applicable to such a case. But the only principle applicable to such a case by the law of England is, that the validity of a marriage must be tried by reference to the law of the country where it had its origin. Having furnished this principle, the law of England withdraws altogether, and leaves the legal question to the exclusive judgment of the law of Scotland.”

The laws of marriage and the laws of divorce, notwithstanding the almost insuperable difficulties because of difference in sectional views and customs, should be made uniform, for at this time not only is there great variance of jurisprudence as to age limit and the grounds and methods for dissolving the matrimonial tie but common law marriages are upheld in certain States and in others the leaning is to require strict observance of certain forms and ceremonies of marriage.

Kent in his Commentaries Vol. II, p. 87 says of marriage:

"No peculiar ceremonies are requisite by the common law to the valid celebration of the marriage. The consent of the parties is all that is required; and as marriage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that is required by natural or public law. If the contract be made per verba de praesenti, and remain without cohabitation, or if made per verba re futuro and be followed by consummation it amounts to a valid marriage in the absence of all civil regulations to the contrary, and which the parties (being competent as to age and consent) cannot dissolve, and is equally binding as if made in facie ecclesiae. There is no recognition of an ecclesiastical authority in forming the connection, and it is considered entirely in the light of a civil contract. This is the doctrine of the common law, and also the common law which governed marriages in England prior to the Marriage Act of 26 Geo. II."

Endless litigation has grown out of common law marriages where it was deemed by the contracting parties suffi

cient to agree between themselves that they should be husband and wife and without conforming to any religious or civil ceremony. The vital question is the existence of a contract of marriage. In the case of State vs. Hansbrough, 181 Mo. p. 350, where the State based a prosecution for bigamy on recognition of the parties by their friends and acquaintances for twenty years as husband and wife, held that it was not sufficient to prove a contract of marriage to show cohabitation and general reputation as husband and wife, for "while a marriage at common law required no particular form or ceremony to make it valid, enough had to be said. and done by the contracting parties to make a contract."

When a minor under the age specified by law, can contract a Common Law marriage and does enter such an agreement, a suit for nullity will lie and may be brought by the infant, parents or guardians, Sec. 1744, of the Code of Civil Procedure, of New York, reads:

"An action to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties had not attained the age of legal consent may be maintained by the infant, or by either parent of the infant, or by the guardian of the infant's person; or the court may allow the action to be maintained by any person as the next friend of the infant."

And similar relief is granted by other States. But when a suit is filed to annul a marriage contracted by persons of less than the age when the law permits there arises the question of the legitimacy of children, if there are any. In the suit of McCan vs. McCan in the Supreme Court of New York recently Justice Ordway filed the following memorandum:

"This is an action for the annulment of a marriage on the ground that the plaintiff was only seventeen years of age when she married the defendant, and left him before reaching the age of eighteen, and had not cohabited with him since. There is one child born of the marriage and still living. The plaintiff has offered no evidence tending to show misconduct on the part of her husband, or any rea

son for the annulment of her marriage beyond the facts already stated, but she is not required to do so, and any such evidence would probably be immaterial and irrelevant. I regret that I am compelled to grant the decree asked for (Kruger v. Kruger, 137 App. Div., 289). It seems to me unfortunate that the law of this State should permit these 'trial marriages,' which may be annulled at the mere request of either party, if he or she was married and left the other before reaching the age of eighteen years. In this case such a law seems particularly unfortunate in view of the fact that no power is given to the court in an action for annulment of this kind to make any provision for the care or support of children of the marriage. It seems to me most desirable that the Legislature should consider this matter and amend the law so as to protect more fully the marriage relation and family ties. Decision and interlocutory judgment signed and filed."

Thus it is seen that there are many sides and many views of the contract of marriage, the responsibilities of the contracting parties, the obligations arising to the society in which we live, property rights and the consequences to heirs. Courts can only apply the laws as they are written and the great need is of a general housecleaning of the Statute Books, and in some instances amendments to State Constitutions, the expunging of the great accumulation of useless and conflicting enactments, and uniform legislation along certain lines so that full faith and credence may be given by each State to the laws and judgments of courts of the other States without injustice or confusion resulting.

The matter of jurisdiction in divorce actions has given rise to much judicial discussion. The courts of one State have no general authority to grant divorce. The question arises would jurisdiction be had because the marriage contract was entered into in a State, or the alleged breach of the bond occurred within its boundaries, or the parties, or

one of them, reside therein though both marriage and offense occurred without the State. It has been generally held that bona fide residence of either husband or wife within a State gives jurisdiction in divorce actions. But if a party goes to a jurisdiction other than that of his domicile for the sole purpose of securing a divorce and his residence is not bona fide, jurisdiction is not had over the marriage relation in the State of temporary residence, and a decree obtained by such fraud would be open to attack as to its validity by the other party. In general the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife, but when living apart and for the purpose of establishing the right to sue for divorce the wife may acquire a domicile in a State where she goes with the intent to make such place her home. But where neither party has actual domicile within a particular State its courts can have no jurisdicition in respect to their marital status, and any decree of divorce made therein must be nugatory.

Nor can service of process on the defendant be had in another State than where the action is brought. He must be cited either through an attorney appointed to represent his interests by the court or he must be cited by publication, if he is without the State. Notice by publication is accomplished by a form printed in a public journal or posted as the Statute may direct, usually being on the courthouse doors. The purpose of citation is to bring knowledge of the action to the defendant. Where personal service can be had on the defendant it is the one safest and surest proceeding.

Under existing conditions of our varied divorce laws it seems absurd to hold up our hands in horror at certain biblical and historic characters who maintained wives by the hundred, for there are States where it is so easy and inexpensive to have the bond of matrimony legally removed a man, bigamously inclined, or a woman with a hard taste to please in husbands, can take, and dispose, of all kinds of spouses, one at a time, as Irvin Cobb says, marriage these days being "an option and not a contract."

Many Varying Laws

AS THEY AFFECT WOMEN IN THE SEVERAL STATES

ALABAMA.

The married woman in Alabama may contract with her husband or with others and her separate property is liable for such contracts, but where the contract is for the mutual benefit then the common property of both is liable. The husband is not liable for the contracts of his wife unless he has participated in them or their benefits. The married woman may conduct a business as a public merchant by obtaining the consent of her husband in writing and placing this consent of record in the Probate Court. When this consent is filed she may contract and be contracted with in relation to her business the same as a male or femme sole. Alabama recognizes the married woman of eighteen years as being of full age while the unmarried woman is not of age until she has attained twenty-one years, hence marriage in Alabama emancipates the female minor of three years less than majority.

A girl of seventeen years may marry with the consent of her parents or guardians, but without such consent she cannot marry until she is twenty-one years of age.

There is no inheritance tax upon property.

If the wife survive her husband she takes all of the personal property if there are no descendants. If there are

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