tlement, and for the purpose of inducing the company to make the same, that he had a perfect title; that the company, relying upon such false assertion of title, was, in fact, induced to make the settlement alleged to have been made; and that it would not have made such settlement if such false representations had not been made, See Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 13 Gray, 177-180; Ins. [Co. v. Matthews, 102 Mass. 221. Wisconsin Sup. Ct., March 30, 1880. Stache v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. Opinion by Taylor, J. CRIMINAL LAW. BIGAMY -PRESUMPTION OF DEATH FROM ABSENCE. -In prosecutions for bigamy, where absence for a number of years of the wife or husband of the indicted party is relied on as a defense, held, that no artificial rule as to presumption is allowed to obtain in such cases, and the jury must draw their own inferences from the facts, without any anticipation by the law. After much controversy in the earlier cases, as to whether the presumption of innocence should outweigh the presumption of a continuance of human life for the period of seven years, it seems now to be generally conceded, that on principle, the one should be considered as neutralizing the other, though in a general way, the law prefers the presumption of innocence. 1 Bish. Mar. & Div, § 453; Bishop's Stat. Crs., § 611; 1 Greenleaf on Ev., § 41; R. v. Harborne, 2 A. & E. 540; Coper v. Thurmond, 1 Kelly, 538; Newman v. Jenkins, 10 Pick. 515; State v. Moore, 11 Ired. 160. And such seems to be the tendency of former decisions in our State. Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 433; Lockhart v. White, 18 id. 110. In Regina v. Lumley, L. R., 1 Cr. Cas. Res. 196, it was said: In an indictment for bigamy, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the husband or wife, as the case may be, was alive at the date of the second marriage. That is purely a question of fact. The existence of the party at an antecedent period may or may not afford a reasonable inference that he (or she) was living at the subsequent date. If, for example, it were proved that he was in good health on the day preceding the second marriage the inference would be strong, almost irresistible, that he was living on the latter day, and the jury would, in all probability, find that he was so. If, on the other hand, it were proved that he was in a dying condition, and nothing further was proved, they would probably decline to draw that inference. Thus the question is entirely with the jury. The law makes no presumption either way." Texas Ct. of Appeals, Jan. 24, 1880. Hull v. State of Texas. Opinion by Clark, J. 66 CORPORATION MAY BE INDICTED FOR SABBATH BREAKING. A corporation may be indicted for "Sabbath breaking "under the Code of West Virginia, which provides that "If a person on a Sabbath day be found laboring at any trade or calling, or employ his minor children, apprentices, or servants in labor, or other business, except in household or other work of necessity or charity, he shall be fined not less than five dollars for each offense." The modern authorities agree that corporations are liable for torts committed by their agents in the discharge of the business of their employment and within the proper range of such employment; and that too, whether the tort be one the responsibility for which is to be enforced by an action on the case, or by trespass. See Yarborough v. Bank of England, 16 East, 6; Rex v. Mayor of Stratford, 14 id. 348; Regina v. Birmingham, etc., Co., 3 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 223; Maund v. Monmouthshire Canal Co., 4 Man. & G. 452; Chestnut Hill & Spring H. Turnp. Co. v. Rutler, 4 Serg. & R.16; Whiteman v. Wilmington & Susq. R. Co., 2 Harr. (Del.) 514; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hud. R. R. R. Co., 14 Wend. 51; Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. 42; Underwood v. Newport Lyceum, 5 B. Mour. 130; Humes v. Mayor of Knoxville, 1 Humph. 403; Hazen v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 2 Gray, 574; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Reedy, 17 Ill. 580; Baylor v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 9 W. Va. 270. See, also, South-eastern Railway v. European & Amer. Tel. Co., 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 513; Queen v. Great North of Eng. Railway, L. R., 2 Q. B. 151; Maund v. Monmouthshire Canal Co.,4 Man. & G.452. They are liable for the acts of their agents, though willfully or maliciously done. For libel: where the agent of a railway company telegraphed along its line that a banker had stopped payments. Whitfield v. SouthEast. R. Co., referred to in 21 How. 212, where a report was made to stockholders by directors. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202. See, also, Maynard v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48. In National Exch. Co. of Glasgow v. Drew, 2 Macq. H. of L. Cas. 103, a corporation was held liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation of its affairs in a report, whereby a party was induced to purchase its stock. And in Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 630, it was held that an action for a malicious prosecution could be sustained against a corporation. In Atlantic & Great Western R. Co. v. Dunn, 13 Ohio St. 162, and in Pittsburg, F. W. & C. R. Co. v. Shiper, id. 157, it was decided that a corporation might be subjected to exemplary or punitive damages for tortious acts of its agents or servants done within the scope of their authority; and in Moore v. Fitchburg R. Co., 4 Gray, 465, that a corporation might be sued for an act of its servant while acting within his authority, which amounted to an assault and battery. It may now be regarded as settled, not only that a corporation may be sued in tort, but that it may be indicted for a failure to perform certain public duties which the law or its charter imposed upon it. See Freeholders v. Strader, 3 Harr. 108; Regina v. Birmingham & Glo. R. Co., 9 Car. & P. 469; Susquehanna & Balt. Turnp. Co. v.People, 15 Wend. 267; Commonwealth v. Proprietors of Newburyport Bridge, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 142; Regina v. Great North. Ry. Co., 9 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 319; State v. Vt. Cent. R. Co., 27 Vt. 108; Commonwealth v. Proprietors N. B. Bridge, 2 Gray, 339. West Virginia Sup. Ct. of Appeals, June Term, 1879. State v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. Opinion by Green, P. J RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CARRIER OF PASSENGERS -DUTY TO FURNISH SAFE MEANS OF ALIGHTING.- Plaintiff took a return ticket at Richmond station on the S. company's line, over which defendants had running powers. On his return journey plaintiff travelled in defendant's train, managed by defendants' servants. In alighting at Richmoud station he was injured owing to the carriage, which was built to suit the stations on defendants' own line, being too high above the platform. Held (affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas Division), that defendants were bound to provide reasonably safe means of alighting, and that there was evidence to justify a verdict for plaintiff. Great West. R. Co. v. Blake, 7 H. & N. 991; Thomas v. Rhymney R. Co., L. R., 5 Q. B. 226; S. C., 61d. 266, Marshall v. York, etc., R. Co., 11 C. B. 655; Austin v. Great. West. R. Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. 442; Dalyell v. Tyrer, 28 L. J. 52; Reynolds v. North-East. R. Co., Roscoe's N. P. 596, (14th ed). Ct. of Appeal, March, 1880. Foulkes v. Metropolitan District Railway Co. Opinion by Bramwell, Baggallay and Thesiger, L. JJ., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 345. LEASE- -COVENANT AS TO USE OF PREMISESWAIVER BY ACCEPTING RENT.- The defendants held certain premises of the plaintiffs for a term of years under a lease whereby the lessees covenanted not to permit or suffer, at any time during the said term, to be used, exercised, or carried on upon the premises, or any part thereof, any art, trade, profession, or business whatsoever, without the license or consent in writing of the lessor, first obtained for that purpose. The lease contained a power of re-entry upon breach of covenant. The lessees had, by consent, made some alterations in the premises, and part of the new building was occupied by two of the defendants as plumbers, and they carried on their business there in a shop suited for the purpose. There was no written license or consent of the lessor for this business, but two quarters' rent was paid as usual by the lessees after the business commenced, with the lessor's knowledge of this use of the premises. There was no evidence of the nature of the plumber's tenancy, but within a year of its commencement the plaintiffs took proceedings to recover the land on the ground of a forfeiture by a continuing breach of the covenant. Held, that it could not be presumed that a plumber's business would be commenced upon a less tenancy than a year of the shop in which it was to be carried on; and that the plaintiff's waiver of the breach by receipt of rent was sufficient under the circumstances to render these proceedings ineffectual. Q. B. D., March 8, 1880. Griffin v. Tompkins. Opinion by Lush and Manisty, JJ., and Cockburn, C. J., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 359. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. SUBJECT AND REGULATIONS FOR THE POST-GRADUATE PRIZE OF TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS, FOR 1880. THER Committee on Prizes of the New York State Bar Association announce the following subject and regulations for the Post-graduate prize of $250 for 1880: First. - The Post-graduate prize of $250 for 1880 will be awarded to the writer of the best original thesis, argument or work upon the following subject: "The propriety of regulating commercial intercourse (especially that relating to railroads) between the States by National legislation; or, what National legislation (if any) should be had to regulate commercial intercourse between the States." Second. The essay must be sent to the Chairman of the Committee, at Malone, on or before the fifteenth day of September next, sigued merely with a nom de plume, and accompanied with the real name of the writer in a sealed envelope. Only the envelope containing the name of the author of the winning essay will be opened; all others will either be destroyed unopened, or returned with the accompanying manuscript to the author upon his request. The successful essay will be the property of the Association, and all the other essays, not requested to be returned, will be filed for preservation in the archives of the Association. Third. The prize will be awarded at the annual meeting of the Association in Albany, on Tuesday, the 16th day of November, 1880. Fourth. Only those can compete for this prize who are members of the Bar of the State of New York, of five or more years' standing, and the prize can only be awarded when there shall be at least five competitors. Fifth. — Every production submitted will be examined by each member of the Committee, and the award of the prize will be made by the Committee upon a majority or plurality vote; or in case of a failure of a plurality vote, by the Chairman, from those productions having the highest and equal votes. Sixth. No member of the Committee on Prizes shall in any manner compete for said prize. The members of the legal profession are cordially invited to compete for this prize. Its founders, by limiting the privilege of contending for it to lawyers of five or more years' standing, appeal to the experienced portion of the profession, to renew the emulations of scholastic life, under the conviction that this would be one of the methods of increasing devotion to the science of law among lawyers, and an acquaintance with its principles among the people. The Committee hope that the response to this invitation will be such as to secure those ends. JOHN I. GILBERT, Chairman, Malone, 4th Dist., NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. ABBOTT'S TRIAL EVIDENCE. Trial Evidence. The Rules of Evidence applicable on the trial of Civil Actions (including both causes of action and defenses) at common law, in equity, and under the Codes of Procedure By Austin Abbott, of the New York Bar. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1880. Pp. XXX, 884. THE plan of this work is entirely novel, so far as we 66 know. It assumes that the reader is familiar with the general principles of the law of evidence, and is concerned with their proper application in actual practice." In a word, it assumes to instruct the practitioner exactly how to try every kind of case, so far as the evidence is concerned. It states the appropriate evidence in every class of actions; it describes the mode of proof; it treats of the weight and sufficiency of evidence, of witnesses and documentary evidence, and of the effect of the Codes on the rules of evidence. In preparing his case, if the practitioner wants to know exactly what he must prove and how to prove it, here is his guide. It is therefore a practical as distinguished from a theoretical work of evidence, and if well executed cannot fail to be the most important and useful text-book issued in many years. That the work is faithfully performed the reputation of its author is a sufficient guaranty. All of Mr. Abbott's previous work is characterized by exactness, thoroughness, and discrimination, and we have dipped into this large volume sufficiently to be warranted in saying that it is worthy of his reputation. The rules are neatly and clearly stated, and every rule is fortified by reference to authorities. There is an analytical table of contents and also a good index, but no table of cases cited. The book should find a place in the library of every lawyer, and should lie at the right hand of every judge and referee. Indeed, we cannot see how our profession have so long done without such a work. The typography is very compact but legible enough, and the paper is of the best. V BRADWELL'S REPORTS. Reports of the Decisions of the Appellate Courts of the State of Illinois. By James B. Bradwell. Volume V. Containing all the remaining opinions of the first district up to March 29, 1880, all the remaining opinions of the second district up to the June term, 1880; all the remaining opinions of the third district up to the May term, 1880, and a part of the opinions of the fourth district of the February term, 1880. Chicago Chicago Legal News Co., 1880. Pp. 692. We note the following cases: Egan v. City of Chicago, p. 70. An action may be maintained against a city for services rendered, in pursuance of a resolution of its common council, in examining the walls of a building being erected by the United States government upon its own land in the city, with a view of ascertaining whether they are safe. Stowell v. Bair, p. 104. A mortgage of an unsown crop is invalid. Western Assurance Co. v. Mason, p. 141.- In an action on a policy of fire insurance on a summer residence, it appearing that during the winter the insured visited it once a week, and her husband went to it two or three times a week, frequently taking meals and remaining over night and entertaining friends there, held, no breach of the condition against vacancy. Chicago & North-western Railroad Co. v. Carroll, p. 201. A railroad company is not absolutely bound under all circumstances to furnish all its passengers with seats. Lawrence v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, p. 280.- Where one whose life was in Leonard. This case is reported 46 N. Y. 688, in mem- NEW YORK, June 1, 1880. E. H. L. American Law Review for July contains the sured died in consequence of inadvertently or negli- THE Ameristallment of the law of Collateral Secu gently taking an overdose of laudanum, held, no breach of the condition that the policy should be void in case rities, by Leonard A. Jones; the Judgment non obstante of self-destruction, voluntary or involuntary, sane or veredicto, by William A. Manny; and the case of Hudinsane. Neill v. Spencer, p. 461. —One who has per- dell v. Seitzinger, Ex parte Wood, on notes transferred formed pastoral service for a religious society, without as security for antecedent debts, with a note by Arthur having been elected pastor, cannot recover therefor, Biddle; beside the usual miscellaneous matter. even quantum meruit, against the persons signing the We clip the following advertisement from the New call. Gale v. Rector, p. 481. It is error to allow medi- | York Daily Register: "Lawyers and law students cal publications to be read to the jury. Morton v. willing to become organizers of a lawyers' temperance Steward, p. 533. - An infant's note' for necessaries is society in this city, please address 'Temperance,' Daily voidable. Wabash Railroad Co. v. Brown, p. 590. — A Register office. ju29-1t." The undertaking is laudrailway company owes no duty to its employees, either able, but is not "1t," which we understand to mean at common law or by statute, to keep its track fenced one time," rather inadequate notice? against cattle. ! CORRESPONDENCE. DENIALS UNDER THE Code. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In view of some recent decisions at the Special Term, Supreme Court, in this district, and at General Term of the Court of Common Pleas, it might be of interest to the readers of the JOURNAL to have the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Allis v. Leonard printed in full. The form of general denial almost universally employed in this district is as follows: "Defendant denies each and every allegation in the complaint contained, not hereinafter specifically admitted or de nied." It was held in McEncroe v. Decker, Special Term, New York, November, 1879, that this was neither a general nor specific denial, and is a form of denial in no way provided for by the present system of pleading. 58 How. 250. Subsequently, in Bixby v. Drexel, General Term, Court of Common Pleas, April 5, 1880 (9 Reporter, p. 630), it was held that in an answer, a denial of all the allegations of a pleading, except such as are thereafter admitted, is not sanctioned by the Code. Both these decisions are based upon, and the opinions in them refer to, the cases of The People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 400, and The People v. The Northern Railroad Co., 53 Barb. 98, affirmed 42 N. Y. 217. It is true that in People v. Snyder there is a dictum of Judge Daniels, which sustains the proposition, but it was not necessary to the decision of the case, nor was the point raised below. The same proposition is held in The People v. The Northern Railroad Co., 53 Barb., at General Term, and in the Court of Appeals the case is affirmed, 42 N. Y. 227, but not on that point. The affirmance, also, is by a divided court (4 to 3), and the dissenting opinion of Foster, J., page 240, presents a strong argument in support of the propriety of the pleading. It does not appear that in either of the two recent decisions, 58 Howard and 9 Reporter, the attention of the court was called to the later decision of the Court of Appeals, in the case of Allis v. 66 Not every lady and gentleman who has this season applauded Miss Terry's "Portia" is aware that, about the date when the "Merchant of Venice" may be supposed to have exhibited his gaberdine on the Rialto, there actually existed great female lawyers in the neighboring city of Bologna. Prof. Calderini, who 1360, and Prof. Novella, who occupied it in 1366, were held the Chair of Jurisprudence in that University in not only celebrated for their legal lore and skill, but if we may trust their portraits, exceedingly beautiful women, with noble Greek profiles, dressed in a style vantage. If women hereafter should again obtain which Miss Terry might have copied without disadentrance into the legal profession, it is not at all improbable that we may see something more of the keenness of feminine wits engaged in disentangling the knots of the law. Two ladies in Ireland, according to the Times' Dublin correspondent, have just been conducting their own most intricate cases in a manner which excited the surprise of the Master of the Rolls, who even observed that he was "astonished that the ladies had been able to put their case on paper so intelligently and clearly without legal advice. If other ladies should follow the example of the Misses Fogarty, what a falling off must ensue in the solicitors' bills? They lost their case, it is true, but seemingly could not have won it under any guidance; and at all events they have escaped that great aggravation of the misery of defeat in a court of law-the lawyer's costs.-Pall Mall Gazette. "American law in the East" is referred to in connection with the recent murder trial at Alexandria. We should be glad to learn how American law in Egypt differs from American law in New York, and under what sanction a man can be tried and condemned to death by a United States Minister, the public prosecutor being the American judge of the International Tribunals who opposed the application of the prisoner's counsel that four assessors might sit as a jury. It is certainly a mockery of justice that a person charged with murder should be kept in prison for twelve months, and after that delay be convicted by a diplomatist and by him sentenced to death.-Law Times. The Albany Law Journal. A ALBANY, JULY 17, 1880. CURRENT TOPICS. Ta meeting of members of the bar of the Fourth Judicial Department, held in Buffalo on the 18th ult., a committee of fifteen members of the bar of that department was appointed and charged with the duty of preparing an amended judiciary article of the Constitution, to be submitted to the Legislature at its next session; and requested to invite the aid, counsel and co-operation of the members of the bar of the several judicial districts in the State, in preparing said amended article, and in procuring action upon it in the Legislature. The committee are as follows: Eighth District - Addison G. Rice, Grover Cleveland, David H. Bolles, Myron H. Peck, George C. Greene. Seventh District William F. Cogswell, James C. Cochrane, Josiah T. Miller, James R. Cox, E. A. Nash. Fifth District John F. Seymour, John C. Churchill, Wm. C. Ruger, Irving G. Vann, John D. Kernan. The committee have resolved to convene at Saratoga Springs, on the 11th of August, 1880, for the purpose of taking action in the matter suggested in the resolution. What that action will be has not been discussed or even suggested by the members of the committee, but that some action in that direction is necessary, is a fact fully realized, we believe, by the members of the bar, suitors and business men generally, throughout the State. Any gentleman of the profession wishing to submit suggestions upon the subject, but unable to attend, can send his views to any member of the committee at any time prior to the meeting, and such suggestions will be considered. The Social Science Association have received from the president of the Juristic Society of Berlin, a communication in reference to the prize of 6,900 marks, to be offered in the year 1882, for an essay on "The Formulæ in the Perpetual Edict of Hadrian, in their Wording and Connection." The Savigny Foundation is a fund subscribed in commemoration of the great lawyer, Von Savigny, the interest of which is applied every two years in a prize for an essay on a legal subject, the adjudicators being the Imperial or Royal Academies of Sciences of Vienna, Munich and Berlin, in rotation. The competition, from which only the ordinary home members of the Royal Bavarian Academy are excluded, is confined to no nationality. The essays, which must be written in Latin, German, English, French or Italian, must be sent in by the 28th of March, 1882, addressed to the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences, and bearing, instead of the author's name, a motto, repeated in a closed envelope containing the author's Further particulars may be had on application at the office of the Social Science Association, 1 Adam street, Adelphi, W. C. name. VOL. 22.-No. 3. In connection with the recent article on Effect of Subsequent Marriage, etc., 21 Alb. L. J. 486, our attention has been called to the case of Thorp v. Thorp, decided in the General Term of the First Department, holding in harmony with Marshall v. Marshall, and reversing the judgment of the referee, ex-Recorder James M. Smith. It is said that this case will go to the Court of Appeals. The learned referee conceded that the case of Williams v. Oates, 4 N. C. 535, was against his position, and consonant with the Marshall case. He, however, adduced a dictum in his favor in Haviland v. Haviland, 34 N. Y. 646, 647, and cited Pensford v. Johnson, 2 Blatch. 51, as directly in point to the same effect. The latter, however, seems hardly authoritative, for it was conceded that one party to the marriage, at least, was innocent of any intent to evade the law, and the point received no extended consideration. It is to be hoped that the principal case will settle the interesting question, for the Marshall case seems never to have gone up. In the English Court of Appeal judgment has been rendered, denying the application of Thomas Castro, the "Tichborne claimant" to have the two sentences passed upon him for perjury made concurrent instead of consecutive. Lord Justice James said that as a man could be tried for several misdemeanors on distinct counts, there was no reason to think he could not be sentenced for them. Lord Justice Bramwell concurred. He said he thought the American case (Tweed) cited justified the attorney-general in issuing the fiat for the writ of error in this case, but now that the matter had been discussed it was plain that there was no error in the sentence. The Treeed case is reported in 3 Hun, 760, and 60 N. Y. 559. The principal opinion below was pronounced by Westbrook, J., and contains an elaborate examination of authorities and a strong argument upon principle. But we then thought and still think the opinion of the Court of Appeals unanswerable. The present decision of the English court will greatly rejoice Mr. O'Conor's heart, and he can now sing nunc dimittis; but we receive every thing from an English court concerning the claimant with a grain of suspicion. The arrogance with which the English press treat the Tweed decision is rather amusing. The London Telegraph speaks of it as a "curious decision" "dragged to light." And again: "But although the judgment of the court of New York naturally carries with it great weight, it seems to formulate neither good law nor good sense. No other American court has adopted it. The principle it embraces is unknown to English law and unjustified by English precedents. Indeed, it was given in reversal of the decision of other judges, who, for aught we know, were men whose opinions were as much entitled to respect as are the opinions of those who delivered it." The Times says: "It proceeds on considerations foreign to English criminal law, and it does not commend itself as intrinsically rea to life, are forbidden, as duelling and prize-fighting. Others are not, as pedestrian matches and rowing contests. Tanner is professedly not trying to kill himself; he proposes to live. So if he should die his watchers could not be condemned as abettors of suicide. He does not come within Mr. Bergh's ju sonable." Even Lord Justice James, in delivering the opinion of the court in the Claimant's case, departs from the courtesy and respect of late shown by English judges to American decisions. He says: "I have always felt unfeigned respect for the decisions of the courts in America upon matters of law common to their jurisprudence and ours; but Irisdiction, for his act is entirely voluntary, and he In our note on Nash v. Fugate, 21 Alb. L. J. 464, we spoke of the decision as opposed to Guild v. Thomas and People v. Bostwick. We did not intend to be understood that either of those cases involved the exact circumstances of the principal case, namely, a scroll at the bottom of a bond with no name appended, and the bond delivered to the obligee by the principal obligor, in violation of a condition imposed by one of the signers, that others should sign. We meant to say that the principal case is opposed to those, in that it holds that the bond being complete on its face, no such secret condition can be shown. The point about the scrolls is subsidiary, and is adjudged merely to show that this bond was complete on its face. confess that I was startled by the mode in which is an adult, presumably capable of eating if he the judges in the case cited dealt with the question. wants to eat. The best way to put a stop to such They seem to have thought it sufficient to say that idiocy is to let other idiots stop running after him. the contrary view to theirs had never been laid down, and that theirs was in accordance with the English common law in 1775, at the era of the separation from this country, disregarding the dicta of our judges since then. And they treat the precedent of the sentence in the Tichborne case as of no authority, though that was a judgment of several judges, and theirs was only the decision of three judges overruling the opinion of three others." This extract shows with how little care and how much bias his Lordship has read the opinion of our court. So far from having "thought it sufficient to say that the contrary view to theirs had never been laid down," the court exhaustively review all the authorities, and discuss the matter upon principle, in two opinions of 31 pages, on the point in question. So far from the judgment having been pronounced by three judges, it was the unanimous opinion of a court of seven, while that of the original Tichborne case was of only three, we believe, and at nisi prius. After being "shocked" and "startled" to a great degree, his Lordship discovers "that the judgment of the American court proceeded upon a view different from that of our courts, that different offenses should not be prosecuted in the same indictment." It is sufficient for the vindication of the remarks of our court on the Tichborne case, to say, that it demonstrates that there was no warrant for the Tichborne sentence in the English common law prior to April 19, 1775, which is the foundation of our law, and that, as our court observe, "the practice of uniting several counts in an indictment" for felony, "is a departure from the ancient practice." We are aware that the prevalent English doctrine has been sanctioned in remarks on the Tweed case by Mr. Bishop, with his customary violence, and by Dr. Wharton, with his customary calmness. It must be remembered that our court do not deny the right to try several misdemeanors under one indictment, but only the right to impose a greater aggregate punishment than is permitted for one. "A The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania seem to be "experiencing religion." We called attention, 21 Alb. L. J. 462, to the remarkable way in which they had eaten their own words in case of Bishop O'Hara v. Stack; and now we have to chronicle another case of the same sort. In Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District of Upper Darby, 20 Alb. L. J. 383, they held that an institution for the support and education of the orphan children of a distinct denomination of Christians was not such a "purely public charity" as to be exempt from taxation, within the spirit of the Constitution. Trunkey, J., delivered the opinion. We did not notice any dissent. But a reargument was granted, and now the court decide substantially the converse. 8 W. N. C. 446. The exact decision is as follows: 'purely public charity' within the meaning of the Constitution of Pennsylvania may be one in which the designated beneficiaries are to be all of one particular religious faith, provided that the persons to be benefited are indefinite within the specified class. The fact that the beneficiaries were to be of a particular religious faith did not make the institution any less a 'purely public charity.' At any rate the persons of the third class were in legal contemplation beneficiaries upon the same title and with the same abstract rights as those of the first and second classes; and therefore the institution must be held to be open to the general public." ence is made to the former decision. Trunkey, and Sterrett, JJ., dissented. allude to the opinion elsewhere. It is our purpose here only to note the extreme uncertainty of the law in Pennsylvania where religious institutions are con A good many have asked us whether something cannot be done to put a stop to the disgusting exhibition making by Dr. Tanner, in the city of New York, in trying to go without food for forty days, and whether, if he breaks down in the attempt, those who are watching him cannot be punished as accessory to his death. We really do not now think of any way to stop him nor to punish his abettors. There seems to be no law against a man's making an ass of himself. Some voluntary risks, dangerous | cerned. No refer- |