spur, and that it is no matter of impediment or burden, the horse is not to be accounted the less of, which will not do well without the spur; but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy than a virtue. So glory and honour are the spurs to virtue and although virtue would languish without them, yet since they be always at hand to attend virtue, virtue is not to be said the less chosen for itself, because it needeth the spur of fame and reputation: and therefore that position, nota ejus, quod propter opinionem et non propter veritatem eligitur, hæc est; quod quis, si clam pu taret fore, facturus non esset, is reprehended.

IV.

Quod rem integram servat, bonum; quod sine receptu est, malum: nam se recipere non posse, impotentiæ genus est; potentia autem bonum.

HEREOF Æsop framed the fable of the two frogs, that consulted together in the time of drought, when many plashes, that they had repaired to, were dry, what was to be done; and the one propounded to go down into a deep well, because it was like the water would not fail there; but the other answered, "Yea, but "if it do fail, how shall we get up again?" And the reason is, that human actions are so uncertain and subject to perils, as that seemeth the best course which hath most passages out of it. Appertaining to this persuasion, the forms are: You shall engage yourself; on the other side, Non tantum, quantum voles, sumes ex fortuna, etc. You shall keep the matter in your

own hand.

The reprehension of it is, that proceeding and resolving in all actions is necessary. For as he saith well, Not to resolve, is to resolve; and many times it breeds as many necessities, and engageth as far in some other sort, as to resolve. So it is but the covetous man's disease, translated into power; for the covetous man will enjoy nothing, because he will have his full store and possibility to enjoy the more: so by this reason a man should execute nothing, because he should be still indifferent, and at liberty to execute

any thing. Besides, necessity and this same jacta est alea, hath many times an advantage, because it awaketh the powers of the mind, and strengtheneth endeavour; Cæteris pares, necessitate certe superiores estis.

V.

Quod ex pluribus constat et divisibilibus est majus, quam quod ex paucioribus, et magis unum; nam omnia per partes considerata majora videntur : quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert: fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit; nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, et impedit comprehensionem.

THIS colour seemeth palpable; for it is not plurality of parts without majority of parts, that maketh the total greater; yet nevertheless it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiveth the sense; as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead and continued, than if it have trees or buildings, or any other marks whereby the eye may divide it. So when a great monied man hath divided his chests, and coins, and bags, he seemeth to himself richer than he was; and therefore a way to amplify any thing is, to break it, and to make anatomy of it in several parts, and to examine it according to several circumstances. And this maketh the greater shew if it be done without order, for confusion maketh things muster more; and besides, what is set down by order and division, doth demonstrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there; whereas if it be without order, both the mind comprehendeth less that which is set down; and besides, it leaveth a suspicion, as if more might be said than is expressed.

This colour deceiveth, if the mind of him that is to be persuaded, do of itself over-conceive, or prejudge of the greatness of any thing; for then the breaking of it will make it seem less, because it maketh it to appear more according to the truth: and therefore if a man be in sickness or pain, the time will seem longer without a clock or hour-glass, than with it; for the mind doth value every moment, and then the

hour doth rather sum up the moments, than divide the day. So in a dead plain the way seemeth the longer, because the eye hath preconceived it shorter than the truth, and the frustrating of that maketh it seem longer than the truth. Therefore if any man have an over-great opinion of any thing, then if another think by breaking it into several considerations he shall make it seem greater to him, he will be deceived; and therefore in such cases it is not safe to divide, but to extol the entire still in general. Another case wherein this colour deceiveth, is when the matter broken or divided is not comprehended by the sense or made at once, in respect of the distracting or scattering of it; and being intire and not divided, is comprehended: as an hundred pounds in heaps of five pounds will shew more than in one gross heap, so as the heaps be all upon one table to be seen at once, otherwise not as flowers growing scattered in divers beds will shew more than if they did grow in one bed, so as all those beds be within a plot, that they be object to view at once, otherwise not: and therefore men, whose living lieth together in one shire, are commonly counted greater landed than those whose livings are dispersed, though it be more, because of the notice and comprehension. A third case wherein this colour deceiveth, and it is not so properly a case of reprehension, as it is a counter colour, being in effect as large as the colour itself; and that is, omnis compositio indigentiæ cujusdam in singulis videtur esse particeps, because if one thing would serve the turn, it were ever best, but the defect and imperfections of things hath brought in that help to piece them up; as it is said, Martha, Martha, attendis ad plurima, unum sufficit. So likewise hereupon Æsop framed the fable of the fox and the cat; whereas the fox bragged what a number of shifts and devices he had to get from the hounds, and the cat said he had but one, which was to climb a tree, which in proof was better worth than all the rest; whereof the proverb grew, Multa novit vulpes, sed felis unum magnum. And in the moral of this fable it comes likewise to pass, that

a good sure friend is a better help at a pinch, than all the stratagems and policies of a man's own wit. So it falleth out to be a common error in negociating, whereas men have many reasons to induce or persuade, they strive commonly to utter and use them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth, as was said, a neediness in every of the reasons by itself, as if one did not trust to any of them, but fled from one to another, helping himself only with that: Et quæ non prosunt singula, multa jucant. Indeed in a set speech in an assembly, it is expected a man should use all his reasons in the case he handleth, but in private persuasions it is always a great error. A fourth case wherein this colour may be reprehended, is in respect of that same vis unita fortior, according to the tale of the French king, that when the emperor's ambassador had recited his master's stile at large, which consisteth of many countries and dominions; the French king willed his chancellor, or other minister, to repeat over France as many times as the other had recited the several dominions; intending it was equivalent with them all, and more compacted and united. There is also appertaining to this colour another point, why breaking of a thing doth help it, not by way of adding a shew of magnitude unto it, but a note of excellency and rarity; whereof the forms are, Where shall you find such a concurrence; Great but not complete; for it seems a less work of nature or fortune, to make any thing in his kind greater than ordinary than to make a strange composition. Yet if it be narrowly considered, this colour will be reprehended or encountered, by imputing to all excellencies in compositions a kind of poverty, or at least a casualty or jeopardy; for from that which is excellent in greatness, somewhat may be taken, or there may be a decay, and yet sufficient left; but from that which hath his price in composition if you take away any thing, or any part do fail, all is disgrace.

VI.

Cujus privatio bona, malum; cujus privatio mala,

bonum.

THE forms to make it conceived, that that was evil which is changed for the better, are, He that is in hell thinks there is no other heaven. Satis quercus, Acorns were good till bread was found, etc. And of the other side, the forms to make it conceived, that that was good which was changed for the worse, are, Bona magis carendo quam fruendo sentimus: Bona a tergo formosissima: Good things never appear in their full beauty, till they turn their back and be going away, etc.

The reprehension of this colour is, that the good or evil which is removed, may be esteemed good or evil comparatively, and not positively or simply. So that if the privation be good, it follows not the former condition was evil, but less good: for the flower or blossom is a positive good, although the remove of it to give place to the fruit, be a comparative good. So in the tale of Æsop, when the old fainting man in the heat of the day cast down his burden, and called for Death; and when Death came to know his will with him, said, it was for nothing but to help him up with his burden again: it doth not follow, that because death, which was the privation of the burden, was ill, therefore the burden was good. And in this part, the ordinary form of malum necessarium aptly reprehendeth this colour; for privatio mali necessarii est mala, and yet that doth not convert the nature of the necessary evil, but it is evil.

Again, it cometh sometimes to pass, that there is an equality in the change of privation, and as it were a dilemma boni, or a dilemma mali: so that the corruption of the one good, is a generation of the other, Sorti pater æquus utrique est : and contrary, the remedy of the one evil is the occasion and commence ment of another, as in Scylla and Charybdis.

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