115 whofe diameters are but 1,co0,000th part of a gry*, will operate no otherwife upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than thofe of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce fenfe, thought and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, grofs particles of matter, as by thofe that are the very minuteft that do any where exift; they knock, impel, and refift one another, juft as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will fuppofe nothing firft, or eternal, matter can never begin to be; if we fuppose bare matter, without motion, eternal, motion can never begin to be; if we fuppofe only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be; for it is impoffible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself fenfe, perception and knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then fenfe, perception and knowledge, must be a property eternally infeparable from matter and every particle of it; not to add, that though our general or specific conception of matter makes us fpeak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any fuch thing existing as one material being, or one fingle body that we know or can conceive. And therefore if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and diftinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty, which is to be found in nature. Since, therefore, whatfoever is the firft eternal being muft neceffarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things, muft neceffarily contain in it, and actu A gry is r-roth of a line, a line 1-10th of an inch, an inch 1-10th of a philofophical foot, a philofophical foot 1-3d of a pendulum, whofe diadroms, in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to one fecond of time, or 1-60th of a minute. I have affectedly made use of this meature here, and the parts of it, under a decimal divifion, with names to then, because I think it would be of general convenience that this fhould be the common measure in the commonwealth of letters. ally have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exift; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in itfelf, or at leaft in a higher degree; it neceffarily follows, that the first eternal Being cannot be matter. $ 11. Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom. IF, therefore, it be evident, that fomething neceffarily muft exift from eternity, it is also as evident that that fomething must neceffarily be a cogitative being: For it is as impoffible that incogitative matter fhould produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, fhould produce a pofitive being or matter. $ 12. THOUGH this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind does fufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; fince it will hence follow, that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge, or extent of power, than what he gives them; and therefore if he made those, he made alfo the less excellent pieces of this universe, all inanimate beings, whereby his omniscience, power and providence will be established, and all his other attributes, néceffarily follow: Yet to clear up this a little farther, we will fee what doubts can be raised against it. § 13. Whether material or no. FIRST, Perhaps it will be faid, that though it be as clear as demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal being, and that being muft alfo be knowing, yet it does not follow but that thinking being may also be material. Let it be fo; it equally still follows that there is a God; for if there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being, it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that being to be material or no. But herein, I fuppofe, lies the danger and deceit of that fuppofition: There being no way to avoid the demonftration, that there is an eternal knowing being, men, devoted to matter, would willingly have it granted, that this knowing being is ma terial; and then letting flide out of their minds, or the discourse, the demonstration whereby an eternal knowing being was proved neceffarily to exift, would argue all to be matter, and fo deny a God, that is, an eternal cogitative being: whereby they are fo far from establishing, that they destroy their own hypothefis; for if there can be, in their opinion, eternal matter, without any eternal cogitative being, they manifestly separate matter and thinking, and fuppofe no neceffary connection of the one with the other, and so establish the neceffity of an eternal spirit, but not of matter, fince it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if thinking matter may be feparated, the eternal exiftence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative being, and they fuppofe it to no purpose. §14. Not material, 1. Because every Particle of Matter is not cogitative. BUT now let us fee how they can fatisfy themselves or others that this eternal thinking being is material. First, I would ask them, whether they imagine, that all matter, every particle of matter, thinks? This, I fuppofe, they will fcarce fay; fince, then, there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are particles of matter, and fo an infinity of gods. And yet if they will not allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter to be as well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reafons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak. § 15. SECONDLY, If all matter does not think, I next ask, whether it be only one atom that does fo? This has as many abfurdities as the other; for then this atom of matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful thought or will, made all the reft of matter; and fo we have 2. One Particle alone of Matter cannot be cogitative. the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialists stick at; for if they suppose one fingle thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannot afcribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other account than that of its thinking, the only fuppofed difference. But allow it to be by fome other way, which is above our conception, it must be ftill creation, and thefe, men muft give up their great maxim, ex nihilo nil fit. If it be faid that all the reft of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom, it will be to fay any thing at pleafure, though never fo abfurd; for to fuppofe all matter eternal, and yet one fmall particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the reft, is without any of the least appearance of reason to frame any hypothefis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the fame figures and motions of any other ; and I challenge any one in his thoughts to add any thing else to one above another. 16. 3. A Syftem of incogitative Matter cannot be cogitative. THIRDLY, If, then, neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking being, nor all matter, as matter, i. e. every particle of matter, can be it; it only remains, that it is fome certain fyftem of matter, duly put together, that is this thinking eternal being. This is that which I imagine is that notion which men are apteft to have of God, who would have him a material being, as most readily fuggefted to them, by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no lefs abfurd than the other: For to fuppofe the eternal thinking being to be nothing else but a compofition of particles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to afcribe all the wifdom and knowledge of that eternal being only to the juxta-pofition of parts; than which nothing can be more abfurd; for unthinking particles of matter, however put together, cau have nothing thereby added to them, but a new rela tion of pofition, which it is impoffible fhould give thought and knowledge to them. § 17. Whether in motion or at reft. BUT farther, this corporeal fyftem either has all its parts at reft, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking confifts. If it be perfectly at reft, it is but one lump, and fo can have no privileges above one atom. If it be the motion of its parts, on which its thinking depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited, fince all the particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much lefs be regulated by the thoughts of the whole; fince that thought is not the cause of motion (for then it must be antecedent to it, and fo without it), but the confequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wife thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind matter; fince to refolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the fame thing; not to mention the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that muft depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more abfurdities and impoffibilities in this hypothefis (however full of them it be) than that before mentioned; fince, let this thinking fyftem be all, or a part of the matter of the univerfe, it is impoffible that any one particle fhould either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole know the motion of every particular, and fo regulate its own thoughts or motions, or indeed have any thought resulting from fuch motion. § 18. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind. OTHERS Would have matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial being. This, though it take not away the being of a God, yet fince it denies one and the first great piece |