Minnesota, New York, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. A re-marriage by the guilty party is prohibited in Maryland, New York, Mississippi, Virginia, and perhaps other states. In the State of Washington the court may in its discretion grant a divorce in case of incurable or chronic mania or dementia of either party having an existence of ten years.

In view of the differences as above indicated and others too numerous to here point out, it is no wonder that some features of our divorce history has been such a scandal upon our civilization. No such differences should exist. There should be a unity of law on questions of marriage and divorce if upon no others. So long as there are such disparities, so long will the temptation exist of migration for divorce with its train of attendant evils. Chancellor Green in a New Jersey case said (Winship vs. Winship 1 C. E. Green 107) "conflict of jurisdiction, injury to morals, reproach to our law, oppression and fraud, as well as abloquy to the judicature which must administer the law, are the evident consequences which must follow from the influx of parties from other states to obtain a dissolution of marriage here, in opposition to the rule of their own law."

It is remarkable that the evils of conflict of divorce laws have been so long and so patiently endured by the American people. In view of the lengthy terms of residence prescribed by most of the states as a prerequisite to a divorce suit, it should occur to all, (not excluding the inhabitants of North Dakota and Oklahoma,) that a 90 days residence is too short, and that such a period is unfair and unjust to the other states. One year is as short a time for residence as should be tolerated. Little is heard of divorce abuses from the states requiring a six months residence, but let the 90 days states change their time to one year or longer and the six months states would soon become Meccas

for divorce. There is some temptation, but no excuse, for new commonwealths to add to their population, temporarily at least, by holding out divorce inducements. Let the wealthy from other countries and states come into a small city and bring large fees for the attorneys, liberal patronage for hotels, livery stables, and all classes of business houses, and perhaps celebrate the severance of the marital cord by giving champagne suppers, with diamond souvenirs to the guests, and it is little wonder that such communities develop a strong sentiment in favor of the lax and loose divorce mill. They receive the benefits while the inhabitants of other states must suffer the consequences. While one state gets the souvenirs the other gets the widows and orphans.

With a few exceptions, however, there are not such radical and fundamental dissimilarities in this legislation as to indicate the impossibility of a compromise of all upon some uniform code. Of course South Carolina would have to give up its old fogy notion of husband and wife, "now and forever one and inseparable." New York would also have to yield considerably. The New England states would probably have to make their time of residence shorter. All might compromise on a residence of eighteen months or two years. A marriage and divorce law framed by representatives of all the states would no doubt be more perfect and consistent than the present laws of any one state. For instance, it occurs to me that the provision found in only one or two states, for a divorce on the ground of insanity when incurable and of long standing might find favor with all the states if their attention were directed to the topic. Such a ground would probably take the place of some suits, not now unknown to the courts, of divorce against an insane defendant for a cause accruing prior to defendant's insanity.

A word in reference to the statuary grounds of divorce

in Utah. I do not know of any modification of the existing grounds to be recommended. I believe cases might arise under any of these provisions which would appeal as strongly to justice for a dissolution as for the crime of adultery. I believe that easy divorces are not so much due to the law as to its administration. Utah has been the subject of some criticism for liberal judicial separations. This was partly due perhaps to the fact that, owing to conditions. formerly existing in the state, divorce jurisdiction was conferred upon probate judges as authorized and permitted by the Organic Law; and partly to an early divorce law which enacted that: "If the court is satisfied that the person so applying is a resident of the territory, or wishes to become one," etc., the bonds of matrimony might be dissolved for grounds almost identical with our present statute, except there was added the following ground: "When it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction and conviction of the court that the parties cannot live in peace and union together, and that their welfare requires a separation."

That our courts were sometimes imposed upon in granting divorces under this statute to persons who were not residents of the territory and did not in good faith intend to become such, is indicated by the following decisions confirming judgments for bigamy, adultery, etc., where the defendants had re-married after securing divorces in Utah: State vs. Hood, 56 of Indiana, State vs. Armington, 26 Minnesota, State vs, Fleak, 54 Iowa, and People vs. Smith, 16th Hun. Divorces granted here were also held void for the same reason in Hardy vs. Smith, 136 Massachusetts, Litowitch vs. Litowitch, 19 Kansas, and other cases.

After the notoriety Oklahoma has received as being for divorces in America what Gret Green was once in Great Britain for marriages, it is interesting to read the recent case from that territory of Beach vs. Beach, (46 Pac.

Rep.) The case is instructive as showing what desperate chances will be taken even by one of high professional standing to defraud the courts in this class of cases. Charles Fisk Beach jr., the plaintiff, is no doubt well known to all present as a legal author of some prominence in this country. His petition for divorce was based upon the statutory grounds of extreme cruelty and neglect of duty. The case was tried before Judge Scott and a decree granted the plaintiff. From the review of the evidence given by the Supreme Court in their intensely interesting opinion, one is lead to wonder how the lower court ever came to grant a decree in such a case.

As to his residence in the Territory the following is extracted from the opinion of the court:

"The record shows that on the 5th day of April, 1895, defendant in error went to Norman, in Cleveland county; that was the first time he had ever been in that county; that on the next day he filed the petition in this cause for divorce; that the same day, after filing said petition, or the next day, he left the county; that he returned there on the 31st of May, to attend the court in the hearing of a motion for alimony in the cause; that he stayed until the next day, and left upon the first train after the motion was heard; that he did not return to the county again until 1 o'clock of the morning of the day the cause was heard upon its merits; that, during the time said cause was pending he was absent from the territory, at various places, the 'most of the time at Indianapolis, regularly attending to business in which he was interested.' "The defendant in error, in his testimony in the cause, stated that his place of residence was Norman, Okl. T.; that he had been a resident of Oklahoma territory about six months, and of Cleveland county since about the 1st of April, 1895. The facts appearing from this record show that the defendant came to

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this territory about the last of December, 1894, or first of January, 1895; that he stopped at Perry a part of the time, perhaps the greater part of the time until the 5th of April, occupying a furnished room there, and taking his meals at other places; that during &.portion of that time he was absent from the territory, attending to business. He testifies that one object in his coming to the territory was to procure a divorce. The facts do not show him to have had any other object. He had no other business, and did not endeavor to establish any other business. He was by profession a lawyer and an author of legal text-books, yet he left his library in New York, and did not form or attempt. to form any relationship with the practice of the law in this territory, or to acquire any property, or to make any investments, which might show any intent to permanently identify him with the territory. He had no relation or kindred living here. He brought with him only such personal effects as were necessary to one traveling from place to place, or making a short sojourn. We cannot be expected to believe that one whose income from the practice of the law and from authorship amounted to $15,000 per annum would expect to better his condition financially or intellectually, and obtain greater remuneration in the practice of the law, or find more facilities and aids to legal authorship, in Perry or Norman than in the city of New York.”

As to the causes for the estrangement of the parties I quote the following from the opinion:

"For 11 years the parties had lived together as husband and wife, with more apparent concord and happiness than is usally the lot of married people. No clouds had appeared to darken the horizon of their married life until. in Agust, 1893 the wife, whether rightfully or wrongfully, became impressed with the conviction that her husband had become infatuated with another woman. Within a little