barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that, whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have fuch ideas in their minds, when no fuch thing exifts, no fuch object affects their fenfes. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an evidence, that puts us paft doubting; for I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly confcious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the fun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or fmells a rofe, or only thinks on that favour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our fenfes, as we do between any two diftinct ideas. If any one fay, a dream may do the fame thing, and all thefe ideas may be produced in us without any external objects, he may please to dream that I make him this answer: 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his fcruple, or no; where all is but a dream, reafoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifeft difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be refolved to appear fo fceptical, as to maintain that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream, and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any fuch thing as fire actually exists without us: I answer, that we certainly finding that pleafure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whofe existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive by our fenfes; this certainty is as great as our happinefs or mifery, beyond which we have no concernment to know, or to be. So that I think, we may add to the two former forts of knowledge this alfo, of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and confcioufnefs we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, de

monftrative, and fenfitive; in each of which, there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty.

§

15. Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas

are fo.

BUT fince our knowledge is founded on, and employed about our ideas only, will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our ideas; and that where our ideas are clear and diftinct, or obfcure and confufed, our knowledge will be fo too? To which I anfwer, No: For our knowledge confifting in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of any twoideas, its clearness or obfcurity confifts in the clearness or obfcurity of that perception, and not in the clearnefs or obfcurity of the ideas themselves; v. g. a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very obfcure perception of their agreement, and fo have but a very obfcure knowledge of it. But ideas, which by reason of their obfcurity or otherwife, are confused, cannot produce any clear or diftinct knowledge; because as far as any ideas are confused, fo far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree: Or, to exprefs the fame thing in a way lefs apt to be mifunderstood, he that hath not determined the ideas to the words he uses, cannot make propofitions of them,. of whofe truth he can be certain.

K

CHAP. III.

OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWledge.

§ I.

NOWLEDGE, as has been faid, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, that,

1. No farther than we have Ideas.

FIRST, We can have knowledge no farther than we have ideas.

§ 2. SECONDLY, That we can have no knowledge farther than we can have perception of that agreement or difagreement. Which perception being, 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas: or, 2. By reafon, examining the agreement or difagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of fome others: or, 3. By fenfation, perceiving the existence of particular things: Hence it alfo follows,

2. No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Difagreement.

§3. 3. Intuitive Knowledge extends itself not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.

THIRDLY, That we cannot have an intuitive knowledge, that fhall extend itfelf to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them, because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus having the ideas of an obtufe, and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement or difagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: The difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate application; and therefore, there is need of fome intervening quantities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or rational knowledge.

§ 4. 4. Nor Demonftrative Knowledge. FOURTHLY, It follows alfo, from what is above observed, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas: Because between two dif ferent ideas we would examine, we cannot always find fuch mediums, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge, in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstration.

$5. 5. Senfitive Knowledge narrower than either. FIFTHLY, Senfitive knowledge, reaching no farther

than the existence of things actually prefent to our fenfes, is yet much narrower than either of the for

mer.

§ 6. 6. Our Knowledge, therefore, narrower than our

Ideas.

FROM all which it is evident, that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of all being, and far fhort of what we may juftly imagine to be in fome even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information is to be received from fome few and not very acute ways of perception, fuch as are our fenfes; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this world refolved. Nevertheless, I do not queftion but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and conftitutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if men would fincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of difcovering truth, which they do for the colouring or fupport of falfehood, to maintain a fyftem, intereft or party they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may without injury to human perfection, be confident, that our knowledge would never reach to all we might defire to know concerning those ideas we have; nor be able to furmount all the difficulties, and refolve all the questions that might arise concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a square, a circle, and equality; and yet, perhaps, fhall never be able to find a circle equal to a fquare, and certainly know that it is fo. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but poffi bly fhall never be able to know, whether any mere material being thinks, or no; it being impoffible for

us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to difcover, whether Omnipotency has not given to fome systems of matter fitly difpofed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to mat ter so disposed, a thinking immaterial fubftance; it being, in respect of our notions not much more remote from our comprehenfion to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, fuperadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he fhould fuperadd to it another fubftance, with a faculty of thinking; fince we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what fort of subftances the Almighty has been pleafed to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Crea tor. For I fee no contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking Being fhould, if he pleafed, give to certain fystems of created fenfelefs matter, put together, as he thinks fit, fome degrees of fenfe, perception and thought: Though, as I think, I have proved, lib. 4. ch. 10. it is no lefs than a contradiction to fuppofe matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of fenfe and thought) fhould be that eternal first thinking Being. What certainty of knowledge can any one have that fome perceptions, fuch as, v. g. pleafure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial fubftance, upon the motion of the parts of body? Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to ftrike and affect body; and motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion fo that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or found, we are fain to quit our reafon, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For fince we must allow he has annexed effects to motion, which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reafon have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a fubject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a fubject we