to prove insanity which is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the sanity of the accused at the time of the commission of the act for which he is sought to be held accountable. (Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555; Jamison v. People, 145 id. 357; People v. Casey, 231 id. 261.) If the statement of plaintiff in error to the effect that he was wholly unconscious of what took place at the time of this shooting is true, then it is clear that he was not then accountable for his acts and should have been acquitted. On the other hand, we are not prepared to say that there is no evidence in the record which justified the jury and the trial judge in disbelieving this testimony of plaintiff in error. It is undisputed that immediately after he shot deceased he said to the bartender who was grappling with him, "I will shoot you, too," and that he said concerning the other bartender when he came to help his partner, "I will shoot that fellow, too." The addition to both these statements of the adverb "too" indicates that he knew he had already shot one party. It is also significant that when the bartender inquired of him why he wanted to shoot him, he replied, "I guess that's right; you have been my friend." While the circumstances surrounding this shooting are strange and while it is difficult to account for the conduct of plaintiff in error, it is clear that there was in the record undisputed evidence which justified the verdict of the jury. In a long line of cases this court has said that the most important and useful function which a jury is required to perform is to determine on which side of a controversy the real truth lies where the testimony as to the material facts is directly in conflict and irreconcilable. This court will not interfere with a verdict of guilty except when this court is able to say, from a careful consideration of the whole testimony, that there is clearly a reasonable and wellfounded doubt of the guilt of the accused. It was never the intention of the law that the court should usurp the province of the jury. It is the special province of the jury

to determine whether the circumstances of the case are such as to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Gainey v. People, 97 Ill. 270; People v. Hubert, 251 id. 514; People v. Schoop, 288 id. 44; People v. Dare, 288 id. 182; People v. Foster, 288 id. 371; People v. Binger, 289 id. 582; People v. Laures, 289 id. 490.

Plaintiff in error further contends that the trial court erred in giving to the jury instructions defining manslaughter. He contends that the holding of this court in People v. Schultz, 267 Ill. 147, is controlling here. We think the cases are clearly distinguishable. In that case there was no evidence whatever justifying an instruction on manslaughter. In this case plaintiff in error was committing an unlawful act by carrying a revolver when he was not engaged in the discharge of his official duties, (Hurd's Stat. 1917, pp. 958, 960,) and the killing of deceased was the direct result of the unlawful act of flourishing and discharging a deadly weapon. In People v. Venckus, 278 Ill. 124, we held that intentionally firing a revolver in a public place in close proximity to other people is an unlawful act. Where there is evidence in the record by which the jury might, as they did here, reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter, the People have a right to have manslaughter defined and to have a form of verdict submitted on that theory of the case. People v. Doras, 290 Ill. 188.

There is no complaint of the conduct of the State's attorney, the jury or the court. From our examination of the record we feel that plaintiff in error has had a fair and impartial trial, and we are not able to say that the evidence did not justify the verdict of the jury.

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook county is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(No. 13198.-Reversed and remanded.)

GEORGE PARSONS et al. Appellees, vs. THE CITY OF HERRIN et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed April 21, 1920-Rehearing denied June 3, 1920.

MOTOR VEHICLES-when an ordinance for licensing of motor vehicles is not void. An ordinance for the licensing of motor vehicles owned by the inhabitants of a municipality is not void because it does not apply also to parties living outside the city, nor because it requires the license fee to be paid in the first instance to the city clerk, nor because it requires applicants for a license to furnish such information as may be required. (Robbins v. City of Herrin, ante, p. 133, followed.)

APPEAL from the City Court of Herrin; the Hon. A. D. MORGAN, Judge, presiding.

CHARLES C. MURRAH, and HOSEA V. FERRELL, for appellants.

THOMPSON & THOMPSON, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

The appellees filed in the city court of Herrin their bill in equity in behalf of themselves and fifty or more persons similarly situated and engaged in the same business who might wish to become parties complainant, to enjoin the city of Herrin, the mayor, city attorney and chief of police, who were made defendants, from enforcing an ordinance requiring a license for the use of any motor vehicle in the transportation of persons or property upon the streets, avenues or alleys of the city. The bill alleged that the complainants were the owners of and engaged in the use of motor vehicles in the city for the purposes specified in the ordinance, and charged that the ordinance was void because (1) yeas and nays were not taken and recorded in the journal of the proceedings for the passage of the ordinance;

(2) it did not appear from the record that a majority of all the members elected to the city council voted for the passage of the ordinance; (3) the ordinance was presented at the meeting at which the council attempted to pass it and the rules were not suspended; (4) the ordinance discriminated between persons living outside and inside of the city; (5) the ordinance provided that the license fee should be paid to the city clerk; and (6) the ordinance required applicants for a license to furnish such other information as might be prescribed, which was inquisitorial and discretionary with some unnamed officer or person. The bill was answered, and upon a hearing the court entered a decree finding the ordinance to be ultra vires, illegal and void and enjoining the defendants from enforcing it. From that decree the defendants prayed an appeal, and upon a certificate of the judge that, the validity of the ordinance being in question, the public interest demanded that the appeal be taken to this court, an appeal was allowed accordingly.

The objections to the ordinance are the same as those made to a like ordinance requiring a license and the payment of a license fee for the use of horse-drawn vehicles, which has been considered and decided in Robbins v. City of Herrin, (ante, p. 133.) The original record of the passage of the two ordinances was the same in form and a like amendment was made as to each. The arguments in the two cases are identical and every question involved in this case was considered and decided in the other.

For the reasons given in the opinion adopted in the case above mentioned the decree in this case is reversed and the cause remanded to the city court, with directions to dismiss the bill. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(No. 13232.-Reversed and remanded.)

GEORGE J. LAWTON, Appellant, vs. JOSEPH F. HAAS, Registrar of Titles, Appellee.

Opinion filed April 21, 1920-Rehearing denied June 4, 1920.

I. REGISTRATION OF TITLE-effect of section 94 of act for registering land titles. Section 94 of the act for the registration of titles, providing that any person aggrieved by the action of the registrar may petition the circuit court in the proceeding in which the land was registered, continues the jurisdiction of the court to control the action of the registrar, not only as to any matter pertaining to the first registration but also as to any estate or interest therein after the first registration.

2. SAME-appeal may be taken from decree dismissing petition under section 94 of act concerning land titles. A decree dismissing a petition, under section 94 of the act concerning land titles, to compel the registrar to receive and file a tax deed and enter a memorial of the same upon the certificate of title is a final order within the purview of sections 25 and 26 of the act, from which an appeal is allowed under section 26, as the appeal provided therein is not intended to be limited to the original proceeding for registration.

3. SAME-holder of tax deed may have same filed without surrender of outstanding certificate of title. The provisions of section 83 of the act concerning land titles that no certificate of title shall be issued on a tax deed except upon the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding certificate of title or upon order of court, as provided in section 88 of the act, do not apply where the holder of a tax deed merely seeks to have the same filed by the registrar and a memorial thereof entered on the certificate of title, and under section 94 the registrar may be compelled to file the tax deed.

4. SAME-owner of certificate of title is not a necessary party to petition to compel registrar to file tax deed. A petition, under section 94 of the act concerning land titles, to compel the registrar to file a tax deed and enter a memorial thereof on the certificate of title in his office is to compel the performance of a purely ministerial duty and not to adjudicate anything concerning the title, and the owner of the duplicate certificate is not a necessary party.

CARTER, J., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. W. PINCKNEY, Judge, presiding.

ENOCH J. PRICE, for appellant.