Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or difagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas.

Judgment is the thinking or taking two idees to agree or disagree, by the intervention of one or more ideas, whofe certain agreement or difagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath obferved to be frequent and ufual.

18. Confequences of Words, and Confequences of

Ideas.

THOUGH the deducing one propofition from another, or making inferences in words, be a great part of reafon, and that which it is ufually employed about, yet the principal act of ratiocination is the finding the agreement or difagreement of two ideas one with another, by the intervention of a third; as a man by a yard finds two houses to be of the fame length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta-pofition. Words have their confequences, as the figns of fuch ideas; and things agree or difagree, as really they are; but we obferve it only by our ideas.

$ 19. Four Sorts of Arguments.

BEFORE we quit this fubject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four forts of arguments, that men in their reafonings with others do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their affent, or at least so to awe them as to filence their oppofition.

1. Ad Verecundiam.

Firft, The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or fome other caufe, has gained a name, and fettled their reputation in the common efteem with fome kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modefty for others. to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in poffeffion of it. This is apt to be cenfured, as carrying with it too much of pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be re

ceived with refpe&t and fubmiffion by others; and it is looked upon as infolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity, or to put it in the balance against that of fome learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with fuch authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the caufe, and is ready to ftyle it impudence in any one who fhall ftand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam.

§ 20. 2. Ad Ignorantiam.

SECONDLY, Another way that men ordinarily ufe to drive others, and force them to submit their judgments, and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to affign a better. And this I call argumentum ad ig

norantiam.

21. 3. Ad Hominem.

THIRDLY, A third way is to prefs a man with confequences drawn from his own principles or conceffions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem.

§ 22. 4. Ad Judicium.

FOURTHLY, The fourth is the ufing of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum ad judicium. This alone of all the four brings true inftruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another man's opinion to be right, because I out of respect, or any other confideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the fame with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeft, and therefore not oppose another man's perfuafion; I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better; I may be in an error, and another may fhow me that I am fo; this may difpofe me, perhaps, for the reception of truth,

but helps me not to it; that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arifing from the nature of things themselves, and not from my fhamefacedness, ignorance, or error.

§ 23. Above, contrary, and according to Reason. By what has been before said of reafon we may be able to make fome guefs at the diftinction of things, into thofe that are according to, above, and contrary to reafon. 1. According to reafon are fuch propofitions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from fenfation and reflection, and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reafon are fuch propofitions whofe truth or probability we cannot by reafon derive from those principles. 3. Contrary to reafon are fuch propofitions as are inconfiftent with, or irreconcileable to our clear and diftinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God is according to reafon; the existence of more than one God contrary to reafon; the refurrection of the dead above reafon. Farther, as above reafon may be taken in a double fenfe, viz. either as fignifying above probability, or above certainty; fo in that large fense alfo, contrary to reafon, is, I fuppofe, fometimes taken.

§ 24. Reafon and Faith not oppofite. THERE is another use of the word reason wherein it is oppofed to faith; which though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet common ufe has fo authorised it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it; only I think it may not be amifs to take notice, that however faith be oppofed to rea fon, faith is nothing but a firm affent of the mind; which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason, and so cannot be oppofite to it. He that believes, without having any reafon for believing, may be in love with his own fancies, but neither feeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him ufe thofe difcerning faculties he has given him to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does

not this to the best of his power, however he fometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance, and I know not whether, the luckinefs of the accident will excufe the irregularity of his proceeding. This at leaft is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into ; whereas he that makes ufe of the light and faculties God has given him, and feeks fincerely to difcover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this fatisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that though he fhould mifs truth, he will not mifs the reward of it; for he governs his affent right, and places it as he should, who in any cafe or matter whatsoever believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him; he that does otherwife tranfgreffes against his own light, and mifufes those faculties which were given him to no other end but to fearch and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability. But fince reafon and faith are by fome men oppofed, we will fo confider them in the following chapter.

CHAP. XVIII.

OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT FROVINCES.

1. Neceffary to know their boundaries.

T has been above shown, I. That we are of neceffity ignorant, and want knowledge of all forts where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational knowledge where we want proofs. 3. That we want general knowledge and certainty as far as we want clear and determined fpecific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our affent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor teftimony of other men, to bottom our reason upon.

From these things thus premifed, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reafon, the want whereof may poffibly have

2

189 been the caufe, if not of great diforders, yet at least of great difputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world, For till it be refolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain difpute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.

2. Faith and Reafon what, as contradiftinguished. I FIND every fect, as far as reafon will help them, make use of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above reafon. And I do not fee how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainfayer, who makes use of the fame plea, without fetting down ftrict boundaries between faith and reason, which ought to be the first point eftablifhed in all queftions where faith has any thing to

do.

Reafon therefore here, as contradiftinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of fuch propofitions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from fuch ideas, which it has got by the ufe of its natural faculties, viz. by fenfation or reflection.

Faith, on the other fide, is the affent to any propofition, not thus made out by the deductions of reafon, but upon the credit of the propofer, as coming from God, in fome extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call Revelation.

$3. No new fimple Idea can be conveyed by tradi tional Revelation.

FIRST, then I say, That no man infpired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new fimple ideas, which they had not before from fenfation or reflection; for whatfoever impreffions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new fimple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another either by words or any other figns; because words by their immediate operation on us caufe no other ideas but of their natural founds; and it is by the custom of using them for figns that they excite and