contract be considered as in restraint of trade or commerce, nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation thereto. Nothing in this Act shall exempt from punishment, otherwise than as herein excepted, any persons guilty of conspiracy, for which punishment is now provided by any Act of the Legislature, but such Act of the Legislature shall, as to the agreements, combinations, and contracts hereinbefore referred to, be construed as if this Act were therein contained; provided, that nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize force or violence, or threats thereof.

SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect immediately.

FEDERAL EIGHT-HOUR LAW.

An Act relating to the limitation of the hours of daily service of laborers and mechanics employed upon the public works of the United States and of the District of Columbia.

[Approved August 1, 1872. (27 Stats. at Large, p. 340.)]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the service and employment of all laborers and mechanics who are now or may hereafter be employed by the Government of the United States, by the District of Columbia, or by any contractor or subcontractor upon any of the public works of the United States or of the said District of Columbia, is hereby limited and restricted to eight hours in any one calendar day, and it shall be unlawful for any officer of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia or any such contractor or subcontractor, whose duty it shall be to employ, direct, or control the services of such laborers or mechanics, to require or permit any such laborer or mechanic to work more than eight hours in any calendar day, except in case of extraordinary emergency.

SEC. 2. That any officer or agent of the Government of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or any contractor or subcontractor, whose duty it shall be to employ, direct, or control any laborer or mechanic employed upon any of the public works of the United States or of the District of Columbia, who shall intentionally violate any provision of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for each and every such offense shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction thereof.

SEC. 3. The provisions of this Act shall not be so construed as to in any manner apply to or affect contractors or subcontractors, or to limit the hours of daily service of laborers or mechanics engaged

upon the public works of the United States or of the District of Columbia for which contracts have been entered into prior to the passage of this Act.

In the preceding pages an attempt has been made to get together the existing legislation of especial interest to labor. These enactments are in full effect except the one concerning employment agencies (Stats. of Cal. 1903, p. 14). In a decision of the Supreme Court, Ex parte C. E. Dickey on Habeas Corpus, Section 4 of this statute was declared unconstitutional, on the ground that such an enactment would tend to impair the obligation of contracts and could not stand except as a police measure. Inasmuch as the occupation of the employment agent is highly beneficial and tends in nowise to affect the health or safety of the people, it is not subject to police supervision. While only Section 4 is expressly declared unconstitutional, yet it is hinted by Beatty, C. J., in his concurring opinion, that Section 3 likewise must fail for the same reason.

During the two years since the last report of this Bureau many decisions affecting labor have been rendered by the State and Federal courts. Of especial interest are those on the constitutionality of the laws fixing the length of a working day, and on boycotts, picketing, etc. We have attempted to give the substance of these opinions only, as any more detailed account would be outside the province of this report.

All courts have held that a law fixing the maximum number of hours for a day's work for miners, street railway employés, etc., is constitutional, inasmuch as this is a legitimate use of the police power. (State vs. Cantwell et al., Supreme Court of Missouri, 78 Southwestern Reporter, p. 569; In re Boyce, Supreme Court of Nevada, 75 Pacific Reporter, p. 1; In re Ten-Hour Law for Street Railway Corporations, 54 Atlantic Reporter, p. 602.)

In the case of laws fixing the length of a day's work on public buildings, etc., there have been conflicting opinions in the State courts. In re Dalton, Supreme Court of Kansas, 59 Pacific Reporter, p. 336, declares that an eight-hour law for work on public contracts is constitutional, provided there is a provision requiring a clause to that effect in the contract, since by such a provision prospective bidders have knowledge of the length of the day for their work and may figure accordingly. No man, of a right, gets a contract from the State, and every one may bid or refrain from so doing at his option, and the State, just as an individual, may say how many hours shall constitute a day's work. This is the prevailing doctrine, but in City of Cleveland vs. Clements Brothers Construction Company, the Supreme Court

of Ohio (65 Northwestern Reporter, p. 885) declares a law, even though it contains a provision for an eight-hour clause in the contract, unconstitutional, since, it tends to impair the obligation of contracts.

The Supreme Court of the United States has set the whole matter at rest, however, in Atkins vs. State, appealed from a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas. Justice Harlan says: "Whatever may have been the motives controlling the enactment of the statute in question, we can imagine no possible ground to dispute the power of the State to declare that no one undertaking work for it or for one of its municipal agencies should permit or require an employé on such work to labor in excess of eight hours each day, and to inflict punishment upon those who are embraced by such regulations and yet disregard them. Fuller, C. J., Brewer, J., and Peckham, J.,

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dissented from this opinion.

California's eight-hour law (Stats. of Cal. 1903, p. 119) provides that a clause should be in each contract for public work limiting the length of each working day to eight hours. As this is very similar to the Kan-. sas provision, the decision of the United States Supreme Court noted above is in point, and its constitutionality can not be called in question.

Of very great interest to labor in general, and especially organized labor, are the decisions on boycotting, picketing, etc. "Government by injunction" has been condemned by many people, whether or not justly it is not our province to say. It is simply sought here to give the facts without any bias whatever.

In general terms, the doctrine concerning picketing and boycotting has been that so long as none but peaceable means were used and persuasion merely, without any attempt at intimidation, no injunction would issue. The decision as to whether or not picketing or boycotting could exist without a certain amount of intimidation has varied Iwith the different courts. The decision in Southern Railway vs. Machinists' Local Union No. 14, et al., U. S. Circuit Court for Western District of Tennessee (111 Federal Reporter, p. 49) seems to embody the general doctrine. Here it is held that it is the right of every man to work when he will, quit work when he will, and work for whom he will. There can be no injunction against peacefully procuring information nor unobjectionable social intercourse for the purpose of begging or entreating men not to work, but an injunction will stand against men thrusting themselves upon unwilling "scabs" to argue or against picketing for that purpose.

In Otis Steel Company Limited vs. Local Union No. 218, of Cleveland, Ohio, of the Iron Molders' Union of North America, et al., U. S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio (110 Federal Reporter, p. 698), the court in issuing an injunction against picketing says in substance, that the injunction is issued to restrain unauthorized persons

from exercising a like function. Picketing, says the court, is a form of injunction issued by a body of men not qualified to issue it. The union in question has issued an injunction against the company that it shall not continue in operation and against the non-union men that they shall not continue working.

In Frank et al. vs. Herold et al., Court of Chancery of New Jersey (52 Atlantic Reporter), the same rule is followed as in the two preceding cases. In addition to this a man's right to carry on his business without molestation is declared a property right, and any interference therewith, since it tends to alienate property without due process of law, must be enjoined.

The same tenor is observed in U. S. vs. Haggerty et al., U. S. Circuit Court for Northern District of West Virginia (116 Federal Reporter, p. 510); U. S. vs. Weber et al., U. S. Circuit Court for Western District of Virginia (114 Federal Reporter, p. 950); Union Pacific R. R. Company vs. Ruef, U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Nebraska (120 Federal Reporter, p. 102); Allis Chambers Company vs. Reli able Lodge, U. S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois (111 Federal Reporter, p. 264).

In Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Company vs. Watson et al., Supreme Court of Missouri (67 Southwestern Reporter, p. 391), an injunction against the printing of circulars aimed at the plaintiff is refused, on the ground that such an injunction would impair the liberty of the press and stop free speech. A man may say or print what he will, abiding by the consequences of his act. If he errs he will be punished, but it is outside the province of a court to decide that his acts will be wrong prior to their commission. The power to issue an injunction in cases of intimidation, threats of violence, or destruction of property, was not passed upon.

In Walsh vs. Association of Master Plumbers of St. Louis et al. (71 Southwestern Reporter, p. 455) a boycott was declared illegal, since it tended to a restraint of trade and illegally took away a man's property in his business.

In Wabash Railroad vs. Hanrahan et al. (121 Federal Reporter, p. 563), the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that an association of men such as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen or the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, banded together to better the condition of the individual members, does not form a conspiracy in restraint of trade, even though they threaten a strike, and in their efforts to get an increase of wages they endeavor to persuade the employés of the railroad to strike. An opinion of Judge Taft in Thomas vs. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (62 Federal Reporter, p. 803) is cited where the court uses this language: "It is of benefit to them and to the public that laborers should unite in

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their common interest and for lawful purposes. They have labor to sell. If they stand together they are often able, all of them, to command better prices for their labor than when dealing singly with rich employers, because the necessities of the single employé may compel him to accept any terms offered him. They may unite with other unions. The officers they appoint, or any other person to whom they choose to listen, may advise them as to the proper course to be taken by them in regard to their employment, or, if they choose to repose such authority in any one, he may order them, on pain of expulsion from their union, peacefully to leave the employ of their employer because any of the terms of their employment are unsatisfactory."

The same rule is laid down by Judge, now Mr. Justice, Holmes in Vegelahn vs. Guntner (44 Northeastern Reporter, p. 1077).

Concerning the right of a majority of a union to force those in the minority to strike against their will, Judge Adams, in the main decision under consideration (Wabash Railroad Company vs. Hanrahan et al.), holds that this right is the same right as that exercised by the majority in any body politic. The rule of the majority is followed in our national life. It is assuming too much for a court to take away this right by injunction.

In Erdman et al. vs. Mitchell et al. (56 Atlantic Reporter, p. 327) it is held that while it is lawful for any man or set of men to decline to work in company with any man or set of men, yet it is not lawful to require the employer to discharge these men, and such action is intimidation on the part of an individual and conspiracy on the part of a number of individuals.

In the light of the decisions herein noted, it becomes plain that the legality of the boycott, or picketing, depends largely upon the attendant circumstances. Force or violence always renders them unlawful. These are not necessarily attendant, however, and the employer can not condemn the picketing, etc., in itself on account of these extraneous circumstances. The courts have differed as to whether or not the boycott in itself is a form of coercion; whether or not the mere existence of such a state of affairs does not tend to intimidation and conspiracy to injure the business of an individual. The decision in each case of this matter of fact has depended upon attendant circumstances as viewed by the judge.

In point here will be the decision of Judge Hunt, of the Superior Court, on the California Anti-Injunction Act (Stats. of Cal. 1903, p.289), in the case of E. G. Pierce vs. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760. An appeal has been taken from the decision to the Supreme Court. The Act is here declared unconstitutional, in that it is special legislation and takes away from the Superior Court its equity juris