dutiable by Schedule K of the act of 1909; it may also be noted that paragraphs 650 and 651, supra, fix December 1, 1913, instead of January 1, 1914, as the time up to which "the rates of duty now provided by Schedule K of the existing law shall remain in full force and effect." According to our view the provisions of these paragraphs merely constitute exceptions to the rule declared by paragraph 310 of the same act. That paragraph provided in general that the dutiable. provisions of Schedule K of the former act should continue in force until January 1, 1914. But paragraphs 650 and 651 provide that in respect to wool, wool waste, etc., the provisions of the former schedule should continue in effect until December 1, 1913, only, after which time the merchandise thus specifically enumerated should be admitted free of duty. It is true that this interpretation attaches a narrower signification to the clause "until which time the rates of duty now provided by Schedule K of the existing law shall remain in full force and effect," when found in paragraphs 650 and 651, than that given the same language when found in paragraph 310. Nevertheless we think that this difference of interpretation is justified and required by the different contexts of the two clauses and their relative positions in the act. We conclude, therefore, that the provisions of paragraph 381 of the act of 1909 in relation to "women's and children's dress goods * composed in whole or in part of wool" were in full force and effect in November, 1913, at the time of the importation of the present merchandise, and that the merchandise responds to the description thereof. The next question which arises is whether the provisions of paragraph 318 of the act of 1913, for "woven fabrics, in the piece or otherwise, of which silk is the component material of chief value," is more specific in its application to the present merchandise than the enumeration of "women's and children's dress goods * composed in part of wool." It is conceded that the goods in question are in fact women's and children's dress goods, composed in part of wool; it is also conceded that they are woven fabrics composed in chief value of silk. We find, furthermore, that such provision is modified by the clause, "not specially provided for in this section." * On In comparing the two competing provisions in question we find that one is limited primarily to "dress goods," the other to "woven fabrics." It must be conceded that "dress goods" is a more narrow term than "woven fabrics," and is indeed a species thereof. the other hand, the term "woven fabrics" in the present case is modified by the clause "composed in chief value of silk," which is more narrow and specific than the contrasting modifying clause composed in part of wool." Hartranft v. Meyers (135 U. S., 237). In such a case we think that the primary or eo nomine limitations embodied in the contrasting enumerations should control, and accordingly we hold that "dress goods composed in part of wool" is a narrower and more specific description of the present merchandise than "woven fabrics, in the piece or otherwise, of which silk is the component material of chief value." Brody v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 15; T. D. 31573); Thomsen v. United States (Ib., 37; T. D. 31590); Krauss v. United States (Ib., 17; T. D. 31574); United States v. Zinn (Ib., 419; T. D. 32171); United States v. Vandegrift (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 161; T. D. 32457); Bister v. United States (59 Fed., 452); Greenfield case, G. A. 5799 (T. D. 25629); and G. A. 4126 (T. D. 19249). In the case of Brody v. United States, supra, this court held that an enumeration of "baskets of wood" should prevail over one for "manufactures of willow," the merchandise being baskets made of willow. In the case of Thomsen v. United States, supra, this court made a similar decision in favor of an enumeration of "baskets of wood" as against one of "manufactures of chip," the merchandise being baskets made of chip. * * * In the case of United States v. Vandegrift, supra, this court held that a provision for "cloth made wholly or in part of wool" was more specific than one for "manufactures of * india rubber or of which these substances or any of them is the component material of chief value," the merchandise in the case answering to both of the competing descriptions. In the case of Bister v. United States, supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held upon a similar issue in favor of a provision for "women's and children's dress goods composed wholly or in part of wool," as against one for "manufactures of which silk is the component material of chief value," the merchandise in question responding in character to each enumeration. The court, speaking by Wallace, Chief Justice, said: * It seems hardly debatable that if one provision of a tariff act should prescribe a duty on wearing apparel and another on all manufactures of which silk is the material of chief value, the former would supply the proper classification for an article of wearing apparel made of silk. * * The case falls within the general rule that where a tariff act imposes a duty on an article by a specific name or description, general terms in the act, though embracing it broadly, are not applicable to it. The general must give way to the particular. The reasoning of this decision was approved rather than departed from by the later decision of the same court in the case of Stern v. United States (98 Fed., 417). In the Greenfield case, supra, the Board of General Appraisers similarly held in favor of a provision for "clothing in part of wool," as against one for "manufactures in chief value of fur," the merchandise being overcoats made in chief value of fur. * * Reference is made in argument to the case of Hecht & Co. v. United States (5 Ct. Cust. Appls., 261; T. D. 34444) as a conclusive authority in support of the importer's claim upon the subject of the relative degree of specificity of the competing provisions now in question, but we think that the present question does not come within the ruling made in that case. The comparison before the court in the Hecht case was between "clothing, ready made, and articles of wearing apparel of every description * composed wholly or in part of wool," and "clothing, ready made, and articles of wearing apparel of every description, * of which cotton or other vegetable fiber is the component material of chief value. and not otherwise provided for in this section." The presence of the modifying clause, "not otherwise provided for," in the one provision and its absence from the other was regarded by the court as the controlling factor in the case, and decision was entered accordingly. In the present case, as already stated, the two competing provisions are alike modified by the clause "not specially provided for in this section." * * * The importer presents in his brief the claim that the merchandise at bar if imported before October 4, 1913, would have been dutiable under Schedule K of the tariff act of 1909 only by virtue of the proviso of paragraph 403 of that act, and that since this proviso was not a part of Schedule K and therefore was not extended by the terms of paragraph 310, supra, the present merchandise should not be assessed under Schedule K as extended by that paragraph. We do not enlarge upon this branch of the argument because of our foregoing conclusion that the provisions of paragraph 381 of Schedule K of the act of 1909 taken alone apply more specifically to the merchandise at bar than do the competing provisions of paragraph 318 of the act of 1913, and therefore paragraph 403 of the act of 1909 becomes unimportant in relation to the assessment. We hold that the decision of the board sustaining the importer's protest was erroneous, and it is reversed. Absence of employees, monthly report of, to department discontinued. 36554 36882 Aeroplanes, etc., Curtiss Aeroplane Co., Buffalo, N. Y., drawback on.. 36857 African bassine. (See Vegetable fiber.) Agate collar buttons: Abstracts 40148 and 39992. Appeal from Abstract 39992. 36670 Aigrettes, glass (Abstract 40263). Air brakes, Westinghouse Air Brake Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., drawback on 36604 Alabaster globes (Abstract 40148). Alabaster lamps; appraiser's report.. Albumen (Abstract 40376). International Distilling Co. (Ltd.), New Orleans, La., drawback on... 36812 Jefferson Distilling & Denaturing Co., New Orleans, La., draw- 36813 Louisiana Distillery Co. (Ltd.), New Orleans, La., drawback on. 36810 36780 36795 Aluminum tablespoons (Abstract 40355). Almond paste, National Almond Products Co. (Inc.), New York, Amendment of Customs Regulations of 1915. (See Customs Regula- |