: cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? 1 fay not this, that I would any way leffen the belief of the foul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the modefty of philo. fophy not to pronounce magifterially, where we want that evidence that can produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to difcern how far our know ledge does reach: for the state we are at prefent in, not being that of vifion, we muft, in many things, content ourselves with faith and probability; and in the prefent question, about the immateriality of the foul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough fecured, without philofophical proofs of the foul's immateriality fince it is evident, that be who made us at first begin to fubfift here, fenfible intelligent beings, and for feveral years continued us in fuch a state, can and will restore us to the like ftate of fenfibility in an other world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has defigned to men, according to their doings in this life; and therefore it is not of fuch mighty neceffity to determine one way or the other, as fome over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the foul, have been forward to make the world believe, who, either on the one fide, indulging too much their thoughts immerfed altogether in matter, can allow no existence to what is not material; or who, on the other fide, finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to a fubftance which has the modification of folidity. He that confiders how hardly fenfation is, in our thoughts, reconcileable to extended matter, or existence to any thing that hath no extenfion at all, will confefs, that he is very far from certainly knowing what his foul is. It is a point which feems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge: And he who will give himself leave to confider freely, and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothefis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the foul's materiality; fince on which fide foever he views it, either as an unextended fubftance, or as a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to conceive either, will, whilft either alone is in his thoughts, ftill drive him to the contrary fide; an unfair way which some men take with themselves, who, because of the unconceivableness of fomething they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothefis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiaffed understanding. This ferves not only to fhow the weakness and fcantinefs of our knowledge, but the infignificant triumph of such sort of arguments, which, drawn from our own views, may fatisfy us that we can find no certainty on one fide of the question, but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite opinion, which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what fafety, what advantage to any one is it, for the avoiding the, feeming abfurdities, and to him unfurmountable rubs, he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on fomething altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from his comprehenfion? It is paft controversy, that we have in us something that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is; and it is as vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cafes to be positive against the being of any thing, because we cannot comprehend its nature; for I would fain know what substance exists, that has not fomething in it which manifeftly baffles our understandings. Other fpirits, who fee and know the nature and inward conftitution of things, how much muft they exceed us in knowledge? To which if we add larger comprehenfion, which enables them at one glance to fee the connec tion and agreement of very many ideas, and readily fupplies to them the intermediate proofs, which we by fingle and flow steps, and long poring in the dark, hardly at laft find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another; we may guefs at fome part of the happiness of fuperior ranks of fpirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating fight, as well as a larger field of knowledge. But to return to the argument in hand; our knowledge, I fay, is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes fhort of that too. But how far it reaches, let us now inquire. $7. How far our Knowledge reaches. THE affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to thefe four forts, viz. identity, co-existence, relation, and real exiftence. I fhall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of thefe. § 8. 1. Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity as far as our Ideas. FIRST, As to identity and diverfity, in this way of the agreement or difagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves : and there can be no idea in the mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other. $9. 2. Of Co-existence a very little way. SECONDLY, As to the fecond fort, which is the agree ment or disagreement of our ideas in co-existence; in this, our knowledge is very fhort, though in this confifts the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning fubftances. For our ideas of the fpecies of fubftances being, as I have fhowed, nothing but certain collections of fimple ideas united in one fubject, and fo co-exifting together; v. g. our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fufible: Thefe, or fome fuch complex I ileas as these in mens minds, do these two names of the different fubitances, flame, and gold, ftand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning these, or any other sort of substances, what do we inquire, but what other qualities or powers these subftances have or have not? which is nothing else but to know what other fimple ideas do or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex idea. § 10. Because the Connection between moft fimple Ideas is unknown. THIS, how weighty and confiderable a part foever of human science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reafon whereof is, that the fimple ideas, whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up, are, for the most part, fuch as carry with them, in their own nature, no vifible neceffary connection or inconfiftency with any other fimple ideas, whofe coexistence with them we would inform ourselves about. 11. Efpecially of fecondary Qualities. THE ideas that our complex ones of fubftances are made up of, and about which our knowledge coneerning fubftances is moft employed, are thofe of their fecondary qualities; which depending all (as has been fhown) upon the primary qualities of their minute and infenfible parts, or if not upon them, upon fomething yet more remote from our comprehenfion, it is impoffible we should know which have a neceffary union or inconfiftency one with another: For not knowing the root they fpring from, not knowing what fize, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which depend, and from which refult thofe qualities which make our complex idea of gold, it is impoffible we fhould know what other qualities refult from, or are incompatible with the fame conftitution of the infenfible parts of gold; and fo confequently must always co-exist with that complex idea we have of it, or else are inconfiftent with it. § 12. Because all Connection between any fecondary and primary Qualities is undifcoverable. BESIDES this ignorance of the primary qualities of the infenfible parts of bodies, on which depend all their fecondary qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance, which fets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co-existence or in-coexiftence (if I may fo fay) of different ideas in the fame fubject; and that is, that there is no discoverable connection between any fecondary quality, and thofe primary qualities which it depends on. § 13. THAT the fize, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change in the fize, figure, and motion of another body, is not beyond our conception: The feparation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another; and the change from reft to motion upon impulfe; these, and the like, feem to us to have fome connection one with another. And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reafon to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of thefe operations of them one upon another: But our minds not being able to discover any connection betwixt these primary qualities of bodies, and the fenfations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the confequences or co-existence of any fecondary qualities, though we could discover the fize, figure, or motion of thofe invifible parts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what figure, fize, or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a sweet tafte, or a fharp found, that we can by no means conceive how any fixe, figure, or motion of any particles, can poffibly produce in us the idea of any colour, tafte or found whatsoever; there is no conceivable connection betwixt the one and the other. $14. In vain therefore, fhall we endeavour to discover by our ideas (the only true way of certain and univerfal knowledge) what other ideas are to be found conftantly joined with that of our complex idea of any fubftance; fince we neither know the real conftitution of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend, |