but because they never thought otherwife? that imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined their own opinions? which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all; and yet thefe of all men hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets, who have leaft examined them. What we once know, we are certain is fo, and we may be fecure that there are no latent proofs undifcovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt; but in matters of probability, it is not in every cafe we can be fure that we have all the particulars before us that any way concern the question, and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unfeen, which may caft the probability on the other fide, and outweigh all that at prefent feems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leifure, patience, and means, to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, fo as fafely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information? and yet we are forced to determine ourfelves on the one fide or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay, for thofe depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonftrative knowledge, and wherein it is neceffary for us to embrace the one fide or the other.

§4. The right use of it, mutual Charity and Forbear

ance.

SINCE, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greateft part of men, if not all, to have several opinions, without certain and indubitable proofs of their truths, (and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenets prefently upon the offer of an argument, which they cannot immediately answer, and fhow the infutficiency of) it. would methinks, become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity and friendship, in the

diverfity of opinions, fince we cannot reasonably expect that any one fhould readily and obfequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind refignation to an authority, which the understanding of man acknowledges not; for however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reafon, nor blindly fubmit to the will and dictates of another. If he, you would bring over to your fentiments, be one that examines before he affents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and recalling what is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to fee on which fide the advantage lies; and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him a-new in fo much pains, it is but what we do often ourselves in the like cafe, and we fhould take it amifs if others fhould prefcribe to us what points we should study; and if he be one who takes his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce thofe tenets which time and cuftom have fo fettled in his mind, that he thinks them felf-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty, or which he takes to be impreffions he has received from GOD himself, or from men fent by him? How can we expect, I fay, that opinions thus fettled fhould be given up to the arguments or authority of a ftranger, or adversary, especially if there be any fufpicion of intereft or defign, as there never fails to be, where men find themselves ill treated? We fhould do well to commiferate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information, and not inftantly treat others ill, as obftinate and perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and receive our opinions, or at least thofe we would force upon them, when it is more than probable, that we are no lefs obftinate in not embracing fome of theirs. For where is the man that has inconteftible evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falfehood of all he condemns, or can fay, that he has examined to the bottom all his own or other mens opinions? The neceffity of believing without knowledge, nay, often upon very flight grounds, in this fleeting ftate of action and

blindnefs we are in, should make us more bufy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others; at least, those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others, and are unreasonable in impofing that as truth on other mens belief, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got paft doubt in all the doctrines they profess, and govern themselves by, would have a jufter pretence to require others to follow them; but these are so few in number, and find fo little reafon to be magifterial in their opinions, that nothing infolent and imperious is to be expected from them; and there is reafon to think, that if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less impofing on others.

§ 5. Probability is either of Matter of Fact, or Specu

lation.

BUT to return to the grounds of affent, and the feveral degrees of it, we are to take notice, that the propofitions we receive upon inducements of probability, are of two forts; either concerning fome particular exiftence, or, as it is ufually termed, matter of fact, which falling under obfervation, is capable of human teftimony; or elfe concerning things, which being beyond the difcovery of our fenfes, are not capable of any fuch tefti

mony.

§ 6. The concurrent Experience of all other Men with ours, produces Affurance approaching to Knowledge. CONCERNING the first of these, viz. particular matter of fact,

First, Where any particular thing, confonant to the conftant obfervation of ourselves and others in the like cafe, comes attefted by the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt, as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occafion to mention it, fhould affirm that it froze in

Book IV. England the last winter, or that there were swallows seen there in the summer, I think a man could almost as little doubt of it, as that seven and four are eleven. The first therefore, and highest degree of probability, is, when the general confent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and neverfailing experience in like cafes, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attefted by fair witneffes; fuch are all the stated conftitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of caufes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This we call an argu

ment from the nature of things themfelves; for what our own and other mens conftant observation has found always to be after the same manner, that we with reafon conclude to be the effects of steady and regular causes, though they come not within the reach of our knowledge: Thus, that fire warmed a man, made lead fluid, and changed the colour or confiftency in wood or charcoal; that iron funk in water, and fwam in quickfilver; thefe, and the like propofitions about particular facts, being agreeable to our conftant experience, as often as we have to do with these matters, and being generally fpoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found conftantly to be fo, and therefore not fo much as controverted by any body, we are put paft doubt, that a relation affirming any fuch thing to have been, or any predication that it will happen again in the fame manner, is very true. Thefe probabilities rife so near to certainty, that they govern our thoughts as abfolutely, and influence all our actions as fully, as the moft evident demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded rifes to affurance. $7. Unquestionable Teftimony and Experience for the moft part produce Confidence.

SECONDLY, The next degree of probability is, when I find by my own experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most part fo, and that the particular inftance of it is attefted by many and undoubted witneffes, v. g. hiftory giving us fuch an ac

count of men in all ages; and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to obferve, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the public. If all historians that write of Tiberius, fay that Tiberius did fo, it is extremely probable; and in this cafe, our affent has a fufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call confidence.

8. Fair Testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, produces alfo confident Belief.

THIRDLY, In things that happen indifferently, as that a bird fhould fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c.; when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unfufpected witneffes, there our affent is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is fuch a city in Italy as Rome; that about 1700 years ago, there lived in it a man called Julius Cafar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle against another called Pompey; this, though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it, yet being related by hiftorians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.

$9. Experiences and Teftimonies clafbing, infinitely vary the degrees of Probability.

THUS far the matter goes eafy enough. Probability upon fuch grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or difbelieve, as a demonstration does whether we will know or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when teftimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witneffes clash with the ordinary courfe of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness is required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the affent to the different evidence and probability of the thing, which rifes and fails, according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. common obfervation in like cafes, and particular testimonies in that particular