one large squadron. The revenues were not yielding over $30,000,000 a year, and Secretary Chase's hesitation about risking war by relieving Sumter was largely caused by the poor credit of the government, which had been forced to pay one per cent a month before the end of Buchanan's administration. The resources of the North, on the other hand, were vastly beyond those of the South, and Lincoln, with the eye of a statesman, never lost sight of the fact that what he needed was the tactful patience to keep his course so conservative that any deep division would be avoided. The military problem was second to the political one. It was by a slowness which required fortitude in the face of criticism that he had held the Northern Democrats and forced Douglas to drop hostile comment on the administration for enthusiastic defence of his country. "They," Lincoln had already said, referring to the Democrats, "are just where we Whigs were in 1848 about the Mexican War. We had to take the Locofoco preamble when Taylor wanted help, or else vote against helping Taylor, and the Democrats must vote to hold the Union now, without bothering whether we or the Southern men got things where they are. And we must make it easy for them to do this, for we cannot live through the case without

them." He then told about the Illinois man who was chased by a fierce bull in a pasture, and, dodging around a tree, caught the tail of the pursuing beast. After pawing the earth for a time the bull broke away on a run, blowing at every jump, while the man clinging to its tail cried on, “Darn you, who commenced this fuss?" This knowledge of plain, essential human nature had led the President to wait every possible minute for the other side to begin the fuss. In the same connection in which he had illustrated by the bull story the difficulties of satisfying all the critics in the North, he had shown by another tale his belief in the impossibility of any real alliance between secession and Northern Democrats. Some pious member of the church wished to build a bridge over a dangerous river, but found great difficulty in securing an engineer competent for the work. Brother Jones suggested one Myers who announced that he could build one to hell, if necessary. Jones, to quiet his friends, and at the same time support his engineer, remarked that he believed Myers so honest a man and so able an architect that he could accomplish this task if he said he could; but that he himself felt bound to express some doubt about the abutment on the infernal side. Lincoln explained that, in hearing any talk of

accommodation between the two branches of the Democracy, he had always had his doubts about the abutment on the other side.

Even after Sumter was fired upon his step was as cautious as it was firm. To a committee from the Virginia convention, which waited upon him April 11, while the news of the firing on the fort was coming in, he explained again that invasion was no part of his policy at present. “My policy is to have no policy," he often said. He was ruling a Democracy, and he could learn nothing from the history of other lands. But with patience went decision, and to this same delegation he said: "If, as now appears to be true, in pursuit of a purpose to drive the United States authority from these places, an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess, if I can, like places which had been seized before the government was devolved upon me. And in every event I shall, to the extent of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall perhaps cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the states which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the government justifies and possibly demands this."

When the next morning brought the news

of Sumter's fall, he made his first test of Northern feeling by a proclamation, drawn by him that day and published Monday, in the papers that gave the first full story of the fight, calling for 75,000 militia to serve three months. Nobody had any idea how many troops would be needed to put down the rebellion, but all through the war Lincoln's insistent desire to accept every regiment that offered showed not only his willingness to conciliate the particular officers and men, as part of public sentiment, but his feeling of the size of his task. To an adviser, who, in discussing this first call for troops, spoke slightingly of the South, the President replied: "We must not forget that the people of the seceded states, like those of the loyal ones, are American citizens, with essentially the same characteristics and powers. Exceptional advantages on one side are counterbalanced by exceptional advantages on the other. We must make up our minds that, man for man, the soldier from the South will be a match for the soldier from the North and vice versa."

To all who had doubted the fighting spirit of the North, the response to Lincoln's proclamation was a surprise. The free states answered with enthusiasm. The governors found themselves in a position where it was difficult not to give more troops than were wanted. Camps

sprung up everywhere. "Ten days ago," came the reply from Iowa, "we had two parties in this state; to-day we have but one, and that one is for the Constitution and Union unconditionally." Ohio offered as many militia as the government would accept, Indiana replied that she was ready with more than twice her quota. One day after the Governor's call forty companies had been tendered in Illinois. A regiment marched fully equipped from Massachusetts within forty-eight hours. Michigan offered 50,000 men if they were needed. Factories began to work on ammunition at once; money, credit, and the use of railroads were offered. The War Department, with all its wish to keep down the number of troops, was obliged to accept nearly 16,000 more than the President had required.

The South prepared for the battle with no less decision. The Secretary of War asked for 32,000 more troops. Virginia seceded on the 17th and on the same day Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation inviting privateers to prey on United States commerce. To this last move President Lincoln replied two days later with a blockade of the Southern ports and a declaration that privateers would be treated as pirates. The governors of Kentucky, North Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Missouri sent sharp refusals to the call for troops. All the border states, in