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think, I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and fenfible world, are in this perfectly alike; that that part, which we see of either of them, holds no proportion with what we fee not; and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts, of either of them, is but a point, almoft nothing in comparison of the reft.

24. Because of their Remoteness. SECONDLY, Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are capable of. As the want of ideas, which our faculties are not able to give us, fhuts us wholly from thofe views of things, which it is reasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we, have, of which we know nothing; fo the want of ideas I now fpeak of, keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and motion, we have ideas of: But though we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure, and motion, of the greatest part of the bodies of the univerfe, we are ignorant of the feveral powers, efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the effects which we daily fee are produced. Thefe are hid from us in fome things, by being too remote; and in others, by being too minute. When we confider the vaft diftance of the known and vifible parts of the world, and the reafons we have to think, that what lies within our ken, is but a small part of the immense univerfe, we fhall then discover an huge abyfs of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of the great mafles of matter, which make up the whole ftupen dous frame of corporeal beings, how far they are extended, what is their motion, and how continued or communicated, and what influence they have one upon another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themfelves in. If we narrow our contemplation, and confine our thoughts to this little canton, I mean this fyftem of our fun, and the groffer maffes of matter that vifibly move about it; what feveral forts of vegetables, animals, and intellectual

corporeal beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth, may there probably be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward figures and parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this earth; there being no natural means, either by fenfation or reflection, to convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge; and what forts of furniture and inhabitants thofe manfions contain in them, we cannot fo much as guess, much lefs have clear and diftinct ideas of them.

$25. Because of their Minuteness.

Ir a great, nay, far the greatest part of the feveral ranks of bodies in the universe escape our notice by their remotenefs, there are others that are no lefs concealed from us by their minuteness. These infenfible corpufcles being the active parts of matter, and the great inftruments of nature, on which depend not only all their fecondary qualities, but alfo most of their natural operations; our want of precife diftinct ideas of their primary qualities, keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we defire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure, fize, texture, and motion of the minute conftituent parts of any two bodies, we fhould know without trial feveral of their operations one upon another, as we do now the properties of a fquare or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and a man, as a watchmaker does those of a watch, whereby it performs its operations, and of a file, which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels; we should be able to tell beforehand, that rhubarb will purge, bemlock kill, and opium make a man fleep, as well as a watchmaker can, that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going, till it be removed; or that fome fmall part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lofe its motion, and the watch go no more. The diffolving of filver in aqua fortis, and gold in aqua regia, and not vice

verfa, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a smith to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilft we are deftitute of fenfes acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; nor can we be affured about them any farther than fome few trials we make are able to reach: But whether they will fucceed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of univerfal truths concerning natural bodies: and our reafon carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.

$26. Hence no Science of Bodies.

AND therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far foever human industry may advance useful and experimental philofophy in phyfical things, fcientifical will still be out of our reach; because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those which we have ranked into claffes under names, and we think ourselves beft acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of. Diftin&t ideas of the feveral forts of bodies that fall under the examination of our fenfes, perhaps we may have; but adequate ideas, I fufpect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of thefe will ferve us for common use and discourse, yet whilft we want the latter, we are not capable of Scientifical knowledge, nor shall ever be able to discover general, inftructive, unqueftionable truths concerning them. Certainty and demonftration are things we must not in these matters pretend to. By the colour, figure, tafte, and fmell, and other fenfible qualities, we have as clear and diftinct ideas of fage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a triangle; but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will pro

duce; nor when we fee thofe effects, can we so much as guefs, much lefs know their manner of production. Thus having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their conftitutions, powers, and operations; and of bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing fo much as their very outward fhapes, or the fenfible and groffer parts of their conftitutions.

27. Much lefs of Spirits.

THIS, at first fight, will fhow us how difproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings; to which if we add the confideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognifance, nor can frame to our felves any diftinct ideas of their feveral ranks and forts, we fhall find this caufe of ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obfcurity, almost the whole intellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than the material. For bating fome very few, and thofe, if I may fo call them, fuperficial ideas of fpirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all fpirits, the eternal independent Author of them and us and all things; we have no cer tain information, fo much as of the existence of other fpirits, but by revelation. Angels of all forts are naturally beyond our discovery: And all thofe intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal fubftances, are things whereof our na tural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself, every man has a reafon, from their words and actions, to be fatisfied; and the knowledge of his own mind cannot fuffer a man that confiders, to be ignorant that there is a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there that by his own fearch and ability can come to know? Much lefs have we dif

tinct ideas of their different natures, conditions, ftates, powers, and feveral conftitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one another, and from us; and therefore in what concerns their different fpecies and properties, we are under an abfolute ignorance.

§ 28. Secondly, Want of a difcoverable Connection between Ideas we have.

SECONDLY, What a fmall part of the fubftantial beings that are in the universe, the want of ideas leave open to our knowledge, we have feen. In the next place, another caufe of ignorance, of no lefs moment, is a want of a difcoverable connection between those ideas we have; for wherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of univerfal and certain knowledge; and are, as in the former cafe, left only to obfervation and experiment; which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge, we need not be told. I fhall give fome few inftances of this cause of our ignorance, and fo leave it. It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of feveral bodies about us, produce in us feveral fenfations, as of colours, founds, tates, fmells, pleasure and pain, &c. Thefe mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with thofe ideas they produce in us (there being no conceivable connection between any impulfe of any fort of body, and any perception of a colour, or smell, which we find in our minds), we can have no diftinct knowledge of fuch operations beyond our experience, and can reafon no otherwife about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wife Agent, which perfectly furpafs our comprehenfions. As the ideas of fenfible fecondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily caufes, nor any correfpondence or connection be found between them and those primary qualities which (experience shows us) produce them in us; fo, on the other fide, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as unconceivable. How any thought fhould produce a motion in body, is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any bo.

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