"MANASSAS JUNCTION, Sunday night. "Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious. The enemy was routed, and fled precipitately, abandoning a large amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground was strewed for miles with those killed, and the farm-houses and the ground around were filled with wounded. "Pursuit was continued along several routes, toward Leesburg and Centerville, until darkness covered the fugitives. We have captured several field-batteries, stands of arms, and Union and State flags. Many prisoners have been taken. Too high praise cannot be bestowed, whether for the skill of the principal officers, or for the gallantry of all our troops. The battle was mainly fought on our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy estimated at 35,000. 16 17 strong, under Lieut. Col. Stuart, on | cannonading and skirmishing, but no the heels of our flying troops. He serious engagement, on our left. 1 telegraphed that night to his Con- But, when our defeat on the right gress as follows: became manifest, Gen. Johnston " again ordered Ewell to advance and attack; which he did, but was received by the 2d brigade, Col. T. A. Davis, with so rapid and spirited a fire of grape and canister that he precipitately retreated. There were still more than three hours of good daylight when the Rebels saw our routed right rushing madly from the field," like frightened sheep, yet their pursuit amounted to nothing. They came across Bull Run, preceded by their cavalry, and seem to have taken a deliberate, though rather distant, survey of the 5th division, drawn up in good order along the slope west of Centerville, and eagerly expecting their advance. But they appear to have been aware that their victory was a lucky accident, and they did not choose to submit its prestige to the chances of another fray. Having gratified their thirst for knowledge, considerably out of musket-shot, they returned to their previous hidingplaces in the woods skirting Bull "JEFFERSON DAVIS." Had Davis been aware of the utter demoralization of our soldiers by panic, he would doubtless have had them pursued, not only toward Centerville, but, if possible, into and beyond it; and he would not have needed so grossly to understate the strength of his army in order to magnify his victory. Before 3 P. M., there had been fitful 18 Beauregard says, in his official report, that he sent orders to Gen. Ewell, holding his extreme right at the Union Mills ford, next south of Blackburn's (on Bull Run), to advance and attack; and that they did advance a mile toward Centerville on the Union Mills road, but retreated again “under a sharp fire of artillery, in consequence of the miscarriage of orders." 17 Gen. Johnston, who had joined Beauregard, at Winchester on the 20th, was the ranking officer, and entitled to command: but, after listening to Beauregard's plans, promptly acceded to them, and directed him to carry them into execution. As Davis himself finally arrived on the field, the Rebel army may be said to have had three commanders-in-chief during the course of the battle. 18 A correspondent of The New York Tribune, who witnessed and described the battle and the flight, says: "Notwithstanding all that I had seen, it seemed incredible that our whole army should melt away in a night; and so I remained at Centerville, trusting that, by the morning, a sort of reorganization would have taken place, and that our front would still oppose the enemy. At 7 A. M., I started toward the battle-field; and, on reaching a considerable acclivity, was amazed to find that no vestige of our troops remained, excepting a score or two of straggling fugitives, who followed the tracks of those who had gone before. While returning to Centerville, a group of Rebel cavalry passed, who looked inquiringly, but did not question. Their conversation turned upon the chances of cutting off the retreat at Fairfax Court House. After seeking Mr. Waud, an artist from New York, who also lingered, I went straight to Fairfax. As we passed the church used as a hospital, the doctors came out, and, finding what was the condition of affairs, walked rapidly away. I do not wish to say that they deserted the wounded. They may have returned, for aught I know." 19 FAILURE OF THE VICTORS TO PURSUE-LOSSES. Run. During the fore part of the night, some of our men, who had not been stampeded, went down toward the battle-field and brought away one or two guns, which had been abandoned in the flight, but not captured by the enemy. Our 5th division, constituting the reserve, now become the rear-guard, of our army, remained in position until after midnight; when, under peremptory orders from Gen. McDowell, it commenced its deliberate retreat to the environs of Washington.20 19 Beauregard, in his official report, thus lamely explains this modesty : "Early's brigade, meanwhile, joined by the 19th Virginia regiment, Lieut. Col. Strange, of Cocke's brigade, pursued the now panic-stricken, fugitive enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry, and Beckham, had also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy had come upon the field that morning; but, soon encumbered by prisoners, who thronged his way, the former was unable to attack the mass of the fast-fleeing, frantic Federalists. Withers's, R. J. Preston's, Cash's, and Kershaw's regiments, Hampton's Legion and Kemper's battery, also pursued along the Warrenton road by the Stone Bridge, the enemy having opportunely opened a way for them through the heavy abatis which my troops had made on the west side of the bridge, several days before. But this pursuit was soon recalled, in consequence of a false report, which unfortunately reached us, that the enemy's reserves, known to be fresh and of considerable strength, were threatening the position of Union Mills Ford." 20 The impression that the Rebels, had they pursued, might have captured or dispersed our flying forces, is unsustained by facts. For between the panic-stricken fugitives and the victors were not merely the reserve (5th) division, which remained in position, and had not fired a shot, but the 1st (Tyler's) division forming our left, which had suffered little loss, but had signally repulsed the demonstration made upon it at the close of the fight; while the better portion of our beaten right and center, including the regular infantry and cavalry, still stood its ground and sternly faced the foe. Maj. Barry, our Chief of Artillery in the battle, in his official report, after noticing the loss of ten of his guns at the close, through the flight of their supporting infantry, says: "The army having retired upon Centerville, I was ordered by Gen. McDowell in person, to post the artillery in position to cover the retreat. "The batteries of Hunt, Ayres, Tidball, Ed 545 Gen. McDowell reports our losses in this engagement at 481 killed and 1,011 wounded, but says nothing of how many wounded or others were taken prisoners." Gen. Beauregard reports the Rebel loss at 269 killed and 1,533 wounded;" in all, 1,852; saying nothing of any loss in prisoners, of whom two or three hundred were taken by our soldiers in the early part of the battle, and duly forwarded to Washington. He says he had sent 1,460 wounded and other prisoners to Richmond, and estimates wards, Green, and the New-York 8th regiment, (the latter served by volunteers from Wilcox's brigade,) 20 pieces in all, were at once placed in position; and thus remained until 12 o'clock P. M,, when, orders having been received to retire upon the Potomac, the batteries were put in march, and, covered by Richardson's brigade, retired in good order and without haste. and, early next morning, reöccupied their former camps on the Potomac." Col. J. B. Richardson, commanding the 4th brigade of Tyler's division, remained unmolested in position one mile in advance of Centerville, on the Blackburn's Ford road, until 2 A. M. of Monday; then retreated, per order, through Centerville to Fairfax and Arlington, entirely unassailed. 21 Among our killed were Col. James Cameron, brother of the Secretary of War-of the 79th New York (Highlanders); Col. Slocum, and Major Ballou, of the 2d Rhode Island; and Lieut. Col. Haggerty, of the 69th New York. Among our wounded were Gen. David Hunter and Gen. S. P. Heintzelman-commanding divisions; Col. Oliver B. Wilcox, of Michigan; Col. Gilman Marston, of the 1st New Hampshire; Col. A. M. Wood, of the 14th New York; Col. H. W. Slocum, of the 27th New York; and Col. N. I Farnham, of the 11th New York (Fire Zouaves). Col. Wilcox was also taken prisoner, as well as Col. Michael Corcoran, of the 69th New York (Irish), and Maj. James D. Potter, of the 38th New York-both slightly wounded. 22 "Se De Kay," a Rebel officer, writing to The Louisville Courier from Manassas Junction, on the 22d, says: "Our loss is fully two thousand killed and wounded. Among the killed are Gen. Bee, of South Carolina; Gen. E. K. Smith, [a mistake], Gen. Bartow, of Georgia; Col. Moore and all the Alabama field officers; Col. Fisher and the North Carolina field officers; Adjt. Branch, of Georgia, and a host of other leading men." our part after the battle, but of what our men threw away. Beauregard explains his failure to pursue, after our discomfiture, as follows: [five weeks after the fight] that the | there was no pursuit, and no loss on number may be increased to 1,600. That is certainly a very lean exhibit of prisoners as the fruit of so decisive a victory; but the fleetness of our soldiers is to be taken into the account. He guesses that our losses will amount to 4,500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and adds : “The ordnance and supplies captured include some 28 23 field-pieces of the best character of arms, 24 with over 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun, 37 caissons, 6 forges, 4 battery-wagons, 64 artillery horses, completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of smallarms ammunition, 4,500 sets of accouterments, over 500 muskets, some 9 regimental and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and intrenching tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence." At 7 A. M., of Monday, the 22d, the last of our stragglers and wounded left Centerville, which a Rebel cavalry force was about to enter. But 23 Our reports admit a loss of 17 guns; other accounts make it 22. Beauregard, writing on the 26th of August, should have been able to state the exact number. His statement of the number of muskets taken at "over 500," including all those dropped by our dead and wounded, proves that the stories told by excited correspondents and other fugitives, of our men throwing away everything that could impede their flight, were gross exaggerations. 24 Gen. Heintzelman, in his official report of the battle, giving an account of his retreat by the circuitous road on which he had advanced, says: แ "Having every reason to fear a vigorous pursuit from the enemy's fresh troops, I was desirous of forming a strong rear-guard; but neither the efforts of the officers of the regular army, nor the coolness of the regular troops with me, could induce them to form a single company. We relied entirely for our protection on one section of artillery and a few companies of cavalry. Most of the road was favorable for infantry, but unfavorable for cavalry and artillery. About dusk, as we approached the Warrenton turnpike, we heard a firing of rifled cannon on our right, and learned that the enemy had established a battery enfilading the road. Capt. Arnold, with his sec "An army which had fought like ours on that day, against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food, except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle. "On the following day, an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance, with reasonable prospect of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility." The forces actually engaged in this celebrated battle, so decisive in its results and so important in its consequences, were probably not far from 25,000 on either side; " while the combatants actually on the battle-field, or so near it as to be practically at the disposal of the respective command 25 tion of artillery, attempted to run the gauntlet and reach the bridge over Cub Run, about two miles from Centerville, but found it obstructed with broken vehicles, and was compelled to abandon his pieces, as they were under the fire of these rifled cannon. The cavalry turned to the left, and, after passing through a strip of woods and some fields, struck a road which led them to some camps occupied by our troops in the morning, through which we gained the turnpike. At about 8 P. M., we reached the camps we had occupied in the morning. Had a brigade from the reserve advanced a short distance beyond Centerville, nearly one-third of the artillery lost might have been saved, as it was abandoned at or near this crossing." These were the only guns lost by us, save those abandoned for want of horses, on the immediate field of conflict. Pollard, in his "Southern History," says: "Our effective force of all arms ready for action on the field, on the eventful morning, was less than 30,000 men." This was before the arrival of that portion of Johnston's army led to the field by Kirby Smith, and afterward commanded by Elzey, or the brigade of Early-to say nothing of the reënforcements that were received during the day from the direction of Richmond. CAUSES OF OUR DEFEAT-SCOTT'S STRATEGY. 26 ers, were, on either side, not far from 35,000. But the Rebels, who were somewhat the fewer at day-break, fought under the encouraging stimulus of a knowledge that every hour, as it passed, added to their strength; that each railroad train arriving at the Junction, brought fresh brigade after brigade to their support; " and these, as they arrived, were hastened to that part of the field whereon their services could be most effective: while our men, who had been called to arms at 2 o'clock in the morning, and had generally thrown aside their knapsacks and haversacks to facilitate their movements, had been fourteen. hours marching-some of them on the double-quick for miles-or fighting, and were utterly exhausted and faint with hunger and thirst; while not a single company had been added to their numbers. Some regiments fought badly, and had been demoralized and dispersed prior to the general catastrophe; but the great majority evinced a courage and devotion which, under favoring auspices, would have commanded victory. They gave way only when hope seemed deadwhen the ever-increasing hosts of 26 Mr. Julius Bing, on his return from captivity at Richmond, having been taken prisoner on the battle-field, after seeing and hearing all that he could on both sides, reports as follows: "Beauregard's force at Bull Run was 27,000; which was increased by 8,000 of Johnston's the day before, and by 5,000 more during the engagement. This statement is confirmed from an independent and trustworthy source." 27 The New York Times of July 26th contained a carefully prepared statement, by its Editor, of a conversation with Gen. Scott at his own dinnertable on the Tuesday before the battle; wherein Gen. Scott developed his conception of the strategy required for the overthrow of the Rebellion, as follows: "If the matter had been left to him, he said, he would have commenced by a perfect blockade of every Southern port on the Atlantic and on 547 their foes not only outnumbered them in their front, but filled the woods on their right flank, exposing them to an enfilading fire, which they could not return with effect; and, their defeat once confessed, the confusion and panic of their flight are explained, not excused, by the fact that, owing to the long détour they had necessarily made in advancing to the attack, pursuant to the plan of battle, their line of retreat lay in part along the front of the foe, much of whose strength was actually nearer to Centerville than they were when the fortunes of the day turned against them. The causes of this disaster, so shamefully misstated and perverted at the time, are now generally understood. No one could, at this day, repeat the misrepresentations that for the moment prevailed, without conscious, palpable guilt and ignominy. The true, controlling reasons of our defeat are, briefly, these: I. The fundamental, fatal error on our side was that spirit of hesitation, of indecision, of calculated delay, of stolid obstruction, which guided " our Military councils, scattering our the Gulf Then he would have collected a large force at the capital for defensive purposes, and another large one on the Mississippi for offensive operations. The Summer months, during which it is madness to take troops south of St. Louis, should have been devoted to tactical instruction -and, with the first frosts of Autumn, he would have taken a column of 80,000 well-disciplined troops down the Mississippi-and taken every important point on that river, New Orleans included. It could have been done, he said, with greater ease, with less loss of life, and with far more important results, than would attend the marching of an army to Richmond. At eight points, the river would probably have been defended, and eight battles would have been necessary; but, in every one of them, success would have been made certain for us. The Mississippi and the Atlantic once ours, the Southern States would have been compelled, by the natural and inevitable pressure of events, to seek, by a return to the Union, escape from the forces and paralyzing our efforts. Had any real purpose of suppressing the Rebellion been cherished by Gen. Scott, he would never have scattered our eastern forces along the line of the Potomac and Chesapeake, from Cumberland to Fortress Monroe, divided into three or four distinct armies, under the command of militia ruin that would speedily overwhelm them, out of it. 'This,' said he, 'was my plan. But I am only a subordinate. It is my business to give advice when it is asked, and to obey orders when they are given. I shall do it. There are men in the Cabinet who know much more about war than I do, and who have far greater influence than I have in determining the plan of the campaign. There never was a more just and upright man than the President-never one who desired more sincerely to promote the best interest of the country. But there are men among his advisers who consult their own resentments far more than the dictates of wisdom and experience, and these men will probably decide the plan of the campaign. I shall do, or attempt, whatever I am ordered to do. But they must nothold me responsible. If I am ordered to go to Richmond, I shall endeavor to do it. But I know perfectly well that they have no conception of I know the the difficulties we shall encounter. country-how admirably adapted it is for defense, and how resolutely and obstinately it will be defended. I would like nothing better than to take Richmond; now that it has been disgraced by becoming the capital of the Rebel Confederacy, I feel a resentment toward it, and should like nothing better than to scatter its Congress to the winds. But I have lived long enough to know that human resentment is a very bad foundation for public policy; and these gentlemen will live long enough to learn it also. I shall do what I am ordered. I shall fight when and where I am commanded. But, if I am compelled to fight before I am ready, they shall not hold me responsible. These gentlemen must take the responsibility of their acts, as I am willing to take that of mine. But they must not throw their responsibility upon my shoulders.' This is the substance and very nearly the language of a portion of Gen. Scott's conversation on the occasion referred to. It proves couclusively that he was opposed to the advance upon Richmond by way of Manassas, at that time." Hon. Francis P. Blair, in a speech in the House (Aug. 1st, 1861), after repelling the false imputation that Gen. Scott had been constrained by the President (his only superior) to fight this battle prematurely, in opposition to the dictates of his own judgment, stated that "The President, after he had information that Gen. Johnston had escaped through the hands of Gen. Patterson and had joined Gen. Beaure | officers who had never smelt burning powder, unless in a squirrel-hunt. His advance across the Potomac, after having been put off so long as possible, was made, as we have seen, on the 24th of May. Within one week thereafter, a column of 50,000 men should have taken the road to Richmond, with their commander in their gard on Friday evening, went to Gen. Scott, and suggested the propriety of waiting until Patterson's corps could come up and reënforce the army that was then before Manassas; but, so firmly fixed was Gen. Scott's determination to attack the enemy then and there, that the President's suggestion was disregarded. The Secretary of War also returned from the field before the battle, and endeavored to induce Gen. Scott to send forward reënforcements; he urged it again and again; and finally succeeded in having five regiments sent, two of which reached Centerville before the retreat commenced." Mr. Blair then took up the above statement of The Times, and thus dealt with it: "I do not believe that it was Gen. Scott's plan. I do not think he would promulgate his plan. I think, even, that, if such was his plan, gentlemen, without arrogating to themselves any superior military knowledge, might well dissent from it. I do not profess to have any knowledge of military matters at all; and yet I can say that any such plan as that would lead to a fatal disaster to our country, in the relations which it would bring about between the people of the Northern and Southern States; in the relations it would bring about between our Government and foreign governments, and between the Union men in the Border States and their enemies. I think it would be a fatal mistake. I am well satisfied that it is not the plan of the Government, and will not be acted upon, whether Gen. Scott favors it or not. That is the plan which the Confederate troops and authorities are in favor of, and they have proceeded upon it. Their desire is to make the whole of this war within the Border States, and escape themselves scot free-not only free from Scott, but from all our other Generals. They wish to enjoy entire quietude, in order to raise their cotton, that they may hold it out to foreign nations as a bribe to break our blockade. That is their object and their heart's desire. "They wish, also, to intrench themselves within those Border States, where they can get plenty of subsistence, and wring a reluctant support from the Union men of those States. The counties of Alexandria and Fairfax gave an immense Union vote when the question was submitted to them; and, at the last vote upon the Ordinance of Secession, they would have given the same vote for the Union if they had not been restrained by the bayonets of the Confederate troops; for, in whatever part of Virginia they |