the series of questions was, "Based upon the same matters, have you an opinion as to whether or not, on the 7th of January, Sophia Dodson was able to recall to her mind her property and make disposition of it understandingly according to some plan formed in her mind?" It seems too clear for argument that this witness was not only not qualified to give any opinion on the mental capacity of testatrix, but particularly to give an opinion of the mental condition of testatrix on a day more than three months prior to the only, time she ever saw her. Non-expert witnesses cannot give their opinion as to the mental condition of the testator on the day of the execution of the will when they did not see him on that day. (Blake v. Rourke, 74 Iowa, 519, 38 N. W. 392.) The same error was committed in permitting witnesses Mrs. Nellie Fleming and Mrs. M. A. Nelson to express an opinion as to the testatrix's mental condition on January 7, 1916, without proof that they saw her on that day. Non-expert witnesses should not be permitted to give an opinion regarding the mental condition of a testator until it is shown by a preliminary examination that they have had an acquaintance long enough and intercourse frequent enough to enable them to observe the mental condition of the testator. (14 Ency. of Evidence, 372; 2 Jones' Com. on Evidence, 882.) Unless the witness details conversations, incidents, facts and circumstances sufficient to impress the mind of the man of common experience that the witness has a knowledge of testator's mental condition and that his opinion is not a guess, supposition or speculation, the court should not permit the witness to express an opinion. Hettick v. Searcy, 278 Ill. 116; Walker v. Struthers, 273 id. 387; Brainard v. Brainard, 259 id. 613; Graham v. Deuterman, 244 id. 124; Grand Lodge I. O. M. A. v. Wieting, 168 id. 408..

Contestants contend that the court erred in giving proponent's 17th instruction, which reads as follows:

"The court instructs the jury that the instrument purporting to be a will signed by Sophia Dodson in the presence of witnesses Gillespie and Davidson [this being the will of March 25, 1912,] has been permitted to go to the jury solely upon the question whether or not the testatrix was of sound mind when she afterwards made statements, if any shown by the evidence, in reference to the contents of a prior will made by her; that you are not to consider said will as giving any rights or interests in her property which would bar her from thereafter making another will, nor are you to consider said will as any admission on the part of the testatrix that the legatees and devisees therein named were at the time of the signing of the instrument in this case the natural objects of her bounty or entitled to any interest in her estate."

The provisions of the will of March 25, 1912, were different from the provisions of the will of January 7, 1916. Testimony regarding the contents of a former will, or the will itself, is not admissible where the terms of such will are variant from the will in the suit. (O'Day v. Crabb, 269 Ill. 123; McCune v. Reynolds, 288 id. 188.) In view of the testimony in the record tending to show that this will of March 25, 1912, was prepared out of the presence of testatrix and read to her but once, and in view of the condition of her hearing, we think it very doubtful whether this will should have been admitted in evidence for any purpose, and if it was to be admitted in evidence it was proper to limit the purpose as it is limited in the given instruction.

For the errors indicated the decree is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Champaign county. Reversed and remanded.

(No. 12700.-Judgment affirmed.)

F. R. ISENBURG, Appellant, vs. C. I. MARTIN, Appellee.

Opinion filed June 16, 1920.

I. ELECTIONS-general rule as to what constitutes a distinguishing mark on ballot. Any deliberate marking of the ballot by a voter that is not made in an attempt to indicate his choice and is effective as a mark by which his ballot may be identified is to be considered as a distinguishing mark.

2. SAME—what marks on ballots are distinguishing marks. A straight red mark drawn through all the squares opposite the names of candidates of the party for which the voter has voted by making a cross in the party circle, or a small circle drawn inside the party circle in which a proper cross is made, constitutes a distinguishing mark which renders the ballot void.

3. SAME what marks on ballots are not distinguishing marks. A very light line opposite a candidate's name, evidently made by a flourish of the pencil by someone other than the voter, figures written in one corner or on the back of a ballot, evidently written by the printer or by a judge or clerk in counting the ballots, or two small dots just above the party circle containing a cross, apparently made to see if the pencil would write, are not distinguishing marks.

4. SAME what crosses are sufficient to constitute valid votes. No particular form of cross is required to be made by the voter, and a St. Andrew's cross in a party circle, or a double cross made by drawing a horizontal line across a curved line within a party circle, is a cross sufficient to constitute a valid vote and is not a distinguishing mark.

5. SAME-effect where crosses are made in two party circles and also in squares opposite candidates of one party. Where a voter makes crosses in two party circles and also makes crosses in the squares opposite the names of the candidates on one of the tickets, the crosses in the circles neutralize each other while the crosses in the squares constitute valid votes for the candidates whose names are opposite those squares.

6. SAME-cross in party circle is a vote for candidate whose name is written in. A cross in the party circle at the head of a ticket having the names of no candidates for county office printed thereon is a vote for a candidate for county office whose name is written by the voter on the ticket though no cross is marked in the square to the left of the written name; and marking the ballot in such manner does not constitute a distinguishing mark.

7. SAME-when ballot is invalid as having been voted for two candidates. Where a voter votes for a candidate by making a proper cross in the square opposite the candidate's name and makes a cross like a capital T in the square opposite the name of another candidate for the same office, the latter cross must be regarded as a vote and the ballot cannot be counted for either candidate, as the voter has voted for both of them.

8. SAME-when ballot is invalid for want of cross in square or circle. A ballot which contains no cross in the party circle and has only a check-mark or a straight line drawn in the square opposite the candidate's name cannot be counted for the candidate.

9. SAME—when ballots are mutilated so they cannot be counted. Ballots which are defectively cut by the printer so that the heading "Official Ballot" and the party circles and designations are omitted, together with the names of some of the candidates near the head of the ticket, while the remainder of the ballot includes the women's ballot printed beneath, should not be handed to the voters and if voted will not be counted.

10. SAME-effect of writing the word "yes" in a party circle. The word "yes" written in a party circle is not sufficient to cast a vote for any candidate on that ticket, but it cannot be held to be a distinguishing mark.

II. SAME-the effect of making crosses in two or more party circles. The making of crosses in circles of two or more party tickets nullifies the ballot in so far as the tickets contain the names of candidates for the same offices but is valid as to candidates for offices for which there are nominations on one of such tickets, only.

12. SAME ballot cannot be counted for candidate where cross is marked out. Where the voter, after making a cross in the square to the left of a candidate's name or in the party circle, attempted to mark out the cross by other lead pencil marks, the ballot should not be counted for the candidate for whom it was so marked.

13. SAME-correcting a mistake cannot be considered a distinguishing mark. Obliterating a square opposite a candidate's name by pencil marks and writing the word "wrong" to the left of the square is a clear indication of the correction of a mistake and should not be considered as a distinguishing mark.

14. SAME-what marks do not constitute a cross. Neither making a straight mark across a square opposite a candidate's name nor making a circle within the square can be considered a cross sufficient to cast a vote for the candidate.

APPEAL from the County Court of Tazewell county; the Hon. CHARLES SCHAEFER, Judge, presiding.

W. J. REARDON, and WILLIAM A. POTTS, for appellant.

WILKINS & BRECHER, and CURRAN & DEMPSEY, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: Appellant, F. R. Isenburg, democratic candidate for county superintendent of schools of Tazewell county, on December 4, 1918, filed a petition in the county court of said county to contest the election of C. I. Martin, republican candidate for said office, who was declared elected upon a canvass of the returns of the general election held November 5, 1918. Upon answer to the petition and replication thereto being filed, issues were joined and proper proofs made of the preservation of the ballots, and an order was entered that the ballots be opened and re-counted. Upon a re-count 3052 ballots were counted for appellant without objections and 3062 ballots were counted for appellee without objections. During the count appellant objected to 83 ballots, which were designated as petitioner's objected-to ballots numbered from 1 to 83, inclusive. Appellee objected to 89 ballots, designated as defendant's objected-to ballots numbered from 1 to 89,.inclusive. The court ordered that 74 of the ballots designated as defendant's objected-to ballots should be counted for appellant, and that 68 of the ballots designated as petitioner's objected-to ballots should be counted for appellee. The final count as ordered by the court made a total of 3126 ballots for the appellant and 3130 ballots for appellee, and the court thereupon declared appellee elected by a majority of four votes. During the re-count of the ballots appellee filed a motion to throw out and to not count all the ballots in precincts No. 1, No. 3, No. 4 and No. 9 in the city of Pekin, in said county, on the ground that the ballots were handed out by judges to the voters in each of said precincts which contained the initials of judges in each of said precincts other than the