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An indictment charging commission of an offense on a parcel of land described by metes and bounds, alleged to have been acquired with the consent of the State for "public purposes' by the United States and to be under its exclusive jurisdiction, held sufficiently specific under this section to give jurisdiction to a Federal court. Brown v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 257 Fed. 46, certiorari granted (1919), 250 U. S. 637, and reversed on other grounds (1921), 256 U. S. 335.

Evidence. In a prosecution for murder committed on land alleged to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, where the land is described and shown by oral testimony to have been in exclusive possession of the United States at the time, it was not necessary to prove its title, and introduction of title documents and deeds

could not have injured defendant, whether technically proven or not. Brown v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1919), 257 Fed. 46, certiorari granted (1919), 250 U. S. 637, and reversed on other grounds (1921), 256 U. S. 335.

Habeas corpus.--Whether locus of alleged crime was within exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, involving controverted questions both of law and fact, is for determination by the court where the indictment was found, and can not be raised by writ of habeas corpus on ground of want of jurisdiction when accused is sought to be removed from one district to another. Rodman v. Pothier (1924), 264 U. S. 399, reversing (C. C. A. 1923), 291 Fed. 311, which reversed (D. C. 1923), 285 Fed. 632.

856. Arson or injury to arsenals, etc. (Criminal Code, sec. 286).-Whoever shall maliciously set fire to, burn, or attempt to burn, or by any means destroy or injure or attempt to destroy or injure, any arsenal, armory, magazine, ropewalk, ship house, warehouse, blockhouse, or barrack, or any storehouse, barn, or stable, not parcel of a dwelling house, or any other building not mentioned in the section last preceding, or any vessel built, building, or undergoing repair, or any lighthouse or beacon, or any machinery, timber, cables, rigging, or other materials or appliances for building, repairing, or fitting out vessels, or any pile of wood, boards, or other lumber, or any military, naval, or victualing stores, arms, or other munitions of war, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than twenty years. Sec. 286, act of Mar. 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1144); U. S. C. 18: 465.

857. Laws of States adopted for punishing wrongful acts (Criminal Code, sec. 289). Whoever, within the territorial limits of any State, organized Territory, or District, but within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired, described in section two hundred and seventy-two of this act, shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which is not made penal by any law of Congress, but which if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof now in force would be penal, shall be deemed guilty of a like offense and be subject to a like punishment; and every such State, Territorial, or District law shall, for the purposes of this section, continue in force, notwithstanding any subsequent repeal or amendment thereof by any such State, Territory, or District. Sec. 289, act of Mar. 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1145); U. S. C. 18: 468.

For sec. 272 above referred to see 855, ante.

Notes of Decisions

As military offense.-Violation of a stat ute of the Territory of Hawaii denouncing as a misdemeanor the organizing, forming, maintaining, and joining an unlicensed secret association, is punishable under A. W. 96, ante, 454, Crouch v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1926), 13 F. (2d) 348.

Constitutionality. The claim that power of legislation is unconstitutionally dele gated to the State legislatures by sec. 2, act of July 7, 1898, adopting such punish

ment for offenses committed in places under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States as the laws of the State in which such places are situated "now provide" for a like offense, the punishment therefor not being otherwise provided for by any law of the United States, is too clearly unfounded to serve as the basis of a writ of error from the Supreme Court to a circuit court. Franklin v. U. S. (1909), 216 U. S. 559.

Congress may lawfully declare that the criminal law of a State as it exists at the time shall be the law of the United States in force in particular portions of the territory of the United States, subject to the latter's exclusive jurisdiction. Washington P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Magruder (D. C. 1912), 198 Fed. 218.

Design of statute in general.-Congress, with the design that the places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall not be freed from the restraints of the law, has enacted for them a criminal code ending with this section. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles (1909), 214 U. S. 274.

Statute as incorporating into Federal law State statute of limitations.-Sec. 2, act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 717), providing that when any offense is committed in any place, jurisdiction over which has been retained by, or ceded to, the United States the punishment for which is not provided for by any law of the United States, the of fender shall receive the same punishment as the laws of the State provide for the like offense, does not incorporate into the Federal law the general statute of limitations of the State relating to crimes, but a prosecution thereunder is governed as to limitation by the Federal statute. U. S. v. Andem (D. C. 1908), 158 Fed. 996.

Statute as limited to fixing of punishment for offenses under Federal laws.-R. S. 5391 (embodied herein), and act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 717), the former of which provides that in case of any offense committed in any place ceded to and under the jurisdiction of the United States, "which offense is not prohibited or the punishment thereof is not specially provided for by any law of the United States, such offense shall be liable to and receive the same punishment as the laws of the State in which such place is situated now in force provide for the like offense," and the latter of which contains similar provisions respecting offenses committed in any place jurisdiction over which has been retained by the United States or ceded to it, etc., "the punishment for which offense is not provided for by any law of the United States," are neither of them limited to the fixing of punishment for offenses expressly created by the Federal laws, but they apply to and make punishable any act committed in such places not so provided for, but which is an offense under the laws of the State. U. S. v. Franklin (C. C. 1909), 174 Fed. 163. Application to offenses under State laws in general. This section is limited to offenses committed in places ceded to the United States and adopts the State law as to such offenses if not otherwise provided for, and in such cases, if the offense is a felony by State law, it becomes a felony by this sec

tion.

U. S. v. Coppersmith (C. C. 1880), 4 Fed. 198, 204.

An act not specifically made an offense by the statute of the United States, but which is an offense under the laws of the State wherein performed, is made, by R. S. 5391 (embodied herein), an offense under the laws of the United States, and punishable by the same penalties which are infiicted under the laws of the State. Sharon v. Hill (C. C. 1885), 24 Fed, 726, 731.

Places to which law applies.-In view of act of July 1, 1902, confirming cession to United States by Chickasaw Nation of Sulphur Springs Reservation, which by resolution of June 29, 1906, was designated Platt National Park, and sec. 8184, Comp. St. Okla. 1921, disclaiming any right, title, or interest of Oklahoma in lands embraced in Platt National Park, courts take judicial notice that Platt National Park was under exclusive jurisdiction of United States Government at time of admission of Oklahoma into Union, and that jurisdiction of such Government to punish for crimes committed therein was reserved in sec. 7, enabling act, especially in view of this section, making any act not specifically made offense by United States laws, but which is offense under laws of State wherein committed, also offense under laws of United States. Underhill v. State (Okla. 1925), 237 Pac. 628.

State statutes to which law applies.-In U. S. v. Paul (1832), 6 Pet. 141, this provision was held to be limited to the laws of the several States in force at the time of its enactment. Hollister v. U. S. (1906), 145 Fed. 773; Steele v. Halligan (D. C. 1916), 229 Fed. 1011.

R. S. 5391 (embodied herein), providing that when an offense not provided for by the laws of the United States is committed in a place ceded to the Government, the same shall be subject to the same penalties provided for the like offense by the laws "now in force" of the State in which such place is situated, applied only to State statutes existing at the time of its passage, in 1825. U. S. v. Barnaby (C. C. 1892), 51 Fed. 20, following U. S. v. Paul (1832), 6 Pet. 141, 142.

R. S. 5391 (embodied herein), making criminal offenses committed in any place under the jurisdiction of the United States, not prohibited or provided for by any law of the United States, subject to punishment in accordance with the laws of the State in which such place is situated, "now in force," is not referable, for the purpose of ascertaining the State laws applicable, to the date when it was first enacted, in 1825, but to the date of the adoption of the Revised Statutes, in 1878, by sections 5595 and 5596, post, 1905, 1906, of which the

prior act was superseded and repealed. In no event could such section relate back to an earlier date than April 5, 1866, when the old act was substantially reenacted. U. S. v. Tucker (D. C. 1903), 122 Fed. 518. Common-law crimes.-The common law of crimes is in force in the State, except where affected by statute, and common-law procedure is in force unless special provision is made by statute to exclude the same. Territory v. Montoya (N. M. 1912), 125 Pac. 622.

State crime committed in post-office building. Sec. 2, act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 717), provides that, when any offense is committed in any place jurisdiction over which has been retained by or ceded to the United States the punishment for which is not provided for by any law of the United States, the offender shall receive the same punishment as the laws of the State provide for a like offense. Held, that ander such statute a Federal court has jurisdiction to prosecute and punish for a crime denounced by the State law committed in a post-office building owned and occupied by the United States within a State over which legislative jurisdiction has been ceded by the State. U. S. v. Andem (D. C. 1908), 158 Fed. 996.

Criminal libel.-The circulation in the Government reservation at West Point and in the post-office building in New York City of copies of a newspaper containing a criminal libel printed and primarily published in such city can not be punished in the Federal courts under sec. 2, act of July 7, 1898, providing that offenses committed in places under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, when not expressly made criminal by any law of the United States, shall be punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such places are situated, since the State laws afford adequate punishment for the offense, without resorting to the Federal courts, and the plain purpose is that there shall be but a single prosecution and conviction for a criminal libel. U. S. v. Press Pub. Co. (1911), 219 C. S. 1.

of the States or of the United States. U. S. v. Barnaby (C. C. 1892), 51 Fed. 20.

Assault to kill in navy yard.-The Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York had jurisdiction of an indictment for an assault with intent to kill committed in the navy yard at Brooklyn under act of March 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 115). U. S. v. Dolan (C. C. 1865), Fed. Cas. No. 14978.

False pretenses.-Under sec. 1, act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 717), which is in substance a reenactment of R. S. 5391 (embodied herein), any act committed in any place under the jurisdiction of the United States, if made an offense by the laws of the State in which such place is situated, when committed elsewhere in the State, is an offense against the United States and punishable as in the State law provided, since at the date of the passage of this act the act of obtaining money or goods by false pretenses was made a crime by the laws of most of the States of the Union it is therefore under this act also made a crime against the United States in all places over which the United States exercises exclusive legislative jurisdiction, within the several States having laws providing for the punishment of such an act as a crime. Biddle v. U. S. (1907), 156 Fed. 759, 763.

Larceny. A larceny committed in a place not under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States may be punishable under sec. 3, act of Mar. 3, 1825 (4 Stat. 115). U. S. v. Davis (C. C. 1829), Fed. Cas. No. 14930.

Indictment.-In an indictment under sec. 2, act of Apr. 5, 1866 (14 Stat. 12), it. is not necessary to aver that the offense is not punishable by any law of Congress, and is punishable by the State laws, and a conclusion "against the form of the statute" is correct. U. S. v. Wright (D. C. 1871), Fed. Cas. No. 16774.

Under R. S. 5391 (embodied herein), and the Kentucky statutes, in force in 1866, 1873, and 1878, defining the offense of cutting, stabbing, etc., an indictment for the offense of cutting and stabbing with intent to kill, committed at a place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, situated within an the State of Kentucky, which avers that the accused did willfully, and unlawfully, in sudden heat and passion, and not in self-defense, cut, stab, and wound a certain person, without killing him, is sufficient. U. S. v. Tucker (D. C. 1903), 122 Fed. 518.

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Offenses by Indians.-R. S. 5391 (embodied herein), providing that, when offense not provided for by the laws of the United States is committed in a place ceded to the Government, the same shall be subject to the same penalties provided for the like offense by the laws "now in force of the State in which such place is situated, does not apply to an offense committed by One Indian against another on the Flathead Reservation, because Indians living in the tribal relation are not subject, in their internal social relations, either to the laws 51109-30 -44

Punishment.-Punishment in the Federal courts as an offense against the United States, but only in the way and to the extent that such offense would have been punishable if the territory embraced by the

Government reservation where the crime was cominitted had remained subject to the jurisdiction of the State, is what was intended by sec. 2, act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. 717), adopting such punishment for offenses committed in places under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States as the laws of the State in

which such places are situated now provide for a like offense, the punishment therefor not being otherwise provided for by any law of the United States. U. S. v. Press Pub. Co. (1911), 219 U. S. 1.

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An act of Congress adopting the punishment fixed by a State law held valid. lister v. U. S. (1906), 145 Fed. 773.

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858. Recovery of bodies.-That there is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sum as may be necessary to pay the expenses incident to the recovery of bodies of officers, cadets, United States Military Academy, acting assistant surgeons, members of the Army Nurse Corps, warrant officers, enlisted men, and civilian employees, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe. Act of Mar. 8, 1928 (45 Stat. 248).

859. Burial expense and transportation of remains. That there is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time such sums as may be necessary for expenses of interment, cremation (only upon request from relatives of the deceased), or of preparation and transportation to their homes or to such national cemeteries as may be designated by proper authority, in the discretion of the Secretary of War, of the remains of officers on the active list and retired officers who die while on active duty, cadets, United States Military Academy, acting assistant surgeons, members of the Army Nurse Corps, and enlisted men in active service and retired enlisted men who die while on active duty, and accepted applicants for enlistment; for interment or preparation and transportation to their homes of the remains of civilian employees of the Army in the employ of the War Department who die abroad, in Alaska, in the Canal Zone, or on Army transports, or who die while on duty in the field; for interment of military prisoners who die at military posts; for the interment and shipment to their homes of remains of enlisted men who are discharged in hospitals in the United States and continue as inmates of said hospitals to the date of their death; for interment of prisoners of war and interned alien enemies who die at prison camps in the United States; for recovery of bodies of the abovementioned military personnel; for removal of remains from abandoned posts to permanent military posts or national cemeteries, including the remains of Federal soldiers, sailors, or marines interred in fields, abandoned graves, or abandoned private and city cemeteries; and for expenses of the segregation of bodies in permanent American cemeteries in Great Britain and France: Provided, That in any case where the expenses of burial or shipment of the remains of officers or enlisted men of the Army who die on the active list, or retired officers or enlisted men who die while on active duty, or of any of the military or civil personnel mentioned above, are borne by individuals, where such ex

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