CONSTITUTION. Article 1st. This association shall be denominated "the Home League for the protection of American labor, and the promotion of reciprocal commerce." Art. 2. Any person subscribing to this constitution and paying into its treasury the sum of one dollar annually, or at any one time the sum of five dollars, shall be a member of this league, and entitled to all its benefits and privileges. Art. 3. The officers of the league shall be a president and four vice presidents, a corresponding and recording secretary, a treasurer, and a central committee of twelve, to be chosen annually by the members as directed in the by-laws, and the presidents of the state branches shall be ex-officio vice presidents of the Home League. Art. 4. In each state the league shall form a central association to promote the objects of the league, with auxiliary branches in the principal towns and counties, and at each annual meeting delegates are to be appointed to attend at the annual meeting of the Home League. Art. 5. The stated annual meeting of the association shall be in the city of New York during the fair of the American Institute, when its officers and central committee shall be chosen by a majority of votes present. Art. 6. By-laws for the government of the league shall be enacted by the respective associations for their own government. On motion, the following gentlemen were appointed a committee to prepare an address to the people of the United States, viz: Messrs. Blunt, Haven and Travers, of New York, and W. B. Kinney, of New Jersey. On motion of Mr. Haven, the president of the convention was added. Messrs. White, of Tennessee, Simpson, of New York, and Hubbard, of Connecticut, severally offered resolutions, which were debated, approved and referred to the committee on an address. A committee of finance was appointed. A resolution was passed, requesting the public journals of this city and the whole country to publish the proceedings of this convention. On motion, adjourned sine die. [N. Y. Tribune. ABOLITION OF SLAVERY. What is the extent of the power of legislation here granted? exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever these debates, I find that the clause of the constitu- In the first place, it is "exclusive." There is no I have thus shown-from the express language of And this extent of the power of its legislation is the constitution-from the necessary exclusiveness in perfect accordance with the exclusiveness of the of the jurisdiction of congress-from the language jurisdiction of congress over the territory. All other of the grant of power in this case, in contrast with legislative authority being excluded, there arises the other grants of power-from the absence of an obvious necessity that that of congress should every thing from the constitution which can enable be complete; otherwise the people of the District us to determine what exercise of legislative power, would be left without a legislature, to the necessary if any, shall be excepted from the grant in quesand indispensable purposes of government. tion-and from contemporaneous construction--that But further. Look at the sweeping language of congress possess that constitutional power to abothe grant of power to legislate for this District, in lish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Cocontrast with the specific grants of power to legis-lumbia. late for the country generally. In regard to the latter, this government is one of specifically granted powers. Thus, for example, in the first sixteen clauses of the 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution, congress is authorised, among other things, to regulate commerce, to coin money, to establish post offices and post roads, to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain a navy, &c. All the powers (including, of course, the power to pass laws necessary and proper for carrying these powers into execution) not thus specifically granted were reserved to the states, or to the people. Now, why was the language changed in the 17th clause of the 8th article, from the specification, as in the previous sixteen clauses, of particular cases in which congress might legislate, to the general grant of power to legislate "in all cases whatsoever?" Why did not the 17th clause also specify the particular cases in which congress might legislate for the District? No other answer can be given to this question than that it was intended to grant all legislative power-to make no exception-to leave nothing for the control, either of the people of the District, or of any other power; so that the great design of setting apart a separate District for the seat of the government of the United States might be fully answered-namely, that of having it subjected to the jurisdiction and control of no other power. Our practice is to Register the leading speeches upon the principal topics of discussion in congress, so as to afford a fair views of both sides, whatever the question may be. Upon the question for rejecting petitions for the abolition of slavery, so warmly debated during the session of 1840, we selected and published the speech of WILLIAM COST JOHNSON, esq. of Maryland, on the one side, fully intending to follow it with the speech of WILLIAM SLADE, esq. of Vermont, on the opposite side of the question-but the immense length of the latter speech occasioned us to postpone it from time to time, in order to give place to matter of immediate interest that continued to crowd upon our files, still expecting that we should shortly have more room. The presidential election and the political movement of the contending parties occupied almost the whole period from the termination of that session of congress until the next session caught us; and, that was hardly disposed of before the extra session arrived-and now another regular Mr. SPEAKER, if we leave the plain intelligible session is on our heels. We are constrained to lop terms of the grant of power in this case, and resort off some pages of both the commencement and con-ling quicksand, which will sink beneath us. to implication, we leave a solid rock for the trembclusion of Mr. Slade's speech, not being so immedi- But do any still doubt with regard to the completeately relavent to the question in hand, in order to en-ness of the power of congress over this District? If able us to get it into the Register. By thus pruning we shall be enabled to register this speech in the pre sent and next numbers. SPEECH OF HON. WILLIAM SLADE, SLAVE TRADE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. I come now, Mr. SPEAKER, to a grave and important question, namely, that of the constitutional power of congress to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. The right to adopt the rule before us, and thereby reject all petitions and other papers touching that subject, is claimed on the ground that no such power exists. I have asserted that it does exist, and I will now proceed to prove it. All power over this subject is derived from the grant of power in the constitution, which declares (sec. 8, art. 1) that "congress shall have power to But again. If the power of congress to legislate for the District is limited, who is to determine what the limitation shall be? Why exclude the subject of slavery rather than any other subject? If "all cases whatsoever" mean only some cases, who is to determine what those some cases are? One may exclude slavery-another the matter of the currency-another the prohibition of lotteries-another the suppression of duelling-another of gambling, and another the power to punish crimes. Which is right? Who shall determine? Who can determine? my reasoning has failed to convince them, let me call Mr. Madison has been justly styled the father "The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the union-I might say, of the world-by virtue of its general supremacy." "Complete" was the simple, significant, comprehensive term used by Mr. Madison to express his idea of the power. Let me next turn to the debates in the Virginia convention, during its deliberations upon the adoption of the constitution. Virginia authority, I think, must be good here on this subject. On looking into And now, Mr. Speaker, let me show you what construction has since been put upon this grant by congress, by committees of congress, by members of congress from slaveholding states, by the people of this District, and by men now occupying the highest stations in this government. On the 1st of March, 1816, the house of representatives, on motion of Mr. Randolph, of Virginia, passed the following resolution: "Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the existence of an inhuman and illegal traffic in slaves, carried on in and through the District of Columbia, and to report whether any, and what measures are necessary for putting a stop to the same." This resolution, it will be observed, did not contemplate the mere regulating of the slave trade, but the annihilation of it. Nobody can pretend that the action of congress which the resolution contemplated did not involve the whole question in slavery herethe power to abolish the slave trade manifestly including the power to abolish slavery. The committee appointed under this resolution were Messrs. Randolph and Kerr, of Virginia, Maryatt, of S. Carolina, Goldsborough, of Maryland, and Hopkinson, of Pennsylvania. This committee, four of whom were from slaveholding states manifested their concurrence with the house in its acknowledgment of the power of congress over the subject of slavery by asking for authority to send for persons and papers, which the house granted. The committee on the 30th of April, reported sundry depositions taken by them, which were ordered to lie on the table. And here terminated the whole proceeding! Although Mr. Randolph, on offering the resolution, urged the necessity of immediate action, and declared that "if the business was declined by the house he would undertake it himself, and ferret out of their holes and corners the villians who carried it on," yet "the business" was never prosecuted beyond the taking and reporting of the depositions; which depositions, by the way, are not now to be found on the files of this house." The zeal of Mr. Randolph and of the committee appears to have suddenly evaporated! They discovered that they were attacking the "patriarchal institution," and shaking what has since been called "the corner stone of our republican edifice"--and desisted! But they showed, and the house showed, that they considered the power of congress over the subject of slavery here to be as complete as over any other subject. On the 11th of January, 1827, the committee for the District of Columbia, by their chairman, Mr. Powell, of Virginia, said in a report to the house: "The congress of the United States has, by the constitution, exclusive jurisdiction over this District; and has the power upon this subject, (the imprisonment of free negroes as runaways and their sale into slavery), as upon all other subjects of legislation to ex"Unlimited" was the ercise unlimited discretion." very word used by Patrick Henry in the Virginia convention, to express his idea of the extent of the power. I come now to a still more distinct recognition of the power for which I contend. On the 9th of January, 1829, the house of representatives, on motion of Mr. Miner, of Pennsylvania, adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, That the committee for the District of Columbia be instructed to inquire into the expediency of providing, by law, for the gradual abolition of slavery within the District, in such manner that the interest of no individual shall be injured thereby." This resolution was passed by a vote of 114 to 66; and it is worthy of remark that, of those who voted in the affirmative, eleven were from the slave states, viz: one from Delaware, two from Maryland, three from Virginia, one from North Carolina, one from Tennessee, and three from Kentucky. On the 29th of January the committee for the District of Columbia reported a bill providing, among other things, that no slave should be imported into the District; and that, upon such importation, the slave should be free, on leaving the District within ten days. Of the committee of seven who thus recognized the power of congress over the subject of slavery here, there were four from slave states, viz: two from Virginia and two from Maryland. It further appears that, on the 20th of April, 1830, a similar bill was reported by Mr. Washington, of Maryland, chairman of the committee for the District of Columbia. In April, 1836, Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, chairman of a committee on abolition, reported the following resolutions: and therefore it was a "grievance." It outrages the But what is it to abolish slavery? Slavery, it feelings of my constituents; and therefore it is a should be remembered, is the mere creature of sta grievance to them. It is an outrage committed under tute, or positive law. It is unknown to the common the authority of the laws of congress, for which they law. "It is" (said Lord Mansfield, near seventy share a responsibility; and therefore they ask for their years ago, in the celebrated case of the negro Sorepeal. merset, which every lawyer has, of course read)-"It But I have in my hand a still stronger expression is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it on the subject from this District. It is a memorial but positive law." What is it, then, to abolish slaearnestly praying for the abolition of slavery and the very? It is simply to repeal the positive laws which slave trade here, signed by more than eleven hundred sustain it; to open the foul dungeon, locked by the citizens of the District, presented to congress in key of unjust legislation, and permit the slave to 1828-among the signers of which were chief justice walk forth, and breathe the pure, invigorating atCranch, Judge Morsell and Gen. Van Ness, besides a mosphere of the common law. It is to restore to its large number of others of the most intelligent and re- just efficacy the great fundamental law of natural spectable of the inhabitants of the District. And now, justice, on which the common law is founded-a law sir, listen to the expression of their opinion upon the written upon every man's conscience and in every power of congress. After describing in glowing language the horrors of the slave trade here, comparing it with the foreign slave trade, denounced and punished as piracy, and speaking of "the reproach of inconsistency cast upon the free institutions established among us," they say: "We behold these scenes continually taking place among us, and lament our inability to prevent them. The people of this District, have within themselves, no means of legislative redress, and we therefore appeal to your honorable body, as the only one invested by the American constitution with the power to relieve us." Two years after the presentation of this memorial, "Resolved, That congress possess no constitutional viz: January, 1830, the grand jury of the county of authority to interfere, in any way, with the institution Washington expressed their conviction of the power of slavery in any of the states of this confederacy. of congress over this subject, in a communication "Resolved, That congress ought not to interfere, addressed to the chairman of the committee for the in any way, with slavery in the District of Colum- District of Columbia, in which they gave an appalling description of the slave trade, and declared that "the inhuman practice is so shocking to the moral sense of the community, as to call loudly for the interposition of congress. bia." Here, again, the power to legislate on the subject of slavery here is clearly admitted, by the marked difference in the phraseology of the two resolutions; the first expressly declaring that congress have no constitutional power to interfere with slavery in the states, while the second merely declares that congress ought not to interfere in this District-omitting all reference to the constitution, In accordance with these proceedings, which show the recognition, by the house of representatives and its committees, of the power in question, is the presentation, by members of congress from the slave states, of abolition memorials, viz: By Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, January 14, 1822, from citizens of that state, for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. By Mr. Saunders, of North Carolina, December 13, 1824, from citizens of that state, praying for the gradual abolition of slavery in the United States. By Mr. Barney, of Maryland, on the 11th of February, 1828, from citizens of Baltimore, for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. By Mr. A. H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, March 30, 1828, from citizens of that state, praying congress to take measures for the entire abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia; and By Mr. Washington, of Maryland, March 5, 1830, from inhabitants of the county of Frederick, in that state, for the same object. To these expressions of opinion by individual members of congress from slave states, I add that of Alexander Smyth, of Virginia, in the debate on the Missouri question, in January, 1820, in which he said: "If the future freedom of the black is your real object, and not a mere pretence, why do you not begin here? Within the ten miles square you have undoubted power to exercise exclusive legislation, Produce a bill to emancipate the slaves in the District of Columbia, or, if you prefer it, to emancipate those born hereafter." From these recognitions of the power in question, I turn to admission of the power by the people of this District. In the year 1802, the grand jury of the county of Alexandria made a formal presentment of the slave trade as a "grievance." Having described the trade with its horrible and heart-rending atrocities, they say: "We consider these grievances demanding legis lative redress." Let me present you, Mr. Speaker, with the additional testimony of two distinguished men, and I shall have done with the question of constitutional power. refer to the declarations of the two highest officers of this government. I In the United States senate, on the 1st of February, 1820, in the debate on the Missouri question, Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky, said: "In the District of Columbia, containing a population of 30,000 souls and probably as many slaves as the whole territory of Missouri, the power of providing for their emancipation rests with congress alone. Why, then, this heart-rending sympathy for the slaves of Missouri, and this cold insensibility, this eternal apathy towards the slaves in the District of Columbia?" man's heart. This congress is called on to do by the petitions which we are now contriving means summarily to reject. It is by the statute laws of the United States, and by them alone, that men are made slaves in this District. The congress of the United States have passed laws repealing the law of eternal justice; and the petitioners ask us to repeal the repealing laws, and restore the law repealed to its full force and efficacy. They ask us to remove the crushing weight we have placed upon the soul and body of the slave, and permit him to rise up and walk. They ask this in the name of JUSTICE. And are we to be told that we have no power to grant their request? Had we power to enact these laws? Where did we get it? If the constitution gave it—which I deny-does it not give us power to repeal them? Have we power to pass a law making men the property of their fellow men; and have we no power to pass a law restoring to them the ownership of themselves? thereby violate? I deny that there are, or ever can Will any one talk of vested rights which we should be, in justice, any vested rights in such a case. It has been said by a great statesman that "that is property which the law makes property." If by this proposition is meant that what the law makes property is property, according to law, I do not, of course, deny it. This would be merely saying that law is law. But if it is intended to affirm that what the law makes property is rightfully and justly property, then I deny it utterly. The law may make force it, and the community may, of necessity, subthe declaration; and the power of the state may enmit; but, after all, it will be a mere law of force and not of right; unless, according to the philosophy of the infidel Hobbes, "the sole foundation of right and wrong is the civil law." That is the philosophy for slavery; but not for the freedom which finds the rule of right and wrong in a higher law than that of the state. And now, I give you the testimony of the present chief magistrate of the United States, whom no one Let me test this proposition to which I have referwill suspect of a want of inclination to please the red by an example. Suppose we enact a law declarsouth by denying the constitutional power of congressing that the first red man from the western wilds who over this subject, if it were possible to find even plausible reasons for such a denial. In a letter to a committee of gentlemen in North Carolina, of the 6th of March, 1836, Mr. Van Buren said: "I would not, from the lights now before me, feel myself safe in pronouncing that congress does not possess the power of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia." This was Mr. Van Buren's way of affirming the power of congress to abolish slavery here. Is the abolition of slavery within the competency of legis lation. may chance to fall within your power shall be your property. Would our law make him property?Would not the voice of nature and the voice of this nation unite in thundering an indignant no to such an inquiry? Whence is derived the original idea of property?— It is not the creature of statute law. There are no statutes declaring that lands and houses, and cattle, and the productions of human skill and industry, shall be property. There are statute laws regulating their alienation and descent, but none declaring that they may be the subjects of ownership by man. And this Having thus shown that the language of the grant for the best of reasons. There is a law older than all of power to legislate for this District, necessarily, in human laws, and above all human laws, which has the absence of express limitation extends to every settled the matter. It is the law of nature; which is possible "case" of legislation, and that this is in ac- nothing more or less than the will of the great oricordance with ancient construction and modern prac-ginal Proprietor. That Proprietor never stamped on tice, I come to consider some objections which are man the quality of property. He never authorised urged against the exercise of the power. one man to own another man; nor did He ever authorise a legislature to make a law giving such ownership. Ownership in man? You may as well talk of owning the stars or the sun. No. Man was made to be the owner of himself. Every quality of his noble nature, and every aspiration of his undying spirit, proclaim it. It is said that it is not competent for legislative power to abolish slavery; and that, inasmuch as the grant of power to congress must necessarily be limited to "cases" within the competency of legislation, therefore the "all cases whatsoever" of the constitution, cannot be taken to embrace the "case" of slavery. No legislative power is, I admit, competent to do Let me stop a moment to consider the language of every thing. It cannot, for example act, by law, upon this presentment "grievances!" We have been told the consciences or the faith of men. It cannot compel that slavery and the slave trade are no grievance, or sanction the commission of crime. It cannot enwhose redress can be prayed for, because congress act that husbands shall not protect their wives, or that have no power over the subject. Not so thought the parents shall not provide for their children, or that grand jury of Alexandria. And then, again, we female chastity shall be exposed to violation; and so are told that slavery and the slave trade are no grie- of many other cases I might specify. It cannot pass vance to the people of the north, because their inte- such laws for the very same reason that it could not rests are not affected by them. How are the inte- rightfully pass the laws by which slaves are holden rests of the grand jurors of Alexandria affected by here; and for the very reason why it is bound to rewhat they presented as a grievance? It did not take peal them, namely, because such laws are contrary away their property. It did not destroy their health, to the great law of nature, which no human legislaor endanger their lives. But it outragedtheir feelings, tion may violate. Having shown that the abolition of slavery is, upon the principles of natural justice, within the competency of legislation, let me now advert, briefly, to the history of abolition, to show how extensively these principles have been acted on. It may surprise those who habitually regard abolition as the mere fungus creation of moon-struck fanaticism, to learn the extent to which its "abstractions," as they are called in derision, have been actually made the basis of legisla tion. I hold in my had the 5th number of the "AntiSlavery Examiner," in which I find the following very brief summary of the history of abolition, which I beg permission to read: "The abolition decree of the great counell of England was passed in 1102. The memorable Irish de cree, 'that all English slaves in the whole of Ireland | regulations respecting the territory or other property dinance was drawn by a distinguished member from be immediately emancipated and restored to their belonging to the United States;" a power by no Massachusetts, (Mr. Dane), yet the idea of abolishformer liberty,' was issued in 1171. Slavery in Eng-means as clearly reaching the "case" of abolition, as ing slavery in the northwestern territory was origiland was abolished by a general charter of emancipa- that of legislating "in all cases whatsoever" within nally brought out by Mr. Jefferson, having been sugtion in 1381. Passing over many instances of the and for the "ten miles square." Let it not be said gested by him in 1784, in his report, as chairman of a abolition of slavery by law, both during the middle that the prohibitions to which I have just alluded committee of congress, of a plan for the government ages and since the reformation, we find them multi- were enacted under the authority of that clause of of the territory. plying as we approach our own times. In 1776, sla- the constitution to which I have before referred the And now, sir, by what authority did the congress very was abolished in Prussia by special edict. In abolition of the foreign slave trade, since the autho- of '87 thus abolish slavery in the northwestern terriSt. Domingo, Cayenne, Guadaloupe and Martinique, rity derived from that clause, to prohibit the impor- tory? Was there any power to do it conferred by the in 1794, where more than 600,000 slaves were eman- tation of slaves, was prohibited to be exercised prior articles of confederation which will at all compare cipated by the French government. In Java, 1811; in to the year 1808; while these acts prohibiting their with the authority given to congress in the present Ceylon, 1815; in Buenos Ayres, 1816; in St. Helena, importation into the territories of Mississippi and Or- constitution to abolish slavery here? None will pre1819; in Colombia, 1821; by the congress of Chili in leans were passed in 1798 and 1804. tend it. And yet the ordinance was passed, and sla1821; in Cape Colony, 1823; in Malaca, 1825; in the But there is a still more striking illustration of the very abolished-so strong was the anti-slavery feelsouthern provinces of Birmah, 1826; in Bolivia, 1826; pushing of legislation to "the verge" of constitution- ing at that day-so ready were the men of the revoin Peru, Guatemala and Montevideo, 1828; in Jamai- al power in favor of human liberty, in the celebrated lution to strain authority to the very utmost, for the ca, Barbadoes, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Anquilla, ordinance of 1787, "for the government of the terri- purpose of banishing slavery from the land which Mauritius, St. Christopher's, Nevis, the Virgin Is-tory of the United States northwest of the river freemen's blood had been profusely poured out to relands, (British), Antigua, Montserrat, St. Vincent's, Ohio." The sixth of the "articles of compact" of deem from oppression's power. Grenada, Berbice, Tobago, St. Lucia, Trinidad, that ordinance declares that "there shall be neither Objection-property cannot be taken without process of Honduras, Demerara, Essequibo, and the Cape of slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territolaw, nor without compensation. Good Hope, on the 1st of August, 1834. But, waiv- ry, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes." But it is said that the power to legislate "in all ing details, suffice it to say, that England, France, This article not only prohibited the future introduc- cases whatsoever," is restrained from abolishing Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Russia, Austria, Prussia tion of slaves into the northwestern territory, but in slavery, by the fifth of the amendments to the constiand Germany, have all, and often, given their testi- effect, abolished the slavery which then existed tution, which declares that "no person shall be demony to the competency of the legislative power to there. This is sufficiently obvious from the terms of prived of life, liberty or property, without due proabolish slavery. In our own country, the legislature the ordinance. And such is the effect which has cess of law." My reply to this is, that the term "propassed an act of abolition in 1780, Connecticut in been given to it by judicial decision. I refer to the perty," as used in the amendment, cannot be there 1784, Rhode Island in 1784, New York in 1799, New case of Harvey and others vs. Decker and Hopkins, taken to mean slaves, because the constitution itself Jersey in 1804, Vermont by constitution in 1777, decided by the supreme court of Mississippi, in the calls them persons, and treats them as such. They Massachusetts in 1780, and N. Hampshire in 1784." year 1818. Walker's reports, p. 36. are described in the 2d section of the 4th article as Here, sir, are the "abstractions" of abolition, em"persons held to service or labor;" and in the 2d secbodied in the legislation of Europe and America durtion of the 1st article, which provides for their being ing the last five hundred years; and yet we are told represented in this body, they are spoken of as "all that legislative power is incompetent to the abolition other persons." If, then, it had been intended to proof slavery! hibit the taking of slaves "without due process of law," the amendment should have so described them. The constitution must be made its own interpreter; and it calls them "persons." No mere intendment, therefore, can include them within the meaning of the term "property." This was the case of three slaves who had been taken by Decker from Virginia to the northwestern territory, in 1784, where they remained until after the ordinance of 1787, and until the year 1816. How the case came up for adjudication in Mississippi does not appear. It was fully argued upon a motion for a new trial, and the court decided that the slaves were emancipated by the ordinance of '87. One of the points made in the case was, that whatever might be the effect of the ordinance, the slaves were emancipated by the constitution of Indiana, adopted in 1816. This was resisted on the ground that to give it such an effect would be to violate vested rights. The decision of the court on this point, coming from the highest judicial tribunal of a slave state, is worthy of special notice. To the evidence thus furnished of the recognition You take from us a vested right arising from munici- That the practical effect of the ordinance was to emancipate the slaves within the territory at the time The abolition of the slave trade, no one will deny, of its adoption, (and that, too, let it be remembered, involves the great principle of the right to abolish without compensation), appears from the fact that slavery. That trade on the high seas, in American slaveholders in the territory petitioned congress for a vessels, congress has abolished, or attempted to abo- repeal of that part of the ordinance touching the sublish. It has authorised the commanders of its armed ject of slavery, upon the ground that it had such an vessels to capture the slave ship, take from its owner effect. I refer to the memorial of "the inhabitants of his cargo of men, and bring in his vessel for con- the counties of St. Clair and Randolph," Illinois, demnation, and himself for trial as a pirate. presented to congress on the 12th of January, 1796. Now, by what authority has congress thus inter- It is an interesting document, embodying as it does fered to wrest from the citizens of the United States men bought with their money? By what authority has it interfered with "vested rights?" By what authority does it thus take "private property?" Does the constitution say that congress may legislate in Fall cases whatsoever" touching the African slave trade? No. It simply declares that "the congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations." It is upon the foundation of this simple grant of power, that congress has reared its structure of slave-trade-prohibiting legislation, and has brought up, for the top-stone of the noble edifice, the punish ment of DEATH. But further. Congress, by an act passed on the 7th of April, 1798, prohibited, under a heavy penalty, the importation of slaves from any place without the limits of the United States, into the territory of Mississippi; and declared that, upon such importation, such slaves should be free. It also, on the 26th of March, 1804, enacted a similar prohibition of the importation of slaves into the territory of Orleans, with a similar provision for their freedom. the principal arguments now urged, and always urg- The memorialists declared the ordinance to be By what authority were these abolition acts passed? Simply in virtue of that clause of the constitu- Such was the ordinance of 1787-an ordinance tion which declares that "the congress shall have passed unanimously, with the exception of a single power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and vote. It is worthy of remark that, although this or If it be said that this construction would not make the constitution prohibit individuals from depriving slaveholders of their slaves without process of law. I admit it. The guaranty extending, for the reason mentioned, in no wise to slaves, their "owners" are, of course, left to their rights as existing independent of the guaranty. The honorable member from Georgia (Mr. Cooper) refers to that clause of the amendment which prohibits the "taking of private property for public use without just compensation," and finds in that an argument against abolishing slavery. "Is it pretended (says he) that this government has a 'public use' for this property?" Sir, I admit that abolition does not take for "public use." But I at the same time maintain that it does not take at all, within the meaning of the constitution. It performs a nobler work than taking slaves for public use. It takes off from them the crushing weight of laws which consign them, without compensation, to the use of others, and restores them to the use of themselves. This is abolition. But I have another reply to the argument drawn from the amendment to the constitution referred to. It is, that the government of the United States has always refused to recognize slaves as "property" for which "compensation" might be claimed under the constitution. In numerous cases in which they were taken into the service by their masters as waiters, and killed in the service, has congress refused compensation, though it has uniformly made it for horses and other property destroyed by the enemy while employed in such service. But, what is more directly to the point now before us, congress has, in passing laws providing compensation for property impressed into the service--"taken for public use"-expressly refused to include slaves. Thus, when the act of the 9th of April, 1816, "authorising the payment for property lost, captured or destroyed by the enemy, while in the military service of the United States," was under discussion, Mr. Maryatt, of South Carolina, moved to amend the section which provided payment for impressed horses, carts, &c. so as to include all other property lost in the service. He particularly called the attention of the house to the cases of slaves used as drivers of wagons, as sailors, laborers, &c. impressed into the service, and lost, captured or destroyed by the enemy. His motion was negatived by a large majority. A similar motion was made by Mr. Forsyth, on the 24th of January, 1825, to amend the bill authorising further payment to sufferers during the war, and with a similar result. In addition to all this, the house of representatives repeatedly refused, upon the most pressing and urgent applications of Francis Larche, to make compensation for his slave, impressed into the service at New Orleans, in the winter of 1814 '15, and killed Consent of the people of the District. in the service. A report of the committee of claims: "Good faith implied in the cession and acceptance." congress power to legislate "in all cases whatso in this case may be found in the third vohane of Re-What toes this mean It must means this: that there ever," it would be incompetent for Virginia and ports of Committees, 1st session, 21st cui gress, No. ¦ was something in the cession and acceptance, or in Maryland to make the stipulation that it should not 401; in which numerous cases of rejected appaca- the circumstances connected with them, that raised a legislate in a particular case-since it had been extions for compensation for slaves killed in the service confidence in Virginia and Maryland that the govern- pressly declared in the Virginia convention by Mr. are referred to. ment of the United States would not abolish slavery Madison, the farther of the constitution, "that the or the slave trade in the District--this confidence, ceding states might settle the terms of cession," and It is, in the next place, said that congress may not from whichever of these sources derived, carrying "make what stipulation they please in it." Nor abolish slavery here without the consent of the peo- with it a corresponding pledge on the part of the could the omission to make the stipulation have reple of the District. This objection has received the United States that such action would not take place. sulted from an impression that it was unnecessary sanction of my venerable friend from Massachusetts Now it is manifest that there could have been no to stipulate against the exercise of a power not within (Mr. Adams), in an address to the people of the U. such pledge implied, because there could properly the competency of legislation; since the competency States, since the last session of congress, and deserves, have been none such expressed. Congress had no of legislative power to abolish slavery was then unifor that reason, if for no other, to be well considered. power to make such pledge. It would have been versally conceded. I understand the venerable member to have placed utterly void, if made, because the constitution havthis objection on the ground that it is against the ing given to congress the power to "exercise exclugreat leading principle of our institutions-that of sive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the Disself-government-that the people should be acted on trict, no one congress can, by any act, restrict a subby legislation without their consent. I admit the sequent congress to the exercise of that power in some correctness of the principle, but deny that it sustains cases only; if it could, it would have the power to the objection. It will not certainly be claimed that alter the constitution by act of legislation. the consent must, in all cases, be expressed. There But, waiving this, let us look into the acts of cesare very few now on the stage, who expressly assent-sion and of acceptance, and see whether any thing ed to the constitution when it was adopted; yet no- can be found from which the supposed confidence body denies that we are all bound by it in virtue of could be raised on one side, or the supposed pledge an assent, implied. And is not the assent of the peo- implied on the other. ple of this District to our legislation implied, upon the same principles? When the territory composing this District was a part of Virginia and Maryland, the assent of its inhabitants to that constitution which The acts of cession, one dated December 8, 1789, and the other December 19, 1791, are as follows: "Be it enacted by the general assembly, That a tract authorises congress to exercise exclusive legislation of country not exceeding ten miles square, or any in all cases whatsoever, was, in effect, given by the lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of adoption of that constitution by Virginia and Mary- the state, and in any part thereof, as congress may land; and the present inhabitants of the District are by law direct, be, and the same is hereby, forever bound to submit to that legislation upon precisely the ceded and relinquished to the congress, and govern same principle that obliges any of the states to sub-ment of the United States, in full and absolute right, mit to the legislation of congress constitutionally ex- and exclusive jurisdiction as well of soil as of persons residing, or to reside, thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution of the government of the United States." ercised. If this reasoning be correct, the assent of the people of this District to the constitutional action of congress is implied; and to require that it be expressed asserts a principle which would absolve the people of Such were the cessions. "Full and absolute right and the whole country from all obligation to obey the exclusive jurisdiction of soil and persons residing or laws either of the states or of the nation. And here to reside thereon." And that there should be no it should be borne in mind that the objection does not hesitancy on the part of the United States to accept apply solely to legislation for the abolition of slavery, the cessions, on account of any supposed failure to but that, from its nature, it is applicable to all sub-make the grants they contained, co-extensive with jects of legislation affecting the interests of the people of the District; so that the principle it involves strikes at the whole power of congress supposed to be conferred in the clause of the constitution we have been considering. the grant of power to congress in the constitution, it Whence, then, the very significant and important omission to settle this question by a stipulation in the acts of session? There can be but one answer to this question; and that is, that Virginia and Maryland did not intend to make such a stipulation; they did not, in fact desire to make it. The subject of the power of congress, under the general grant of power to legislate in cases whatsoever, did not escape the attention of the leading men in those states. They knew that by the cessions they parted with all jurisdiction over the territory; that congress was made its exclusive legislature; and that legislative power was then relied on as a legitimate means for abolishing slavery; and yet with their eyes thus wide open, they ceded the ten miles square, and expressly confirmed the ample power over it granted to congress by the constitution, without the slightest attempt to impose any limitation whatever upon the exercise of that power in the abolition of slavery. While the supposition of an "implied faith" to Virginia and Maryland is thus clearly negatived by the terms of the cessions, and the significant omission of any stipulation in them in favor of slavery, there are other considerations which render it ma nifest that no such limitation can be implied. What is the ground of the suppose "good faith" to Virginia and Maryland? It is the assumption that the abolition of slavery and the slave trade here would injuriously affect the interests of those states. But is legislation on the subject of slavery the only legislation which the principle of this objection would reach? Is there, in fact, any legislation capable of affecting the interests of the neighboring states, to which it might be applied? Might it not, for example, reach the criminal code which we might enact for the District? or the licensing of lotteries or gaming es tablishments in it? or our legislation upon the subject of currency here? The acts of congress accepting these cessions are But let us see how the principle contended for is mere acts of acceptance, containing nothing which Does not the principle of this objection strip us of to be carried out. How is the new piece of timber has the slightest bearing on the present question. all power, not only over the subject of slavery, but to be put into the building which has been so "fitly Now, what is there in these cessions and their ac-over every other subject our legislation on which framed?" There must, it is said, be an express as- ceptance to raise an expectation on one side, or im- might affect the feelings or the interests of Virginia sent of the people of the District. How is that as-ply a pledge on the other, that the power to abolish and Maryland, and send us, cap in hand, to those sent to be obtained? By what authority? Shall slavery was to become a practical exception from states, in the attitude of inquiring what we may do meetings be called? How and by whom? And when the "exclusive jurisdiction" expressed in the ces- in the exercise of our powers of legislation? Who is they are called, and come to act-upon what princi- sions, or from the authority to legislate "in all cases willing to take this attitude? Who dreamed at the ple-by virtue of what organic law shall the decision whatsoever," given in the constitution to which they adoption of the constitution, that the federal governof the majority bind the minority, or bind those who ment would be brought to the necessity of taking it? do not choose to attend? And then, in what form and under what circumstances is the assent to be given? Must the law which we may pass be submitted to the people in their assemblies for their sanction? Or shall they meet beforehand and give congress power to exercise legislation in certain cases or upon certain subjects, leaving to congress the power to settle the details of its own action? Congress has hitherto always proceeded on the ground that its power to act was derived from the constitution. And when the inquiry has arisen, what are we authorised to do? wise and learned men have gravely looked into the constitution to determine the question. But, under the new doctrine, the case is entirely changed; and our wise men must lay aside their spectacles, shut the book of the constitution, and go about to inquire, what power do the people of this District think we have a right to exercise? Or what power are they disposed to grant us? We used to think we must inquire of the constitution to know what we might do, especially as we were solemnly sworn to support it; but now we must inquire of the people of this District! Who ever heard of such a government as this would be if the doctrine I am combatting should prevail? Surely I need say no more to prove what every body must see-that it puts an end to the government of congress over this District, and abolishes the 17th clause of the 8th section of the constitution as completely as some of the "men and women" of the north desire to see slavery and the slave trade abolished. Implied faith to Virginia and Maryland. It is further objected to the exercise of our power of abolishing slavery and the slave trade here, that it would be a violation of the "good faith to Virginia and Maryland, implied in the cession and acceptance" by congress of the territory which forms this district. refer? What sort of "good faith" is it which, in the Such is the humiliating position in which the slave power seeks to place the government of this republic! It being thus apparent that there is nothing in the “cessions and acceptance” implying the "good faith" which is relied on; and that such implication, carri- Implied pledge of the north to the south in adopting the I know it is said I may petition: but I do not see what use there is in sending my petition to my repreI come now to another branch of the subject of im- sentative, if, the moment he gets up with it in his plied faith of a more general nature; I mean the "im- hand, it is to be considered as objected to, and the quesplied faith" that congress will not legislate on the sub- tion about its being received is to be considered as laid ject of slavery here, and that the people of the north upon the table. Now, I consider that it all amounts will not agitate the subject-draw from what is call to saying, in a short of back-handed way-and I dis"the compromise which lies at the basis of the constitution." like it the more for that-that my petition shall not I do not here refer to the assertion often made, that be received or considered; and I would as lief they "slavery, as it exists at the south, is guarantied by would say that I shall not write it and send it as to the constitution," because such an assertion has not do this; for if they will not hear me, what's the use even plausibility enough to entitle it to notice in a in sending my petition, and asking my representative grave discussion; though there are thousands, proba- to present it? bly, who really believe that there is such a guaran- Now, as I said, I do not agree to all this. These ty-which those who claim the right of free discus- rights of speaking, and writing, and printing, and pesion are wickedly violating. But I state the objec- titioning, are great rights, which I am thinking these tion as it is expressed by Mr. Van Buren in his North constitution-makers would have had no business to Carolina correspondence. He did not place it on the stop the exercise of, even if they had put it in the ground of a guaranty in the constitution, or inferable constitution; and certainly that it cannot be stopped from the constitution, but of a faith implied in "the merely because they stopped talking about slavery; compromise which lies at the basis of the federal for, if I understand the matter, that stopping only compact." This is surely sufficiently indefinite for meant that they would say no more about abolishing the largest convenience of non-committalism. slavery by the constitution; and what shows this is, The compromise? Where is it? And what is it? that they went to talking about slavery, and writing Those who rely on it profess to infer it from the his- about it, and printing about it, and having societies tory of the proceedings on the question of slavery in about it, and petitioning about it, right off after the the convention that formed the constitution. What constitution was formed. is that history? Briefly this? And, besides all this, the constitution, if I rememSlavery existed in a portion of the states. A de-ber right, says that congress shall make no law abridgsire existed in the north to introduce an express pro-ing the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right vision into the constitution for its abolition. This of the people to petition for a redress of grievances. the south resisted; and the constitution was adopted Now, think it is pretty essentially abridging these without such provision. rights to say that I shall not speak nor write, nor have These are the facts. What then was the compro- my writing printed, about slavery; and that I shall mise? A compromise involves a mutual concession.not petition against slavery and the slave trade in the What did the north concede? She conceded the point that grieved me, it is that slavery, and that buying and District of Columbia; for if there ever was any thing in dispute. And what was that? Simply whether the constitution should abolish slavery. How did this selling, and driving and shipping to market of men, concession pledge the north not to speak, write, print women and children in that District. or petition against slavery? If the objection were placed on the ground of the present wishes of Virginia and Maryland, then I say give them all the effect to which the desires of those states are fairly entitled; but when they place it on the high and imposing ground of a breach of implied faith, my reply to them is, that there is not and never was such implied faith as they contend for, that the change in their minds since 1789 does not change the character of the enactment and acceptance of the cessions; and that they must, therefore, be content to abide by them according to their fair import. Indeed, I go further, and say that the state of public sentiment on the subject of slavery at that period, and the universal expectation then entertained that slavery would, at no distant day, be abolished, not only negative the idea of the implied faith contended for, but furnish the strongest ground for an opposite implication. I shall presently, for a more general purpose, produce such evidence of that public sentiment and expectation as will, I trust, satisfy the most incredulous that, instead of objecting to the action of congress on the subject of slavery here, the states of Virginia and Maryland were bound, in good faith, long since, to abolish slavery within their own limits; and that their neglect to do so is just ground of complaint on the part of the United States. In no part of The good Book, again, tells me to remember those the union were there louder and more bitter denunthat are in bonds as bound with them; (and thisMr. Speaker, it seems to me that this simple state-as bound with them—I take it, means something); and ciations against slavery than in the same states of Virginia and Maryland when the territory was ceded ment of the case makes it almost too plain for argu- yet I must not say, or write, or print a word about and accepted. It was not only universally admitted, find even plausible ground for the inference of the talking about slavery while they were making the The mind is actually compelled to labor to my feelings, because the constitution-makers stopped as I have shown, that the abolition of slavery was within the competency of legislation, but that it musted with great pertinacity. It is said that slavery was pray every day, to my Heavenly Father for the slaves, guranty relied on; and yet that inference is maintain- constitution. And then, again, I may pray, and do and would be effected, to use Washington's language, "at no distant day." The cessions of this territory; agreed to drop it, and make no provision to abolish shuts its ears, and won't hear me, because the conan exciting subject, and that the convention, having and His ears are open to my prayer; and yet, congress therefore, it must be apparent to all, were accepted slavery, there therefore arose an implied guaranty stitution-makers stopped talking about slavery while by congress with the expectation well understood by that it should be no more discussed; but that the north they were hammering out the constitution! How Virginia and Maryland that the District about to be set apart for the seat of government would soon cease absurd it is to suppose an implied guaranty against to be surrounded by a slave population-a considerathe exercise of these rights, when that very constitution which may well be supposed to have had great tion declares that they shall not be abridged, and does not influence in inducing the decision of congress to lomake any exception of the case of slavery! I am cate the seat of government here. told it was Virginia that was the means of putting this into the constitution; and I thank Virginia for it. Now, it seems to me that, if they had meant to except the case of slavery, they would have said so right out, and not left it to this loose sort of understanding, which, after all, I do not see was any understanding at all.' Instead, therefore, of the present agitation of the subject of slavery and the slave trade here being justly to be regarded, (to use the language of Mr. Van Buren to the North Carolina committee), "as a surprise upon the people of Maryland and Virginia," the surprise should be on the other side; and, instead of "being confident, (to use his language), that, if the state of things which now exists had been apprehended by those states, the cession of the District would not have been made," no man can consider the state of feeling and expectation in regard to slavery at that time, without being confident that "if the present state of things had been apprehended by" the middle and northern states, "the cession would not have been" accepted. Such being the true state of this case; such the "faith" really "implied" in the history and spirit of the time to which I have referred, is it not amazing to witness what is now passing? Instead of the redemp. tion of the implied pledge to remove from around this seat of government the curse of slavery, it has been permitted greatly to increase; and this very city has become the great slave mart of large portions of these states-insomuch that the representatives from the free states, and their constituents who come to this city to witness the deliberations of congress, are compelled to witness the driving of colles of slaves through its principal avenues, and by the very doors of this capitol-to witness, in fact, the slave trade, with all its infernal machinery of prisons, whips, chains and slaveships-a trade little less horible-in some of its aspects more so-than that whose prosecution on the high seas our laws have subjected to the punishment of death. ment. should forever after hold her peace! Now, however incredible this may appear to men The fact is it's a pretty great affair to take away these natural rights of speaking and printing and petitioning; and especially to take them away in such a case as this. And then, to take them away by implication, too. Why, if I had seen it in the constitution itself, I should hardly have believed my eyes; and yet they say I am deprived of these rights by implication! Now, it seems to me that in such a case as this, if there is to be any thing implied, it should be the other way; that is, in favor of my natural rights, and especially in favor of the rights of the poor slave, that I think about just as much as I do about my own. And now, to sum up the whole matter, it is my opinion that this implication ought to be turned the other end foremost. That's the natural way; and, besides, I have heard it said that when the constitution was made, every body expected that slavery would be abolished in a little while; and, as I don't see how that could be done unless folks were to be allowed to speak and print against it, I think that is evidence that the understanding was that way. And then I understand that there are six or seven thousand slaves in the District of Columbia, and that Now, Mr. Speaker, look at this ploughman, as he there are pens there, right in sight of the capitol, lays down his newspaper, takes off his spectacles, and where slaves that have been bought are shut up, un-thus reasons, and tell me if his argument is not contil there are enough of them got together to send off clusive and unanswerable. to market, away to the south, where they will never see their husbands, nor wives, nor parents, nor brothers, nor sisters, any more. I declare it makes me And now, to crown the whole, the very petitions-feel bad to think about them. And I understand that prayers of citizens of the United States, asking in the name of humanity, the abolition, not of slavery in Virginia and Maryland, but of slavery and the slave trade here, are sneered at, and rejected without a hearing; while the petitioners are branded as "desperate and despicable fanatics" on this floor. Mr. Speaker, need I ask who has the right to complain of a violation of "good faith" in regard to the matter of slavery here? Such, sir, is the common sense which is at work among the people upon this question, which slavery has so much mystified; and this is the way the cobweb arguments that have been elaborated for its procongress has a right to say that these six or seven tection are swept away. You will perceive that my thousand slaves shall not be slaves any more; and, farmer has brought his reasoning to a very importalso, that slaves shall not be bought and shut up there ant conclusion, namely, that all implication in such Now I am a case should be in favor of natural rights; and, thereany more, to be sent away to the south. told here, in this newspaper, that because the men fore, should, in this case, be exactly the reverse of that made the constitution stopped talking about sla- what is claimed in behalf of slavery. And is he not very, I am prohibited from sending my petition to correct? Is it not demanded by the common sense congress asking it to exercise its power about slavery and unperverted feelings of all men, that implication and the slave-trade in the District of Columbia. shall never be permitted to take away or abridge |