dy should produce any thought in the mind. That it is fo, if experience did not convince us, the confideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have a conftant and regular connection, in the ordinary course of things, yet that connection being not discoverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no neceffary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connection to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that all-wife Agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive. $29. Inftances. IN fome of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and connections, fo vifibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them feparable from them by any power whatsoever; and in thefe only we are capable of certain and univerfal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle neceffarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation, this connection of these two ideas, to be poffibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwife. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of fenfation in us of colours and founds, &c. by impulfe and motion; nay, the original rules and communication of motion being fuch, wherein we can discover no natural connection with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wife Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the refurrection of the dead, the future ftate of this globe of earth, and fuch other things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free Agent. The things that, as far as our obfervation reaches, we conftantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law fet them, but yet by a law that we know not; whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects conftantly flow from them, yet their connections and dependences being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how little it is of being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we fhall do no injury to our knowledge, when we modeftly think with ourselves, that we are fo far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philofophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a part of us; concerning their fecondary qua. lities, powers, and operations, we can have no univerfal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our fenfes, of which we have fo far fenfitive knowledge; but the causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy, to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect science of natural bodies, (not to mention fpiritual beings) we are, I think, fo far from being capable of any fuch thing, that I conclude it loft labour to feek after it. $30. Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas. THIRDLY, Where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable connection between them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing thofe ideas which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out thofe intermediate ideas, which may show us what habitude of agreement or difagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their rela tions, and agreements or disagreements one with another, has been, I fuppofe, the ill use of words. It is impoffible that men should ever truly feek or certainly discover the agreement or difagreement of ideas themselves, whilft their thoughts flutter about, or ftick only in founds of doubtful and uncertain fignifications. Mathematicians abftracting their thoughts from names, and accuftoming themselves to fet before their minds the ideas themselves that they would confider, and not founds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confufion, which has fo much hindered mens progress in other parts of knowledge; for whilst they ftick in words of undetermined and uncertain-fignification, they are unable to diftinguish true from false, certain from probable, confiftent from inconfiftent, in their own opinions. This having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of the men of letters, the increase brought into the ftock of real knowledge has been very little, in proportion to the fchools, difputes and writings the world has been filled with; whilst ftudents, being loft in the great wood of words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own or the general stock of knowledge. Had men, in the dif coveries of the material, done as they have in those of the intellectual world, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation and voyages, theories and ftories of zones and tides, multiplied and difputed; nay, fhips built, and fleets fet out, would never have taught us the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared herefy to hold there were any. But having fpoken fufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is commonly made of them, I fhall not say any thing more of it here. $31. Extent in refpect of Univerfality. HITHERTO we have examined the extent of our knowledge, in refpect of the feveral forts of beings that are. There is another extent of it, in respect of univerfality, which will also deserve to be confidered; and in this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the ideas are abftract, whofe agreement or disagreement we perceive, our knowledge is univerfal; for what is known of fuch general ideas, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that effence, i. e. that abstract idea is to be found; and what is once known of fuch ideas will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general knowledge, we must fearch and find it only in our own minds, and it is only the examining of our own ideas that furnisheth us Truths belonging to effences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those effences, as the existence of things is to be known only from experience. But having more to fay of this in the chapters where I shall speak of general and real knowledge, this may here fuffice as to the univerfality of our knowledge in general. with that. I CHAP. IV. OF THE REALITY OF KNOWLEDGF. 1. Obj. Knowledge placed in Ideas may be all bare Vifion. DOUBT not but my reader by this time may be apt to think, that I have been all this while only building a caftle in the air; and be ready to fay to me, To what purpose all this flir? Knowledge, fay you, is only the perception of the agreement or difagreement of our own ideas: but who knows what those ideas may be? Is there any thing fo extravagant, as the imaginations of mens brains? where is the head that has no chimeras in it? Or, if there be a fober and a wife man, what difference will there be, by your rules, between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and perceive their agreement and difagreement one Book IV. with another. If there be any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed man's fide, as having the more ideas, and the more lively; and fo, by your rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of our own ideas, the vifions of an enthusiast, and the reasonings of a fober man, will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are; so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably, it is all truth, all eertainty. Such castles in the air, will be as ftrong-holds of truth, as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an harpy is not a centaur, is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth, as that a fquare is not a circle. But of what ufe is all this fine knowledge of mens own imaginations, to a man that inquires after the reality of things? It matters not what mens fancies are, it is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized; it is this alone gives a value to our reafonings, and preference to one man's knowledge over another's, that it is of things as they really are, and not of dreams and fancies. § 2. Anfw. Not fo, where Ideas agree with Thoughts. To which I anfwer, That if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is fomething farther intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little more ufe than the reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built thereon of no more weight, than the discourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream, and with great affurance utters them. But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own ideas, goes a little farther than barė imagination; and I believe it will appear, that all the certainty of general truths a man has, lies in nothing elfe. 3. Anfw. Not fo, where Ideas agree with Things. Ir is evident, the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of |