such officer, &c., by a private creditor.' XX, 413; XXIII, 550; XXVI, 466; XXVIII, 47; XXXIII, 8; XXXIV, 26. Where indeed the pay due has been paid over to a third person as the authorized agent or attorney of the party entitled to receive it, it may be attached by the garnishee process in the hands of such person. VIII, 493.

2. Held, on the analogy of the principle protecting an officer's pay from being taxed by the authorities of a State, (see TAX § 1,) that the necessary and proper baggage of an officer travelling on duty, of not greater amount than allowed by the Army Regulations to be transported with him at the public expense, was properly exempt from attachment for his private debts. An officer, however, can not be allowed to claim such an exemption to an unreasonable extent, and should he assume to transport or procure to be transported with him any considerable amount of baggage greater than that permitted by the Regulations, he would justly become liable to the consequences of the abuse of his privilege. In such a case he could not claim to be sustained by the government in resisting an attachment or execution levied upon his effects. XXXV, 484.

3. Held that the personal property of an officer required to be possessed and used by him in the regular performance of his military duties-as, for example, his sword, or, in a case of a cavalry officer, his horse-could not legally be seized upon an attachment or execution issued from a State court. XXXIII, 8.

4. The legality of the service of the process of a State court at a military post depends, (as to its original authority,) upon the question whether the sovereignty of the soil resides wholly in the United States, (either by virtue of a reservation of the same by the United States upon the admission of the State, or of its subsequent surrender by the State,) or is shared by the State government. Where, by an act of cession of the legislature of a State in which a military reservation or post is situated,

'Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 Howard, 20; Averill v. Tucker, 2 Cranch, C. C. 544; Derr v. Lubey, 1 McArthur, 187; XIII Opins. of Attys. Gen. 566. And the same principle is applied to moneys due from municipal corporations. Hawthorn v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59; Burnham v. Fond du Lac, 15 Wisc. 193; Wilson v. Bk. of La. 55 Ga. 98; Pruitt v. Armstrong, 56 Ala. 306; Boone Co. v. Keck, 31 Ark. 387.

exclusive jurisdiction over the same has become unconditionally vested in the United States, as contemplated by Art. I, Sec. 8 § 17 of the Constitution, no process issued from the State courts can legally be served thereon, but only process issued from the courts of the United States can be there executed. Where, however, in ceding jurisdiction, the State has reserved to itself the right, not unfrequently reserved under the circumstances, (and which it is often for the advantage of the United States to have reserved, since otherwise the post might become an asyium for criminals-see CESSION OF JURISDICTION § 4.) to serve within the premises civil and criminal process on account of rights accrued, obligations incurred, or crimes committed in the State but outside of the premises, then the writs of the State tribunals may be executed on the land in the class of cases thus excepted. Of course where there has been no cession of jurisdiction by the State, its officials have the same authority to serve the process and mandates of its courts, and its courts have the same jurisdiction over acts done and crimes committed, within the military post as elsewhere in the State; the fact of the ownership or occupation of the land by the United States having no effect to except it from the operation of the State laws. XVI, 514; XXI, 567; XXXIII, 8. [See CESSION OF JURISDICTION § 1.]

5. Where a military post or reservation is situated in a Territory, the Territorial courts are authorized to issue process for the arrest of officers or soldiers of the command charged with crime, or to cite them to appear before them as defendants in civil actions, or to attach, replevy upon, or take in execution any property belonging to them within the posts &c., not specially exempted from legal seizure. This for the reason that the courts in which is vested the judicial power of a Territory are not the courts of a sovereignty distinct from the United States but are the creatures of Congress,'

1See authorities referred to in note to CESSION OF JURIS DICTION § 5.

2A Territory is not properly sovereign. It is an organization through and by means of which Congress for a time gov erns a particular portion of the country. Its rights are those which are set forth in the organic Act." Opinion of the Attorney General of August 2, 1878, (XVI Opins. -.)

being established by it directly, or indirectly by its authority through the Territorial legislature, under the provision of the Constitution, (Art. IV, Sec. 3 § 2,) empowering Congress "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory belonging to the United States." Thus while officials charged with the service of the process of such-as indeed of any-courts would, in comity, properly refrain from entering a military post for the purpose of serving process therein, or at least from making the service, till formal permission for the purpose had been sought and obtained from the commanding officer, yet, on the other hand, officers commanding military posts in the Territories should certainly interpose no obstacle to the due service within their commands of the legal process of the Territorial courts.1 XXVIII, 1; XXXIX, 541.

6. It is settled that a State court can have no authority to enjoin the United States judiciary from executing their judgments, or from proceeding with actions of law pending before them. Similarly held that a State Court was not empowered to enjoin an executive department or officer of the United States from performing the contracts of the United States, and, accordingly that an injunction issued from a State court prohibiting an officer of the army, charged with the duty of paying to a contractor a certain sum of money due him under a contract between him and the United States, from paying said sum, would legally and properly be disregarded by such officer.3 XLII, 128.

See the opinion of the Judge Advocate General published in G. O. 30, Hdqrs. of Army, 1878, in connection with VII Opins. of Attys. Gen. 564.

McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279; Duncan v. Darst, 1 Howard, 306; City Bk. v. Skelton, 2 Blatch. 26; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wallace, 166; United States v. Council of Keokuk, Id, 514; Mariposa Co. v. Garrison, 26 How. Pr. 448; English v. Miller, 2 Rich. Eq. 320; Chapin v. James, 11 R. I. 86.

3 See the subsequent confirmatory opinion of the Attorney General in this case, of January 29, 1879, published in G. O. 3, Hdqrs. of Army, 1879. In an earlier opinion of the same authority, of January 3, 1876, (XV Opins. -,) it was held that as a State can not by its judicial process legally obstruct or indirectly interfere with the operations of the U. S. government, a State court could not be authorized to enjoin a contractor with the United States from receiving payments under his contract and thus hinder him in the due performance of the same.

7. Where, in time of peace, a U. S. Marshal of a Territory, under color of a formal warrant, made an arrest of a civilian, and an officer of the army thereupon assumed to release him by military force on the theory that the arrest had been made outside the Marshal's district, held that the act of the officer was wholly unauthorized, and—an indictment having been found against him in a United States court-advised that he be required to surrender himself to the U. S. Attorney or Marshal for trial. XXVI, 468.

SEE PAY AND ALLOWANCES § 7.

CIVIL RIGHTS.

A party by whom a colored person is caused to be deprived of any of the rights guaranteed by the provisions of Sec. 1977, Rev. Sts., is liable not only to a civil action in the U. S. Circuit Court, "for redress," under the Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, s. 1, (Sec. 1979, Rev. Sts.,) but also to criminal prosecution, in the U. S. District Court and punishment by fine and imprisonment, under the Act of May 31, 1870, c. 116, s. 17, (Sec. 5510, Rev. Sts.) XXI, 678.

CLAIMS.1

1. Under the law and practice governing the executive departments, a head of a department is held not to be in general empowered, without specific statutory authority for the purpose, to reopen, (except for the correction of an error in calculation,) a claim once duly settled by his department, in the absence of new and material evidence clearly entitling the claimant to an additional allowance. So where the Secretary of

The reason of the restricted authority, (illustrated under this Title,) of the Executive department in the allowance of claims may be found in the principle of public law, as expressed by Miller J., in the case of The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wallace, 676,-that "in our structure of government all power is delegated and defined by law:" "we have no officers, from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority."

See, as among the principal authorities on this point, United States v. Bk. of Metropolis, 15 Peters, 378; IV Opins. of Attys. Gen. 356; V Id. 125; X Id. 259; XII Id. 358, 388; also Opins. of June 15, 1877 and Jany. 11, 1878, in XV Id., —.

War, under authority expressly given him by Act of Congress, had entertained and adjusted the account and claim for military transportation of a Railroad Company, and had settled the same by the allowance of a sum which was paid and accepted as a final award, held that his authority over the claim, in the absence certainly of new and controlling evidence on the merits, was to be regarded as exhausted, and that without new authority from Congress, he would not be empowered to reopen the claim for the purpose of allowing further credits to the claimant.' XLII, 332. So held, that, in the absence both of new evidence and new statutory authority, the Secretary of War would not be empowered to reopen and reconsider a claim for the repayment of a certain sum, (paid as commutation money by a party who claimed to have been illegally drafted,) the question of the allowance of which had been duly considered by a former Secretary, (under a statute authorizing him to repay the same if deemed to be justly due,) and had been unfavorably determined, ten years before. And this, though the correctness of such determination was considered to be doubtful; the proper recourse of the claimant in such a case being to Congress. XLII, 357.

2. An executive official cannot, of his own authority, appropriate the money of the United States for the purpose of satisfying a claim. So held that the Secretary of War could have no authority to reimburse a claimant for the amount of a tax assessed upon him by the military authorities during the war, and since paid into the Treasury, whether or not the same was legally exacted, but that Congress must be applied to for the necessary action. XVIII, 668.

3. A claim, though deemed by the Secretary of War to be probably just, cannot in general, in the absence of any appropriation for its payment, or other authority to allow the same, properly be entertained by him. And where to pass upon a claim must be clearly quite futile, a consideration of its merits will in general be out of place, and the claimant, without being heard thereon, will properly be referred to the depart

1

This opinion, in support of its conclusion, cites IV Opins. of Attys. Gen. 356; V Id. 125; X Id. 259; XII Id. 388,— authorities which the Attorney General, in a concurring opinion of January 29, 1880, (XVI Opins. -,) refers to as "singu larly pertinent."