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defense to a charge of bigamy, when the second marriage is within
the statutory period of seven years' continual absence of such wife
out of the state or beyond the seas. (Vt.) State v. Ackerly, 940.
1. BILLS AND NOTES-Negotiable Instruments-Unconditional
Payment. An order reading, "Hutchinson, Kan., August 10, 1903.
G. W. Lightner, Offerle, Kan.: Dear Sir.-Pay to the order of the First
National Bank of Hutchinson, Kansas, $1500 on account of contract
between you and the Snyder Planing-mill Company. The Snyder
Planing-mill Company, Per J. F. Donnell, Treasurer; accepted, G.
W. Lightner," is a negotiable bill of exchange, payable absolutely.
The words "on account of contract," etc., are not a direction to
charge a particular fund, and merely indicate the fund to which
the drawee is to look for reimbursement. (Kan.) First Nat. Bank
v. Lightner, 353.
2. BILLS AND NOTES-Lost Notes-Allegation and Proof.-In
an action to recover on a mortgage note, a copy of which is set forth
in the complaint, evidence of loss of the note and of its execution and
contents is admissible, although no allegation of its loss is made
in the complaint. (Kan.) Bare v. Ford, 336.
3. BILLS AND NOTES.-The Undertaking of the Indorser of a
check is, that if the check is not paid on presentation within a reason-
able time he will pay it, provided he is properly notified. The reason-
able time for presentation and demand for payment is within the day
following the indorsement. (Mich.) First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
Certification of Check.
4. BILLS AND NOTES.-The Certification of a Check on pres-
entation by an indorsee is equivalent to payment, discharging the
drawer as well as the indorsers, notwithstanding the absence of funds.
(Mich.) First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
5. BILLS AND NOTES.-The Certification of a Check on pres-
entation by the indorsee discharges the indorser, although the check
is presented, payment refused, and the indorser notified within the
time within which notice would have been given had there been no
certification. (Mich.) First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
6. BILLS AND NOTES.-The Certification of a Check procured
by an indorsee, who thereupon parts with value, creates a new con-
tract, whereby the certifying bank becomes the primary debtor.
(Mich.) First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
7. BILLS AND NOTES.-Where an Indorsee of a Check Pro-
cures Its Certification and then parts with value, the subsequent in-
solvency of the certifying bank is immaterial on the question of the
indorser's liability. (Mich.) First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
8. BILLS AND NOTES.-Where the Indorser of a Check has
been discharged by the indorsee procuring a certification, the consent
of the indorser to an extension of time for payment does not revive
his liability, since there is no consideration for his promise. (Mich.)
First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
Demand of Payment and Notice of Dishonor.
9. BILLS AND NOTES.-The Indorsee of a Check, as between
himself and the indorser, undertakes to demand payment within the
day following the indorsement, and, if payment is not made, to give
due notice of dishonor. (Mich.) First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
10. BILLS AND NOTES.-The Fact that There are No Funds in
the account against which a check is drawn does not relieve the
holder from the duty of presenting it and giving notice of dishonor,
unless the indorser knows the facts. (Mich.) First Nat. Bank v.
11. BILLS AND NOTES.-The Right of the Indorser of a Check
to presentation and notice of dishonor is not changed because he
will suffer no apparent damage from a failure of the indorsee to take
these steps. (Mich.) First Nat. Bank v. Currie, 537.
12. WAIVER in Ignorance of Legal Effect of Known Pre-existing
Facts-If one who signs a waiver of demand, notice and protest of
a promissory note knows of the absence of such demand, notice and
protest, his waiver is effective, though he did not know that such
absence had relieved him from liability. (Mass.) Toole v. Crafts,
13. FRAUD, Evidence of.-In an action against the indorser of a
note who had been released by the failure to make demand for pay-
ment and give notice of dishonor, but who had thereafter executed
a written waiver of such demand and notice, and claims that such
waiver was procured by fraudulent misrepresentation, he should be
permitted to testify that when he signed the waiver he did not know
that he had been released from liability. Such evidence, though not
admissible for the purpose of diminishing the effect of the waiver,
is relevant upon the issue of fraud. (Mass.) Toole v. Crafts, 455.
See Banks and Banking.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY.
1. BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-Death of Obligor.-The
obligation to fulfill a promise of marriage is personal and not herita-
ble, and the obligation to respond in damages for the breach of such
promise is incidental thereto, and if the obligor die before compli-
ance with his promise and before he is put in default, no action will
lie against his heirs to recover damages for noncompliance. (La.)
Johnson v. Levy, 378.
• 2. BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-Death of Obligor-Re-
covery from Heirs.-If the obligee in a marriage promise obtains
judgment against the obligor for the damages resulting from a breach
of his promise, such judgment may be enforced against his heirs
in the event of his death before satisfying it. (La.) Johnson v.
3. BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-Death of Obligor-Re-
covery from Heirs.-An obligor in a promise to marry may abandon
his right to comply with his promise and voluntarily bind himself to
pay the damages resulting from his noncompliance, and the obli-
gation thus assumed may be enforced against his heirs in the event
of his death. (La.) Johnson v. Levy, 378.
4. BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-Default and Death of
Obligor-Recovery from Heirs.-If the obligor in a promise to marry
is put in default according to law, his right to fulfill his promise
is thereby forfeited, and his obligation to marry becomes merged in
his obligation to respond in damages, which becomes heritable and
may be enforced against his heirs in the event of his death. (La.)
Johnson v. Levy, 378.
5. BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-Damages-Injury to
Feelings and Reputation.-Damages arising from a breach of prom-
ise to marry resulting in injury to feelings, reputation and standing
are actual or compensatory, as contradistinguished from exemplary,
and if the liability of the obligor is fixed, by his being put in de-
fault according to the statute, they may be recovered in the same
manner and to the same extent as damages to person or property.
(La.) Johnson v. Levy, 378.
1. BRIBERY-Proof of Other Crimes. While the prosecution
cannot show separate and isolated crimes or facts having no bearing
upon the crime under investigation, it may show all the circumstances
connected with the particular crime, even if in so doing it has to
bring to light other offenses. It may go back to the time when the in-
tention to commit the crime in question was first formed, and trace
it through all the intervening circumstances to the consummation of
the criminal act, and thus lay before the jury the whole transaction.
(Ark.) Butt v. State, 42.
BRIBERY-Evidence-Statement in Presence of Accused.-In
the prosecution of a senator for bribery, it is competent to prove that,
prior to the commission of the crime, another senator, in the presence
of the defendant, suggested an organization to control legislation and
exact money for the passage or defeat of bills, to which the defend-
ant assented. (Ark.) Butt v. State, 42.
See Constitutional Law, 14-19.
See Evidence, 2.
CARRIER Notice of Injury as Condition Precedent to Re-
covery. A condition in a bill of lading for the shipment of live-
stock, made in consideration of a reduced rate, that, as a conditionTM
precedent to a recovery of damages for injuries to the animals, the
shipper must give notice before they are mingled with other stock
and within one day after their delivery at their destination, is reason-
able and binding, and places the burden on the shipper of showing
that he gave such notice. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Pearce,
2. CARRIER-Delay in Shipment Market Reports as Evidence
of Value.-Standard market reports of the price of livestock during
the period of a delay in the shipment of livestock are admissible in
evidence in an action against the carrier for losses occasioned to the
shipper by such delay. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Pearce, 75.
3. CARRIER-Contract for Prompt Delivery Implied.-Where a
contract for the transportation of livestock does not expressly require
the carrier to make a delivery in time for any special market, the
law implies a contract to deliver with reasonable promptness and
without unnecessary delay. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v.
4. CARRIER Contracts Restricting the Liability of a carrier,
or releasing it from a liability already accrued to the shipper, must
be reasonable and based upon a consideration. (Ark.) St. Louis etc.
R. R. Co. v. Pearce, 75.
5. CARRIER-Release of Liability.-If a Carrier is already liable
to a shipper for a failure to furnish cars, it has no right to require
a release of this liability before according to him the privilege of
shipping upon terms the same as those given to other shippers who
assert no claim for damages. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v.
6. CARRIERS.-A Contract Limiting the Liability of a carrier is
valid when not forced upon the shipper. Therefore, he cannot evade
such a contract by proving that he signed it without reading, and
that the agent did not inform him of another rate under a contract
of unrestricted liability, unless upon demand the agent refused to
give such information or to accept the shipment under an unrestricted
liability. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Pearce, 75.
CARRIERS-Proper Cars for Shipment of Fruit.-Where a car-
rier accepts perishable fruit to ship to market, it is its duty to
furnish cars especially adapted to the preservation thereof during
transportation. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Renfroe, 58.
8. CARRIERS-Duty to Ice Refrigerator-Car.-When a carrier
undertakes to transport fruit in a properly iced refrigerator-car, it
is liable for a failure to comply with such undertaking, although it
has an agreement with an independent contractor to furnish the
car and the refrigeration therefor. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v.
9. CONNECTING CARRIERS-Presumption of Negligence.-The
presumption that in case of damage to goods which have been shipped
over connecting railway lines the delivering carrier caused the injury
obtains only in the absence of any proof locating the negligence.
(Ark.) St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Renfroe, 58.
10. CONNECTING CARRIERS-Presumption of Negligence.-In
an action against an initial carrier of two or more connecting lines,
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the damages
occurred on its line; but in a suit against the last or delivering car-
rier, the burden is upon it to show that the damage was not done
on its line. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Pearce, 75.
11. CARRIER-Passenger on Free Pass.-A railway company is
liable for its negligence to a passenger riding on a free pass which
stipulates that the person accepting it "assumes all risk of accidents
and damages without claim upon the company," for such a stipulation
is against public policy. (Ark.) St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Pitcock,
12. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS for Hire Must Use the Highest
Degree of Care consistent with the nature and extent of their busi-
ness to provide safe and suitable vehicles for their carriage, and to
maintain all such reasonable arrangements for the control and su-
pervision of passengers and of their own servants as prudence dic-
tates against all dangers that are naturally and according to the
usual course of business to be expected. Such carriers are bound to
select and employ a sufficient number of competent servants to meet
any exigency which, in the exercise of that high degree of diligence
and care to which they are held, they ought reasonably to have an-
ticipated. (Mass.) Kuhlen v. Boston etc. Ry. Co., 516.
13. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS, Duty of to Protect from Other
Passengers. The duty of a carrier of passengers for hire to use all
proper means and precautions to protect its passengers against injury
caused by the misconduct of other passengers, such as under the cir-
cumstances might have been anticipated and could have been guarded
against, is not less stringent than the obligation to prevent miscon-
duct or negligence on the part of its own servants. (Mass.) Kuhlen
v. Boston etc. Ry. Co., 516.
14. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS, Liability of for Injuries Due
to Pushing and Crowding at Stations.—If a passenger, in entering a
car, is pushed and crowded by other passengers, and thereby receives
personal injuries, resulting in the fracture of her wrist, the railroad
company may be held answerable, if, in the opinion of the jury, based
upon and sustained by the evidence, the carrier ought to have an-
ticipated what took place, and, in the exercise of ordinary care, ought
to have taken reasonable precautions to guard against such injuries
as were caused to the plaintiff, and was negligent in failing to take
such precautions and to give plaintiff the adequate protection which
she had the right to expect. (Mass.) Kuhlen v. Boston etc. Ry. Co.,
15. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS, Negligence in not Preventing
Crowding at Stations.-If there is danger to passengers at a station
at certain hours of the day from the crowding and pushing by other
passengers, the jury should be left to say whether an increased num-
ber of servants should have been employed by the carrier to prevent
such pushing and crowding and the consequent danger to passengers.
(Mass.) Kuhlen v. Boston etc. Ry. Co., 516.
16. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Contributory
When not Imputable to Passenger on Entering a Station or Car Where
There is Crowding and Pushing by Other Passengers.-Though a
woman has been in crowds before at a railway station and seen the
failure of a carrier to control them, it cannot be held, as a matter of
law, that she was not in the exercise of due care because she entered
a station where such crowding and pushing were probable, and suf-
fered injury therefrom. All these circumstances are important to be
considered by the jury, but are not conclusive against her. (Mass.)
Kuhlen v. Boston etc. Ry. Co., 516.
17. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS, Liability of, When not Ex-
Icluded by the Fact that the Carrier did not Own or have Absolute
Control of the Station Where Crowding and Pushing Occurred.—
Though the station at which the pushing and crowding by passengers
in attempting to enter cars occurred was not owned by, nor under the
control of, the carrier, except that it might make regulations by the
permission of a municipal transport commission, it is not relieved
from liability to a passenger injured by the pushing and crowding by
other passengers, if no rules had been adopted and no measures taken
by which to prevent such crowding and pushing, and the carrier had
held the place out as a proper one for its passengers to come for the
purpose of taking its cars. (Mass.) Kuhlen v. Boston etc. Ry. Co.,
18. RAILROAD-Passengers-Conclusiveness of Ticket.-If a per-
son on a railroad train proposes to pay his fare by ticket, he must
be provided with and tender one that under the established rules
of the company has the intrinsic effect of paying such fare, and in
the determination of the right to travel under the ticket tendered as
fare, conclusive force to be given to the intrinsic effect of such
ticket as expressed on its face. (N. J. L.) Shelton v. Erie R. R.