not obeying a requisition from the Secretary of War to enter the service. Meade v. Deputy Marshal (C. C. 1815), Fed. Cas. No. 9372.

By the Constitution of the United States, the power to determine who shall compose the militia is vested in Congress; and after it has been exercised by Congress a State legislature can not constitutionally provide for the enrollment of any other persons in the militia. Opinion of Justices (1859), 80 Mass. (14 Gray), 614. See also Tyler v. Pomeroy (1864), 8 Allen (Mass.), 480.

The only instance where governmental powers may be exercised by the United States is when the militia shall be employed in the service of the United States. At all other times the whole government of the militia is within the province of the State, and therefore any legislation which the State may adopt relating to the government of the militia in nowise contracts powers conferred upon Congress, as long as it does not infringe upon the method of organization. People v. Hill (1891), 59 Hun, 624, 13 N. Y. Supp. 637; judgment affirmed (1891), 126 N. Y. 497, 27 N. E. 789.

talions, and companies, as the legislature of the State may direct," a State legislature had power to provide for the disbanding of Organized Militia companies. People v. Hill (1891), 126 N. Y. 497, 27 N. E. 789.

Power of governing the militia, given by this clause, is of a limited nature, and confined to the objects specified, and in all other respects and for all other purposes the militia are subject to the control and government of their respective States. Ansley v. Timmons (S. C. 1825), 3 McCord, 329.

The duties of the National Guard being defined by the State military act, by which the governor is alone authorized to prescribe regulations, in the absence of proof that the governor had adopted and promulgated the United States Army Regulations as governing the State militia, such regulations are not applicable to the militia. Manley v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1911), 137 S. W. 1137.

The power of commanding the service of the militia in times of insurrection and invasion is a natural incident to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the country, and was wisely vested in Congress by the framers of the Constitution. In re Griner (1863), 16 Wis. 431.

I. District of Columbia.

II. Places acquired or held by Government.

I. District of Columbia

United

When jurisdiction of Federal Government vested. The jurisdiction of the States over the District of Columbia vested on the first Monday in Dec., 1800, the day on which, by law, the District became the seat of Government. U. S. v. Hammond (C. C. 1801), Fed. Cas. No. 15,293.

States and governmental powers of District. The act of Congress to provide a government for the District of Columbia confers such powers only as are granted in the statute creating that government, and such powers as are necessary to carry into practical effect those which are expressly granted. Barnes v. District of Columbia (D. C. 1874), 1 MacArthur, 322.

The District of Columbia has no legislative power, it being merely a municipal

corporation bearing the same relation to Congress that a city does to the legislature of the State in which it is incorporated. U. S. v. Macfarland (1907), 28 App. D. C. 552.

The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, although its organization is peculiar, there being no general organic law covering all of the ordinary powers usually conferred in the creation of a municipal corporation; no formal charter. District of Columbia v. Tyrrell (1914), 41 App. D. C. 463.

It was the purpose of the framers of the Constitution that the 10 miles square, which by the cession of States and the acceptance of Congress might become "the seat of the Government," should be as permanent as the States from which it should be taken; and territory acquired from States for the seat of the Government continues to be national. The District of Columbia is a part of the United States for all pur

poses, domestic and international.

James . U. S. (1903), 38 Ct. Cl. 615, reversed (1906), 202 U. S. 401.

Certain corporate powers are exercised by the District government, yet the District of Columbia as the seat of the government is controlled by Congress exclusively. The United States Government is the sovereign and the District government one of the agencies of the sovereign power. Mackey v. E. S. (1911), 47 Ct. Cl. 121.

Congress not only has plenary power as the local legislature of the District of Coiambia but has as much authority to vest carts of the District of Columbia with a variety of jurisdiction and powers as State legislature has in conferring jurisdicdon on its court. Hill v. Dorsey (App. D. C. 1927), 22 F. (2d) 1003.

a

In a proceeding brought by a public utility against the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, in the Supreme Court of the District, under the act of March 4, 1913 (37 Stat. 974), the court is mpowered, not merely to decide legal questions of fact as incident thereto, but also to amend, and if need be, enlarge valuations, rates, and regulations established by the commission, which the court finds upon the record and evidence to be inadequate, and to make such order as in its judgment the commission should have made. This is legislative, as distinguished from judicial, power. And under the power 66 to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsover" over the District of Columbia, Congress may vest this jurisdiction in the courts of the District. But such power can not be conferred upon the Supreme Court of the United States, and the provision made by the above act (par. 64) for appeals to that court from the Court of Appeals of the District, is, therefore, void. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co. (1923), 261 C. S. 428, dismissing appeal to review 1921), 276 Fed. 327, 51 App. D. C. 77.

Constitutional guaranties.-The constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, and property apply to the District of Columbia, as elsewhere, and this section is not to be construed as excepting the District from the operation of the same. Willson v. McDonsell (App. D. C. 1919), 265 Fed. 432; Cailan r. Wilson (1888), 127 U. S. 540.

Public improvements.-Congress has power to direct that the whole or any part of the Cost of a public improvement in the District of Columbia shall be assessed against the lands benefited. Willard v. Presbury (1871), 81 U. S. (14 Wall.) 676.

The United States possesses not only political, but municipal, authority over the District, and has authority to condemn lands in the District for a public park, an authority not limited by any provision in 51109-302

the Maryland act of cession (act Md. 1791, c. 45). Shoemaker v. U. S. (1893), 147 U. S. 282.

In the District Code, sec. 483 (31 Stat. 1265), providing for the condemnation of land in this district for a right of way for sewers, or for any other municipal use authorized by Congress, the words "authorized by Congress" limit only the words preceding them in the same phrase, "or for any other municipal purpose," and have no reference to the preceding phrases; so that the commissioners have the right to institute and prosecute proceedings to condemn land for sewer purposes without express direction of Congress to do so. Macfarland v. Elverson (1908), 32 App. D. C. 81.

II. Places Acquired or Held by Government

Construction and effect of clause in general. This constitutional provision is not applicable where a State cedes its jurisdiction over a military reservation within its borders. Benson . U. S. (1892), 146 U. S. 325.

When the title is acquired by purchase, with the consent of the legislatures of the States, the Federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all State authority. This follows from the declaration of the Constitution that Congress shall have "like authority" over such places as it has over the district which is the seat of government; that is, the power of "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever." Broader or clearer language could not be used to exclude all other authority than that of Congress. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe (Kan. 1885), 114 U. S. 525, 532. See also Steele v. Halligan (D. C. 1916), 229 Fed. 1011; U. S. v. Holt (C. C. 1909), 168 Fed. 141, affirmed (1910), 218 U. S. 245; Pundt v. Pendleton (D. C. 1909), 167 Fed. 997; World's Columbian Exposition v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1893), 56 Fed. 654, 670; Williams v. Arlington Hotel Co. (C. C. A. 1927), 22 F. (2d) 669, reversing (D. C. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 412.

This clause applies only to land acquired by actual purchase accompanied by a cession of jurisdiction by the State; and where land is acquired directly from the State as owner by an act of cession, as in the case of Fortress Monroe, the constitutional provision does not apply, and the United States holds the land only as prescribed in the act of cession. Crook Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co. (C. C. 1893), 54 Fed. 604.

There must be an actual purchase for the purposes specified by the United States, and consent by the legislative authority of the State, as conditions precedent to the operation of the power of exclusive legisla

tion, and thereupon all jurisdiction is ceded and passes to the General Government. In re Kelly (C. C. 1895), 71 Fed. 545, 549.

This clause contemplates the purchase of land "needful," for any reason, to the discharge of any of the constitutional duties, or the exercise of any of the constitutional powers, of the United States. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 289.

Under this clause Congress has power to construct an aqueduct drawing its supply of water for the city of Washington from within the limits of Maryland, and using and occupying the land for that purpose in Maryland, by permission and consent of the State. Reddall v. Bryan (1859), 14 Md. 444, 74 Am. Dec. 550.

This clause does not apply to lands acquired otherwise than by purchase. Barrett r. Palmer (1891) 16 N. Y. Supp. 94.

When land is purchased by the United States Government for purposes not among those named in this section, jurisdiction of the United States is not exclusive unless expressly so declared. People v. Mouse (Cal. App. 1927), 259 Pac. 762.

Needful buildings.-This clause extends to land bought for post offices or courts. Battle v. U. S. (1908) 209 U. S. 36.

Lands acquired by the United States for needful public buildings with the consent of the State legislature are "places" within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. U. S. v. Pierce County (D. C. 1912), 193 Fed. 529.

The reservoirs, aqueducts, and other constructions appurtenant to the water supply of the city of Washington, D. C., are to be considered "needful buildings," within this clause, and since a roadway is an appropriate and necessary appurtenance to such works, the Conduit Road constitutes territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 289. Consent of State and effect thereof in general. As to sufficiency of consent to warrant expenditure of appropriation for improvements, see 944, post, and notes thereunder.

Jurisdiction which a State has once exercised can not be withdrawn from it, and conferred on the General Government, without the consent of the State. U. S. v. Stahl (C. C. 1868), Fed. Cas. No. 16,373.

This clause provides the only constitutional method by which the United States may acquire lands within a State with exclusive jurisdiction thereover, but it does not affect the power of the Government to acquire the mere use of such lands without exclusive jurisdiction. Consent of the State is not required when exclusive jurisdiction is not sought. Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. (C. C. 1887) 32 Fed. 9, 18. The act of the legislature of Maryland empowering the United States to acquire land in said State, for the use of the Wash

ington Aqueduct, is not in conflict with the Constitution either of that State or of the United States. (1855) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 114.

Jurisdiction is acquired by the United States by the consent of a State to the purchase of land within the same for constitutional uses of the Union. (1856) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 628.

Under this provision of the Constitution, there is no power in Congress to acquire or assert exclusive jurisdiction over any part of the territory of ny State without the consent of the legislature of the State; and, to acquire exclusive jurisdiction over a national cemetery, the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same is situated must first be obtained. (1869) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 131.

The assent of the State legislature is necessary to the establishment of forts and permanent garrisons by the United States within the boundaries of a State. Jackson v. Wilcox (III. 1837), 1 Scam, 344.

The consent of the State is not a condition precedent to the taking of lands by the General Government. Its consent is required only for the purpose of a transfer of jurisdiction. People t'. Humphrey (1871), 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94.

The purchase of land within a State by the United States for public purposes does not of itself oust the jurisdiction or the sovereignty of such State when it is so purchased; but it is only when land has been purchased by the National Government, by the consent of the legislature, that the former obtains exclusive control over such land.

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson (Pa. 1848), 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 384.

The legislative powe, over a place purchased by the United States with the consent of the legislature of the State is transferred from the State to the Federal Government, except as restrained by some qualification in the expression of State consent. Allegheny County v. McClung (1867), 53 Pa. (3 P. F. Smith), 482.

Grant or conveyance to Government.-A conveyance of lands to the United States is void and inoperative unless the purchase is authorized by Congress. United States v. Tichenor (C. C. 1882), 12 Fed. 415.

When the grant has been accepted by the General Governinent and the conditions of the purchase have been fully performed, such grant becomes a solemn compact, which the General Government will not permit the State to violate. Bannon v. Burnes (C. C. 1889), 39 Fed. 892, 897. A contention that a national soldiers' home was a corporation and a conveyance of the land to it was not a conveyance to State the United States was without force. v. Willett (Tenn. 1906), 97 S. W. 299. The conveyance by the State of Virginia to the United States of the land at Old

Purchase of lands intended for forts, arsenals, etc.-Under the provision for exclusire legislation over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State for the erection of forts, etc., and other needful buildings, when a purchase of land for any of these purposes is made by the National Government, where the State legislature has given its consent to the purchase, the land so purchased, ipso facto, falls within the exclusive legislation of Congress and the State jurisdiction is completely ousted. U. S. v. Cornell (C. C. 1819), Fed. Cas. No. 14867.

Exclusive jurisdiction of Congress in general-Where the purchase of land is made by consent of the State legislature, such land, under the constitutional provision, falls within the exclusive legislation of Congress. U. S. v. Cornell (C. C. 1819), Fed. Cas. No. 14867.

This clause vests in the National Government exclusive jurisdiction over places occupied for military purposes when the site has been acquired with the consent of the legislature of the State in which it is situated. U. S. e. Holt (C. C. 1909), 168 Fed. 141, judgment affirmed Holt v. U. S. (1910), 218 C. S. 245.

The United States has exclusive jurisdiction, under this section, of the punishment of crimes committed on land purchased by it for use as an Indian school with the consent of a State, evidenced by a joint resolution of its legislature, although there has been no cession of the land to the United States by the State and no congressional acceptance of the same. U. S. v. Wurtzbarger (D. C. 1921), 276 Fed. 753.

The land on which Fort Oglethorpe is located in Georgia being a part of that acquired by the United States for a national military park with the consent of the State legislature, which ceded jurisdiction of the lands and roads therein, said fort being used as a military post, is within the provision of this clause, giving exclusive jurisdiction over forts, etc., to Congress, and neither the State nor other local authorities have power to interfere with any instrumentalities necessary to the proper Use of such location as a military post. Pundt v. Pendleton (D. C. 1909), 167 Fed. 997.

The purchase by the United States of the land occupied by Fort Trumbull, Conn., and the consent of the State legislature to the purchase, though a formal cession of juris

diction is wanting, give to Congress the exclusive power of legislation over the purchased land. (1871) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 411.

The transfer of jurisdiction may take place in two ways: Indirectly, by the State consenting to the purchase of the land by the United States, and directly, by the State granting the jurisdiction to the United States. (1871) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 461.

Where the United States has acquired title to lands by purchase by consent of the legislature of a State, and there was no reservation on the part of the State of concurrent jurisdiction over the lands so disposed of, the Federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all State authority. (1900) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 254.

Congress has the right of exclusive jurisdiction over the entire length of the Conduit Road appurtenant to the water supply of the city of Washington, provided the roadbed is owned in fee by the United States and has been acquired in accordance with the consent of the Legislature of the State of Maryland contained in the act of May 3, 1853 (Laws Md. 1853, ch. 179). (1907) 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 289.

The Conduit Road is not a public highway, but is subject to the control of the Chief of Engineers, and its use by the public may be subjected to such regulations as may be appropriate, obedience to which may be secured by the use of such reasonably sufficient force as the Secretary of War may deem advisable. Id.

Cession or abandonment of jurisdiction by State. At the time of the cession by the State of Kansas to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation, then owned by the United States, there was a railroad running through the territory included in the cession. Held, that a law of the State, making a railroad company whose road was not included by a lawful fence liable to the owner of cattle killed or wounded by its engines or cars for the full value of the animals killed and the full damage to those wounded, whether the killing or wounding was caused by negligence or not, continued in force in the reservation after the cession. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn (1885), 114 U. S. 542.

Laws Kans. 1875, p. 95, ceding to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation, with certain exceptions as to service of process and taxation by State authorities, constituted a valid cession of jurisdiction, and, though made without any request by the General Government, yet, as it conferred a benefit, its acceptance is to be presumed. Benson v. U. S. (1892), 146 U. S. 325.

Lands over which jurisdiction has been ceded, or which are not within the limits

of any State used for constitutional purposes, are subject only to the laws of Congress, in the case of conflict. U. S. v. Ames (C. C. 1845), Fed. Cas. No. 14441.

The acceptance by Congress of the cession by a State of exclusive jurisdiction over territory in a military reservation which existed before the State was created is not necessary to vest such jurisdiction in the United States under this clause. Ex parte Hebard (C. C. 1877), Fed. Cas. No. 6312.

Cession by a State is only necessary to extinguish its jurisdiction in whole or in part and is not necessary to the use of land by the United States for public purposes, subject, like all lands within the limits of the Union, to the concurrent jurisdiction of both Governments; that of the Federal being supreme. Stockton v. Balti

more & N. Y. R. Co. (C. C. 1887), 32 Fed. 9, 19.

Inasmuch as this clause authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the places referred to therein, statutes abandoning State jurisdiction therein are held to have accomplished their evident intent. State jurisdiction is thereafter at an end.

Beekman v. Hudson River West Shore R. Co. (C. C. 1888), 35 Fed. 3, 8.

That a State, being sovereign, may waive or transfer its right to exercise judicial authority over portions of its territory, can not be doubted. A State may sell or cede its own territory, with all its powers over it, to another power, as in the case of the cession of the District of Columbia to the United States, or in the sale to Congress of places to be used as forts, dockyards, hospitals, etc. Commonwealth v. Frazee (Pa. 1856), 5 Am. Law Reg. 167, 169, 2 Phila. 191.

A State legislature has no power to abdicate the jurisdiction of the State over places within its limits, except where the title to them has been acquired by the United States. In re O'Connor (1875), 37 Wis. 379, 19 Am. Rep. 765.

Relinquishment or retrocession of jurisdiction. Acts 1897-98, p. 668, retroceding to Indiana and Illinois the jurisdiction of the United States over territory purchased by the consent of said States for the location of branches of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, does not violate this clause. State v. Board of Com'rs of Grant County (Ind. 1899), 54 N. E. 809.

Where the United States has acquired the jurisdiction over lands within the territory of a State, for any of the purposes allowed by the Constitution, Congress has power to relinquish or recede to the State the jurisdiction, without abandoning the property; and acceptance of such recession by the State is not necessary. Renner v. Bennett (1871), 21 Ohio St. 431.

Act Jan. 21, 1871, relinquishing to a State "exclusive jurisdiction" over a place purchased for an asylum for disabled soldiers is not so in conflict with a proviso reserving the "powers and rights" theretofore conferred on the board of managers incorporated by Congress that they may not stand together and both be operative. Id.

Places held or acquired without consent or cession of jurisdiction.-The purchase of lands by the United States for public purposes within the territorial limits of a State does not of itself oust the jurisdiction of sovereignty of the State over such lands. U. S. v. Cornell (C. C. 1819), Fed. Cas. No. 14867.

The rights and remedies of the United States in respect to land owned by it within the limits of the State and over which it has no cession of jurisdiction are governed by the lex rei sitæ, unless treaties or statutes of the United States otherwise provide. U. S. v. Ames (C. C. 1845), Fed. Cas. No. 14441.

The United States has not sole and exclusive jurisdiction over land rented for a military camp, but only such jurisdiction as is necessary for military purposes. U. S. v. Tierney (C. C. 1864), Fed. Cas. No. 16517.

On the admission of Kansas into the Union, jurisdiction within forts of the United States within the State was not excepted, and the consent of the State was necessary to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction therein. U. S. v. Stahl (C. C. 1868), Fed. Cas. No. 16373.

The site of the navy yard at Pensacola having been reserved out of the public domain of the United States for naval purposes while Florida was a Territory, and jurisdiction over such site not having been ceded by the Legislature of Florida after its admission as a State, advised that, in this case, application be made to the State for a cession of its jurisdiction thereover to the United States, as without such cession the latter can not claim exclusive jurisdiction over the premises. (1855) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 571.

There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the United States purchasing land within a State without the consent of the State legislature; but when land is so purchased in a State without such consent the United States can not exercise "exclusive legislation" over the place. (1861) 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 35.

The United States has over lands within a State held for national cemeteries or other public purposes, which were acquired by the former without the consent of the State, or over which the latter has not ceded its jurisdiction, only such jurisdiction as it has over other parts of the State wherein they possess no proprietary interests, (1875), 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 558.