side of the territorial limits of the district is so contrary to the general trend of authorities in other jurisdictions that they are again presenting this question to this court with the suggestion that this court may in its wisdom be disposed "to modify its former rulings as to the land in the main channel outside of the confines of the sanitary district." In view of these former holdings of this court, which practically cover all the principal grounds urged by counsel for appellant, it would be sufficient, in our judgment, simply to re-affirm the conclusions reached in those cases without entering into any discussion of the principles involved, but in view of the earnest and comprehensive argument of counsel for appellant we have decided to refer again briefly to the principles involved. Counsel for appellant argue that the weight of authority in this country is in favor of the proposition that all land owned by a municipal corporation and used in furtherance of its organic purposes is exempt from taxation whether such land is within or without its territorial limits, and they have cited numerous authorities in other jurisdictions which tend to support their argument in this regard. This court in the first case discussing this question (Sanitary District v. Martin, supra,) conceded that in other jurisdictions the rulings might be different from the conclusion reached in that case as to the property in question being subject to taxation, but held that it has been the rule in this State from its earliest history that the assessment of taxes upon public property of State, county or municipal corporations was a mere question of policy and that the power existed to make it bear its share. It is clear from the reasoning of Judge Cooley in his authoritative work on Taxation (vol. I, 3d ed. p. 263,) that the rule in most jurisdictions is that it is purely a question of public policy whether the public property of municipalities shall be exempt. It is also stated in Sanitary District v. Martin, supra, that whatever may be the law in other States, the language of the constitution of this State plainly implies that the property of municipal corporations is subject to taxation unless there is a law exempting it; that statutes exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed, and that property claimed to be exempt must clearly appear to be within the terms of the statute, otherwise the courts will not hold it exempt from taxation. The court in that case discussed at considerable length the very principles of our constitution and revenue laws now relied on in the extended brief of counsel for appellant as showing that this property should be exempt, and held said property not to be exempt under our constitution and statutes. These conclusions in that case have been adhered to in the later cases, particularly Sanitary District v. Hanberg, supra, and Sanitary District v. Young, supra. In the case of Sanitary District v. Hanberg, supra, the court laid down the rule (p. 483) that "the public outside of the district have no right to use the drain or channel for sewage, and that part of the channel is a mere conduit for carrying off the sewage from the drainage district. The only beneficial use of the public in that part of the channel is a mere easement of passage over the water for the purpose of navigation. It was therefore held that the authorities of Will county could lawfully levy taxes upon said lands." The same rule was applied in Sanitary District v. Young, supra. This reasoning fully disposes of and answers the argument of counsel for appellant "that the Calumet Sag channel right of way, including the channel itself, are public grounds used for public purposes; that the Calumet channel not only carries through the towns of Worth, Palos and Lemont sewage and drainage of the Calumet region, but it furnishes suitable and complete drainage, such as never before was enjoyed, for 100 square miles of territory adjacent to territory." In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the argument of counsel for appellant that the term "public purpose," as used in the Revenue law, should be * * * said given a broader meaning than it was given by this court in Sanitary District v. Hanberg, supra. It appears also from the record that the old canal or ditch known as the "Calumet feeder" has been included in the right of way of the new Sag channel, a part of it being within the bed of the channel itself, and it is claimed by appellant that the land upon which the Calumet feeder was located belongs to the State of Illinois under section 2 of the act of 1903, (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 427,) and therefore is exempt from taxation as still belonging to the State. It is obvious that the exact amount of this land upon which the old Calumet feeder was located is not shown by the record. If appellant desired to have the land upon which the original Calumet feeder was located listed separately and treated differently for taxation purposes from the other land contained in the main right of way of the Calumet Sag (sanitary district) channel it should have furnished a proper description of the land upon which the Calumet feeder was located to the proper officials before the assessment was made, with the request that it be listed separately. Sanitary District v. Gifford, supra. We have given the questions presented by counsel the consideration that we deem the importance of the principles involved required, and have reached the conclusion that there is no reason why the holdings of this court in the former decisions already cited should be modified in any particular with reference to the right of way of the Calumet Sag channel or the main drainage channel or the other real estate involved. It necessarily follows that the decree of the superior court should be affirmed. Decree affirmed. (No. 13083.-Reversed and remanded.) THE INTERNATIONAL COAL AND MINING COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.— (JAMES NICHOLAS, Defendant in Error.) Opinion filed June 16, 1920. 1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-what agreement is a waiver of provisions of Compensation act. An agreement by an injured employee to accept a lump sum which is less than the award of the arbitrator and to sign a release for any and all claims, damages, causes of action in law or equity or arising under the Compensation act, is a waiver of the provisions of the act and is precluded by section 23 unless approved by the Industrial Commission. 2. SAME settlement of a claim must be in accordance with the provisions of the Compensation act. One of the purposes of the Compensation act is to encourage settlements of claims arising from injuries from employment, but such settlements, to be within the contemplation of the act, must be made in accordance with the provisions of the act, and jurisdiction cannot be taken from the Industrial Commission by act of the parties unless such action is in conformity with the statute. 3. SAME-lump sum settlement must be approved by the Industrial Commission. A lump sum settlement between the employer and the employee must be petitioned for as provided in section 9 of the Compensation act and must be approved by the Industrial Commission. 4. SAME-employer cannot relieve himself of liability by contract with employee. An employer cannot relieve himself of liability under the Compensation act by a contract with his employee. 5. SAME what is not an award for disfigurement and for loss of use of the same member. The Industrial Commission cannot award compensation for disfigurement of and for the loss of use of the same member, but an award for disfigurement of the face and for loss of use of eyes and arms does not contravene the rule. 6. SAME-applicant cannot give his opinion as to per cent of loss of use of member. The determination of the per cent of loss of use of an injured member is an issue of an ultimate fact before the arbitrator and the Industrial Commission, and on this question the applicant may testify as to his ability to do certain things in the use of the injured member before and after the accident or as to any other fact which may enable the commission to reach a conclusion, but neither the applicant nor an expert witness may take the place of the commission and declare his belief as to such ultimate fact. 7. SAME to what credit employer is entitled after making invalid settlement by payment of lump sum. An employer who has made an invalid settlement of a claim by paying the injured employee a lump sum without the approval of the Industrial Commission is entitled to credit only to the extent of satisfying installments of the award as fixed by the commission up to the time of the final determination of the award. 8. EVIDENCE-witness cannot testify that his injury will be permanent. A witness, although he is not qualified as an expert, may testify as to his state of health or general physical condition or as to whether he is suffering pain, but he is not allowed to give his opinion that his injury will be permanent. 9. CONTRACTS-court will not assist either party to illegal transaction. The court will not assist either party to an illegal transaction but will leave the parties where they have chosen to place themselves. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. J. F. GILLHAM, Judge, presiding. R. W. ROPIEQUET, for plaintiff in error. A. W. KERR, and FRED H. KRUGER, for defendant in error. EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, (GEORGE A. SCHNEIDER, of counsel,) for the Industrial Commission. Mr. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the court: The plaintiff in error filed its bill in equity in the circuit court of St. Clair county to review the proceedings had before the Industrial Commission in the above entitled cause. The circuit court, after hearing, dismissed the complainant's bill for want of equity and confirmed the findings of the Industrial Commission. Defendant in error, James Nicholas, was injured on February 12, 1918, in the course of his employment as a coal |