A technical objection to the form of senteuce, not raised in either the trial court or the appellate courts to which the case was taken, nor noticed by either appellate court as a "plain error," does not afford ground for discharge of defendant on habeas corpus. Ex parte Rice (D. C. 1925), 6 F. (2d) 167, affirmed (C. C. A. 1925), 7 F. (2d) 319. In habeas corpus proceeding to review order for removal, defendant will not be discharged because of defects in arrest or commitment, if on hearing Government shows sufficient grounds for detention. Charlie Wong v. Esola (C. C. A. 1925), 6 F. (2d) 828. On habeas corpus proceedings brought by resident Chinese, who are held for deportation, and who claim to be citizens of the United States, petitioners are not entitled to their discharge from custody, but are to be held for trial in the district court on the issue of citizenship. Ng Fung Ho v. White (1922), 259 U. S 276, affirming (C. C. A. 1920), 266 Fed, 765. On collateral review in habeas corpus proceeding by alien, who had been ordered deported, it is sufficient that there was some evidence from which conclusion of administrative tribunal could be deduced, and that it committed no error so flagrant as to convince court of essential unfairness of trial. U. S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration at Port of New York (1927), 273 U. S. 103. When it is found, in habeas corpus, that aliens, refused admission to the country and held for deportation, were denied a right of appeal to the Secretary of Labor, accorded by the immigration law and regulations, they should not therefore be discharged from custody and their bail be released, but the order should secure them the appeal and remand them to custody of the immigration authorities pending decision by the Secretary. Tod. v. Waldman (1924), 266 U. S. 113, 547, reversing (C. C. A. 1923) 289 Fed. 761, holding further, however, that an order in habeas corpus remanding immigrants to the custody of the immigration authorities for a further hearing should be followed by their discharge if the hearing be not granted seasonably. Discharge of prisoner on habeas corpus for invalid sentence should be without prejudice to Government's right to resentence, and notice should be given to prosecuting officer. Biddle v. Thiele (C. C. A. 1926), 11 F. (2d) 235. The common-law doctrine of res judicata does not extend to a decision on habeas corpus refusing to discharge a prisoner. But in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion" to dispose of the party as law and justice may require," a Federal court may base its refusal to discharge on a prior refusal; and, as a safeguard against abuse of the writ, the applicant in any case may be required to show whether he has made a prior application and, if so, what was done on it. Salinger v. Loisel (1924), 265 U. S. 224, reversing (C. C. A. 1923), 295 Fed. 498. Correction of sentence or other proceeding. Where a court has entered against a prisoner a sentence of imprisonment defective in form only, a Federal court, in a habeas corpus proceeding, which is required by this section to "dispose of the party as law and justice require," should not dis charge such prisoner without affording the court which imposed the sentence an opportunity to correct the same. U. S. v. Carpenter (1907), 151 Fed. 214; Bryant v. U. S. (1914), 214 Fed. 51. Where petitioner was subject to deportation and had been legally sentenced, he would not be discharged on habeas corpus because the warrant was defective until the Government had been afforded an oppor tunity to prepare a valid warrant. Ex parte Yabucanin (D. C. 1912), 199 Fed, 365. Admission to bail. On testimony given in court on the return of habeas corpus, bail will be allowed if it is clear that a convic tion of murder should not take place. U. S. v. Marshal of the District of Columbia (Cr. Ct. D. C. 1856), Fed. Cas. No. 15726a. Conclusiveness and effect of decision.— The discharge of a party under a writ of habeas corpus from the process under which he is imprisoned discharges him from any further confinement under the same, but not from arrest under other process which may issue against him in the same indictment. Ex parte Milburn (1835), 34 U. S. (9 Pet.) 704. One decision on habeas corpus is not final where a full trial was not had. Ex parte Robinson (C. C. 1855), Fed. Cas. No. 11935. A decision under one writ refusing the discharge of a prisoner is no bar to the issuing of other successive writs by any court or magistrate having jurisdiction. Ex parte Kaine (C. C. 1852), Fed. Cas. No. 7597. Where a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus appeals to the United States Supreme Court from a judgment of the circuit court denying his application, voluntarily omitting a material portion of his case, be can not, after failing on the appeal upon the record presented, renew his application before another court or justice of the United States, upon the same record, with the addition of the matter thus omitted, without first having obtained leave for that purpose from the Supreme Court. Ex parte Cuddy (C. C. 1889), 40 Fed. 62. 767. Witness fees.-That jurors and witnesses (other than witnesses who are salaried employees of the Government, and detained witnesses) in the United States courts, including the District Court of Hawaii, the District Court of Porto Rico, and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, who attend, including those attending before United States commissioners, shall be entitled to a per diem for each day of actual attendance and for each day necessarily occupied in traveling to attend court, or upon the commissioner, and return home, and, in addition, mileage as hereinafter provided. Sec. 1, act of Apr. 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 323); U. S. C. 28: 600a. Jurors attending in such courts, or before such United States commissioners, shall receive for each day's attendance and for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the same $4, and 5 cents per mile for going from his or her place of residence to the place of trial or hearing, and 5 cents per mile for returning. Sec. 2, act of Apr. 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 323) ; U. S. C. 28: 600b. Witnesses attending in such courts, or before such commissioners, shall receive for each day's attendance and for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the same $2, and 5 cents per mile for going from his or her place of residence to the place of trial or hearing and 5 cents per mile for returning: And provided further, That witnesses (other than witnesses who are salaried employees of the Government and detained witnesses) in the United States courts, including the District Court of Hawaii, the District Court of Porto Rico, and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, who attend court or attend before United States commissioners, at points so far removed from their respective residences as to prohibit return thereto from day to day, shall, when this fact is certified to in the order of the court or the commissioner for payment, be entitled, in addition to the compensation provided by existing law, as modified by this Act, to a per diem of $3 for expenses of subsistence for each day of actual attendance and for each day necessarily occupied in traveling to attend court and return home. Sec. 3, act of Apr. 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 324); U. S. C. 28: 600c. Jurors and witnesses in the United States courts, or before a United States commissioner, in the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming shall receive for each day's attendance and for mileage the same fees as jurors and witnesses as he rein provided. Sec. 4, act of Apr. 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 324); U. S. C. 28: 600d. All laws or parts of laws in so far as they are in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. This Act to be effective thirty days after its approval. Sec. 5, act of Apr. 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 324). Claims against the United States, 768. (Judicial Code, sec. 145. Claims of disbursing officers, 770. (Judi- Decree in case of loss by a disbursing of- Claims pending in other courts, 775. (Ju- Time limit for filing claims, 776. (Judicial Petitions and verification, 777. (Judicial Code, sec. 159.) Dismissal of petition on account of disloyalty, 778. (Judicial Code, sec. 160.) Burden of proof as to loyalty, 779. (Judicial Code, sec. 161.) Calling on departments for information. 780. (Judicial Code, sec. 164.) Petition must show ground for relief, 781. (Judicial Code, sec. 165.) Fraudulent claims, 782. sec. 173.) (Judicial Code, New trial on motion of United States, 783. Cost of printing record, 784. (Judicial No interest allowed before judgment, 785. Payment of judgment; effect, 786. (Judicial Code, sec. 178.) Final judgment to bar further demand, 787. (Judicial Code, sec. 179.) Ascertainment of amounts due United States from debtors, 788. (Judicial Code, sec. 180.) Review by Supreme Court, 789. Appearance by Attorney General for defense, 790. (Judicial Code, sec. 185.) Evidence furnished by departments, 791. 768. Jurisdiction; claims against the United States (Judicial Code, sec. 145, par. 1). The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters: First. All claims (except for pensions) founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress, upon any regulation of an executive department, upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to the said court jurisdiction to hear and determine claims growing out of the late Civil War, and commonly known as "war claims," or to hear and determine other claims which, prior to March third, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, had been rejected or reported on adversely by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same. Par. 1, sec. 145, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1136); U. S. C. 28: 250. When any claim or matter is pending in any of the executive departments which involves controverted questions of fact or law, the head of such department may transmit the same, with the vouchers, papers, documents, and proofs pertaining thereto, to the Court of Claims and the same shall be there proceeded in under such rules as the court may adopt. When the facts and conclusions of law shall have been found, the court shall report its findings to the department by which it was transmitted for its guidance and action: Provided, however, That if it shall have been transmitted with the consent of the claimant, or if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court upon the facts established, that under existing laws or the provisions of this chapter it has jurisdiction to render judgment or decree thereon, it shall proceed to do so, in the latter case giving to either party such further opportunity for hearing as in its judgment justice shall require, and shall report its findings therein to the department by which the same was referred to said court. The Secretary of the Treasury may, upon the certificate of any auditor, or of the Comptroller of the Treasury, direct any claim or matter, of which, by reason of the subject matter or character, the said court might under existing laws, take jurisdiction on the voluntary action of the claimant, to be transmitted, with all the vouchers, papers, documents, and proofs pertaining thereto, to the said court for trial and adjudication. Sec. 148, act of Mar. 3, 1911 (36 Stat. 1137); U. S. C. 28: 254. See ante, 753, and notes. The reference to "this chapter" in sec. 148, set forth above, is to the chapter in the Judicial Code entitled "Court of Claims." Notes of Decisions Consent as basis of suits against United States. The Government may be sued only after strict compliance with terms and conditions it prescribes, whether reasonable or unreasonable. Davis v. Griffith (Okla. 1924), 229 Pac. 499. Where a statute prescribes certain conditions precedent to the allowance of a claim, such conditions must be performed before relief can be granted by the Court of Claims. Singles v. U. S. (1926), 61 Ct. Cl. 433. Protest at payment of part of claim or appeal not condition precedent to claimant's right to resort to Court of Claims. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. U. S. (1925), 268 U. S. 169, affirming in part and reversing in part (1924), 59 Ct. Cl. 82. When a requisition for goods was made under statutes passed anterior to the Lever Act which gave exclusive jurisdiction to the circuit court the fact that the goods were delivered after the passage of the latter act did not deprive this court of jurisdiction. Atlantic Refining Co. v. U. S. (1924), 59 Ct. Cl. 108. Jurisdiction.-The court has jurisdiction to construe the tariffs published by railroad companies and to determine under what classification, if any, articles transported by railroads should properly be placed. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. U. S. (1921), 56 Ct. Cl. 341. And where the defendant withholds the balance due under a contract for the construction of certain buildings after completion and acceptance of the same on the ground that said contract was executed under a mutual mistake as to the size of the buildings to be constructed, and the evidence shows that both parties to the contract understood its meaning when it was executed, the court will not reform the contract and will render judgment for the balance of the contract price so withheld. Warren, Moore & Co. v. U. S. (1921), 57 Ct. Cl. 419. The Court of Claims has no such equity jurisdiction as would allow it to adjudicate rights between stockholders in a suit seeking to defeat a conveyance to the United States because of fraudulent practices by majority stockholders or corporate officers to the injury of the minority. Leather v. U. S. (1925), 61, Ct. Cl. 388, certiorari denied (1926), 271 U. S. 660. Where plaintiff executes a settlement contract without duress and receives the amount which the Government agrees therein to pay, it is bound by the terms of said settlement contract and can not enforce its rights under the cancelled contract. Hartsville Oil Mill v. U. S. (1925), 60 Ct. Cl. 712, affirmed (1926), 271 U. S. 43. The fact that the person entitled to compensation under act of Oct. 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 345), to increase facilities for testing ordnance materials, appropriating money to pay for buildings, land, etc., "and damages and losses to persons resulting from the procurement of the land," and providing that if land and improvements could not be procured by purchase the President was authorized to take them over with all appurtenant rights, and the United States should make just compensation therefor, to be determined by the President, and that if the amount so determined were unsatisfactory |