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SHERMAN IN COMMAND-REBEL STRATEGY.
of his seat in the Senate, and the disso- not fully compensate the Rebellion lution of the Union; demonstrating, for the loss of its boldest and most after his fashion, the unconstitution- unscrupulous champion in the Fedality of struggling to uphold the Con-eral Congress. stitution; the atrocity of the despotism which had ventured to arrest a few of the many traitors actively at work to subvert the National Government; and charging the Legislature of his State with "woeful subserviency to every demand of Federal despotism and woeful neglect of every right of the Kentucky citizen," etc., etc. Here is a specimen of his rhetoric:
"I would speak of these things with the simple solemnity which their magnitude demands; yet it is difficult to restrain the expression of a just indignation while we smart
under such enormities. Mr. Lincoln has
thousands of soldiers on our soil, nearly all from the North, and most of them foreigners, whom he employs as his instruments to do these things. But few Kentuckians have enlisted under his standard; for we are not yet accustomed to his peculiar form of lib
"I will not pursue the disgraceful subject. Has Kentucky passed out of the control of her own people? Shall hirelings of the pen, recently imported from the North, sitting in grand security at the Capital, force public opinion to approve these usurpations and point out victims? Shall Mr. Lincoln, through his German mercenaries, imprison or exile the children of the men who laid the foundations of the Commonwealth, and compel our noble people to exhaust themselves in furnishing the money to destroy their own freedom? Never, while Kentucky remains the Kentucky of old!-never, while thousands of her gallant sons have the will and the nerve to make the State sing to the music of their rifles!"
Gen. W. T. Sherman, early in October, succeeded Gen. Anderson in command of the district of Kentucky. The Rebels, with an art which they had already brought to perfection, imposed on him, with success, as on Gen. McClellan and other of our commanders, a most exaggerated notion of the amount of their forces; so that, when Kentucky might easily have been cleared of armed foes by a concerted and resolute advance, Sherman was telegraphing furiously to the War Department for large reënforcements; and, when visited at Louisville, on the 18th, by Secretary Cameron and Adjt.-Gen. Thomas, he gravely informed them that he should need 200,000 men to recover and hold Kentucky; when, in fact, there were not 40,000 Rebels in arms within the limits of that State.
Pollard, writing of the early part of November, says:
"Despite the victory of Belmont, our situation in Kentucky was one of extreme weakness, and entirely at the mercy of the enemy, if he had not been imposed upon by false representations of the number of our forces at Bowling Green.
***“About the middle of September, Gen. Buckner advanced, with a small force of about 4,000 men, which was increased, by the 15th of October, to 12,000; and, though other accessions of force were received, it continued at about the same strength until
the end of November, measles and other diseases keeping down the effective force. The enemy's force then was reported to the War Department at 50,000; and an advance was impossible."
It is clear that Mr. Breckinridge, in his exodus from Kentucky, had perpetrated a serious blunder. As a declaimer in the Senate, in chorus with Vallandigham, Voorhees, and May, The Unionists of south-eastern Kenhe was worth far more to the Con- tucky were mustering and organizing federacy than as a Brigadier in its under Col. Garrard at a point known military service; and even the elec- as Camp Wild-Cat, when Zollicoffer tion of Garret Davis in his stead did | advanced (Oct. 20th) with seven re
giments and a light battery, to attack | either party in this affair was incon
and disperse them. Gen. Schoepf, who had just reached the camp, assumed command of the Union forces prior to the attack, which was made on the morning of the 21st. The
Rebels were superior in numbers; but the Unionists had a strong position, and very easily beat off their assailants, who made two attacks to no purpose, and were repulsed and driven away without serious loss on either side.
A considerable Rebel force, under Col. John S. Williams, having been collected at Piketon, the capital of Pike, the easternmost county of Kentucky, at the head of the Big Sandy, Gen. Wm. Nelson, commanding the Union forces in Eastern Kentucky, started from Prestonburg, Nov. 8th, in quest of them. Having not less than 3,000 men, while Williams reports his full strength at 1,010, Nelson had, at 11 o'clock, A. M., of the 7th, dispatched Col. Apperson, of the 33d Ohio, with nearly half his force, to gain the rear of Piketon by a circuitous route through that rugged, almost roadless region, so as to inclose the Rebels between two fires, and compel their surrender. It was first telegraphed that this movement had proved a perfect success; but Williams, who seems to have been thoroughly posted throughout, retarded Nelson's direct advance by smart, judicious skirmishing in the positions assuring him the greatest advantage, while he hurried off the cattle and other spoils industriously collected from that poor, thinly-settled region, on the road to Pound Gap, whither he retreated on the 9th-his rearguard of 400 leaving Piketon just as Nelson was entering it. The loss of
siderable-not over 100-but the conduct of our soldiers was faultless, and their patient endurance of fatigue, exposure, and privation, most commendable. Williams-who appears to have admirably timed and managed his retreat-reported his force stronger at Pound Gap on the, 13th than it was at Piketon on the 8th.
The heroic Unionists of East Tennessee, who had anxiously expected and awaited the arrival of a Union force since the opening of the struggle, were led to believe, after our successes at Camp Wild-Cat and other points, that its appearance would not much longer be delayed. Many of them stole through the woods and over the mountains to join it and hasten its march; while many of those who remained at home conspired to burn the more important railroad bridges throughout their section, in order to preclude the arrival of reënforcements to their Rebel oppressors during the struggle supposed to be just at hand. They succeeded in burning three or four, but failed with regard to others; and all of them who were captured by the Rebels while engaged in or escaping from these attempts were promptly consigned to an ignominious death.
The hopes of the loyal Tennesseans were strangely and utterly blasted. Gen. Schoepf, in command of our army which, after the repulse of the Rebel attack on Camp Wild-Cat, confronted Zollicoffer, after advancing two or three days in the direction of Cumberland Gap, was induced, by a favorite stratagem of the Rebels, to believe that an overwhelming Confederate force was advancing on his
KENTUCKY TAKEN IN BY THE CONFEDERACY.
appoint Commissioners to negotiate.
right flank from Bowling Green, anders; and this Council proceeded to about to pounce upon and annihilate him. There was not a shadow of foundation for this story: the Rebels at Bowling Green were glad enough to keep still, and not expose their weakness, knowing well that Sherman might and would have crushed them, had he been aware of it; yet, without waiting to verify this absurd report, Gen. Schoepf faced about and raced two days toward the Ohio, as if for dear life, strewing the road with wrecked wagons, dead horses, baggage, etc., and leaving East Tennessee to her fate. The bitter disappointment and agony of her gallant sons in his army, who but now confidently supposed themselves about to see the old flag floating in triumph from the spires of Knoxville and Jonesville, can but faintly be realized.
George W. Ewing,
How it happened that two of these persons-Messrs. Henry C. Burnett and Thomas B. Monroe-were, that same day, sworn in as Senators from Kentucky at Richmond, it is not easy to understand; but it is of no consequence. They had probably been appointed, several days before, by
since then, Kentucky has been regularly represented in the Confederate Congress, though no popular election thereto was ever held on her soil, and no shadow of consent ever given by
On the 18th of November, the Kentucky Secessionists held a Convention at Russellville, in the south-'Governor' Johnson. Suffice it that, ernmost of her counties, behind their principal camp at Bowling Green, and organized what they termed a 'Provisional' Government-perhaps from their inability to make any provision for its support. Geo. W. John-her to such delegation of power. son, of Scott county, was here chosen Governor; the party having had enough of popular elections, in which they never had any success or made a respectable figure. They chose, likewise, a "Legislative Council," which they clothed with ample pow
• Johnson being killed in the battle at Shiloh next Spring, he was somehow succeeded in his shadowy Governorship by Richard Hawes a weak old man who, some quarter of a century before, had twice represented, as a Whig, the Lexington district in Congress.
late, her representatives in that Congress have been chosen by the Kentuckians serving in the Rebel armies; which, though not very regular, seems straightforward and businesslike. They represent bayonets; let them be chosen accordingly."
10 The Louisville Journal of Oct. 12th sharply said:
"Hundreds of those exceedingly sensitive Kentuckians, who so eloquently proclaimed that they could never take up arms against the Southern States, inasmuch as those States were Kentucky's sisters, have now taken up arms for the 'So announced next morning in The Norfolk conquest of Kentucky herself! Isn't that enough Day-Book.
to make the devil laugh?"
THE POTOMAC-BALL'S BLUFF-DRANESVILLE.
THE disaster at Bull Run, and the amazing imbecility betrayed in allowing several of the regiments there routed to continue their panic-stricken, disorderly flight over the bridges into Washington, whence many soldiers, and even officers, dispersed to their respective homes, had dispelled all lingering illusions as to the capacity of Gen. Scott for the conduct of a great war. Though it was still deemed a military necessity to conceal the failure of his faculties, to excuse his blunders, and even, in some instances, to eulogize his abilities as well as magnify his services, the urgent, imperative need of replacing him by a younger and more vigorous commander was felt by every intelligent Unionist. It was he, Winfield Scott, and none other, who had precipitated a third of our forces, on or near the line of the Potomac, into a decisive conflict with seven-eighths of the Rebel strength in Virginia, in defiance of every dictate of prudence and of common sense. Neither the President, nor the Secretary of War, nor Gen. McDowell, nor the maligned and detested Radicals--who were naturally anxious that our 75,000 three
1 Gen. Scott, in commenting on Gen. Patterson's testimony in a deliberately written statement, made to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says:
"As connected with this subject, I hope I may be permitted to notice the charge made against me, on the floor of Congress, that I did not stop Brig. Gen. McDowell's movement upon Manassas Junction after I had been informed of
months' men should not be disbanded and sent home without having been of the least positive service-had ever desired or expected any such conflict as this. It was Gen. Scott who had given the orders under which Gen. McDowell advanced and fought on Sunday, the 21st of July. Gen. Cameron, the Secretary of War, who was at Centerville during the preceding day, saw plainly that our regiments at the front were not so many as they should be, and returned hastily that evening to Washington to procure a countermand of the order for battle; but arrived too late to see Gen. Scott and obtain it. Badly as Patterson had behaved, he had reported, on the 18th, by telegraph to Scott, his flank movement to Charlestown; which, any one could see, left Gen. Johnston at perfect liberty to hasten, with all his available force, to the aid of Beauregard at Manassas. And, on the 20th-the day before Bull Run-he had telegraphed to Scott that Johnston had actually departed on that errand.' Though Gen. Scott remained nominally in chief command until the last day of October, he was practically superseded
the reënforcement sent thither from Winchester, though urged to do so by one or more members of the Cabinet. Now, it was, at the reception of that news, too late to call off the troops from the attack; and, beside, though opposed to the movement at first, we had all become animated and sanguine of success; and it is not true that I was urged by anybody in authority to stop the attack; which was commenced as early, I think, as the 18th of July."
GEN. MCCLELLAN IN COMMAND AT WASHINGTON.
forthwith by the formation of a new military department of Washington and of north-eastern Virginia, which Gen. George B. McClellan was summoned, by telegraph, from that of Western Virginia to preside over. This change was officially announced on the 25th of July; on which day Gen. McClellan arrived at Philadelphia, and there received a most enthusiastic ovation. He proceeded next morning to Washington.
Gen. McClellan found the army intrusted with the defense of the capital reduced, by defeat, desertions, and the mustering out of most of the three-months' men, to 50,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery, with 30 field-guns. The city was protected, on the Virginia side of the Potomac, by hastily-constructed but substantial earthworks, on which some heavy guns were mounted. But, if the Rebels had chosen to ford the Potomac a few miles above, either Washington or Baltimore lay at their mercy, provided they could defeat this army in the open field. They did not, however, see fit to risk so bold a movement; though military critics believe that, for the two weeks succeeding their victory at Bull Run, it might have been attempted with reasonable prospect of success. They could probably have thrown across the river a force nearly or quite equal in numbers to that which defended Washington, whereof at least 5,000 would necessarily have been retained in the earthworks on the Virginia side; while the prestige of their recent victory, and the consequent demoralization of our troops, secured to the Rebels decided advantages, which 3 Aug. 4th.
2 July 30th, 1861.
each succeeding week was morally certain to diminish. They did not, however, attempt to cross the Potomac in force, nor even to provoke another battle on its south bank; but, having advanced their lines, soon after their victory, to Munson's Hill, a few miles from Alexandria, they only remained there until a night attack had been planned on our side; when, promptly forewarned by traitors, they hastily withdrew to Fairfax. It does not appear that the main body of their army ever deliberately took position this side of Centerville.
Gen. McClellan commenced by ordering the officers and men of his army out of Washington, where too many, especially of the former, had hitherto been indulged in idling away their time, to the neglect of their duties and the damage of their morals. Col. Andrew Porter, of the 16th regulars, was appointed Provost Marshal to carry this order into effect. The organization of the Army into brigades was soon afterward3 effected; and these brigades were ultimately formed into divisions. But the formation of army corps was, for some reason, postponed and delayed, until finally it was peremptorily directed by the President.