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mending another you do yourself right; for he that "you commend is either superior to you in that you "commend, or inferior. If he be inferior, if he be to "be commended, you much more. If he be superior, "if he be not to be commended, you much less." Glorious men are the scorn of wise men; the admiration of fools; the idols of parasites; and the slaves of their own vaunts.
LV. OF HONOUR AND REPUTATION.
THE winning of honour is but the revealing of a man's virtue and worth without disadvantage. For some in their actions do woo and affect honour and reputation; which sort of men are commonly much talked of, but inwardly little admired. And some, contrariwise, darken their virtue in the shew of it; so as they be undervalued in opinion. If a man perform that which hath not been attempted before, or attempted and given over; or hath been atchieved, but not with so good circumstance; he shall purchase more honour than by effecting a matter of greater difficulty or virtue, wherein he is but a follower. If a man so temper his actions, as in some one of them he doth content every faction or combination of people, the music will be the fuller. A man is an ill husband of his honour, that entereth into any action, the failing wherein may disgrace him more than the carrying of it through can honour him. Honour that is gained and broken upon another, hath the quickest reflexion, like diamonds cut with fascets. And therefore let a man contend to excel any competitors of his in honour, in out-shooting them, if he can, in their own bow. Discreet followers and servants help much to reputation: omnis fama a domesticis emanat. Envy, which is the canker of honour, is best extinguished by declaring a man's self, in his ends rather to seek merit than fame; and by attributing a man's successes rather to divine providence and felicity, than to his own virtue or policy. The true marshalling of the degrees of sovereign honour, are these. In the first place are conditores imperiorum; founders of
states and commonwealths; such as were Romulus, Cyrus, Cæsar, Ottoman, Ismael. In the second place are legislatores, lawgivers, which are also called second founders, or perpetui principes, because they govern by their ordinances, after they are gone: such were Lycurgus, Solon, Justinian, Edgar, Alphonsus of Castile the wise, that made the Siete partidas. In the third place are liberatores, or salvatores; such as compound the long miseries of civil wars, or deliver their countries from servitude of strangers or tyrants; as Augustus Cæsar, Vespasianus, Aurelianus, Theodoricus, king Henry the seventh of England, king Henry the fourth of France. In the fourth place are propagatores, or propugnatores imperii, such as in honourable wars enlarge their territories, or make noble defence against invaders. And in the last place are patres patriæ, which reign justly, and make the times good wherein they live. Both which last kinds need no examples, they are in such number. Degrees of honour in subjects are; first, participes curarum, those upon whom princes do discharge the greatest weight of their affairs; their right hands, as we call them. The next are duces belli, great leaders; such as are princes lieutenants, and do them notable services in the wars. The third are gratiosi, favourites; such as exceed not this scantling, to be solace to the sovereign, and harmless to the people: and the fourth, negotiis pares; such as have great places under princes, and execute their places with sufficiency. There is an honour likewise, which may be ranked amongst the greatest, which happeneth rarely: that is, of such as sacrifice themselves to death or danger for the good of their country; as was M. Regulus, and the two Decii.
LVI. OF JUDICATURE.
JUDGES ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law. Else will it be like the authority claimed by the Church of Rome; which, under pretext of exposition of Scripture, doth not stick
to add and alter; and to pronounce that which they do not find; and by shew of antiquity to introduce novelty. Judges ought to be more learned than witty; more reverend than plausible; and more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue. Cursed, saith the law, is he that removeth the land-mark. The mislayer of a mere-stone is to blame: but it is the unjust judge that is the capital remover of land-marks, when he defineth amiss of lands and property. One foul sentence doth more hurt than many foul examples. For these do but corrupt the stream: the other corrupteth the fountain. So saith Solomon; Fons turbatus, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens in causa sua coram adversario. The office of judges may have reference unto the parties that sue; unto the advocates that plead; unto the clerks and ministers of justice underneath them; and to the sovereign or state above them.
First, for the causes or parties that sue. There be, saith the Scripture, that turn judgment into wormwood; and surely there be also that turn it into vinegar: for injustice maketh it bitter, and delays make it sour. The principal duty of a judge is, to suppress force and fraud; whereof force is the more pernicious when it is open; and fraud when it is close and disguised. Add thereto contentious suits, which ought to be spewed out as the surfeit of courts. A judge ought to prepare his way to a just sentence, as God useth to prepare his way, by raising valleys and taking down hills: so when there appeareth on either side an high hand, violent prosecution, cunning advantages taken, combination, power, great counsel, then is the virtue of a judge seen, to make inequality equal; that he may plant his judgment as upon an even ground. Qui fortiter emungit, elicit sanguinem; and where the wine-press is hard wrought, it yields a harsh wine, that tastes of the grape-stone. Judges must beware of hard constructions and strained inferences; for there is no worse torture than the torture of laws: especially in case of laws penal they ought to have care, that that which was meant for terror be not turned into
rigour; and that they bring not upon the people that shower whereof the Scripture speaketh, pluet super eos laqueos: for penal laws pressed are a shower of snares upon the people. Therefore let penal laws, if they have been sleepers of long, or if they be grown unfit for the present time, be by wise judges confined in the execution; Judiciis officium est, ut res, ita tempora rerum, etc. In causes of life and death, judges ought, as far as the law permitteth, in justice to remember mercy; and to cast a severe eye upon the example, but a merciful eye upon the person.
Secondly, for the advocates and counsel that plead: patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge, first to find that which he might have heard in due time from the bar; or to shew quickness of conceit in cutting off evidence or counsel too short; or to prevent information by questions, though pertinent. The parts of a judge in hearing are four: to direct the evidence; to moderate length, repetition, or impertinency of speech; to recapitulate, select, and collate, the material points of that which hath been said; and to give the rule or sentence. Whatsoever is above these, is too much; and proceedeth either of glory and willingness to speak, or of impatience to hear, or of shortness of memory, or of want of a stayed and equal attention. It is a strange thing to see that the boldness of advocates should prevail with judges; whereas they should imitate God, in whose seat they sit; who represseth the presumptuous, and giveth grace to the modest. But it is more strange that judges should have noted favourites; which cannot but cause multiplication of fees, and suspicion of by-ways. There is due from the judge to the advocate some commendation and gracing where causes are well handled, and fair pleaded; especially towards the side which obtaineth not; for that upholds in the client the reputation of his counsel, and beats down in him the conceit of his cause. There is likewise due to the public a civil reprehension of advocates, where there appeareth cun.
ning counsel, gross neglect, slight information, indiscreet pressing, or an over-bold defence. And let not the counsel at the bar chop with the judge, nor wind himself into the handling of the cause anew, after the judge hath declared his sentence: but on the other side, let not the judge meet the cause half way; nor give occasion to the party to say, his counsel or proofs were not heard.
Thirdly, for that that concerns clerks and ministers. The place of justice is an hallowed place; and therefore not only the bench, but the footpace, and precincts, and purprise thereof, ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption. For certainly grapes, as the Scripture saith, will not be gathered of thorns or thistles: neither can justice yield her fruit with sweetness, amongst the briers and brambles of catching and polling clerks and ministers. The attendance of courts is subject to four bad instruments. First, certain persons that are sowers of suits; which make the court swell, and the country pine. The second sort is of those that engage courts in quarrels of jurisdiction, and are not truly amici curiæ, but parasiti curiæ, in puffing a court up beyond her bounds, for their own scraps and advantage. The third sort is of those that may be accounted the left hands of courts; persons that are full of nimble and sinister tricks and shifts, whereby they pervert the plain and direct courses of courts, and bring justice into oblique lines and labyrinths. And the fourth is, the poller and exacter of fees; which justifies the common resemblance of the courts of justice to the bush, whereunto while the sheep flies for defence in weather, he is sure to lose part of his fleece. On the other side, an ancient clerk, skilful in precedents, wary in proceeding, and understanding in the business of the court, is an excellent finger of a court, and doth many times point the way to the judge himself.
Fourthly, for that which may concern the sovereign and estate. Judges ought above all to remember the conclusion of the Roman twelve tables; salus populi suprema lex; and to know that laws, except they be