my understanding of the matter. From some of his previous appearances before this committee "preaching the gospel of fear," as he did today, I thought the straggling imports of dairy products must have been threatening the very foundations of the dairying industry of the country.

I am sorry, however, that Mr. Holman sees no "ray of hope for the dairy farmer for extensive foreign markets for dairy products," especially since the commercial exports in 1946, not including lend-lease and UNRRA, amounted to $162,000,000 in comparison with imports of some $12,000,000. The complete story is as follows:

In 1937 he appeared before this committee and complained of the imports of cream (p. 360, hearings) because a reduction in tariff on that product had been made in the first Canadian agreement. Apparently he still fears floods of imports of cream from Canada or some other source in the distant future.

He admits that there is a world shortage of butter, yet he stated:

"A dangerous element is the prospect of the depressed level at which controlled prices have been held in foreign countries."

It seems to me that some quantities of imports at lower prices would aid the consumers who cannot now afford to pay the present uncontrolled prices of butter. He is afraid that Britain may pay part of her loan by sending butter into the United States. That seems to me a sensible way to receive payment. Mr. Holman seems to have reversed his position since 1937 when he complained of injury as a result of the reduction in the tariff on Cheddar cheese in the first Canadian agreement. In his prepared statement he stated that the war prevented injury.

The devices which Mr. Holman says are employed by other nations constitute a strong argument for the.negotiations at Geneva at the present time. He had no better method to suggest for eliminating trade barriers.

On page 6 of his statement he seems to be afraid that three countries which are not negotiating at Geneva, Norway, Italy, and Switzerland, important world suppliers of dairy products, "will share the benefits of any concessions which we may make on butter, cheese, and condensed milk." He discussed the point that

under the charter nonmembers would not benefit from the negotiations, since most-favored-nations treatment would not be given to them, and then on page 9 he complains that: "The State Department apparently has shifted its policy. * * * It now apparently seeks to circumvent the law." In his estimation the Department will be "condemned if it does, and condemned if it does not," give most-favored-nation treatment.

He says about the CRI hearings, "These hearings are pro forma and are indifferently conducted by minor officials below the negotiating levels of government." He includes in this category of "minor officials" United States Tariff Commis

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sioners, who must be confirmed by the Senate. Many businessmen before this committee have highly praised the way the recent hearings before the CRI were conducted.

Mr. Holman professes to be concerned because the negotiation at Geneva "is on the verge of giving away the sovereignty of its people.' The negotiators, of course, are committed to bring any such charter to the Congress of the United States. Surely he does not have so little faith in the Congress that he believes they would let an executive Department give away United States sovereignty, even if it were so inclined. Following is a letter from Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, on the commitment of the Department of State to present the ITO to Congress for approval:

Hon. EUGENE D. MILLIKIN,

Chairman, Committee on Finance, United States Senate.

APRIL 3, 1946.

MY DEAR SENATOR MILLIKIN: Mr. Fahy has informed me of your request, made during his appearance before the Committee on Finance on March 25, that the committee be advised as to whether the proposed charter for an International Trade Organization will be submitted to the Senate as a treaty for its advice and consent or to both Houses of the Congress for appropriate legislation.

As you are aware, the forthcoming meeting at Geneva is a meeting of the second session of the Preparatory Committee of 18 countries, established by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to prepare a draft charter for consideration by an International (World) Conference on Trade and Employment. At the end of the Geneva session, the Preparatory Committee will submit the draft charter to the Economic and Social Council which, presumably, will thereafter fix the date and place of the World Conference. Upon completion of the work of the World Conference, the charter will be referred to the governments of the world for acceptance in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. In the case of the United States, the charter will be submitted to the Congress. However, in view of the steps outlined above which have yet to be taken, no decision has been made as to the form in which congressional approval will be asked. You will appreciate that a determination on this issue may very well be affected by the manner in which the discussions yet to be held proceed, and even more by the exact nature of the provisions which emerge from those discussions.

I should like to assure you that this matter will be further discussed by the Department with both the President and the Congress, with a view toward determining the appropriate manner in which congressional approval should be sought.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. Holman said at the bottom of page 7 of his statement: "Members of this committee will recall having to report and pass the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921."

That statement has been repeated before this committee so many times during the present hearings that some may actually believe that such an emergency existed. There is competent opinion to the effect that one of our greatest mistakes, following World War I, was to pass high tariff legislation.

Frank W. Taussig, an eminent tariff authority, said of the Emergency Act of 1921:

"In the spring of 1921, an Emergency Tariff Act (May 27) imposed high duties upon wheat, corn, meat, wool, sugar. Originally passed with a provision that the duties should be in force for six months only, it was reenacted step by step and remained in effect until the final passage of the act of 1922. As a means of meeting the emergency of the time it was hardly more than an amiable gesture. The prices of the several products continued to decline; hardly a better proof could be found of the failure of tariff duties to serve as a remedy of immediate efficacy. "But this Emergency Act, negligible though it was in its immediate effects, was of large consequence on the political situation and on the eventual character of the permanent tariff. By it the representatives of the agricultural States had committed themselves to a policy of high and even ruthless protection."

On the following record of foreign trade, I question the statement that an important emergency existed:

With an excess of exports of nearly $9,000,000,000 for the 3 years, it seems to me that tariff tinkering for a creditor nation was a great mistake, because we had so much to lose in export trade.

It has been stated that agricultural imports were entering in such quantities that duties had to be increased. The following figures for the year 1920, the last year before the so-called tariff emergency, would seem to dispel such fiction

The exports of only a few agricultural products (not including the normally large exports of cotton and tobacco) were valued at about seven times the value of imports and indicate that prices were tied to world prices. Our emergency tariffs impaired the purchasing power of foreign countries and further tended to reduce world prices. Other countries retaliated. Apparently Mr. Holman wants to repeat that experience now.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you clarify the other diseases that are carried in dairy products, such as Bang's disease, which is communicable to human beings?

Mr. HOLMAN. I will attempt to do that, Mr. Chairman. I will ask permission sometime during today or tomorrow to file the documents requested to be filed with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very helpful if you could do that.
Mr. HOLMAN. I appreciate the courtesy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to ask one or two questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman observes that the flesh is weak and the spirit is strong.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I have a table before me that shows in 1946 imports into this country of all dairy products were valued at $12,075,000, whereas in the same year the exports of dairy products from this country totaled $296,105,000. Now, in the face of that, do you not think that it is important we maintain our export trade for the benefit of the dairy industry?

Mr. HOLMAN. I do not think those figures are particularly significant because we are still in the relief stage. We are in the UNRRA stage and we are still in some stages of lend-lease, and you will find that foreign countries have bought very little of these things. We will be glad to make an analysis of that if we can persuade the Government officials to let us have the information. It is not easy to get information about exports and imports from this particular group of officials.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now, the report of the Department of Commerce shows with respect to the year 1946 total exports under UNRRA of dairy products amounted to $107,334,000.

Mr. HOLMAN. That is half of it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Total exports of dairy products, under lendlease, amounted to $26,067,000 for the same period, leaving commercial exports of dairy products amounting to $162,704,000.

Now, commercial imports were only $12,000,000. Commercial exports of dairy products for the year 1946 amounted to $162,000,000. Do you think the dairy industry wants to be cut off from that commercial export trade of $162,000,000 in order to protect itself from a $12,000,000 import?

Mr. HOLMAN. Mr. Eberharter, just because at the present time there is a decimation of dairy herds in many of the countries we normally would expect to export to, does not make those figures representative at all, in my mind. I think it will be only a short time when the feeds will get moving in, when the cattle get built back, and that figure will change from a plus export basis on the part of the United States to a minus export basis. In other words, we will go back to our normal condition of producing almost as much as the United States wants and enough of everything except the cheeses, and we will continue to import cheeses of the Italian and Swiss type and also the French and Dutch types.

But those exports are only because these people are starving and do not have enough cattle to take care of the situation right now. Mr. EBERHARTER. I just want to call your attention to one other significant figure, in my mind.

In the years 1931 to 1935 the average imports of dairy products into this country amounted to $13,157,000, whereas the exports amounted to only $6,168,000, showing the average imports annually in the years 1931 to 1935 were more than two times our exports, whereas now, in 1946, our exports are 15 times our imports on dairy products.

Mr. HOLMAN. Again I say that the figures are not conclusive. They are not representative, and the figures that you last quoted of the international trade in the 1930's is much more in line with normal conditions, and it is of no particular importance to us, a trade of $13,000,000 in dairy products at this time when we have $3,900,000 worth of dairy products that are involved and are in danger as to price levels by this program.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Still, Mr. Holman, before we had the reciprocal trade agreements program, the imports of dairy products into the United States exceeded the exports by more than double.

Mr. HOLMAN. Yes, but the amounts were too insignificant to worry about.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Mr. Eberharter.
Are there any other questions?

Mr. WOODRUFF. Mr. Holman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania has called your attention to the fact that we are exporting 15 times as much of the dairy products as we have previously. Is it not due, to a very large extent, to the fact that we are giving these dairy products to the other countries? We are shipping our dairy products to the other countries and we are doing it either under UNRRA or some

other form, and the people who are consuming it abroad never expect to pay a nickel to the people of the United States.

Mr. HOLMAN. Mr. Eberharter himself accounted for more than $100,000,000 worth of the exports as going to governmental sources. I think that an analysis might show that loans which we have made, which may never be repaid, will account for a large part of the rest of the exports.

Mr. WOODRUFF. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Mr. Holman.

Mr. HOLMAN. I thank the committee for its courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made a very fine statement. The dairy people are well represented by you and your splendid organization. We will now hear from Mr. Č. D. Jackson, vice president of Time, Inc., New York City.

Mr. Jackson, will you please take the witness stand?

STATEMENT OF C. D. JACKSON, VICE PRESIDENT OF TIME, INC., APPEARING IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY

The CHAIRMAN. Are you appearing in a personal capacity, or as a representative of Time?

Mr. JACKSON. Personal capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. How much time will you require?

Mr. JACKSON. About 4 minutes; maybe a little less.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Ways and Means, it is a privilege and honor to be able to appear before you at this time.

I asked for this privilege not because I was in any way an international economist, professional or even amateur, but because I am an importer of news from abroad, and an exporter of American magazines to virtually the whole world. Furthermore, during the war I was attached to the Psychological Warfare Division of General Eisenhower's headquarters, and part of my job was to appraise the reactions and ideas of liberated and conquered peoples toward the Allies in general and the United States in particular.

Like a great many other people in business in America today, I have come to realize since the end of the war that the United States businessman has not only a commercial, and if you will, selfish, responsibility to discharge today, but also an unselfish patrotic responsibility to assist his country in every possible way to achieve its proper place in the world-a world of which it is today an indissoluble part, whether or not that is a pleasing thought to individual Americans.

Trade is a great peacemaker and peace preserver. More world trade is what this world needs today. But in order to get world trade off dead center, someone must assume leadership, and obvious to everyone all over the world is the fact that the United States should and can assume that leadership if she so wishes.

In order to assume that leadership, and have it understood and accepted by the world, two things are necessary-one is intangible, the other is tangible.

The intangible one is evidence to the whole world that the United States truly desires an orderly, prosperous, trading, world. Mr.