Spain. See FRANCE: 1659-1661.

1674-1678.-Ravaged in the campaigns of Turenne and Condé. See NETHERLANDS: 16741678.

1744.-Invasion by the Austrians. TRIA: 1743-1744.

See Aus

1789-1794.-French revolution period.-Origin of the Marseillaise.-The abolition of feudal privileges was one of the first steps of the Revolution, which reverberated in Alsace, where German princes held feudal privileges. These being directly threatened, the rulers appealed to the emperor. Acording to Maurice Leon, this attempt by a handful of German princes to force their feudal claims upon the country that first abolished them in Europe precipitated the war of monarchical Europe against revolutionary France and the consequent attempt to suppress republicanism in France. The Revolution, however, won the day; the people of Alsace and Lorraine sent delegates to the Assembly, while the princes held aloof. The stirring strains of the "Marseillaise" were first sung in Strassburg in 1792, and breathe defiance to the German invaders from Prussia. --See also MUSIC: Folk music and nationalism: France

1871.-Cession to Germany.-"At the close of the Franco-Prussian war Germany required of France the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, with a boundary on the west which was defined by the treaty of Frankfort in 1871. In the next forty years Alsace-Lorraine passed through various stages of government, from military dictatorship through a certain amount of territorial independence to the definite constitution imposed by the Reichstag in 1911. Those who had hoped for autonomy were disappointed in this instrument. which failed to elevate the Reichsland to the position of a federated state of the empire, although an anomalous provision was made for its representation in the Bundesrat. Legally Alsace-Lorraine was still a subject territory of the em pire. . . . For more than half a century the prob lem of Alsace-Lorraine has been debated back and forth with arguments which have had no effect on the opposite sides of the controversy. To the French Alsace and Lorraine had become and remained fundamentally French, having been assimilated gradually and without violence in the eighteenth century, French most of all by having entered fully into the spirit of the French Revolution and taken an active part therein. They begged to remain a part of France in 1871, as the unanimous protests of their representatives show and they continued French at heart against the strongest pressure in the opposite direction. In

spite of differences of language, such as exist in other parts of France, Alsace and Lorraine were French in social structure, in political ideals, and in the sympathies of the population. Without these lost provinces France was a mutilated country, not fully France. Furthermore, the possession of Metz and the Vosges by a military power like Germany constituted a standing menace to a peaceful country like the French Republic; it also menaced the economic life of France and its defence by making possible, as in 1914, immediate seizure of the richest part of its iron supply. France was robbed of these provinces by force in 1871, and the wrong had to be righted, not only in the interest of France but for the sake of the inhabitants."-C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, Some problems of the Peace Conference, pp. 80-85. -"The French call their neighbour [Germany] Allemagne, after an unimportant Teuton people that settled in and about Alsace in the break-up of the Western empire. Teutonic Alsace, Protestant and German-speaking, was conquered by France in the seventeenth century, the last stage of the conquest being marked by circumstances of exceptional treachery and wrong. Nevertheless it became thoroughly French in sentiment, and strongly resented being re-transferred to Germany in 1871. On which side is the principle of nationality to be invoked in the case of Alsace for or against the present [1907] state of things? There is nothing but sentiment to draw it towards France, nothing except sentiment to alienate it from Germany."-H. B. George, Relations of geography and history, pp. 58, 65-66.-"The last great cession of territory in Europe [1871] deprived France of its piece of territory bordering on the Rhine, and restored to Germany a district German in race and language."-Ibid., p. 30.-"The German conquest of 1870 made the political frontier correspond much more nearly to the division of races and languages, though entirely against the wish of the people, who had in the interval been incorporated in France. It is instructive to compare the fate of Lorraine with that of Savoy, that is to say with the composite state over which the dukes of Savoy ruled. Both were divided in language, and more or less in race: both were situated between two great and often hostile powers: both were to a certain extent, in the person of their princes, attracted towards France. Yet Lorraine was, so to speak, squeezed to death between France and Germany, while the house of Savoy throve on the vicissitudes of several centuries, and ultimately became sovereigns of united Italy.... But the main reason for the contrast between Lorraine and Savoy is geographical. It has been pointed out . . . how the Alps between Savoy and Piedmont helped the fortunes of those princes. Lorraine had no such backbone: it lay completely open to France, and Germany had no particular motive for defending it; for it can hardly be said that Metz, in French hands, constituted a menace to Germany, however the case may be now that it has reverted to German hands [in 1871]. The acquisition of Alsace by France marks the end of the period of religious wars, as the seizure of the three bishoprics marks the beginning. It was a piece of sheer undisguised conquest, without any excuse of nationality or of a personal convention between any Alsatian ruler and France. Richelieu simply took advantage of the distractions of Germany to lay hands on a German province. . . a province essentially German ever since the Allemanni invaded the Roman empire, and Protestant in addition. Louis XIV completed the robbery, and indeed improved

on the method. During a period of general peace he seized Strassburg and other places-which, though situated within Alsace, were politically independent of it-and the Empire was not strong enough to resent the outrage."—Ibid., pp. 237-238. -See also FRANCE: 1871 (January-May).

1871-1879.-Organization of government as a German imperial province. See GERMANY: 18711879.

1879-1894.-Manteuffel era of German rule.Administration of Hohenlohe as Statthalter.Policy of Alsatian minister Puttkammer.-"The 'Manteuffel Era,' as this period of Alsatian history is called, lasted six years, from 1879 to 1885. If anyone could have succeeded in the rôle he had mapped out Manteuffel could have. Believing correctly that no government is successful for any length of time that does not have the people on its side, Manteuffel sought first to know those among whom he had come to rule. He traveled much through the country, trying to impart his ideas to local officials and notabilities, municipal councilors, clergymen, and teachers, to say the happy and healing word to everyone. He told the people of Alsace and Lorraine that he understood and respected their sentiments, that he did not ask for an enthusiastic adhesion to the new order of things, but only a reasoned submission to the ineluctable fact. He warned them, however, that he would proceed à outrance against anyone who should conspire with the foreigner. He announced that as the Doge of Venice had solemnly wedded the Adriatic, so he wished to woo Alsace-Lorraine and obtain her liberties for her. . . . In his personal capacity he won general esteem. Accessible to all, receiving freely even workingmen who came to present their grievances, he exemplified the fine politeness of the Old Régime and was a more popular figure than his predecessor or than any of his successors were to be. . . . In his fundamental purpose Manteuffel could not succeed. Moreover, he did not have the support of his own officials whose conduct served more or less to nullify and insulate the Staathalter. All through his regency the bureaucrats of Alsace-Lorraine, big and little, carried on an incessant and perfidious campaign in the German press, seeking to undermine him. Harassed by the Germans who criticised his moderation and irritated by the Alsatians and Lorrainers whose passive resistance to the one thing that counted revealed the essential superficiality of the 'pacification,' moreover compelled from time to time in the discharge of his obligations to the authorities in Berlin to adopt harsh and unpopular measures, such as the suppression of certain newspapers. . . . Manteuffel stood insecurely upon treacherous sands. So strong was the opposition to his policy in Germany that he would have been recalled had it not been that the octogenarian Emperor, William I, did not like to dismiss old friends and advisers. . . . Manteuffel's programme, the only wise one, could only succeed if assured of length of years for its realization. And these were not to be vouchsafed the sagacious experiment. Manteuffel's official days were numbered. But he was spared the crowning humiliation of recall because his earthly days were also numbered. He died on June 17, 1885, and the policy for which he stood died with him. As the Manteuffel régime had not, in the brief space of six years, reconciled Alsace to Germany, as the process of comparatively mild Germanization had made no appreciable advance, the German government now resorted to methods with which it was more familiar, and in which it had a more robust faith. Coercion, pure and simple,

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10th century.-
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13th century.—
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1525.-Revolt
1524-1525.

1552-1774.-M
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undisguised, applied at every gerous and applied without interruption, was henceof the government. To pretion of this policy a new Chlodwig von HohenloheThe period of pointed.

1871 now began and lasted ed all through this regency, the promotion of Hohenip of the Empire in 1894. ger, replete with incidents France, and Alsace-Lorraine Hohenlohe had tried to - Alsace to secure from the : candidates favorable to the r. He told the Alsatians province would inevitably cities and would be fear-tending armies. The rewas quite unexpected. and supported by the Statdefeated. A solid deleganataires' was sent to the gistered voters, the 'provotes, that is 82,000 more ar them in 1884. So stiffemphatically to be tamed

Bismarck went at the termination, exceedingly irwing condemnation of his me it was so overwhelmut the Empire. Extraorsures now rained upon independent people. The Hoffman, considered too recalled and Puttkammer, was appointed in his place, policy of punishment and

4

T

other person, not a German, who wished to enter Alsace-Lorraine, must get a passport viséed at the German embassy in Paris, and it was intended that this passport should be granted only in exceptional cases."-C. D. Hazen, Alsace-Lorraine under German rule, pp. 125-134.

1911. Constitution. "The people of AlsaceLorraine had for forty years been in absolute subjection to other wills than their own. Though allowed a Delegation or Landesausschuss, before which routine legislative proposals were laid, yet that body was elected not directly by the people but indirectly and largely by and from district and municipal councils, so that, by reason of its complicated and carefully controlled composition as well as because of the humble character of its powers, it could only be servile. It could at any moment be overruled by outside powers, by the local executive, appointed from Berlin, or by Berlin itself. There was in this form of government no satisfaction given to the legitimate desire of the Alsatians to manage their own affairs. . . . On March 15, 1910, the Chancellor of the Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, announced in the Reichstag that the Emperor had agreed with the confederated governments to grant a more autonomous constitution to Alsace-Lorraine. This announcement was received with lively satisfaction. But the people of the Reichsland were soon to learn that the Greeks are not the only people to suspect when they come forward bearing gifts. When, on June 29, the members of the Landesausschuss expressed the desire that the Landesausschuss should be consulted beforehand as to the constitutional changes under consideration in Berlin they were informed by the Alsatian ministry that the Imperial Government did not recognize the right of the Landesausschuss to mix in questions which belonged exclusively to the Bundersrath and the Reichstag. Indeed, the speech of the Chancellor ought to have checked any undue optimism on the part of the Alsations. Stating that it was necessary to grant a greater political independence to Alsace,' the Chancellor proceeded to lecture both the Pan-Germanists-for their opposition to any concessions and those whom he called the 'PanFrench,' for their particularistic and Francophile agitation. The cry 'Alsace for the Alsatians' had. he said, a seductive sound, but he added that this could never be realized as long as the leaders of the movement affected not to recognize the fundamentally German character of the population and aimed at Gallicizing the country in the face of ethnography and history..... The cause of Alsace was thus really lost in advance. . . . The actual plan for reform was not laid before the Reichstag until December, 1910. Its discussion dragged from the start. When the Landesausschuss expressed opposition to certain features of the plan its session was abruptly closed, May 9, 1911, an action which naturally produced a bad impression upon the country. On May 26, 1911, the new Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine was voted by the Reichstag. Violently opposed by the PanGermanists and betrayed by those so-called liberal parties in the Reichstag whose supposed principles required that they support it, Alsatian autonomy came out practically by the same door wherein it went. Only one change of any importance was made. The Landesausschuss, or singlechambered body, was now to give way to a bicameral legislature which was henceforth to be the sole source of legislation for Alsace-Lorraine. The lower house was to be elected by secret and practically manhood suffrage, but this house was to be balanced by an upper house in which the

had declined even to Secretary of State and of Alsace-Lorraine, until Metz... had been exAccordingly the ReichMarch 31, 1887, an act enwho did not care for parAgainst another deputy Mulhouse, a decree of then suspended, then reecution and finally by a measure, which forced the jepart. A vigorous attack

various Alsatian organizamedical society of Strasburg, societies. Other organizaadmit the German immidership, such as gymnastic t clubs, were likewise disse decree.... A series of

alarming and calculated a and tension of the times, arrest, on Alsatian soil, of ailway official at Pagny-sur

colleague of Novéant who ther for the transaction of cident that for several days hold its breath (April 20, ay of intimidation received ation in a measure, which,

German government would be recalcitrants, a new and scribing the use of passports, orce June 1, 1888. Hencees of people were absolutely Lorraine, for instance, anythe French army. Every

Government would always be assured of a majority. The control of the legislature over the budget, a vital test of its importance, was affirmed but was rendered illusory by the provision that if it should refuse to vote it, then the Government should be entirely free to levy taxes and incur expenses on the basis of the preceding budget, that is, to raise and spend as much money as ever. Moreover the legislature, in this respect like the other legislatures of Germany, would have no means of enforcing its wishes. The executive power remained concentrated, as before, in the hands of the Statthalter who would reside, it is true, in Strasburg, but whose inspiration and instructions would come, as hitherto, from Berlin. The local ministry was to be, as hitherto, responible not to the elected chamber, but to the Statthalter alone, and the Statthalter was responsible only to the Emperor. As the Statthalter and the ministry were to appoint and control the bureaucracy, or civil service, Alsace would remain, as in the past, entirely subject to an oligarchy of oreign officials, the detested immigrants from Germany, and to the daily vexations and irritaions of a despotic bureaucracy. Every individual in Alsace would be subjected as during the past torty years to the system of espionage which is one of the ubiquitous elements of modern German government. The Constitution of 1911 pretended to raise Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of a German state, to place it on a plane of equality with the other twenty-five members of the confederation. In practice it did nothing of the kind. It allowed her three votes in the Bundesrath. She would thus, like all the other states, be represented in both the Bundesrath and the Reichstag. But the three delegates from AlsaceLorraine were to receive their instructions from the Statthalter, were to vote in the Bundesrath as he might direct. But the Statthalter was not an independent sovereign like the King of Saxony or the Duke of Mecklenburg, ruling by his own right; nor was he an elected republican head of the state. He was appointed by the Emperor, and was his representative, revocable at will and consequently not likely to do anything distasteful to him. The Constitution af 1911 increased greatly the power of the Emperor; it did not increase the power of the people. In theory AlsaceLorraine was given statehood; in practice, she was to be as tightly bound as ever. ... The Alsatians were shown, in all this campaign of much talk about nothing, that nowhere in Germany did they have any friends in their desire for real self-government, not even in the Center and Socialist parties which decisively betrayed their allies in the Reichsland for the sake of the immediate political advantages which offered themelves. The latter coöperated with the Conservatives and the Pan-Germanists in granting this mockery of autonomy. The trail of Pan-Germanism was everywhere to be seen in the annexed provinces during the few remaining years of peace. It was indeed provided by Article 28 that any further modification of the new Constitution should be made by the Reichstag and the Bundesrath. The people themselves of the new 'state' would not be able to change their fundamental law in any particular. Their Constitution of 1911, like that of 1879, now superseded, was blighted in the same way.... At any moment the legislative organs of the German Empire were at liberty to withdraw it or to alter it. Alsace-Lorraine remained what she had always been in theory and in fact, an Imperial Territory, a Reichsland. the property of the collective states of the confedera

tion. . . . The period from 1911 to 1914 was the last act in the long and ignoble history of oppression which since 1870 has been the sign manual of German rule. The situation became steadily more and more critical for the Alsatians and Lorrainers.

"After 1911 a species of terrorization was organized in Alsace-Lorraine. Spies infested the country, denouncing every manifestation of opposition or criticism. Even local officials like the Statthalter, Wedel, or the chief secretary, Zorn von Bulach, a native Alsatian who had long ago gone over to the German official side, were reproached bitterly . . . with lukewarmness and indifference to the welfare of the Fatherland. . . During the three years preceding . . . [the World War] the cloven hoof appeared repeatedly. The public opinion of the provinces was exacerbated and alarmed by a series of irritating episodes which showed the people the humiliation of their position, the fragility, indeed the non-existence, of any guarantee of their liberties. Hansi (J. J. Waltz), a native Alsatian, was thrown into prison for having caricatured a Pan-German high school teacher, Herr Gneisse, and in 1914 he was

prosecuted for high treason in the federal court at Leipsic because of caricatures which in any self-governing country would pass current as the most ordinary satires upon the foibles and pretensions of the official class. Abbé Wetterlé, editor of a newspaper in Colmar, and formerly a member of the Reichstag, was condemned to fine and imprisonment for protesting against the insolence of the Pan-Germans. A merchant of Mülhouse was expelled from Alsace for having asked a hotel orchestra to play the Marseillaise. During these years, also, the authorities proceeded against numerous Alsatian societies and clubs in a way that could only create widespread irritation and resentment, against choral unions, gymnastic clubs, and societies founded for the purpose of caring for the graves of Alsatians who died on Alsatian soil during the Franco-German war. In addition to military and political pressure, economic pressure was also used to further the programme of Germanization. Alsatian economic interests were repeatedly sacrificed in the interest of neighboring states like Baden or of the powerful RhenishWestphalian steel-and-iron-mongers. Alsatian manufacturers or merchants were the victims of despicable informers and all who were suspected of French sympathies were made to feel the full displeasure of the government. The great locomotive corporation of Graffenstaden, on which the life of that town absolutely depended, was informed that there would be no more government contracts, unless it dismissed a manager whom the Pan-Germanists considered Francophile. As the business would have been ruined without government orders, the corporation submitted. reaction of all these incidents, grave or petty as the case might be, was exactly what might have been expected. The Alsatians and Lorrainers united as one man against this recrudescence of tyranny. Dropping their differences of opinion, ignoring party lines, they joined in indignant protest against a government which subjected them to continued maltreatment, which failed to assure them the most elementary rights of free men. The hollowness and the mockery of the boasted Constitution of 1011 were patent to all the world in the light of these events."-C. D. Hazen, Alsace-Lorraine under German rule, pp. 175-186. 1913.--Zabern (Saverne) affair.-"The Berlin government was harassed by the fear of treasonable arrangements between Alsace-Lorraine ..

The