language objected to in this regard by the said court in the said law was as follows:

If in any factory or workshop, any process of work is carried on by which dust, filaments, or injurious gases are generated or produced, that are liable to be inhaled by the persons employed therein, and it appears to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics that such inhalation could, to a great extent, be prevented by the use of some mechanical contrivance, he shall direct that such contrivance shall be provided, and within a reasonable time it shall be so provided and used.

The vice in this language, as found by the court, is the fact that by its terms it makes no rule of conduct for the people to follow, but leaves it to the Commissioner to make the rule as to when dust, etc., is liable to be inhaled, when such inhalation can be prevented, and as to what appliance shall be used.

Now, however, whether the above language of the statute contains a delegation of legislative power to the Commissioner as named, or whether it merely invests him with authority to determine the existence of facts upon which the action of the law depends, which latter can in proper cases validly be done, a seeming incongruity appears as between the decision of the Supreme Court in the case in point, and its decision in the case of Taylor vs. Hughes, 62 Cal., which case arose and is as follows:

Section 637 of the Penal Code of this State is in language as follows: "Every owner of a dam or other obstruction in any running water in this State, who, having been ordered and notified by the Fish Commissioners to construct a fish-ladder on, or repair a fish-ladder already constructed on, such dam or other obstruction, according to the plans of the Fish Commissioners, fails to construct or repair such fish-ladder within thirty days after such notice, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall pay a fine of not less than fifty dollars," etc.

It will be observed that by the next foregoing language no rule of conduct is made by the law itself for the people to follow; but it is left to the Fish Commissioners to make the rule as to when fish-ladders shall be used or repaired, and as to the kind and dimensions of such ladders, etc.

The case of Taylor vs. Hughes, supra, was one wherein, some years ago, the owner of a dam such as is contemplated by Section 637 had refused to construct a ladder in connection therewith, according to the orders and plans of the Fish Commissioners, and was thereupon arrested, charged with misdemeanor for thus refusing, tried, convicted, and fined in a Justice's Court. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Justice's Court to the Superior Court, and on such appeal the judgment was affirmed. Defendant then took the matter to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, and the latter court summarily dismissed the writ, with the simple observation that the case disclosed no ground for interference under the writ, and thus allowed the judgment of the Justice's Court to stand and to be enforced.

The entire similarity of fact, law, and procedure in these two cases can but be noted.

In the case of Schaezlein and Burridge, the Supreme Court, noting the case of Taylor vs. Hughes, distinguished as follows: that in the latter case the defendant was occupying property belonging to the State, to wit, the running water, and said that there existed marked difference as to the extent to which regulation of the use of property located on property of the State might go, as compared with the regulation of property located on merely private property.

It should be readily conceded, (1) That legislative power to enact general laws can not be delegated to any person, commission, or individual; (2) That property located upon property of the State is subject to regulation in greater degree than is property located on merely private premises.

But, the real question here is not as to the extent of regulation, but as to the method of regulation, and there following comes the question, to wit: "Is there constitutional or other sanction in this State, permitting the delegation, to a commission, of legislative power to make a general law which shall govern persons owning property or occupying property, located on State property or premises, and which shall make the rule determining when such persons are guilty of crime, while similar sanction is lacking in connection with the ownership of property owned or occupied on private property or premises?"

However, the Legislature of this State, at its last session, so amended the sanitary law in question as to eliminate this objection as to delegation of legislative power, and the matter of causing compliance with said law as amended will, in due course, receive the careful attention of the Bureau.

EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES.

Noting what is said on page 74 of the Ninth Biennial Report of this Bureau in relation to illegal practices in connection with the "Commercial Clerks' Information Bureau," conducted by a Mr. S. Morris, and supplementary thereto be it said that complaints continued to reach this Bureau from time to time relative to the illegal collection of fees by said Mr. Morris, with result that about February, 1901, complaint was made to the Police Commission of the City and County of San Francisco, regarding the said "Commercial Clerks' Bureau" and its proprietor, accompanied by request that the license of the said Morris as an employment agent be revoked by the Commission. The Commission thereupon summoned Mr. Morris to appear before it and show cause why his said license should not be revoked. Mr. Morris duly appeared and, upon examination, admitted making the illegal collections referred to, but promised the Commission that he would thereafter cease making such collections,

and would, in all ways, conform to the law. Upon this promise the Commission allowed the matter to rest for a probationary period of two weeks. Within that interim this Bureau, through the medium of secret agents, kept track of the actions of Mr. Morris, and secured plain evidence that he was continuing, during said probationary time, the practice of illegally collecting fees from applicants for employment. At the end of the said probationary period Mr. Morris again appeared before the Police Commission, and was confronted with the evidence of his conduct during the said period as herein before named. Upon this showing the Police Commission summarily revoked his license as an employment agent, with result that he was driven from the business,

MONTHLY PAY-DAY LAW.

Complaints continue to be numerous in regard to the unfair advantage attempted to be taken, by some employers, of the provisions of the monthly pay-day law of this State. That law, in its inception, was designed to protect the wage-earner from the practice, indulged in by some employers, of not paying their employés for months at a time. Since the enactment of the law, many employers, generally contractors, who employ large numbers of men as common laborers, have established what they term a monthly pay-day. This pay-day is found usually to be about the 20th of any given month, and on that day the employer purports to pay only the wages earned by the employé during the calendar month prior. It is a well-known rule, in the construction of a contract, that no express provision is inserted in the contract of hiring as to the time during which the contract to labor shall continue. The law presumes that the parties have adopted, as to the indicia of such length of time, the time by which the rate of compensation is measured; thus, in the absence of express provision, a party agreeing to work for $2 per day is presumed to have agreed to work for one full day, and at the end of that time his contract is completed, and he is at liberty to refuse, without notice, to work longer, if he so chooses; or if the agreement is to work for a monthly rate of wages, the legal presumption is, in the absence of express provision, that the party has agreed to work for one full month, etc. In almost every case, common labor is employed by the day, and under this monthly pay-day rule spoken of it very often happens, as was said in the Ninth Report of this Bureau, that a man may go to work on the first day of a given month and work a few days and quit, as he may rightfully do, or he is discharged. Seeking payment of the money he has earned, he is told that he must either wait a matter perhaps of four to six weeks until the regular pay-day (on the 20th of the next month) arrives, or he must agree to a discount, in favor of the employer, of ten per cent of

the money which he has earned. It would seem that this condition should have the attention of our Legislature, with view to enacting a law, if possible, that would provide a remedy.

NON-PAYMENT OF WAGES.

Noting what is said on pages 71 and 72 of the Ninth Biennial Report of this Bureau in relation to complaints made by wage-workers against employers, in regard to refusal to pay wages claimed to have been earned and to be justly due, and to the practice of this Bureau in seeking to effect just settlements in such cases, it is to be said that since the date of the publication of the said Ninth Report some hundreds of such complaints have been filed with the Bureau, involving amounts ranging from a dollar or two to one hundred, and aggregating some thousands. The Bureau has continued its abovesaid practice in connection with such complaints, and with a fair degree of success, and through such medium many hundreds of dollars in the aggregate, justly earned, have been secured and paid to claimants who would otherwise, in all probability, have wholly lost the same.

LAW RELATIVE TO EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS.

Statutes of California, 1889, page 4 (An Act to regulate the hours of labor and employment of minors), reads as follows:

SECTION 1. No minor under the age of eighteen shall be employed in laboring in any manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile establishment, or other place of labor, more than ten hours in one day, except when it is necessary to make repairs to prevent the interruption of the ordinary running of machinery, or when a different apportionment of the hours of labor is made for the sole purpose of making a shorter day's work for one day of the week; and in no case shall the hours of labor exceed sixty in a week. SEC. 2. No child under ten years of age shall be employed in any factory, workshop, or mercantile establishment; and every minor under sixteen years of age when so employed shall be recorded by name in a book kept for the purpose, and a certificate (duly verified by his or her parent or guardian, or if the child shall have no parent or guardian, then by such minor) shall be kept on file by the employer, which book and which certificate shall be produced by him or his agent at the requirement of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

SEC. 3. Every person or corporation employing minors under sixteen years of age, in any manufacturing establishment, shall post and keep posted, in a conspicuous place in every room where such help is employed, a printed notice stating the number of hours per day for each day of the week required of such persons, and in every room where minors under sixteen years of age are employed, a list of their names with their ages. SEC. 4. Any person or corporation that knowingly violates or omits to comply with any of the foregoing provisions of this Act, or who knowingly employs, or suffers or permits any minor to be employed, in violation thereof, shall, on conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars for each and every offense.

SEC. 5. It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to enforce the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

This law was in existence in this State for something like ten years, during which it is not of record that it received any particular attention from any source; in fact, when recently, in the City and County of San Francisco, the law in its amended form was brought to the attention of employers, fully ninety per cent of them declared that they had never before heard of it and were not aware that such a law was in existence.

Our Legislature, at its last session (1901) passed an Act (Statutes of California, 1901, page 631) intended to be a substitute for the Act here next before referred to, which substitute reads as follows:

SECTION 1. No minor under the age of eighteen shall be employed in laboring in any manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile establishment, or other place of labor, more than nine hours in one day, except when it is necessary to make repairs to prevent the interruption of the ordinary running of machinery, or when a different apportionment of the hours of labor is made for the sole purpose of making a shorter day's work for one day of the week; and in no case shall the hours of labor exceed fifty-four in a week.

SEC. 2. No child under twelve years of age shall be employed in any factory, workshop, or mercantile establishment, and every minor under sixteen years of age when so employed shall be recorded by name in a book kept for that purpose, and a certificate (duly verified by his or her parent or guardian, or if the minor shall have no parent or guardian, then by such minor, stating age and place of birth of such minor) shall be kept on file by the employer, which book and which certificate shall be produced by him or his agent at the requirement of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

SEC. 3. Every person or corporation employing minors under sixteen years of age in any manufacturing establishment, shall post and keep posted, in a conspicuous place in every room where such help is employed, a printed notice stating the number of hours per day for each day of the week required of such persons, and in every room where minors under sixteen years of age are employed, a list of their names with their ages.

SEC. 4. Any person or corporation that knowingly violates or omits to comply with any of the foregoing provisions of this Act, or who knowingly employs, or suffers or permits any minor to be employed, in violation thereof, shall, on conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than sixty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment, for each and every offense.

SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect sixty days after its passage.

The enforcement of a law of this kind over the length and breadth of the State is an undertaking of great magnitude, and one which can never be well prosecuted on such broad lines by this Bureau, with its present limited force and appropriation.

It is to be remembered that, in most cases, the work of the Bureau will be obstructed, not assisted, in such regard, and not by employers alone, but by employés as well; for example, when it comes to inquiry of minors as to their ages, there seems often great inclination to conceal, if possible, the true age, and where the child is young, to make itself appear old. While recognizing all this, this Bureau has recognized, as well, that the enforcement of this law was something greatly to be desired in the interests of the children and the youth of the State, and