whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself by its own evidence, or whether he does only with affurance believe it to be fo upon the authority of others; for he hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably mifguide his affent, who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidently true.

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THERE is nothing more ordinary, than that children fhould receive into their minds propofitions (efpecially about matters of religion) from their parents, nurfes, or those about them, which being infinuated into their unwary as well as unbiaffed understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (equally, whether true or falfe) rivetted there by long cuftom and education, beyond all poffibility of being pulled out again; for men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding those of this fort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having observed their early infinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as facred things, and not to fuffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned: They look on them as the Urim and Thummim fet up in their minds immediately by GOD himself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controverfies.

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THIS opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception any propofition fhall find, how clearly foever proved, that shall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with these internal oracles; whereas the groffeft abfurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to fuch principles, go down glibly, and are easily digefted. The great obftinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite contrary opinions, though many times equally abfurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable confequence of this way of reafoning

from received traditional principles; fo that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their fenfes, and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of any thing difagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romanift, that from the very firft dawning of any notions in his understanding, hath had this principle conftantly inculcated, viz. that he muft believe as the church (i. e. thofe of his communion) believes, or that the Pope is infallible; and this he never fo much as heard queftioned, til at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles; how is he prepared eafily to swallow, not only against all probability, but even the clear evidence of his fenfes, the doctrine of tranfubftantiation? This principle has fuch an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be flesh which he fees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion he holds, who, with fome philofphers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning, that he must believe his reafon (for fo men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles) against his fenfes ? Let an enthufiaft be principled, that he or his teacher is infpired, and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reafons against his doctrine. Whoever, therefore, have imbibed wrong principles, are not, in things inconfiftent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are fo candid and ingenuous to themselves, as to be perfuaded to examine even those very principles, which many never fuffer themfelves to do.

§ II. 2. Received Hypothefes.

SECONDLY, Next to these are men whofe understandings are caft into a mould, and fashioned juft to the fize of a received hypotheses. The difference between these and the former is, that they will admit of matter of fact, and agree with diffenters in that, but differ only in affigning of reasons, and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that open defiance with their senses as the former; they can endure to hearken

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to their information a little more patiently; but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things, nor be prevailed on by probabilities, which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the fame manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not be an infufferable thing for a learned profeffor, and that which hist fcarlet would blush at, to have his authority of forty years ftanding, wrought out of hard rock, Greek and Latin, with no fmall expence of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard, in an instant overturned by an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he fhould be made to confefs, that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake, and that he fold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate? What probabilities, I fay, are fufficient to prevail in fuch a cafe? And who ever by the moft cogent arguments will be prevailed with to difrobe himself at once of all his old opinions, and pretences to knowledge and learning, which with hard study he hath all his time been labouring for; and turn himself out ftark naked, in quest a-fresh of new notions? All the arguments can be used will be as little able to prevail, as the wind did with the traveller "to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong hypothefis, may be reduced the errors that may be occafioned by a true hypothefis, or right principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The inftances of men contending for different opinions, which they all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable proof of it. All that call themselves Chriftians, allow the text, that says Meravonte, to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty duty; but yet however erroneous will one of their practices be, who understanding nothing but the French, take this rule with one tranflation to be repentez vous, repent; or with the other faitiez penitence, do penance.

§ 12. 3. Predominant Paffions. THIRDLY, Probabilities which crofs mens appetites and VOL. III.

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prevailing paffions, run the fame fate. Let never fo much probability hang on one fide of a covetous man's reasoning, and money on the other, it is easy to foresee which will outweigh. Earthly minds, like mud-walls, refift the strongest batteries, and though perhaps fometimes the force of a clear argument may make fome impreffion, yet they nevertheless stand firm, keep out the enemy, truth, that would captivate or difturb them. Tell a man paffionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a score of witneffes of the falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words of hers fhall invalidate all their teftimonies. Quod volumus, facile credimus ; what fuits our wishes, is forwardly believed; is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented; and though men cannot always openly gainfay or refift the force of manifeft probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not to the argument. Not but that it is the nature of the understanding conftantly to close with the more probable fide; but yet a man hath a power to fufpend and reftrain its inquiries, and not permit a full and fatisfactory examination, as far as the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities.

§ 13. The means of evading Probabilities; 1. Suppofed

Fallacy.

FIRST, That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in them; and the confequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may be fome of them incoherent. There are very few difcourfes fo fhort, clear, and confiftent, to which most men may not, with fatisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt, and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of difingenuity or unreafonableness, fet themfelves free with the old reply, Non perfuadebis, etiamfi perfuaferis; though I cannot anfwer, I will not yield.

§ 14. 2. Suppofed Arguments for the contrary. SECONDLY, Manifeft probabilities may be evaded, and the affent withheld, upon this fuggestion, that I know

not yet all that may be faid on the contrary fide; and therefore though I be beaten, it is not neceffary I should yield, not knowing what forces there are in referve behind. This is a refuge against conviction so open and fo wide, that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it.

15. What Probabilities determine the Affent. BUT yet there is fome end of it; and a man having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikelinefs, done his utmoft to inform himself in all particulars fairly, and caft up the fum total on both fides, may in moft cafes come to acknowledge, upon the whole matter, on which fide the probability rests; wherein fome proofs in matter of reafon, being fuppofitions upon univerfal experience, are fo cogent and clear, and fome teftimonies in matter of fact fo univerfal, that he cannot refuse his affent: So that I think we may conclude, that in propofitions, where though the proofs in view are of moft moment, yet there are fufficient grounds to fufpect that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as confiderable to be produced on the contrary fide, there affent, fufpenfe, or diffent, are often voluntary actions; but where the proofs are fuch as make it highly probable, and there is not fufficient ground to fufpect that there is either fallacy of words (which fober and ferious confideration may dif cover), nor equally valid proofs, yet undifcovered, latent on the other fide (which also the nature of the thing may, in fome cafes, make plain to a confiderate man), there, I think, a man who has weighed them, can fearce refufe his affent to the fide on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promifcuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method and order, which fhould ftamp on paper a co herent difcourfe; or that a blind fortuitous concourfe of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, fhould frequently conftitute the bodies of any fpecies of animals; in these and the like cafes, I think nobody that confiders them can be one jot at a ftand which fide to take, nor at all waver in his affent. Lastly, When