there can be no fuppofition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the teftimony of witneffes) that there is as fair teftimony against as for the matter of fact attefted, which by inquiry is to be learned, v. g. whether there was 1700 years ago fuch a man at Rome as Julius Cafar; in all such cases, I fay, I think it is not in any rational man's power to refufe his affent, but that it neceffarily follows, and closes with fuch probabilities. In other lefs clear cafes, I think it is in a man's power to fufpend his affent, and perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the opinion that fuits with his inclination or intereft, and fo ftop from farther fearch; but that a man fhould afford his affent to that fide on which the lefs probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable, and as impoffible as it is to believe the fame thing probable and improbable at the fame time.

16. Where it is in our power to fufpend it. As knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception, fo, I think, affent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas appears to our minds, whether immediately, or by the affiftance of reafon, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing thofe objects which I turn my eyes to, and look on in day-light; and what upon full examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my affent to. But though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived, nor our affent, where the probability manifeftly appears upon due confideration of all the measures of it, yet we can hinder both knowledge and affent, by topping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the fearch of any truth. If it were not fo, ignorance, error, or infidelity, could not in any cafe be a fault. Thus in fome cafes we can prevent or fufpend our affent; but can a man, verfed in modern or ancient hiftory, doubt whether there be fuch a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as Julius Cæfar? Indeed there are millions of truths that a man is not or may not think himfelf concerned to know; as, whether our King Richard

the Third was crook-backed or no, or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician or a magician. In these and fuch like cafes, where the affent one way or other is of no importance to the interest of any one, no action, no concernment of his following or depending thereon, there it is not ftrange that the mind fhould give itself up to the common opinion, or render itself to the first comer. These and the like opinions are of fo little weight and moment, that, like motes in the fun, their tendencies are very rarely taken notice of; they are there as it were by chance, and the mind lets them float at liberty; but where the mind judges that the propofition has concernment in it, where the affent or not affenting is thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good or evil to depend on choofing or retufing the right fide, and the mind sets itself seriously to inquire and examine the probability; there, I think, it is not in our choice to take which fide we please, if manifest odds appear on either. The greater probability, I think, in that cafe will determine the affent; and a man can no more avoid affenting or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the agreement or difagreement of any two ideas.

If this be fo, the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of probability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good.

§ 17. 4. Authority.

FOURTHLY, 'The fourth and laft wrong meafure of probability I fhall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other together, is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter; I mean, the giving up our affent to the common receiv ed opinions, either of our friends or party, neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets, than the fuppofed honesty, or learning, or number of thofe of the fame profeffion? as if honeft or bookish men could not err, or truth were to be establifhed by the vote of the multitude: yet this with most men ferves the turn. The tenet has had the atteftation

of reverend antiquity, it comes to me with the paffport of former ages, and therefore I am fecure in the reception I give it other men have been, and are of the fame opinion (for that is all is faid), and therefore it is reafonable for me to embrace it. A man may more juftifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions, than take them up by fuch measures. All men are liable to error, and moft men are in many points, by paffion or interest, under temptation to it. If we could but fee the fecret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of parties, we should not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its own fake, that made them efpoufe the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is not an opinion so abfurd, which a man may not receive upon this ground; there is no error to be named, which has not had its profeffors; and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

§ 18. Men not in fo many Errors as is imagined. BUT notwithstanding the great noife is made in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, there are not fo many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly fuppofed. Not that I think they embrace the truth, but indeed, because concerning those doctrines they keep fuch a stir about, they have no thought, no opinion at all; for if any one fhould a little catechife the greatest part of the partifans of most of the fects in the world, he would not find, concerning those matters they are fo zealous for, that they have any opinions of their own; much lefs would he have reason to think, that they took them upon the examination of arguments, and appearance of probability. They are refolved to stick to a party, that education or interest has engaged them in; and there, like the common foldiers of an army, fhow their courage and warmth as their leaders direct, without ever examining or fo much as knowing the caufe they contend for. If a man's life fhows that he has no ferious regard for religion, for what reason should we think that he beats

his head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the fupport of the common caufe, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment or protection in that fociety. Thus men become profeffors of, and combatants for those opinions, they were never convinced of, nor profelytes to, no, nor ever had fo much as floating in their heads; and though one cannot fay, there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are, yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually affent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined.

A

CHAP. XXI.

OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES.

§ 1. Three Sorts.

I.

LL that can fall within the compafs of human understanding, being either, First, The nature of things as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation; or, Secondly, That which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, efpecially happinefs; or, Thirdly, The ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these are attained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three forts.

§ 2. 1. Phyfica.

FIRST, The knowledge of things, as they are in their own proper beings, their conftitutions, properties, and operations; whereby I mean not only matter and body, but fpirits alfo, which have their proper natures, conftitutions, and operations, as well as bodies. This in a little more enlarged fenfe of the word, I call Purixà, or natural philofophy. The end of this is bare fpeculative truth; and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any fuch, falls under this branch, whether it be God himfelf,

angels, fpirits, bodies, or any of their affections, as number and figure, &c.

3. 2. Practica.

SECONDLY, Пextinn, The fkill of right applying our own powers and actions, for the attainment of things good and ufeful. The moft confiderable under this head is ethics, which is the fecking out thofe rules and meafures of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare fpeculation, and the knowledge of truth, but right,

and a conduct fuitable to it.

§ 4ο 3ο Σημειωτική.

THIRDLY, The third branch may be called Enciation, or the doctrine of figns, the most ufual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed alfo Aoyin, logic; the business whereof, is to confider the nature of figns the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others; for fince the things the mind contemplates are none of them, befides itself, present to the understanding, it is neceffary that fomething elfe, as a fign or reprefentation of the thing it confiders, fhould be prefent to it; and thefe are ideas. And becaufe the fcene of ideas, that makes one man's thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up any where but in the memory, a no very fure repofitory; therefore to communicate our thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own ufe, figns of our ideas are alfo neceffary. Thofe which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make ufe of, are articulate founds. The confideration then of ideas and words, as the great inftruments of knowledge, makes no defpicable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it; and perhaps if they were diftinctly weighed, and duly confidered, they would afford us another fort of logic and critique than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

§ 5. This is the first Divifion of the Objects of Knowledge.

THIS feems to me the first and most general, as well as na