this, of necessity reference must be made to what must exist before the section can take effect, that is, a vacancy filled temporarily by the Governor. When the term of such incumbent is fixed to end at the next general election, such provision relates to elections and is within the scope of the title. If the section had read "Whenever the Governor "shall have appointed a person to fill a vacancy in the office "of District Judge etc. such person shall hold until the next "general election etc. etc.", no question would probably have been made, although as before pointed out, the fixing of the appointee's term does not relate to elections, if the appointment does not. The section as written, means no more than this, and with but one general purpose which is connected with elections, it is easy to see that the details of appointment and term relate to that general purpose.

The result reached would be the same, however, and the consequences of a misapplication of principles upon the third contention are not serious. The fourth contention is adjudged by the Court, through the Chief Justice, to be without merit, although it was said, that "the system tends "to encourage the voting of straight tickets, and to dis"courage independent voting, which some of us think is an "objection."

This disposition of the question, can hardly be claimed to involve a question of constitutional law, and we may here leave it.

As before stated, I do not take issue with the judgment of the Court on either of the questions discussed. It is with the misapplication of principles in the opinion of the majority resulting in an illogical conclusion, which principally calls for criticism. This is attempted here simply in our professional interest, and of course with none but the most appreciative and kindly feeling toward the Court. The case was of vast importance, involving as it did, the entire

election, state and county, and tremendous and possibly unforseen consequences were dependent upon its result. The decision is accepted and approved by an overwhelming majority of the people, and if we of the bar may be permitted to exercise our ingenuity in dissecting the opinions, we must remember the exceptional circumstances of the hearing, and the short time allowed in which to prepare the opinions. Nevertheless, we must challenge the opinions which in some particulars intensify conviction, either, that logic is not a science, or that "casual eclipses of the mind darken will learning.'

The holding of the majority, that the journals may be resorted to for the purpose of impeaching the enrolled bill. if adhered to, may result in very disasterous consequences, Already, we may see the indications of the coming storm. From the shadow of the scaffold a convicted man appeals to the Court to release him from verdict and judgment for murder, because, as he alleges, the law, under which he was convicted, was not constitutionally enacted, and this he proposes to prove by the journals of the Senate and Assembly. To what extent the body of the statute law, and indirectly the public peace and tranquility may be involved in the future, can only be imagined.

The Court is soon to have an opportunity to again consider the question, and it may be, that upon further argument and reflection, it can see clear the way to overrule its dictum, and with the better reason and authority hold with the Chief Justice, that, when the enrolled bill, authenticated by the signatures of the respective presiding officers and the Governor, has been solemnly deposited with the Secretary of State, it is the law of the land.

NOTE.

1. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 3rd. Ed. 178. Allen vs. Louisiana 103 U. S., 84.

2.

7. Cooley Constitutional Lim, 179, Note 2,

TRIAL BY JURY.

BY GEO. P. COSTIGAN JR.

Trial by jury is for many reasons a perennial subject in legal discussions. The jury system is one of long standing -one that has experienced many evolutionary changesone that is today undergoing a process of modification, if not transformation; and it is but natural that such an institution, which has about it much that is archaic, which at the same time exhibits to lawyers and their clients an extremely practical aspect in modern everyday litigation, and which suggests to the thoughtful citizen and political theorist that it has been a wonderful instrument in the onward march of Democracy, should always be a fruitful theme of discourse, Despite the vast amount of attention which the jury system has attracted, however, there is still a place for an intelligent review of its history and its merits, and for suggestions founded on that review, tentative though some of those suggestions must necessarily be, as to the place it should occupy in the future.

One who would discuss trial by jury understandingly must have clearly in mind the salient facts of its history.

The first thing to notice about trial by jury is that in one form or other it is an ancient institution. The better opinion among historians now is that trial by jury-using the words in a broad sense-is traceable to Charles the Great, and the Frank's. The Carolingian kings, beginning at