court should in general suspend the proceedings for the time; or, if his absence is to be prolonged, should adjourn for a certain period. XXI, 177. 19. Should the judge advocate be required to give evidence as a witness, the clerk or reporter of the court may go on to record his testimony while on the stand; or, if there be no clerk or reporter, he may record his own testimony as that of· any other witness. XXI, 177. 20. A judge advocate of a court martial may be detailed to perform other duty, as that of officer of the day or member of a board of survey, if such duty will not interfere with his duties as judge advocate. But in general of course no duties, in addition to those incidental to his function as judge advocate, should be imposed upon him pending an important trial. XXIX, 273. 21. The judge advocate in our practice is entitled to the closing argument or address to the court, and he may present an address although the accused waives his right to present any; the function of the judge advocate, at this stage of the proceedings, not being confined merely to a replying to the accused. XXXII, 497. The judge advocate in his address is not authorized to read to the court evidence or written statements not introduced upon the trial and which the accused has had no opportunity to controvert or comment upon. XXII, 238. 22. Where there have been two or more judge advocates successively detailed in the course of a trial, the one who is acting at the close is the one, (and the only one,) required to authenticate the proceedings by his signature. II, 148. 23. The only authority for the employment of reporters for courts-martial is that contained in Sec. 1203, Rev. Sts., which authorizes the judge advocate of a military court to appoint a reporter for such court. In view of this statute, held that the appointment, by a judge advocate on the staff of a department commander, of a person to act as reporter for all the courts to be convened in the department, was in contravention of law and of no effect. XI, 361. 24. For the court or the president of the court to place or order the judge advocate in arrest would be an unauthorized proceeding. The court indeed, in a proper case under Art. 86, might proceed against its judge advocate as for a con tempt. But an arrest could not be imposed nor a punishment executed in the case of such officer, except through the convening authority or other competent commander. III, 603; XXI, 629. 25. Where the court was convened by a military officeras, in a case of a general court, the general of the army or a department or army commander-it is the duty of the judge advocate, upon the completion of the record, to transmit the same to such officer, (or his successor in command,) for the proper action. Where the court was convened by the President, it is the duty of the judge advocate to transmit the completed proceedings directly to the Judge Advocate General,' in order that, as the staff officer of the President, he may exercise the revisory function reposed in him by Sec. 1199, Rev. Sts. XLII, 457. 26. Up to the time of the dissolution of the court for which he is appointed, a judge advocate is competent to administer an oath to an affiant or deponent, in cases of public property lost or destroyed, under the circumstances indicated in par. 1031 of the Army Regulations. XXXIII, 450. [See OATH, I § 2.] SEE COUNSEL, II. COURT MARTIAL, I § 17. REVISION § 3,6. WITNESS 5, 9, 13, 21, 22, 28, 33. JURISDICTION. SEE CESSION OF JURISDICTION. CIVIL PROCESS § 4,5. COURT MARTIAL, II. LAW OF WAR § 12. MILITARY COMMISSION, II. 1See G. O. 72, War Dept., 1873; do. 39, Hdqrs. of Army, 1877. "It may here be noted that the One hundred and thirteenth Article of War, the only statute relating to the forwarding, by judge advocates, of the proceedings of general courts, is incomplete, and not in harmony with the provisions of Arts. 104 and 109. The practice on the subject-as determined by par. 896, Army Regulations and the supplementary Orders indicated in the foregoing note-represents quite accurately the existing law, and is as stated in the text. L. LAND. SEE CESSION OF JURISDICTION. MILITARY RESERVATION. PUBLIC PROPERTY-DISPOSITION OF § 1-3, 5-12. LARCENY. SEE SIXTY SECOND ARTICLE § 2, 4. LAWFUL COMMAND OR ORDER. SEE TWENTY FIRST ARTICLE § 7, 8. LAW OF WAR. 1. The law of war is, in brief, the law of military government and authority as exercised in time of war, foreign or civil. Its usual field is the territory of a conquered country in the occupation of a hostile army: it is sometimes extended however, though generally in a milder form, to localities under "martial law." [See MARTIAL LAW § 1.] It is properly a part of the law of nations, though its application may be materially varied by the circumstances of the country or the people brought under its sway. It is a fundamental principle of the law of war that, during a state of war, all commercial intercourse between the belligerents is interdicted and made illegal except when and where it may be expressly authorized by the Government. During the late civil war, which, as respects the application in general of the laws and usages of war, was assimilated to a for eign war,' all trade and intercourse with the enemy, except so far as permitted by the President under authority from Congress, (or in rare cases by a commanding general in the field representing the President,) was necessarily suspended.' XI, 553, 647, 651; XIV, 241; XV, 275; XVI, 572; XIX, 673; XXX, 346. 2. As to the principal forms of violation of the law of nonintercourse, and other violations of the laws of war, made the subject of trial by military commission during the late war, see MILITARY COMMISSION, II § 3. 3. Where a chaplain of the confederate army came within the lines of the U.S. army during the war without the authority of the federal government, and was apprehended, tried and convicted of the offence involved, and sentenced, (December, 1864,) to be confined during the war, advised that while his act was in violation of the law of war, yet, as it appeared that his only object in coming within our lines was to purchase bibles, his punishment might well be remitted on his taking the usual oath of allegiance to the federal government. XI, 553. 4. Offences against the law of non-intercourse between the belligerents in time of war are no less such when committed by foreigners than when committed by citizens. Thus where certain persons made their way early in the late war from See Prize Cases, 2 Black, 666-9; Dow v. Johnson, 10 Otto, 164; Brown v. Hiatt, 1 Dillon, 372; Phillips v. Hatch, Id. 571; Sanderson v. Morgan, 39 N. York, 231; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124; Leathers v. Com. Ins. Co., 2 Bush, 639; Hedges v. Price, 2 West Va. 192. The Oachita Cotton, 6 Wallace, 521; Cappell v. Hill, 7 Id. 542, 554; McKee v. United States, 8 Id. 163; United States v. Grossmayer, 9 Id. 72; Montgomery v. United States, 15 Id. 395; Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Id. 73; Mitchell v. United States, Id. 350; Matthews v. McStea, 1 Otto, 7; Dow v. Johnson, 10 Id. 164; Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561; Lieber's Instructions, G. O. 100, War Dept., 1863, par. 86. Beside the suspension incident to the state of war, a suspension of commercial intercourse with the enemy was specially directed by Act of Congress of July 13, 1861, and proclaimed by the President on Aug. 16, 1861. By authority conferred by the same statute, General Regulations, concerning commercial intercourse with and in the States declared in insurrection, were approved by the President, January 26, 1864, and published in G. O. 53, Dept. of the Gulf, of April 29, 1864. Scotland to South Carolina, engaged for a considerable period in the manufacture of treasury notes for the confederate authorities, and at the end of their employment came secretly and without authority into our lines with the design of returning to their home,-held that, though British subjects, they had identified themselves with the cause of the enemy, and were properly amenable to trial for the offence of penetrating our military lines in violation of the laws of war. XV, 112. 5. Where a party arrested in attempting without authority to cross the Potomac for the purpose of holding communication with persons in the enemy's country, was ordered by the Department Commander-his offence having been committed in a district in military occupation-to be placed under military surveillance and to furnish a bond with sufficient sureties, obliging him not to attempt again during the war to join or hold intercourse with the enemy,—held that such proceeding was warranted by the laws and customs of war. III, 255. 6. Two soldiers of the United States army having been seized and delivered across the lines to the enemy, by a party of civilians, in a portion of one of the insurrectionary States in the occupation of the federal forces, an equal number of citizens of the district were ordered by the commanding general to be arrested and held till the offenders, who meanwhile had taken refuge with the enemy, should be surrendered for trial. Held that such an act of retaliation was warranted by the laws and usages of war. IX, 210. 7. There can be no doubt as to the authority of the commander of an army, in occupation and government of the enemy's country, to suppress a newspaper or other publication deemed by him to be injurious to the public interests in exciting opposition to the dominant authority or encouraging the support of the enemy's cause on the part of the inhabitants. A newspaper may be a powerful agent for such a purpose, and, when it is so, it may, under the laws of war, as legally be silenced as may a fort or battery of the enemy in the field. II, 585. 8. Held, (January, 1865,) that a system of correspondence which had been concerted and maintained between northern and southern newspapers by means of an interchange of published communications entitled "Personals," was an evasion |