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strong, under Lieut. Col. Stuart, on cannonading and skirmishing, but no the heels of our flying troops. He serious engagement, on our left. 18 telegraphed that night to his Con- But, when our defeat on the right gress as follows:
became manifest, Gen. Johnston ?? “MANASSAS JUNCTION, Sunday night.
again ordered Ewell to advance and “ Night has closed upon a hard-fought attack; which he did, but was refield. Our forces were victorious. The
ceived by the 2d brigade, Col. T. A. enemy was routed, and fled precipitately, abandoning a large amount of arms, ammu
Davis, with so rapid and spirited a nition, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground fire of grape and canister that he was strewed for miles with those killed, and
precipitately retreated. There were the farm-houses and the ground around were filled with wounded.
still more than three hours of good “Pursuit was continued along several daylight when the Rebels saw our routes, toward Leesburg and Centerville, until darkness covered the fugitives. We
routed right rushing madly from the have captured several field-batteries, stands field,18 like frightened sheep, yet their of arms, and Union and State flags. Many
pursuit amounted to nothing. They prisoners have been taken. Too high praise cannot be bestowed, whether for the skill came across Bull Run, preceded by of the principal officers, or for the gallantry their cavalry, and seem to have taken of all our troops. The battle was mainly fought on our left. Our force was 15,000;
a deliberate, though rather distant, that of the enemy estimated at 35,000. survey of the 5th division, drawn up "JEFFERSON Davis."
in good order along the slope west of Had Davis been aware of the utter Centerville, and eagerly expecting demoralization of our soldiers by their advance. But they appear to panic, he would doubtless have had have been aware that their victory them pursued, not only toward Cen- / was a lucky accident, and they did terville, but, if possible, into and be- not choose to submit its prestige to yond it; and he would not have the chances of another fray. Having needed so grossly to understate the gratified their thirst for knowledge, strength of his army in order to considerably out of musket-shot, they magnify his victory.
returned to their previous hidingBefore 3 P. M., there had been fitful places in the woods skirting Bull
18 Beauregard says, in his official report, that "Notwithstanding all that I had seen, it he sent orders to Gen. Ewell, holding his ex- seemed incredible that our whole army should treme right at the Union Mills ford, next south
melt away in a night; and so I remained at
Centerville, trusting that, by the morning, a sort of Blackburn's (on Bull Run), to advance and
of reorganization would have taken place, and attack; and that they did advance a mile toward
that our front would still oppose the enemy. Centerville on the Union Mills road, but retreated | At y A. M., I started toward the battle-field; again "under a sharp fire of artillery, in conse
and, on reaching a considerable acclivity, was
amazed to find that no vestige of our troops requence of the miscarriage of orders.”
mained, excepting a score or two of straggling 17 Gen. Johnston, who had joined Beauregard, fugitives, who followed the tracks of those who at Winchester on the 20th, was the ranking off had gone before. While returning to Centerville, cer, and entitled to command: but, after listening
a group of Rebel cavalry passed, who looked to Beauregard's plans, promptly acceded to them,
inquiringly, but did not question. Their conver
sation turned upon the chances of cutting off the and directed him to carry them into execution.
retreat at Fairfax Court House. After seeking As Davis himself finally arrived on the field, the Mr. Waud, an artist from New York, who also Rebel army may be said to have had three com lingered, I went straight to Fairfax. As we manders-in-chief during the course of the battle. passed the church used as a hospital, the doctors 18 A correspondent of The New York Tribune,
came out, and, finding what was the condition
une, of affairs, walked rapidly away. I do not wish who witnessed and described the battle and the to say that they deserted the wounded. They flight, says:
| may have returned, for aught I know."
Run." During the fore part of the Gen. McDowell reports our losses night, some of our men, who had not in this engagement at 481 killed and been stampeded, went down toward | 1,011 wounded, but says nothing of the battle-field and brought away how many wounded or others were one or two guns, which had been taken prisoners. Gen. Beauregard abandoned in the flight, but not cap- reports the Rebel loss at 269 killed tured by the enemy. Our 5th di- and 1,533 wounded;"in all, 1,852; vision, constituting the reserve, now saying nothing of any loss in prisonbecome the rear-guard, of our army, ers, of whom two or three hundred remained in position until after mid-were taken by our soldiers in the night; when, under peremptory orders early part of the battle, and duly forfrom Gen. McDowell, it commenced warded to Washington. He says he its deliberate retreat to the environs had sent 1,460 wounded and other of Washington.ao
prisoners to Richmond, and estimates
19 Beauregard, in his official report, thus | wards, Green, and the New-York 8th regiment, lamely explains this modesty: .
(the latter served by volunteers from Wilcox's 16 Tariy's brigade, meanwhile, joined by the 19th | brigade,) 20 pieces in all, were at once placed in Virginia, regiment. Lieut. Col. Strange of Cocke's position ; and thus remained until 12 o'clock brigade, pursued the now panic-stricken, fugitive
P. M., when, orders having been received to reenemy. Stuart, with his cavalry, and Beckham,
tire upon the Potomac, the batteries were put had also taken up the pursuit along the road by
in march, and, covered by Richardson's brigade, which the enemy had come upon the field that
retired in good order and without hast and, morning; but, soon encumbered by prisoners,
early next morning, reöccupied their former who thronged his way, the former was unabló
camps on the Potomac." to attack the mass of the fast-fleeing, frantic Col. J. B. Richardson, commanding the 4th Federalists. Withers's, R. J. Preston's, Cash's, brigade of Tyler's division, remained unmolested and Kershaw's regiments, Hampton's Legion in position one mile in advance of Centerville, on and Kemper's battery, also pursued along the
the Blackburn's Ford road, until 2 A. M. of MonWarrenton road by the Stone Bridge, the enemy having opportunely opened a way for them
day; then retreated, per order, through Centerthrough the heavy abatis which my troops had
ville to l'airfax and Arlington, entirely unassailed. made on the west side of the bridge, several
21 Among our killed were Col. James Camedays before. But this pursuit was soon recalled, in consequence of a fulse report, which unfortu
ron, brother of the Secretary of War of the 79th nately reached us, that the enemy's reserves, known New York (Highlanders); Col. Slocum, and to be fresh and of considerable strength, were threat Major Ballou, of the 2d Rhode Island; and Lieut. ening the position of Union Mills Ford."
Col. Haggerty, of the 69th New York. Among 20 The impression that the Rebels, had they our wounded were Gen. David Hunter and Gen. pursued, might have captured or dispersed our
S. P. Heintzelman--commanding divisions; Col. flying forces, is upsustained by facts. For be- Oliver B. Wilcox, of Michigan; Col. Gilman tween the panic-stricken fugitives and the vic Marston, of the 1st New Hampshire; Col. A. M. tors were not merely the reserve (5th) di Wood, of the 14th New York; Col. H. W. vision, which remained in position, and had | Slocum, of the 27th New York: and Col. N. I not fired a shot, but the 1st (Tyler's) division Farnham, of the 11th New York (Fire Zouaves). forming our left, which had suffered little loss, Col. Wilcox was also taken prisoner, as well as but had signally repulsed the demonstration Col. Michael Corcoran, of the 69th New York made upon it at the close of the fight; while the | (Irish), and Maj. James D. Potter, of the 38th better portion of our beaten right and center, New York—both slightly wounded. including the regular infantry and cavalry, still
22 “ Se De Kay," a Rebel officer, writing to stood its ground and sternly faced the foe.
The Louisville Courier from Manassas Junction, Maj. Barry, our Chief of Artillery in the battle,
on the 22d, says: in his official report, after noticing the loss of
“Our loss is fully two thousand killed and ten of his guns at the close, through the flight of
wounded. Among the killed are Gen. Bee, of their supporting infantry, says:
South Carolina; Gen. E. K. Smith, sa mistakel, "The army having retired upon Centerville, | Gen. Bartow, of Georgia; Col. Moore and all I was ordered by Gen. McDowell in person, to the Alabama field officers; Col. Fisher and the not the artillery in position to cover the retreat. I North Carolina field officers: Adit. Branch of “The batteries of Hunt, Ayres, Tidball, Ed- | Georgia, and a host of other leading men."
[five weeks after the fight] that the there was no pursuit, and no loss on number may be increased to 1,600. our part after the battle, but of what That is certainly a very lean exhibit our men threw away. Beauregard of prisoners as the fruit of so de- explains his failure to pursue, after cisive a victory; but the fleetness of our discomfiture, as follows: our soldiers is to be taken into the « An army which had fought like ours on account. He guesses that our losses that day, against uncommon odds, under a will amount to 4.500 in killed, wound- July sun, most of the time without water
and without food, except a hastily snatched ed, and prisoners, and adds :
meal at dawn, was not in condition for the
toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy "The ordnance and supplies captured in- | immediately after the battle. clude some 28 23 field-pieces of the best
1 “On the following day, an unusually character of arms, 24 with over 100 rounds / heat
heavy and unintermitting fall of rain interof ammunition for each gun, 37 caissons, 6
vened to obstruct our advance, with reasonforges, 4 battery-wagons, 64 artillery horses,
able prospect of fruitful results. Added to completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small- this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient arms ammunition, 4,500 sets of accouter
numbers made an efficient pursuit a inilitary ments, over 500 muskets, some 9 regimental
impossibility." and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blan The forces actually engaged in this kets, a large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and celebrated battle, so decisive in its garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some results and so important in its consesubsistence.”
quences, were probably not far from At 7 A. M., of Monday, the 22d, the 25,000 on either side ; as while the comlast of our stragglers and wounded batants actually on the battle-field, or left Centerville, which a Rebel cav- so near it as to be practically at the alry force was about to enter. But | disposal of the respective command
23 Our reports admit a loss of 17 guns; other tion of artillery, attempted to run the gauntlet accounts make it 22. Beauregard, writing on
and reach the bridge over Cub Run, about two the 26th of August, should have been able to
miles from Centerville, but found it obstructed
with broken vehicles, and was compelled to state the exact number. His statement of the
abandon his pieces, as they were under the fire number of muskets taken at "over 500," in
of these rifled cannon. The cavalry turned to cluding all those dropped by our dead and the left, and, after passing through a strip of wounded, proves that the stories told by exci | woods and some fields, struck a road which led ted correspondents and other fugitives, of our
them to some camps occupied by our troops in
the morning, through which we gained the turnmen throwing away everything that could im
pike. At about 8 P. M., we reached the camps pede their flight, were gross exaggerations.
we had occupied in the morning. Had a brigade
from the reserve advanced a short distance be24 Gen. Heintzelman, in his official report of
| yond Centerville, nearly one-third of the artilthe battle, giving an account of his retreat by lery lost might have been saved, as it was abanthe circuitous road on which he had advanced, doned at or near this crossing." says:
These were the only gung lost by us, save
those abandoned for want of horses, on the im“Having every reason to fear a vigorous pursuit from the enemy's fresh troops, I was desi
mediate field of conflict. rous of forming a strong rear-guard; but neither
26 Pollard, in his "Southern History," says: the efforts of the officers of the regular army, nor the coolness of the regular troops with me, could
"Our effective force of all arms ready for action induce them to form a single company. We re
on the field, on the eventful morning, was less lied entirely for our protection on one section of
than 30,000 men." artillery and a few companies of cavalry. Most This was before the arrival of that portion of of the road was favorable for infantry, but unfa Johnston's army led to the field by Kirby Smith, vorable for cavalry and artillery. About dusk,
and afterward commanded by Elzey, or the brigas we approached the Warrenton turnpike, we heard a firing of rifled cannon on our right, and
ade of Earlyto say nothing of the reënforcelearned that the enemy had established a battery
ments that were received during the day from · enfilading the road, Capt. Arnold, with his sec- the direction of Richmond.
CAUSES OF OUR DEFEAT-SCOTT'S STRATEGY. : 547
ers, were, on either side, not far from their foes not only outnumbered them 35,000. But the Rebels, who were in their front, but filled the woods on somewhat the fewer at day-break, their right flank, exposing them to fought under the encouraging stimu- an enfilading fire, which they could lus of a knowledge that every hour, not return with effect; and, their deas it passed, added to their strength; feat once confessed, the confusion and that each railroad train arriving at panic of their flight are explained, not the Junction, brought fresh brigade excused, by the fact that, owing to after brigade to their support ; 24 and the long détour they had necessarily these, as they arrived, were hastened made in advancing to the attack, purto that part of the field whereon their suant to the plan of battle, their line services could be most effective : of retreat lay in part along the front while our men, who had been called of the foe, much of whose strength to arms at 2 o'clock in the morning, was actually nearer to Centerville and had generally thrown aside their than they were when the fortunes of knapsacks and haversacks to facilitate the day turned against them. . their movements, had been fourteen hours marching-some of them on The causes of this disaster, so shamethe double-quick for miles--or fight- fully misstated and perverted at the ing, and were utterly exhausted and time, are now generally understood. faint with hunger and thirst; while No one could, at this day, repeat the not a single company had been added misrepresentations that for the moto their numbers. Some regiments ment prevailed, without conscious, fought badly, and had been demor- palpable guilt and ignominy. The alized and dispersed prior to the gen- true, controlling reasons of our defeat eral catastrophe; but the great ma- are, briefly, these : jority evinced a courage and devotion 1 I. The fundamental, fatal error on which, under favoring auspices, would our side was that spirit of hesitation, have commanded victory. They gave of indecision, of calculated delay, way only when hope seemed dead -- of stolid obstruction, which guided or when the ever-increasing hosts of our Military councils, scattering our
26 Mr. Julius Bing, on his return from captivity at Richmond, having been taken prisoner on the battle-field, after seeing and hearing all that he could on both sides, reports as follows:
"Beauregard's force at Bull Run was 27,000; which was increased by 8,000 of Johnston's the day before, and by 5,000 more during the engagement. This statement is confirmed from an independent and trustworthy source."
27 The New York Times of July 26th contained a carefully prepared statement, by its Editor, of a conversation with Gen. Scott at his own dinnertable on the Tuesday before the battle; wherein Gen. Scott developed his conception of the strategy required for the overthrow of the Rebellion, as follows:
"If the matter had been left to him, he said, he would have commenced by a perfect blockade of every Southern port on the Atlantic and on
the Gulf Then he would have collected a large
forces and paralyzing our efforts. I officers who had never smelt burning Had any real purpose of suppressing powder, unless in a squirrel-hunt. the Rebellion been cherished by Gen. His advance across the Potomac, after
our eastern forces along the line of ble, was made, as we have seen, on the Potomac and Chesapeake, from the 24th of May. Within one week Cumberland to Fortress Monroe, di- thereafter, a column 50,000 men vided into three or four distinct should have taken the road to Richarmies, under the command of militiamond, with their commander in their
ruin that would speedily overwhelm them, out | gard on Friday evening, went to Gen. Scott, and of it. “This,' said he, was my plan. But I am suggested the propriety of waiting until Patteronly a subordinate. It is my business to give son's corps could come up and reënforce the army advice when it is asked, and to obey orders when that was then before Manassas; but, so firmly they are given. I shall do it. There are men in fixed was Gen. Scott's determination to attack the the Cabinet who know much more about war enemy then and there, that the President's sugthan I do, and who have far greater influence gestion was disregarded. The Secretary of War than I have in determining the plan of the cam also returned from the field before the battle, and paign. There never was a more just and upright endeavored to induce Gen. Scott to send forward man than the President- ever one who desired reënforcements; he urged it agair
nai more sincerely to promote the best interest of | and finally succeeded in having five regiments the country. But there are men among his ad. sent, two of which reached Centerville before the visers who consult their own resentments far retreat commenced." more than the dictates of wisdom and experience, and these men will probably decide the plan
Mr. Blair then took up the above statement of of the campaign. I shall do, or attempt, what The Times, and thus dealt with it: ever I am ordered to do. But they must not hold me responsible. If I am ordered to go to Rich
"I do not believe that it was Gen. Scott's plan. mond, I shall endeavor to do it. But I know
I do not think he would promulgate his plan. I perfectly well that they have no conception of
think, even, that, if such was his plan, gentlemen, the difficulties we shall encounter. I know the
without arrogating to themselves any superior country-how admirably adapted it is for de
military knowledge, might well dissent from it. I fense, and how resolutely and obstinately it will
do not profess to have any knowledge of military be defended. I would like nothing better than
matters at all; and yet I can say that any such plan to take Richmond; now that it has been dis
as that would lead to a fatal disaster to our coungraced by becoming the capital of the Rebel
try, in the relations which it would bring about Confederacy, I feel a resentment toward it, and
between the people of the Northern and Southshould like nothing better than to scatter its
ern States; in the relations it would bring about Congress to the winds. But I have lived long
between our Government and foreign governenough to know that human resentment is a
ments, and between the Union men in the Borvery bad foundation for public policy; and these
der States and their enemies. I think it would gentlemen will live long enough to learn it also.
be a fatal mistake. I am well satisfied that it I shall do what I am ordered. I shall fight | is not the plan of the Government, and will not when and where I am commanded. But, if I
be acted upon, whether Gen. Scott favors it or am compelled to fight before I am readu. theri shall not. That is the plan which the Confederate not hold me responsible. These gentlemen must
troops and authorities are in favor of, and they take the responsibility of their acts, as I am
have proceeded upon it. Their desire is to make willing to take that of mine. But they must not
the whole of this war within the Border States, throw their responsibility upon my shoulders.
and escape themselves scot free-not only freo "This is the substance and very nearly the
from Scott, but from all our other Generals. They language of a portion of Gen. Scott's conversa
wish to enjoy entire quietude, in order to raise tion on the occasion referred to. It proves con
their cotton, that they may hold it out to foreign clusively that he was opposed to the advance
nations as a bribe to break our blockade. That upon Richmond by way of Manassas, at that time."
is their object and their heart's desire.
“They wish, also, to intrench themselves withHon. Francis P. Blair, in a speech in the House
in those Border States, where they can get plen(Aug. 1st, 1861), after repelling the false impu ty of subsistence, and wring a reluctant support tation that Gen. Scott had been constrained by from the Union men of those States. The counthe President (his only superior) to fight this bat
ties of Alexandria and Fairfax gave an immenso tle prematurely, in opposition to the dictates of
Union vote when the question was submitted to
them; and, at the last vote upon the Ordinance his own judgment, stated that
of Secession, they would have given the same ." The President, after he had information that vote for the Union if they had not been reGen. Johnston had escaped through the hands strained by the bayonets of the Confederate of Gen. Patterson and had joined Gen. Beaure- | troops; for, in whatever part of Virginia they