Even the order of development of the three doctrines of property, personal inviolability, and veracity, though clear enough to the curious student, is rather an affair of history than a part of the legist's work.

While, from an historical point of view, it seems clear enough that the doctrine of property first took shape, personal inviolability next, and veracity last, yet all three principles have been so long and are so firmly established, that they should now all be regarded by the legal student as co-ordinate. And we should not suffer a perception that these doctrines once were pliable twigs, though they are now strong trees, to hinder us from seeking to train and improve such seedlings as spring up in our time. While we have thus sketched an outline of a legal analysis, ending with a conception of the legal unit, an act, we have not been led to write about justice in the abstract, nor of that legal entity, "a right." These topics must stand over just now.

I. H. M.

III. THE ALBERT LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY ARBITRATION ACT, 1871, 34 Vict. c. 31.

OF

F the bundle of institutions which must exist in every civilized country, that is to say, the legislative machinery, the army, the navy, the administration of justice, the police, &c., and which in their combination (except in countries purely despotic) we perhaps designate when we speak of the constitution of a country, none is more important, none has greater influence on the stability and prosperity of a nation, than the administration of justice. In no country that ever existed has been or is this sentiment more deeply rooted than in England, and hence it is, that during the most violent internal convulsions to which our history bears witness, our courts of justice in their framework and essentials have remained intact, and historians are unanimous in testifying that the epoch of the great Revolution was as fertile as any in learned, wise, and just judicial determinations. We are, in truth, and perhaps by the instinct of race, a law-abiding people, and set more store than any people have ever done, not merely on the equality of all before the law, but on an administration of the law by judges whose capacity and impartiality are guaranteed beyond all suspicion. To this end, they who occupy the judgment seat are ordinarily selected from the most distinguished members of the most distinguished of professions; they are surrounded by every mark of external dignity; they are

remunerated by salaries becoming their social rank; they are irremovable and disabled from embarking on the troubled sea of political agitation; serene in their exalted tranquillity, they command the unbounded respect and the willing obedience of a people not too easily satisfied with any authority to which it may be subject. Political philosophers have not yet explored a mine rich in instruction beyond all others, but it has often occurred to us, when asking ourselves wherein lies the secret of the long-continued stability of English institutions, that the true reply is to be found in the just administration of the laws. The laws in themselves are cumbrous, complicated, and abstruse, almost beyond the measure of the human understanding; their administration is dilatory and ruinously expensive; the tribunals and their various functions are incomprehensible to all but those who have made of them a life's study, and when understood are found to be but a network of incongruities and absurdities; but amidst all, there stands out this one consoling fact, that the judges can be depended on to exercise their high functions without prejudice, favour, or affection, and to the best and utmost of their ability. A people confident in their tribunals as a certain protection and refuge against injustice, will bear with patience the gravest political grievances, and bide their time to remove them.

Let us cast our eyes for a moment across the Channel, and ask ourselves in which of the institutions of France is there the most marked difference between that country and our own, and we unhesitatingly reply, in the administration of justice. On a future occasion we shall enter on this subject more largely. For our present purpose it is sufficient to say, that ever since the great Revolution the judges are salaried so frugally that no one with moderate practice at the Bar could accept the dignity, unless he had other resources; that although irremovable, they are allowed to be returned as deputies to the legislative assemblies; that in consequence it is no unusual thing for even the supreme judge of an imperial court to descend from his judgment seat, and canvass the electors of the district in which he administers justice. When returned, he will generally be found the complaisant supporter of the powers that be, and thus he will engross into his hands the local patronage of the district. Need we say that a judge so situate will be more than human if justice in his hands retains her spotless purity? In any event, most certain it is that no one will feel the least confidence in the fair adjustment of the scales he holds. We know well that no greater evil has affected France during the last half century, than the utter disrespect with which their tribunals,

both civil and criminal, are regarded. Imbecile, unlearned, and ill-paid judges, absorbed in their own advancement, submitted to the influence of political prejudices and passions, without any sense of the dignity of their offices, is it to be wondered at if the mass of the people, undisciplined in justice, sobriety, and moderation, by familiar intercourse with the courts of justice, which ought to be the best school of popular instruction in those social virtues, seek refuge for their grievances in wild and senseless political theories? Corrupt and ignorant tribunals of justice, criminal or civil, are in truth models of immorality, confounding all distinction of right and wrong, disseminating amongst the whole community an indifference to what is true and just, and cankering the very heart of society.

Not less pernicious are the consequences of legislation which violate the principles of justice inherent in the human mind semper et ubique. For instance, ex post facto legislation has been in every stage of our history odious and repugnant to the British Legislature.

Strictly speaking, every Act of legislation must to a certain extent be retrospective in its operation, and if it be merely an improvement of the mode of procedure, in respect of economy or despatch, the position of existing creditors or debtors may be, nay, must be, materially affected. But the Legislature has never gone so far as to affect the rights of parties by er post facto legislation; and when existing rights might be affected by an Act of Parliament, nothing is more familiar than a provision that the Act shall not affect any rights or liabilities existing before the date fixed for the Act coming into operation. This system harmonizes perfectly with the universal conception of what is just and reasonable, for it is not to be endured that contracts should be entered into, liabilities and obligations incurred, and rights bargained for in a state of circumstances which, pending their maturity, has become materially changed through the caprice of the Legislature, without the consent of or compensation to the parties prejudicially affected. If it were otherwise, confidence in the Legislature would be shaken at its base, and if in this country so disastrous a system of law making were even inaugurated, we might as well enter at once upon the legislation of Communists and Socialists, who recognise no vested rights, no continuity in the institutions of a country, but break down every obstacle that stands in the way of their speculative and experimental theories. However absurd we may be thought by these pretentious philosophers, we, nevertheless, insist that they who make their bargains on the faith of undoubted and existing law, have a right to calculate on the continuance of that law during the entire pendency of the transaction, or to be indemnified if the

law is in the meantime changed, and no one we apprehend with the slightest pretention to be a conservative or constitutionalist could argue otherwise.

With our minds thoroughly impregnated with the foregoing sentiments, we apply ourselves to the Act referred to at the head of this article, and we say unhesitatingly, whether we regard its principles or details, in whatever light we look at it, we devoutly wish it could be torn from the Book of Statutes. We honour our constitutional Legislature, but in this instance it has violated every tradition that has secured the public confidence. We have a profound respect for our legal tribunals, but this Act declares them utterly inefficient for the purposes for which they are created, and for the performance of which they are so liberally remunerated; and at the expense of the suitors themselves improvises a tribunal to discharge judicial duties, on the pretext that the ordinary tribunals are altogether incompetent to dispose of them. We are sensible of the dignity of the Peerage, especially when conferred as the reward of eminent ability and industry; but this Act sanctions the acceptance by a Peer of the realm-who is already a member of the highest judicial tribunal in the country, a Peer who would certainly repudiate with disdain the offer of a puisne judgeship or Vice-Chancellorship-of the humble office of arbitrator for an honorarium to be fixed by himself, but not to be less than 20007., and to be paid as and when, and by whom, he shall think proper. We have no desire to see our exChancellors converted into hack arbitrators, rivals, and competitors of the junior barristers, to whom the functions of arbitrator have been hitherto usually confided.

The title of the Act sufficiently explains its object. Its history is somewhat singular. The Albert Company was ordered to be wound up on the 17th September, 1869. Liquidators were appointed, and some proceedings taken towards settling the list of contributories and the carrying in of claims, but we cannot ascertain that any real progress was made towards a winding up from the period of the order to the passing of the Act. During this period, however, the solicitors and liquidators received about 50007. out of the assets for their costs and expenses. Efforts were made in the interest of the shareholders of the absorbed and affiliated companies to reconstruct the Albert, and to carry on the business on a new scheme, and a meeting was ultimately held of the policyholders and annuitants, and all others interested, at which it was resolved that a petition should be presented to the Court of Chancery for its sanction to the proposed scheme. It was farcical to suppose that the Court of Chancery could or would compel reluctant shareholders to insure in a company totally different from the one with which they had already con

tracted; but as Mr. Webster, Q.C., and Mr. Morris, the solicitor in the winding up, both pledged their professional reputations that it would receive the sanction of the Court, the resolution was carried. As any one familiar with the principles of the Court of Chancery might have predicted, the Court refused to make any such order as was asked for, and then it was that the Legislature was resorted to as the most efficient means of solving the difficulties.

A Bill was brought in, and referred to a select committee, of which Mr. Gathorne Hardy was chairman, and it is a wonder to us how that eminent and aspiring constitutionalist could have accepted with such ready acquiescence the provisions of so singular a Bill. As finally settled into an Act, and approved by the Legislature, it recites the order for winding up the Albert, and details the various companies with which the Albert has been amalgamated, or which it had absorbed. By s. 3 Lord Cairns is appointed arbitrator. By s. 4 the matters referred to him are specified, and they comprise every possible question that could require adjustment between all the companies and their respective policyholders, annuitants, and shareholders, Ss. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, authorise the arbitrator to settle a scheme of compromise, which scheme might be

"In the form of a reconstruction or reconstitution of the Albert Company, with or without modification, or the incorporation by registration or otherwise of that company, or the constitution of another company with, in either of those cases, provisions for the continuance and conduct of all or any branch or part of the insurance and other business of the Albert Company, current at the commencement of its liquidation to the natural termination of that business or otherwise, or in the form of a transfer, total or partial, of that business to another company or other companies existing or to be constituted under the directions of any scheme or schemes or otherwise, or in any such other form or manner as the arbitrator, in his absolute and unfettered discretion thinks expedient, and any of such forms adopted, may be with or without the payment of surrender values, in all cases in which the arbitrator thinks the same equitable or expedient."

Then ss. 6, 7, 8, and 9, are directed to giving effect to the scheme, and rendering it compulsory on all persons interested. S. 10 specifies the specific powers of the arbitrator, but they are quite unnecessary, for s. 11 is comprehensive enough to include them all, and much more. It is as follows:

"The arbitrator may settle and determine the matters by this Act referred to arbitration, not only in accordance with the legal or equi table rights of the parties as recognised in the courts of law or equity, but upon such terms and in such manner in all respects as he in his