12. A contract to sell and convey land can only be performed by giving a deed that will vest in the grantee an indefeasible title. Dela- van v. Duncan. 485
13. Where, under such a contract, the vendee is prepared to pay the purchase-money, but in conse- quence of the title being incum- bered the vendor is unable to perform, a tender of the purchase- money is not necessary in order to preserve the vendee's rights under the contract. Id.
14. Defendant contracted to sell and convey certain premises. At the time fixed for performance he was unable to give an unincumbered title. No part of the purchase- money was paid, and defendant remained in possession. Plaintiff brought action for specific per- formance three years and a half after the time fixed for perform- ance, without giving any notice meantime of his intent to insist upon the execution of the con- tract and without excusing the delay. Held (RAPALLO and PECK- HAM, JJ., dissenting), that plain- tiff was not entitled to the relief sought.
15. Defendant contracted to sell and deliver plaintiff, at Brooklyn, with- in three months, 400,000 brick at $10.50 per M. Defendants deliv- ered 213,500 during the specified time. In an action to recover damages for the non-delivery of
money on hand sufficient to pay the whole purchase-price; it was sufficient if he had the means and resources at command which would have enabled him to pay if the brick had been delivered. Mount v. Lyon. 552
16. Where an order is sent to a mer- chant or manufacturer of goods in which he deals, silent as to price, and the order is accepted, the law fixes the price at the current rate at which the goods are sold, and the party ordering is equally bound as if the price had been stated in the order. So where an order is given for two articles mixed, to a manufacturer of such a mixture without specifying the proportion of each article, the manufacturer is empowered to compound the same in the usual manner in which the mixture is prepared for market, and an accptance of the order makes a valid contract to that effect. Konitzky v. Meyer.
See CORPORATIONS, 1. MORTGAGE, 1. SET-OFF.
the residue,-Held (PECKHAM, J., See O'RILEY v. MCCHESNEY (Mem.),
dissenting), that the delivery of the entire quantity was a condition precedent of the right of defend- ants to demand payment, and the fact that, when they discontinued the delivery, plaintiff had not paid for those delivered was not an excuse for the non-delivery of the residue; also, that it was not neces- sary, as a condition precedent to a right of action, for plaintiff to make a formal demand of the brick, and tender payment therefor at the place of delivery; that it was enough if he was ready and will- ing to receive and to pay on deliv- ery; nor was it necessary that plaintiff should have had, during the whole time specified, a sum of
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