Government residences standardize the scale of living. Mr. Choate's story. ment of the United States as it ought to be transacted. The demands do not come simply from the court or the society in which he finds himself, but the demands made by his own people are very great indeed. They expect certain public receptions to be held on Washington's birthday and on the Fourth of July; they expect hospitality from the ambassador. The number of Americans who go to these great capitals in Europe is very large; it is said that there are sixty thousand Americans normally in London alone; and an ambassador cannot escape the expenditure of a large amount of money. Now, Mr. President, if we give to our ambassadors their rent in addition to the salary they already have, it would certainly make living much easier for them; also it would give to the United States a definite place in the city; it would give the embassy a definite home; and it would establish what I consider a proper scale because it is not merely that an ambassador is forced, if he is a poor man, to live below the scale that he would like to adopt, but there are cases I have in mind where men of great wealth have taken houses and established a scale of living which puts the successor in a position of great embarrassment. At least we should secure that the successive American ambassadors to any one country should live in the same house and should maintain substantially the same scale. I do not think it is decent for a country as rich as the United States to send its ambassadors abroad as they are sent now, even if they have abundant money, to pass six months, a year or eighteen months in looking for a suitable place to house themselves. You have all heard the story of Mr. Choate and what he is reported to have said in a speech at a dinner. He said he wished to compliment the police of London; that on the night of his arrival in London it was very rainy. He was wandering about the streets and a policeman stopped him and said, "What are you doing here?" He said, "I am just wandering about the streets." The policeman said, "You must not do that; you must go home." "Why," said Mr. Choate, "I have no home; I am the American ambassador." [Laughter.] That is an exaggerated way of stating what is an actual fact. excluded The really serious thing to my mind is that the inevitable Poor men tendency of this perfectly inadequate salary is to compel the giving from the of these offices exclusively to men of great wealth. The average service. man, even a man who has got a fair income of his own, knowing what expenditure these places require, does not want to go there, and live in a "two pair back." If he is going to represent his country at all, he wants to do it properly and generously and as it should be represented, and men decline those places because they cannot face the great expense. 122. The Negotiation of Treaties The power of making treaties "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate" is conferred on the President by the Constitution, but it is nowhere definitely stated that the necessity of having the advice and consent of the Senate requires the President to consult that body during the negotiation of any particular treaty. In the following paper, Mr. Lodge shows how the Senate has shared in the making of treaties from the beginning of our government: of the Senate to advise and negotiations. The Senate, being primarily a legislative body, cannot in the The right nature of things initiate a negotiation with another nation, for they have no authority to appoint or receive ambassadors or ministers. But in every other respect, under the language of the Con- disapprove stitution and in the intent of the framers, they stand on a perfect equality with the President in the making of treaties. They have an undoubted right to recommend either that a negotiation be entered upon or that it be not undertaken, and I shall show presently that this right has been exercised and recognized in both directions. As a matter of course, the President would not be bound by a resolution declaring against opening a negotiation, but such a resolution passed by a two-thirds vote would probably be effective and would serve to stop any proposed negotiation, as we shall see was the case under President Lincoln. In the same way the Senate has the right to advise the President to enter upon The right of the Senate to share in treaty making at any stage. Washington's practice. a negotiation, and has exercised this right more than once. Here, again, the President is not bound to comply with the resolution, for his power is equal and coördinate with that of the Senate, but such an action on the part of the Senate, no doubt, would always have due weight. That this right to advise or disapprove the opening of negotiations has been very rarely exercised is unquestionably true in practice, and the practice is both sound and wise; but the right remains none the less, just as the Constitution gave it, not impaired in any way by the fact that it has been but little used. The right of the Senate to share in treaty making at any stage has always been fully recognized, both by the Senate and the Executive, not only at the beginning of the government, when the President and many Senators were drawn from among the framers of the Constitution and were, therefore, familiar with their intentions, but at all periods since. A brief review of some of the messages of the Presidents and of certain resolutions of the Senate will show better than any description the relations between the two branches of the treaty-making power in the United States, the uniform interpretation of the Constitution in this respect, and the precedents which have been established. On August 21, 1789, President Washington notified the Senate that he would meet with them on the following day to advise with them as to the terms of a treaty to be negotiated with the Southern Indians. On August 22, in accordance with this notice, the President came into the Senate Chamber, attended by General Knox, and laid before the Senate a statement of the facts, together with certain questions, in regard to our relations to the Indians of the Southern district, upon which he asked the advice of the Senate. On August 24, 1789, he appeared again in the Senate Chamber with General Knox, and the discussion of our relations with the Southern Indians was resumed. The Senate finally voted on the questions put to it by the President, and in that way gave him their advice. . . . President Arthur, on June 9, 1884, asked the advice of the Senate as to directing negotiations in process with the King of Hawaii Later for the extension of the existing reciprocity treaty with the Hawaiian precedents. Islands. On March 3, 1888, the Senate passed a resolution asking President Cleveland to open negotiations with China for the regulation of immigration with that country. President Cleveland replied that such negotiations had been undertaken. From these various examples it will be seen that the Senate has been consulted at all stages of negotiations by Presidents of all parties, from Washington to Arthur. . . The power of the Senate to amend or to ratify conditionally The right is of course included in the larger powers expressly granted by the Constitution to reject or to confirm. It would have never occurred to me that anyone who had read the Constitution and who possessed even the most superficial acquaintance with the history of the United States could doubt the right of the Senate to amend. . . . ... Notwithstanding the general practice of coöperation between the President and Senate in the negotiation of treaties, Mr. Spooner ably contends that, as a matter of constitutional right, the Senate has no claim to interference in treaty negotiations: to amend. in the The words "advice and consent of the Senate" are used in the The absolute of power Constitution with reference to the Senate's participation in the negotiation making of a treaty and are well translated by the word "ratifica- vested tion" popularly used in this connection. The President nego- President. tiates the treaty, to begin with. He may employ such agencies as he chooses to negotiate the proposed treaty. He may employ the ambassador, if there be one, or a minister or a chargé d'affaires, or he may use a person in private life whom he thinks by his skill or knowledge of the language or people of the country with which he is about to deal is best fitted to negotiate the treaty. He may issue to the agent chosen by him - and neither Congress nor the Senate has any concern as to whom he chooses such instructions as seem to him wise. He may vary them from day to day. That is his concern. The Senate has no right to demand that he shall unfold to the world or to it, even in executive session, his instructions - When the Senate's power begins. The Senate may express an opinion. The position Foreign or the prospect or progress of the negotiation. I said "right." I use that word advisedly in order to illustrate what all men who have studied the subject are willing to concede — that under the Constitution the absolute power of negotiation is in the President and the means of negotiation subject wholly to his will and his judgment. When he shall have negotiated and sent his proposed treaty to the Senate the jurisdiction of this body attaches and its power begins. It may advise and consent, or it may refuse. And in the exercise of this function it is as independent of the Executive as he is independent of it in the matter of negotiation. I do not deny the power of the Senate either in legislative or in executive session that is a question of propriety to pass a resolution expressive of its opinion as to matters of foreign policy. But if it is passed by the Senate or by the House or by both Houses it is beyond any possible question purely advisory, and not in the slightest degree binding in law or conscience upon the President. It is easy to conceive of circumstances in which to pass in legislative session a resolution like that first introduced by my distinguished and learned friend, the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Bacon), asking the President, if in his opinion not incompatible with the public good, to transmit the correspondence in a pending negotiation to the Senate, might be productive of mischief. I think the Morocco case is perhaps one which could be productive of mischief in this, that the President's declination, which would be within his power, upon the ground that the public good required that the correspondence should not be sent to the Senate, might give rise to an inference in other countries that something with reference to one or more of the parties was being concealed from them. . . . The relation of members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the executive department of the Government in its relation to foreign relations is precisely the relation which the Senator from South Carolina and his colleagues sustain to the executive department in its relation to foreign relations. The Committee on Foreign Relations, like the other committees of this body, is not an inde |