are bound to obey all the king's laws, not being contrary to the laws of God.'....The other reserve is also made of all that authority which was committed by Christ and his apostles to the bishops and priests.' And we are not ashamed to own it freely, that we see no other reserves upon our obedience to the king besides these. So that these being here specified, there was an unexceptionable declaration made of the extent of the king's supremacy. Yet, because the term 'head of the church' had something in it that seemed harsh, there was yet a more express declaration made of this matter under Queen Elizabeth.....This explanation," [i. e., that which is in our articles,] "must be considered as the true measure of the king's supremacy; and the wide expressions in the former laws must be understood to be restrained by this, since posterior laws derogate from those that were first made....This is all that supremacy which we are bound in conscience to own; and if the letter of the law, or the stretches of that in the administration of it, have carried this further, we are not at all concerned in it. But in case any such thing were made out, it could amount to no more than this, that the civil power had made some encroachments on ecclesiastical authority; but, the submitting to an oppression, and the bearing it till some better times may deliver us from it, is no argument against our church; on the contrary, it is a proof of our temper and patience," &c.

To conclude; it would seem, on the whole, that the royal supremacy may be viewed under the following aspects :—

1. As the prerogative of governing the church externally, i. e., ruling all the members of it in civil matters, claiming their obedience, to the exclusion of all foreign jurisdiction; and this is the prerogative of every government, as such, whether heathen or Christian.Vide Canon 1, of 1603.

2. A prerogative of interfering in church matters, "in ecclesiastical causes," appointing functionaries, directing usages, providing liturgies, &c., which is only exercised by the king as Christian, and exercised on two grounds, first, because he allows the church's jurisdiction in his kingdom, and creates "prelacy," authoritative courts, and the like; and next, because, by his patriarchal power, he has a claim upon the confidence and devotion of the church. Vide Canon 2, of 1603; agreeably to which is the judgment of the eight bishops already referred to, which declares, that "in case the bishops be negligent, it is the Christian prince's office to see them do their duty."

3. The king has not the power (1) of bestowing the ministerial commission, as is plain from Henry and Edward's words, in granting license to Bonner and Cranmer, "ultra ea quæ tibi divinitus," &c.; (2) of ministering the sacraments, vide Art. 37; (3) of excommunicating, vide the Declaration subscribed by Cromwell; (4) of ministering the Word, (in which, of course, the making articles, &c., is included,) vide Art. 37.

4. There are a number of details in which the extent of the supremacy is undetermined-e. g., the king's power of depriving bishops, of creating or destroying bishopricks, &c. Judge Hales,

"the pre

indeed, places all these matters absolutely in the crown; scribing who shall be a bishop, the extent of his diocese, the circumscription of him, under pain of contempt, to act his powers of order within those limits." But here Hales' instances impair his rule, for the prescribing who shall be bishop is not "inherent in the crown," inasmuch as the chapter has the right of election. And this, indeed, may be observed generally, that in these details of jurisdiction the church has, for the most part, a concurrent voice, even where the crown has the initiative. Thus the chapter must elect when the king recommends to a bishoprick; the bishop must institute to a living; and so of induction, confirmation, installation, &c. I mean that, letting alone the apostolical powers of the church, ordination, &c., even in (so called) ecclesiastical or spiritual matters, i. e., in those peculiar institutions which, in the words of the ordination service, "this church and realm has received," the church must concur in the acts of jurisdiction exercised by the civil power. And this consideration throws some light on the state of the law in such cases of jurisdiction as are not clearly determined by the letter of it, e. g., the union of dioceses.

Lastly, I have no wish to contend that the existing state of the law is, in every part, as consistent as the theory of it is just. E. g., the power of excommunication lies in the spiritual courts, of which the king is the head; which is as great an anomaly as though he was invested with the power of ordination. Warburton, indeed, defends it; but he seems to have made his theory with a view to fit on to the existing state of our law, not upon any religious and philosophical basis.

ON THE TIME AND MANNER OF NOTICING DISSENT.

NO. IV.

SIR,-It remains to answer some objections of various kinds, to any systematic notice of Dissent, at the time and in the manner recommended in No. II., which appeared in the British Magazine of January. The subjects of these objections shall be taken in the same order as when the probable advantageous results of so doing were spoken of,-viz. (1) as they apply to the clergy, (2) to church people, (3) to dissenters.

(Obj. 1.) A clergyman feels uncomfortable and embarrassed in making such a public claim to respect for himself, as if it were magnifying his own profession, and making arrogant pretensions in his own behalf. This is natural; and the feeling arises from various causes, some of them amiable and praiseworthy-in part from a confusion between the dignity of an office, and the worth of its holder as necessarily resulting therefrom,-and some I fear blameworthy. On these last I forbear to say anything, only wishing each person, who feels thus, to search his heart very narrowly for the reason, why he shrinks from, and dislikes, avowing the sacred character of the priestly office which he bears; and to ask himself, whether he, in his mode of life, willingly

(so to say) secularizes it more than he ought, and so that an avowal of its sacred character would be, in some degree, a condemnation of his own habits of life. Upon the almost insensible confusion between the dignity of an office, and the consequent worth of its holder, let thus much be observed-that, be this as it may, the assertion of one's office is due both to those for whom we minister, and also to the office itself. Would an ambassador shrink from producing his credentials, from fear of seeming to exalt himself, if he thought that those, to whom he was commissioned, were ignorant, or forgetful, of the authority with which he was invested? To me this seems a humbling, rather than a self-exalting admission. We have a commission-do our actions run according to its tenor? Do we ourselves sufficiently respect our own office? and if not, how can we expect others to do so? At least here we ought to set the example, and shew we do not claim for the office that which we, its bearers, do not extend to it ourselves.

(Obj. 2.) It may be also objected, that it is so difficult to handle these subjects with discretion, or to find fit opportunities for bringing them forward in sermons without seeming to force them, that it may be better to leave them altogether. Might not the same argument be as conclusively used about all controverted doctrines? Besides, opportunities are not so difficult to find, as would be soon seen on an attentive observance of the lessons, or epistles, and gospel for the day. Further, there is no need always to wait for such occasions. Chance occurrences may turn the preacher's mind, or some of his congregation, that way; or it would be sufficient reason, that a long time had elapsed without any recurrence to these topics. It will not, I think, be found, that a congregation makes such nice discriminations in regard to their pastor's choice of subjects.

(Obj. 3.) Oh, but (say many persons) these are arguments which, though true in themselves, are not level to the understanding of an ordinary congregation, and cannot be brought home to their feelings, because there are not clear and decisive statements respecting them in the Bible. The conclusion may be doubted, and the premiss denied. It may be doubted whether such subjects may not be made intelligible to ordinary hearers, since doctrines more abstruse than these are made so, sufficiently so at least for the full reception; e. g., the doctrine of the Trinity-the propriety of infant baptism-of confirmation-of the present manner of observing the Lord's day-which are constantly and heartily received by those who would be quite unable to give satisfactory proof of them. Consider, as a further illustration of the fact, that the power of giving proof is in no way the law of what we receive and believe; how few common people would be able to give a clear and satisfactory account of the received canon of scripture, or even of the grounds of our reception of the Bible. The forcible words of Jer. Taylor upon another subject may be here appositely used :— "Men may be sure of the thing, even when they are not sure of the argument.'

Moreover, the premiss may be denied, that there are not clear and decisive passages of scripture bearing on these subjects, which might

not be readily brought home to their comprehension. There is a difficulty I admit. But the difficulty is not to find the passages, but to make others understand their application; e. g., (1) the passages from St. Paul against schism, and causing divisions; (2) the exhortations to preserve unity, from St. John's and St. Paul's epistles; (3) the power of excommunication* given to the church; (4) the evidence of different ministerial orders in the apostolical church, conferred in one unvarying manner, drawn from the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles, particularly those to Timothy and Titus; (5) the church mentioned as a visible body. But, if it be a visible body, must not the bonds of union be visible? Can there be a visible church whose terms of communion are invisible? Surely it cannot be denied, that there are passages from scripture clearly and decisively referring to these subjects in some way or other. And if so, thus much may be further affirmed that assuming a man to stand in a position of an authorized teacher, and looked up to, and respected as such, he would not find himself unable to convince his hearers of the manner of their application.

(Obj. 4.) There are many in whose eyes such a course would be objectionable. Those would be pained who cannot bear the appearance of pronouncing an uncharitable condemnation, and on grounds which are not quite clear. Those again, who are called, by some persons, enlightened church-men, would take offence. They would consider such views narrow, and inconsistent with what they term the spirit of Christianity; they would regard the open maintenance of such opinions in itself a proof that the dissenters have claims, and grievances to be redressed, because they are compelled to pay towards the support, or participate in the rites, of a church (e. g. in marriage) which does not hesitate openly to condemn the principle upon which the communities to which they belong are formed. Lastly, dissenters generally would be offended at such a line of conduct. What has been before said may be repeated in answer to the two first classes of objections. Those who do not like any appearance of condemning others on a doubtful point, would feel no distress, if they heard principles only, and not persons condemned; and if all remarks on these subjects were directed to explain the view of the church and were confined to general statements without any particular applications. Next, that many of those who, calling themselves enlightened Christians, stigmatize such views as bigoted and intolerant, should take offence at any statement of them, is, as has been observed, scarce to be regretted. Their cold conformity in the leading and general doctrines of Christianity is scarcely to be called communion. They are amongst us, but they are not of us. It may even be doubted how far they really agree in their way of receiving these few doctrines which

The obvious question then arises, can such a power really exist, if all descriptions of professing Christians are considered as properly belonging to Christ's church? If so, the power is but a name, for a man cannot be put out of the church, if, when excluded from one body, he can always find admission in another of equal worth and dignity.

they profess to hold in common. On the offence likely to be given to dissenters a few words may be added. It is true they will at first be indignant, will talk of popish superstition-priestcraft-spiritual pride-apostolical simplicity-Christian liberty, &c. &c. They will ask, with mixed feelings of sorrow and anger, "when will Judah cease to vex Ephraim, and Ephraim to envy Judah ?"* They will speak of the freedom from prejudice among their enlightened members, who occasionally come to church, e. g. in Lent, on Christmas day, or when there happens to be service at church and none at meeting. It may be said too, that the dissenters would be so excited to renewed and bitterert attacks on the church, complain more and more of their grievances, and gather fresh strength to their arguments in the eyes of lax and ill-instructed churchmen. Add to this, to make the case worse, some will fall away from the church, and become either dissenters or despisers (openly perhaps) of what they call ultra-orthodoxy, or clerical bigotry. Even friends may say, you are doing disservice to your own cause, you are bringing the church into danger by the extravagance of your pretensions. In answer to all these considerations, allowing them the full weight claimed for them, I ask the following questions-Is not the ground of offence the speaking truth, simply but boldly? Are not those who might be disposed to believe the truth prejudiced in the firmness of their conviction by what must be called either a sort of underhand propagation of it, or as if we ourselves hesitated, and did not feel sure of its importance? Further, may not ignorance on these points render indifference as to persuasions excusable, where there have not been opportunities of inquiring into the subject?

Surely if these questions be answered in the affirmative, there should be an end of such careful consideration of consequences. We must assert the truth, and leave results to the disposition of a higher power. It should also be remembered, that you have a right to assume those who attend your church to be church people, or at least to address them as if they were. A Roman catholic would not be expected so to preach as never to hurt the feelings of chance protestant frequenters of his church. Why should it be thought improper that a clergyman of the church of England should occasionally explain passages of scripture which involve a condemnation of the foundation principle of dissent, in the way of caution and admonition to his flock? Were

It is curious, that this favorite oratorical flourish among dissenters conveys in fact a concession of the very point at issue. Why did Judah vex Ephraim? Or again, would a dissenter say, that I laid an uncharitable charge against every individual Ephraimite, and called him a rebel, if I asserted, that the ten tribes were guilty of rebellion-or that the nation was a rebellious nation?

Without wishing to withhold the just credit for moderation and impartiality due to so many of the most respectable and gifted members of dissenting establishments, or to say what may seem undeservedly harsh, may it not be doubted, whether more systematic, more bitter, and I must add, in many cases, more unfair attacks could be circulated than are at present made by many dissenters against the church? I only mention this to shew, that the question is not, whether avoiding these subjects would prevent these frequent attacks, but only whether acting upon the views here advocated would be likely to multiply them.