Ex-President Coolidge said that: I didn't originate it, but he said a mouthful.

I do not intend at this time to enter into a discussion of the pros and cons of this one-term proposal for the Presidency.

I realize that this committee will receive testimony from those who have made a very thorough study of the arguments for and against. I will say that in advocating a single term, I am following a good Vermont tradition.

As far back as 1841, the Vermont Legislature approved a resolution directing the Vermont congressional delegation to work for a constitutional amendment restricting the President to a single term.

In 1867 Senator Luke Poland of Vermont offered a single 6-year term proposal.

Senator Redfield Proctor introduced two proposals-one in 1892 and another in 1896.

In 1909 Senator William P. Dillingham offered a single 6-year term proposal.

In 1913 the U.S. Senate approved a single-term proposal which was not acted upon in the House because the session was expiring.

Since 1913 many proposals relating to the presidential term of office have been introduced in both Houses of Congress, the most recent being this proposal by Senator Mansfield and myself.

And I might say on that vote in 1913 the two Vermont Senators split; one voted for it and one voted against it.

This proposal has now been before the last three sessions of Congress. As I stated in the beginning, there is no perfect method for handling a system which since 1787 has been conceded to be imperfect.

Conditions, however, have changed drastically in the last 180 years. with the advent of radio, television, and news media generally having an important effect upon the functioning of the Chief Executive's Office.

When a new President is inaugurated, he is usually permitted to have a wonderful time for the first 2 or 3 months and then the attacks begin and grow with intensity as the time for another national election draws nearer. He is not only subject to attack from the party which is out of the White House, but also from innumerable members of his own party who didn't get what they thought they were going to get when they supported him for President.

He is required to spend more and more time defending himself against these attacks some of which may be justified but more of which are aimed at defeating him should he be a candidate for reelection.

The 6-year term will not remove "politics" from the Office of the Presidency.

What it will do is to remove to a great extent the President's worry over his own personal political standing and allow him to make decisions free from the temptation of political expediency.

The President as the leader of his political party, will still want to see his party win the congressional elections, and in the long run, he will want his party to be successful in the next presidential electionbut more than all this he will want a favorable place in history.

I do not need to advise this committee as to the harm which can be done to our Government and its institutions through unwarranted

attacks upon the President, and it appears to me now that the time has come to give the people of the 50 States an opportunity to express themselves on this proposal.

They may all turn against it, but if three-fourths of the States feel that a single, 6-year term for President would be better for our country and our form of government, they should be given an opportunity to say so.

All I ask is at this time that through the adoption of this proposed legislation, we give the people of the United States the opportunity to pass on this proposal, which right is provided for by article 5 of our Constitution.

I feel this proposed amendment is important. You know, I recently heard people say, "Well, I don't care what the President says; I don't believe it." That is rather unreasonable and not just directed at one party I might say.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Senator.

I want to again thank both Senator Mansfield and Senator Aiken for being here.

Do you have time for a few questions? I am sure that my colleagues would like to explore your opinions a bit further, as would Ï.

It seems to me that one of the convincing arguments you make is that you take the President out of the political arena by a 6-year single term and lessen his campaign activities so he has more time to deal with national policy.

Let me ask you where that balances out against the responsiveness of a President if a President has to subject himself to reelection every

4 years.

Is he more apt to be responsive to the problems that confront the people in the shorter duration? For example, there are a number of people, including myself, frankly, who have been critical of the timelag with which the President handled the economic problems of the country. Unemployment was permitted to rise over a significant period of time in an effort to control inflation.

Do you feel that this period of time might have been longer if we hadn't a 4-year period of reelection? And I am not ascribing to the President any bad motives or anything because I am sure he felt strongly that what he was doing was right. But if he could see the large number of people that were being affected by this, would he be quicker to change his opinion as to what was right and what was wrong or would we have gone on for another say 2 years before stimulation was applied and controls were applied to try to put the economy on a different path?

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, Mr. Chairman, that question would be unanswerable because it would depend upon the man who held the Office of the Presidency.

But a President under a single, 6-year term would not be removed entirely from politics, but the amount of time he would have to allot to politics would be decreased considerably and by the same token. the amount of time he would be able to spend on looking after the national interest, both domestically and in the field of foreign policy, would be increased.

The pressures wouldn't be there. He would assume, I assume, actions that he felt would be in the best interests of the Nation as a whole regardless of politics.

But the question you raise, Mr. Chairman, I don't think it can be answered because it would depend on the man who occupied the Office of the Presidency at any given time.

Senator AIKEN. I might say, Mr. Chairman, there is a calculated risk in electing or appointing any man or woman to any high Federal office. But we Members of the Congress, as the representatives of the people here in Washington, have under the Constitution, a means for us to deal with any of these high officials who flagrantly violate their oath of office and the intent of their office.

The Congress hasn't exerted that power for a long, long time. I hope we don't ever have to, not in our day at least; but no man, of course, is perfect and no woman is perfect. They all make mistakes. Senators Mansfield and I heard Mr. Kosygin say one night as we got up to leave, "All countries make mistakes."

And there is no truer statement.

Senator MANSFIELD. But not all countries admit it.

Senator AIKEN. Not many will admit it but the best way to get out of trouble is to admit it and get out.

Senator BAYH. I am sure there is no way to answer that question completely.

Senator AIKEN. I said in the beginning there is no perfect form of government. We all know that.

Senator BAYH. The one thing I want to try to resolve in my own mind as we go along with these hearings is to what extent campaign politicking is bad because it takes away the time from other affairs of state and what degree is it necessary to subject ourselves to the political forum. Is it because it requires a higher degree of responsiveness?

I concur with what you both said because I think the prime motive of the President is to do a good job and to be recognized favorably in history. But on the other hand, I am not impressed by the argument that criticism toward a President is necessarily bad. I think Harry Truman said it pretty well when he said, "If you can't stand the heat, you better get out of the kitchen."

So that to me is of lesser importance than the subject you raised about how much time a President has to spend politicking. I noted in going through some information that had been prepared by my staff a Life magazine article that was written by Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell in 1970 in which he dealt with the pressures that existed in the White House under the late President Kennedy's administration. (The article which was referred to follows:)

[Life magazine, Aug. 7, 1970]

L. B. J. AND THE KENNEDYS

(By Kenneth O'Donnell)

There have been many stories circulated since the 1960 Democratic Convention about why John Kennedy gave the Vice Presidency to Lyndon Johnson. Surprisingly, the real story has never come out. On that hectic Thursday morning, when Bobby Kennedy and I were trying to recover from the shock of his offer to Johnson, John Kennedy told me his reasons.

The Kennedy suite in the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles was filled with a throng of Northern Democratic leaders, the old pros like David Lawrence and Bill Green of Pennsylvania, Mike DiSalle of Ohio, John Bailey, Abe Ribicoff, Dick Daley, all of them milling around Kennedy and congratulating him for offering

the Vice Presidency to Johnson. Jack was saying that he had just talked with Lyndon, and Lyndon wanted a little time to think it over but it looked as though he would take it. "Johnson has the strength where you need it most," David Lawrence was saying to Kennedy. I could have belted Lawrence. I was vehemently against the Johnson selection because it represented precisely the kind of cynical, old-style politics we were trying to get away from. I also knew our liberal friends would be appalled by it.

When Jack Kennedy saw the expression on my face, he beckoned to Bobby Kennedy and me to follow him into the bedroom. The bedroom was crowded with people, too, and realizing that I was about to explode, Jack said to Bobby, "I'd better talk to Kenny alone in the bathroom." We went into the bathroom and closed the door behind us.

"This is the worst mistake you ever made," I said to him. "You came out here to this convention like a knight on a white charger, the clean-cut young Ivy League college guy who's promising to get rid of the old political ways. And now, in your first move, you go against all the people who supported you. Are we going to spend the whole campaign apologizing for Lyndon Johnson and trying to explain why he voted against everything you ever stood for?"

He became pale, livid with anger, so upset and hurt that it took him a while before he was able to collect himself.

"Wait a minute," he said. "I've offered it to him, but he hasn't accepted it yet and maybe he won't. If he does, let's get one thing clear."

I never forgot what he said next.

"I'm 43 years old, and I'm the healthiest candidate for President in the United States. You've traveled with me enough to know that. I'm not going to die in office. So the Vice Presidency doesn't mean anything. I'm thinking of something else, the leadership in the Senate. If we win, it will be by a small margin and I won't be able to live with Lyndon Johnson as the leader of a small Senate majority. Did it occur to you that if Lyndon becomes the Vice President, I'll have Mike Mansfield as the Senate leader, somebody I can trust and depend on?" That thought never had occurred to me or, incredibly enough, to anyone else around John Kennedy. Bobby had wanted Henry Jackson for Vice President; I had been for Stuart Symington. I had never heard anyone even mention Johnson's name. But Kennedy saw it differently, and the way he explained it sounded like an elementary history lecture.

He reminded me that Congress was still in session and that he had to go back to the Senate and put on a fight for the issues in his platform-housing, urban renewal, Medicare, relief for depressed areas. By not permanently adjourning Congress, Johnson and Sam Rayburn figured they could pressure various members of Congress in the state delegations into supporting Johnson for President at Los Angeles if the House and the Senate remained in session for the rest of the summer.

"If Johnson and Rayburn leave here mad at me," Kennedy said, "they'll ruin me in Congress next month. Then I'll be the laughingstock of the country. Nixon will say I haven't any power in my own party, and I'll lose the election before Labor Day. So I've got to make peace now with Johnson and Rayburn, and offering Lyndon the Vice Presidency, whether he accepts it or not, is one way of keeping him friendly until Congress adjourns. All of this is more important to me than Southern votes, which I won't get anyway with the Catholic thing working against me. I doubt if Lyndon will even be able to carry Texas, as Dave Lawrence and all those other polls out in the other room are claiming we will."

One of my jobs was keeping the Labor leaders happy and all of them were against Johnson. Kennedy opened the bathroom door and called Bobby in to join us. "Now the two of you can go and see Walter Reuther and George Meany and get to work on them," he said.

While we were gone, bedlam broke out in the suite. Michigan Governor "Soapy" Williams, fighting mad, told a group of Southern governors he would lead a floor fight against Johnson. Jack Kennedy, sitting with one leg hanging over the arm of a chair, watched the whole angry scene without saying a word. He was far and away the toughest of the Kennedys. Bobby used to say, "We can't fire that fellow because he's got five kids." Jack would say, "I'm sorry about his five kids, but he can't handle the job the way I want it handled, so he's out-and let's not have any more talk about it. Put him someplace else, but get him out of there."

After Johnson had relayed the word to the Kennedy suite that he was ready to take the nomination, Bobby and I returned and told Jack that the labor leaders were furious and threatening to put up a candidate of their own. Jack told his brother to go right downstairs and inform Lyndon there might be a floor fight, and Johnson should decide whether he wanted to face it.

Bobby's own feeling about Johnson at this point was neutral. It has been widely reported, and accepted, that Bobby Kennedy tried to block Johnson from the ticket. This is simply not accurate. At first, in fact, he fully endorsed the judgment that picking Johnson was a shrewd political move. When he went with me to check the labor leaders, and learned for the first time how enraged they were, he began to worry. In any case, the hard feelings that later developed between Bobby and Johnson did not begin here. Bobby was merely acting as an envoy. Bobby went to Johnson's suite and talked with Sam Rayburn and John Connally, explaining to them that there was a threat of a floor fight against Johnson and suggesting that Lyndon might want to withdraw if he didn't want to get involved in such a battle. "Do you think he might be interested in being chairman of the National Committee?" Bobby asked. Rayburn, incredulous at the idea, dismissed it with a four-letter word.

Kennedy got on the phone and reassured Johnson that if he was willing to face a floor fight the Vice Presidency was his. Johnson agreed, and that was how he got on the ticket.

President Kennedy often used to needle me later over a glass in the evening when I was trying to disagree with one of his decisions, "Don't forget that day I had to straighten you out in the bathroom in Los Angeles. If I listened to you, Lyndon would still be running the Senate instead of safely tucked away."

As Vice President, Johnson felt sidetracked and ignored, and sorely missed the patronage and the power he had enjoyed when he was the majority leader in the Senate. He blamed his fallen prestige on Bobby Kennedy, and it was on this point that bad feelings between the two of them began to build. He felt that Bobby had taken over his rightful position as the number two man in the government, which was true enough. The President sometimes pointed out with great amusement to Johnson that many of Bobby's friends in the Administration, who were always trying to push him into running the State Department as well as the Justice Department, looked upon his younger brother as the real number one man in the government.

President Kennedy was always uncomfortably aware of Johnson's unhappiness in the Vice Presidency and leaned over backwards to keep him involved in important government affairs. He issued a firm order that everybody in the White House was to be courteous and considerate with Johnson and held me personally responsible that the order not be ignored. Only two men in the government, Johnson and Bobby Kennedy, were given the special privilege of entering the President's office at any time unseen through the back door from the garden, without following the normal route into the front door and through my office. Neither of them ever abused this privilege, and they seldom came to see the President without calling me first. Johnson often called and asked to see the President with various personal complaints, frequently about Bobby. The President and I worked out a set routine for handling Johnson's laments. The President would first hear him out alone, and then call me into his office and denounce me in front of Johnson for whatever the Vice President was beefing about. I would humbly take the blame and promise to correct the situation, and the Vice President would go away somewhat happier.

I remember one day when Johnson's complaint about Bobby ("That kid brother of yours") involved Sarah T. Hughes, the same long-time Texas friend who later as a federal judge in Dallas swore Johnson in as President in the hot and sticky cabin of Air Force One after the assassination.

"Damn it, Kenny, you've gone and done it again," the President said when he called me into his office. "Lyndon, you go ahead and tell him yourself what's happened this time."

Johnson began a long recital of woe, prefacing it, as he usually did, with a recollection of John Nance Garner describing the Vice Presidency as a thankless office with as much prestige as a pitcher of warm spit. He explained that he had asked Bobby Kennedy a few months earlier for a federal judgeship in Texas for Sarah Hughes, and when the Justice Department told him that Mrs. Hughes, then 65, was too old for the position, he had explained sorrowfully to Mrs. Hughes that she couldn't have the job, and had offered the appointment to another Texas