the record that he struck deceased or that he gave any aid or assistance to Ptak in the assault. They contend that the testimony of the physician shows that the blow with the gas pipe was the cause of death and that plaintiff in error had no knowledge of the intention of Ptak to strike this blow, and that he had not previously advised or encouraged Ptak to make the assault. It is true that the mere presence of plaintiff in error is not sufficient to constitute him. a principal unless there is something in his conduct showing a design to encourage, incite or in some manner aid or abet or assist the assault. Aiding, abetting or assisting are affirmative in their character. It is not sufficient that there is a mere negative acquiescence not in any way made known to the principal malefactor. (White v. People, 139 Ill. 143; Crosby v. People, 189 id. 298.) Of course, an innocent spectator is not criminally responsible because he happens to see another commit a crime, but if the proof shows that a person is present at the commission of a crime without disapproving or opposing it, it is competent for the jury to consider this conduct in connection with other circumstances and thereby reach the conclusion that he assented to the commission of the crime, lent to it his countenance and approval and was thereby aiding and abetting the same. (People v. Marx, 291 Ill. 40.) The evidence here clearly shows that plaintiff in error immediately acquiesced in the assault made on the deceased; that he immediately got the blanket and assisted Ptak to wrap and tie deceased in the blanket while deceased was still alive; that many of the wounds were inflicted on the head of deceased after plaintiff in error actively participated in rendering deceased helpless; that deceased was buried in the ground feed while he was still kicking, and that plaintiff in error assisted in placing three hundred-pound sacks of feed over the body of deceased, thereby preventing deceased from extricating himself even if he had sufficient vitality left to regain consciousness. While the doctor testified that the wounds on the head were sufficient to cause death within from three to five minutes, it would not relieve plaintiff in error from responsibility for the death if he inflicted some other wound or did some other act which would hasten the death. Conceding the contention of plaintiff in error that the proof does not show that he had a previous understanding with Ptak, we think the evidence clearly justified the jury in finding that plaintiff in error contributed to the death of deceased. It is further contended that the court erred in admitting proof of the assault on Mrs. Nofftz and the larceny of the property of deceased. The general rule is that evidence of a distinct substantive offense cannot be admitted in support of another offense, but if evidence is admissible on other general grounds it is no objection to its admission that it discloses other offenses. The test of admissibility of evidence is the connection of the facts proved with the crime charged, and whatever testimony tends directly to show the defendant guilty of the crime charged is competent although it tends to show him guilty of another offense. The party cannot by multiplying his crimes diminish the volume of competent testimony against him. (Williams v. People, 166 Ill. 132; People v. Jennings, 252 id. 534; People v. Moeller, 260 id. 375.) It will be remembered that plaintiff in error contends that the assault was not made with any previous understanding to rob, and he also contends that what he did after Ptak made the assault was at the direction of Ptak and because of his fear of Ptak. The evidence of his subsequent acts was clearly admissible to rebut these special defenses. (Wharton on Crim. Evidence,10th ed.―sec. 41; Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385.). In People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, many of the exceptions to the rule that proof of collateral offenses is not admissible are discussed at considerable length. The opinion was considered of sufficient importance to justify the author of Wharton's Criminal Evidence printing it in full as a foot-note to section 31 of the tenth edition. It was there held that evidence of other crimes is generally competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident; a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others or the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. While it is generally true that the proof tending to show one to be an accessory before the fact would be of events occurring before the inflicting of the fatal blow, yet evidence. of subsequent acts is competent to prove participation in the criminal assault. (Wharton on Homicide,—3d ed.— sec. 49.) In People v. Wood, 3 Park. Crim. 681, the defendant was charged with the murder of his brother's wife. The brother, his wife and two children were poisoned with arsenic. The brother and his wife died but the attempt upon the lives of the children failed. Thereupon the defendant procured himself to be appointed the guardian of his brother's children and then commenced to create and utter various false and forged claims against his brother's estate. The theory of the prosecution was that the defendant coveted his brother's estate, and in order to gain possession of it conceived the plan to murder those who stood in his way; that failing in the attempt to kill the children he attempted to accomplish his object by forgery. It will be seen that the forgeries were committed some time subsequent to the murder and that the forgeries were wholly disconnected with the murder, and yet it was held that evidence of all the crimes involved was properly received on the theory that it tended to prove the motive for the commission of the crime charged. The evidence of the events occurring at the house subsequent to the assault upon deceased was clearly admissible, not only because it tended to show that the murder was committed pursuant to a prearranged plan to rob deceased, but because it clearly showed that the participation of plaintiff in error was free and voluntary and not through fear of Ptak. The court should not have admitted evidence of all the details of the robbery, (People v. King, 276 Ill. 138,) but these details were so unimportant in comparison with the details of this brutal and wanton assault that they could not possibly have influenced the jury in reaching their verdict. It is further contended that the trial court erred in interrogating the witness Ptak and the plaintiff in error. Wẻ have examined the questions put to the witnesses by the trial judge, and think that the questions were proper and did not prejudice the rights of plaintiff in error. Furthermore, this question was not raised by plaintiff in error in his written motion for a new trial and therefore must be considered to have been waived. Call v. People, 201 Ill. 499; Herder v. People, 209 id. 50; Yarber v. Chicago and Alton Railway Co. 235 id. 589. It is further contended that the trial court erred in giving certain instructions offered by the People and in refusing certain instructions offered by plaintiff in error. We have examined the series of instructions and consider the objections hypercritical. We think the instructions, taken as a series, fully advised the jury of all the law applicable to the case. The guilt of plaintiff in error was clearly and overwhelmingly established by the evidence and the record fully justifies the maximum penalty of the law. Plaintiff in error may consider himself fortunate that he was tried by a jury that gave him the benefit of punishment by imprisonment. Any other verdict than one of guilty would have been wholly unwarranted, and the penalty is as light as plaintiff in error could reasonably expect. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. (No. 13028.-Cause transferred.) THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEWTON, Appellee, vs. KATHERINE E. HAYES et al. Appellants. Opinion filed June 16, 1920. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when no freehold is involved in suit to set aside deed. In the absence of any question of homestead no freehold is involved in a suit by a creditor to set aside a certain conveyance as in fraud of creditors and to have its judgment made a lien on the land, as payment of the judgment or redemption from any sale of the land thereunder will relieve the land from the lien, and the title in such case will not be changed or affected. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Jasper county; the Hon. WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, Judge, presiding. ALBERT E. ISLEY, for appellants. FITHIAN & KASSERMAN, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: Appellee, the First National Bank of Newton, Illinois, filed a bill in chancery in the circuit court of Jasper county against appellants to set aside a warranty deed from Katherine E. Hayes to her daughter, Leona Worthy, to certain land in Jasper county. The bill alleged that said conveyance was made with intent to defraud appellee and other creditors; that the same was without any valuable consideration; that a certain judgment against appellant Katherine E. Hayes in favor of appellee is a lien upon the land; and that Katherine E. Hayes has no personal property or real estate subject to levy and sale under execution except the land so fraudulently conveyed. The prayer of the bill is that the deed be set aside as to appellee and that execution may be issued on the judgment and the land be levied on and sold by virtue thereof to satisfy the judgment. The answer of appellants denies that appellee has any valid judg |